


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


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
**CURRENT  
INTELLIGENCE  
BULLETIN**

DOCUMENT NO. 28  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X  
IF DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE 1-4-80 REVIEWER:

**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**



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## 1. LATEST SOVIET ARMS DELIVERY TO SYRIA

Comment on:

On 27 September the Soviet vessel Ivan Sechenov arrived in Latakia carrying substantial quantities of military equipment.

The vessel's cargo included "armaments"--apparently the 52,000 light arms Syria had requested the USSR to supply quickly; four of the six motor torpedo boats which Syria had urgently requested earlier in September; 37 armored vehicles; four 85-mm. anti-aircraft guns; 400 heavy machine guns; over 400 radio sets; 16 "repair" vehicles; and ammunition.

Shipments under the last Soviet-Syrian arms agreement, concluded in November 1956, have been virtually completed. Deliveries of some types of arms, particularly aircraft and naval equipment, now exceed quantities contracted for at that time. It is probable, therefore, that this cargo is an advance delivery under a new agreement, the draft of which the Syrian arms purchasing mission in Moscow plans to present on 5 October.

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## 2. IRAQI PALACE REPORTED IN DISAGREEMENT WITH PRIME MINISTER OVER SYRIA

Comment on: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] King Faysal of Iraq told King Hussayn of Jordan [REDACTED] that he was in "complete disagreement" with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Jawdat's pro-Syrian

statement in Damascus, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Previous reports have indicated that the prime minister's trip to Damascus was not discussed in advance with palace circles, which advocate a stiff attitude toward Syria.

The apparent serious policy differences between the Iraqi prime minister and the palace would seem to indicate the necessity for some early change in the Iraqi cabinet. Any move by the palace to replace Ali Jawdat would risk violent popular reaction if it were related to his policy on Syria. [REDACTED]

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### 3. FRENCH CRISIS


#### Comment on:



The current French political crisis is provoking an unusual feeling of "solemnity and even responsibility" among politicians and the press, according to the American embassy in Paris. The realization is spreading that France may lose Algeria and even Black Africa, and that the economic situation at home may deteriorate rapidly unless a strong government and positive programs are found soon. Two million industrial workers are already on strike, adding their protests to those of farmers, bakers, and produce retailers.

Foreign Minister Pineau expects the crisis to last three weeks. President Coty is expected to call on a center party candidate in an urgent effort to bridge the widened gap between the non-Communist left and right.

Many newspapers and center elements in the assembly are intensifying their appeal for constitutional reform as the only solution to France's problems. General De Gaulle is reported to have arrived in Paris from his country retreat to "keep in touch with the situation." The embassy does not think the situation is yet ripe for his return to power, but it reports that the deputies are keenly aware that his chances will increase if the crisis lasts many weeks or another feeble government is set up. 

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#### 4. POLISH STUDENTS RIOT OVER CLOSING OF LIBERAL JOURNAL

Comment on:

Some 2, 000 Polish students demonstrated in Warsaw on 3 October over the closing of the popular liberal journal, Po Prostu. The students had gathered for a protest meeting, reportedly at the behest of a unit of the official youth organization. Several truckloads of police aided by workers militia from the Zeran auto works, using rubber truncheons and tear gas, finally succeeded in dispersing the demonstrators by midnight. More violence may be ahead since students say they are planning another protest demonstration for Friday evening.

According to press reports, over 30 students were arrested, and some Polish journalists were among those beaten up by the militia. Authorities have announced "severe proceedings" will be instituted against the participants.

Po Prostu was closed on orders of the party, reportedly issued by Gomulka himself, after several weeks of negotiation in which the good offices of the Polish journalists' association had failed to mediate the differences between the party and the editorial board of Po Prostu.

The event reflects the regime's difficulty in restraining advocates of additional liberalization. The closing of Po Prostu presumably will not silence the liberals in Poland since there are other periodicals in which their writings can be published.

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## 5. INDONESIA ARMY CONSIDERED QUESTIONABLE AS ANTI-COMMUNIST FORCE

Reference: [redacted]

[redacted] The Indonesian army may not be as effective a deterrent to the growth of Communist influence as had been generally believed, [redacted]

[redacted] The army's effectiveness as an anti-Communist force has been reduced because its loyalties are divided between Djakarta and the dissident provincial regimes. This division will undoubtedly continue as long as Djakarta refuses to make significant concessions to provincial demands.

In addition, [redacted] the army to be apathetic to the Communist threat and unable to understand it. While the army would probably resist a forceful Communist effort to seize power, there are indications that it will not oppose peaceful and legal efforts of the Communists to expand their influence. Communist infiltration may be a factor and is believed to be most serious among the enlisted ranks of units stationed in East and Central Java, where the Communist party has made heavy inroads among the local populations.

In West Java, the army is badly factionalized, with one important grouping being strongly leftist. The territorial commander, Lt. Col. Kosasih, is a supporter of Nasution, whose attitude is said to be anti-Communist but conditioned by loyalty to President Sukarno. Although most higher officers in Java are believed to be non-Communist, Kosasih's chief of staff as well as the town commanders of Djakarta and Bandung are reported to be pro-Communist.

Army units in the outer islands, with the exception of the Second Regiment in North Sumatra, whose pro-Communist commander was recently arrested, are believed to be generally anti-Communist. Javanese troops in these areas, however, are primarily loyal to the central government, and probably will be inclined to remain so regardless of its political complexion. [redacted]

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ANNEX



Watch Report 374, 3 October 1957  
of the  
Intelligence Advisory Committee



Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.
- C. Unstable conditions and tensions stemming from developments concerning Syria continue to create possibilities for conflict in the Middle East. Although Turkey continues to be in position to launch an attack against Syria with little or no warning, an evaluation of available evidence does not indicate that Turkey intends to do so in the immediate future.



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