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
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## CONTENTS

- no* 1. GROMYKO TELLS ASIAN UN DELEGATIONS USSR PREPARED TO USE FORCE IN SYRIA [ ] (page 3).
- no* 2. KING SAUD REPORTED SERIOUSLY EMBARRASSED BY SYRIAN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT SAUDI MEDIATION [ ] (page 4).
- OK* 3. ADDITIONAL EGYPTIAN TROOPS REPORTEDLY ALERTED FOR SHIPMENT TO SYRIA [ ] (page 5).
- no* 4. VIET MINH PROBABLY BEHIND SAIGON EXPLOSIONS [ ] (page 6).
- OK* 5. MOLLET TO TRY TO FORM FRENCH GOVERNMENT [ ] (page 7).
- OK* 6. BRITISH AMBASSADOR SEES STRONG SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENT IN LAOS [ ] (page 8).
- no* 7. TUNISIAN ARMS SITUATION [ ] (page 9).
- OK* 8. YUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN QUARREL THREATENS BELGRADE'S NEW ACCORD WITH SOVIET BLOC [ ] (page 10).

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# 1. GROMYKO TELLS ASIAN UN DELEGATIONS USSR PREPARED TO USE FORCE IN SYRIA




Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 20 October concluded a meeting with selected UN delegations on the Syrian situation by pounding the table and saying, "The Soviet Union is ready to use force," according to an Indonesian delegate who was present. At the meeting, to which the USSR had invited Soviet bloc, Indonesian, Indian, Egyptian, and Syrian UN delegations, Gromyko took an extremely stiff line. He ignored virtually every question concerning Soviet motives and objectives in the UN discussion and repeated charges against the United States and Turkey.

Gromyko's remarks, as reported, cannot be taken as a specific indication of Soviet intention to intervene unilaterally. In his 16 October public statement, Gromyko limited himself to an offer to contribute Soviet forces for a joint UN action, and Soviet spokesmen in private conversations with Western leaders have thus far avoided statements as threatening as those quoted by the Indonesian delegate. Gromyko may have felt, however, that a private reiteration of Soviet allegations against the United States and Turkey would increase the prospects of strong Asian-African support for Syria's complaint in the General Assembly debate. The meeting may have been staged to consolidate Asian neutralist support for the Syrian complaint, as well as to demonstrate to Egypt and Syria the "reality" of Soviet support.



**2. KING SAUD REPORTED SERIOUSLY EMBARRASSED  
BY SYRIAN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT SAUDI MEDIATION**

Comment on:



King Saud feels he has been seriously embarrassed by the sudden Syrian disavowal of Saudi mediation in the dispute with Turkey, [redacted]

Saud is reported to have returned home from Beirut with what he considered the written assurance from Syrian President Quwatli that Syria would accept Saudi mediation efforts. On this assurance, it was announced over the Saudi radio on 20 October that Syria and Turkey were about to send delegations to Dammam. Syria's denial on 22 October that it had agreed to mediation, and Syrian Chief of Staff Bizri's earlier denial on 20 October that he had been invited to visit King Saud, have therefore publicly humiliated the King.

Saud's first reaction is apparently to continue the public dispute with Syria. According to the King's emissary, Mecca radio on 23 October will broadcast a communiqué reflecting the King's astonishment at the Syrian denial, and citing a letter from Quwatli to Saud saying that Syria "accepts willingly mediation of the King between the Turks and the Syrians." Saud desires the Turks to proceed to Saudi Arabia in any event, apparently to save face and show up Syrian bad faith. Saud also said that there were "many things" about which the Saudis and Turks could talk.

Should Saud remain offended and initiate counter-propaganda against Syria, he is likely to be the target for renewed subversive activity by Egypt and Syria, possibly including attempts to sabotage the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, which carries Saudi oil to the Mediterranean via Syria. [redacted]

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### 3. ADDITIONAL EGYPTIAN TROOPS REPORTEDLY ALERTED FOR SHIPMENT TO SYRIA

Comment on:

[Redacted]

Additional Egyptian military units, including an antitank formation, have been alerted for shipment to Syria to reinforce the approximately 1,000-1,500 troops now stationed

there [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The previous shipment on 13 October gave forceful expression to Egyptian-Syrian solidarity, which was probably its objective. The assignment of additional forces would indicate Egyptian concern over the stability of the Syrian regime, in terms of its possible overthrow by pro-Western elements or a take-over by an extreme pro-Soviet group. [Redacted]

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## 4. VIET MINH PROBABLY BEHIND SAIGON EXPLOSIONS

Comment on:

[redacted] investigation by American officials has established that the three explosions which injured several American military personnel in Saigon on 22 October were caused by devices of recent design, prepared by experts. [redacted]

[redacted] Viet Minh agents were probably responsible.

President Diem informed the American ambassador last month [redacted]


[redacted] that Hanoi had ordered Communist cadres in the South to step up terrorist activities. According to Diem, these instructions assigned priority to the assassination of American officials, especially MAAG personnel. Another report stated that such assassinations were to be timed to coincide with the Colombo Plan conference which is now in session in Saigon. Upon receipt and dissemination of these reports, a warning was issued to American personnel.

[redacted] additional attacks against American installations are probable. One objective of a terrorist campaign against Americans could be to give the impression that anti-American sentiment is rampant in South Vietnam. Another could be to cast doubt on the government's ability to maintain law and order, and to undermine Diem's international prestige. [redacted]

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## 5. MOLLET TO TRY TO FORM FRENCH GOVERNMENT

### Comment on:



Socialist leader Guy Mollet's chances of success in his second try to end France's 22-day-old crisis have been markedly enhanced by reported assurances from Independent leader Pinay that the Independent and Peasant party would not vote against him. Mollet's candidacy, which was announced as a

new wave of nationwide strikes were scheduled by both Communist and non-Communist unions for 25 October, may also be favored by the deepening socio-economic crisis.

The cost of living has been climbing at the rate of 1 percent a month and union leaders have been pressed by the rank and file to demand wage increases even though the government is not empowered to act on such demands. The effectiveness of the one-day stoppage on 16 October and the new willingness of foremen and technicians to participate in strikes have probably encouraged labor agitation.

France's financial situation is also worsening. The black-market franc has dropped to 456 to the dollar as compared with the official rate of 420, and there are rumors of further devaluation.

6. BRITISH AMBASSADOR SEES STRONG SUPPORT  
FOR SETTLEMENT IN LAOS

Reference:

[REDACTED] The British ambassador in Laos has the impression that support for a settlement of the unification issue along the lines of the communiqué drafted by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and Pathet chief Souphanouvong is so widespread that attempts to block its issuance would produce an unfavorable reaction against US-UK policy. He is, therefore, advising his government to confine its efforts to stiffening the Laotian government's position on the details of implementation.

Supporting the ambassador's view is the statement of Ngon Sananikone, formerly chief government negotiator with the Pathets and a leader of the conservative Independent party, that assembly deputies now favor an early settlement because they believe the government is in the "driver's seat." Ngon believes that negotiation of the details will not be completed until the end of the year. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



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## 7. TUNISIAN ARMS SITUATION

### Comment on:



Tunisian President Bourguiba informed Ambassador Jones on 21 October that he is willing to wait for arms from Western sources until a new French government is formed, providing this does not take "forever." If there are new border violations by the French army, however, he will count on the United States for "quick help."

Bourguiba added that his main problem is to resolve difficulties with Paris and that he does not wish to embarrass France.


French-Tunisian relations have eased somewhat in the past two weeks because of Bourguiba's willingness to negotiate outstanding problems, some minor concessions made by Paris at the insistence of the French ambassador, and the absence of border incidents during this period.

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## 8. YUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN QUARREL THREATENS BELGRADE'S NEW ACCORD WITH SOVIET BLOC

### Comment on:



The sharp Yugoslav reaction to a pamphlet by Albanian Communist boss Hoxha which is critical of the Yugoslav role in Albania's history demonstrates that differences between Belgrade and other Communist capitals continue to threaten the new accord between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc. The pamphlet was recently published in the USSR and widely circulated in conjunction with the forthcoming celebration of the 40th anniversary of the October revolution.

Although Belgrade may not relish the resumption of a dispute with Tirana, it has made it clear that despite the new accord with the Soviet bloc, it will not tolerate any direct public criticism of its policies. Yugoslavia's leading paper, Borba, on 20 October accused Hoxha of treating the development of Albanian-Yugoslav relations in his brochure in an "untruthful and biased way." Borba interprets the pamphlet as anti-Yugoslav and concludes that Hoxha is continuing a course which "is opposed to the new spirit in the international workers' movement."

Fundamental suspicions have prevented Albanian-Yugoslav relations from developing any real accord, but Belgrade and Tirana have refrained from exchanging polemics in recent months. A Tirana-Belgrade exchange at this time would detract from any declaration of Yugoslav - Soviet bloc solidarity that Khrushchev may be anticipating in conjunction with the 40th anniversary festivities. A violent editorial by Hoxha which appeared in Moscow's Pravda a year ago ignited the Soviet-Yugoslav controversy which followed the Hungarian revolt.

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