


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
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**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**



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
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1. USSR TO TRANSFER VISA AUTHORITY  
TO EAST GERMANY

Comment on:



The German Democratic Republic is to have complete visa authority by 1 January 1958 over American, British, and French nationals--official as well as nonofficial--entering or crossing East Germany except "troop personnel and materials" of the Allied Berlin garrisons. This decision was reached during talks between East German officials in Berlin and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin from 25 to 28 November, according to a report believed credible by the American mission in Berlin.

Personnel of the Western embassies in Warsaw and Moscow who normally cross East Germany traveling to and from their posts would be directly affected by this procedure, as would the personnel attached to Allied military missions in Potsdam. Additionally, a narrow definition of "troop personnel" could be used to compel Allied civilian officials traveling between the Federal Republic and West Berlin to accept documentation and processing by East German rather than Russian officials.

Enforcement of such visa requirements would not only establish a precedent for further restrictions on Allied travel in East Germany but would also strengthen the Communist claim of East German sovereignty. In the event that the Allies retaliate by banning Soviet military and all East German travel in West Germany, Soviet Zone authorities are said to be prepared to stop all Allied travel through East Germany except for personnel of the Berlin garrisons.

## 2. ROLE OF SOVIET PARTY SECRETARIAT ENHANCED

[REDACTED]

Comment on: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The secretariat, executive organ of the Soviet Communist party under Khrushchev as first secretary, may now replace the presidium as the executive seat of power in the USSR.

The plenum of the Soviet party central committee which took place on 16 and 17 December added three party presidium members to the party secretariat, raising the membership of that body to eleven.

The three new secretaries, Nuritdin Mikhitdinov, Aleksey Kirichenko, and Nikolay Ignatov, who are considered Khrushchev partisans, will presumably relinquish their provincial party posts for full-time work in Moscow.

Khrushchev may have maneuvered three additional men into the secretariat in order to increase the power of that group. Since 10 of the 15 full members of the party presidium, the top-level policy-making body, are now members of the secretariat, the move may have the effect of bypassing nonmembers of the secretariat--among others, Bulganin, Voroshilov, and Mikoyan. At the same time, the diffusion of responsibility among a greater number of secretaries will limit the opportunity of any one secretary, such as Suslov, to rival First Secretary Khrushchev effectively. According to recent reports, Suslov is widely considered in East European Communist circles to be a "Stalinist" rival to Khrushchev. [REDACTED]

### 3. USSR EXPANDING USE OF SEMIAUTOMATIC AIR DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS

Comment on:

Semiautomatic air defense communications facilities, first noted in European Russia, have now appeared in several additional areas there and in the Soviet Far East. This semiautomatic system is presently in limited use, but when fully operational, will correct a major deficiency in the Soviet air defense capability and may be the most important single improvement since the introduction of improved radars in 1951.

The new system, first noted in September 1956, is essentially an electronic means for rapid transmission of air defense data. It will afford greatly improved fighter direction through faster relay of ground-controlled-interception data to pilots, probably in visual form on the cockpit panel. Further, it will permit more effective employment of larger numbers of aircraft in intercept missions.

## 4. SITUATION IN INDONESIA

Comment on:

President Sukarno's departure early in January for a six-week rest in India now is firmly established, and final arrangements are being quietly discussed with the Indian government,

[redacted] In-  
dia's Premier Nehru is [redacted]  
[redacted] stating that Sukarno would be welcome at any time and that he could stay as long as he liked. Nehru refused, however, to issue a formal invitation because he feared it would

"embarrass" his government in its relations with Western countries.

[redacted] despite military efforts to bring order from the dislocations created by the anti-Dutch campaign, the economic picture is one of "complete disruption." [redacted] the food situation is particularly bad and that a prolonged food crisis is unavoidable, since it will take time to reorganize the distribution system and get the transport system working again. [redacted] the Communists are trying to secure control of rice stores in the Javanese villages and use them to aggravate the situation.

On the island of Ambon, anti-Djakarta sentiment among army troops apparently has been further intensified by the arrest of several officers by the local army commander, and the local navy commander fears the outbreak of violence. He has requested increased navy support in the area in the event dissident leaders in East Indonesia try to send aid to the anti-Djakarta faction. [redacted]

## 5. FRANCE MAY PRESS FOR H-BOMBS

### Comment on:

[REDACTED] A suggestion that France should have H-bombs, advanced during a November conference on A-bombs attended by top-level French army officers, may presage a diplomatic approach on this subject to the United States, probably after the present NATO conference. One speaker drew applause from the meeting with the statement that the army wanted "a few" H-bombs "to carry out reprisals!"

There have been previous hints of French military interest in H-bombs. However, recent military and diplomatic efforts have been directed at acquiring possession of atomic weapons either through NATO, directly from the United States, or through a national production program.

Nevertheless, intensely nationalist-minded members of the government such as Defense Minister Chaban-Delmas and Interior Minister Bourges-Maunoury can be expected to try to edge France into the category of an H-bomb power once it has established an A-weapon capability.

[REDACTED]



## 6. INDICATIONS OF BRITISH SHIFT TOWARD US POSITION ON COMMUNIST CHINA

Comment on:

British Foreign Secretary Lloyd and numerous Conservative members of Parliament appear to have changed their opinions and now privately oppose wider

recognition of Communist China.

In discussions this week with Ambassador Whitney, some 40 Conservative Members of Parliament expressed satisfaction that the United States has not yielded to earlier British persuasions but has continued to recognize and support Taipei. As reasons for the shift, Whitney suggests--among other things--concern over the growing influence of the Asian-African bloc in the UN which might be reinforced if Communist China became a member, appreciation of the need for Overseas Chinese--particularly those in Malaya--to have a counterattraction to Peiping, and the growing disillusion over prospects for increased trade with China.

Whitney doubts, however, that there will be any public change in Britain's policy toward Peiping in the near future and believes the Conservative MP's will continue to maintain publicly that Britain was right in recognizing a de facto situation on the mainland. The Labor opposition's commitment to Chinese Communist representation in the UN--which is strongly endorsed by British public opinion--indicates the difficulty the Macmillan government would encounter in any attempt to change its long-standing China policy.

**7. JAPANESE FIRM OFFERS TO LEASE SHIPS  
FOR INDONESIA**

Comment on:

Japan appears to be moving cautiously to provide Indonesia with coastal shipping, although Foreign Minister Fujiyama, concerned over possible anti-Japanese repercussions in Europe, announced on 17 December that his government could not comply with an Indonesian request to charter Japanese ships.

On the same date, the Japanese Transportation Ministry announced that two Japanese shipping firms had offered to sell Indonesia up to six coastal ships of 2,000 tons, and an Indonesian spokesman said in Djakarta that Japanese ships would be arriving in two or three weeks to help restore the vital interisland shipping traffic.

Japan's ambassador at The Hague has warned Tokyo that popular sentiment in the Netherlands and throughout Western Europe is extremely unfavorable toward Indonesia. He added that providing ships would have an adverse effect on the implementation of future Japanese policies

toward Europe. A Japanese correspondent in Djakarta, however, has cabled Tokyo that no matter how the political situation in Indonesia turns out, the promotion of economic ties between Japan and Indonesia is inevitable.

The government reaction to these views has been to divorce itself publicly from official involvement in the issue in order to avoid adverse international repercussions. At the same time, it appears to be giving quiet support to the commercial lease of private shipping in order to develop long-sought economic ties with Indonesia.

8. KING SAUD INCREASES SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

Comment on:


King Saud has ordered tighter security measures in recent weeks, not only on a national basis but also to ensure his own personal safety.

**TOP SECRET EIDER**


[redacted] the King issued orders to the interior Ministry and other security agencies to intensify vigilance in view of "the many enemies of Saudi Arabia." As a result of these instructions, the director general of customs ordered tighter security measures at all "airports where aircraft arrive from abroad," and a search of all passenger luggage "without exception." On 15 December the King instituted new security precautions in the preparation and serving of his food, following a report that attempts were being made to poison him. [redacted]

**9. YEMEN SEEKING SAUDI FINANCIAL AID TO MEET  
COMMITMENTS TO SOVIET BLOC**



Comment on:





The Imam of Yemen is pressing King Saud for the balance of the \$10,000,000 loan granted Yemen early in 1956. The Saudis have thus far made available only \$3,000,000 which Yemen appar-

ently has committed largely for Soviet bloc arms. Yemen is now being pressed to begin payment for bloc economic aid, and is also about to assume further obligations to bloc countries for aid materials and military and civilian specialists, 



 King Saud, who is also experiencing a shortage of foreign exchange, against meeting the Imam's request at this stage. 

 the Imam had not fulfilled his agreement to provide information on how the funds had been used, and "all he has done as far as we know is to buy arms from Czechoslovakia." 

## 10. THE SITUATION IN CUBA

Comment on:

Cuban rebel leaders are believed to have completed plans to step up revolutionary activities against President Batista during the last days of December. Action, possibly planned for Christmas week, may include attempts to assassinate military leaders. Rebel leader Fidel Castro's limited success in his campaign to burn sugar fields and his apparent inability to instigate a "general revolutionary strike" are probably at least partly responsible for the decision to increase terrorism.

Castro's capability for antigovernment operations has grown since he opened his guerrilla campaign a year ago. He now has greater popular support, especially in Oriente Province, and his forces have increased and now are better organized and equipped. Without the active support of the armed forces, the labor movement, and other important elements, however, it is unlikely he can unseat the government.

President Batista continues to keep an iron grip on the political situation. He suspended constitutional guarantees on 15 December for another 45-day period--the seventh such suspension in a year.

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