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9 November 1957

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
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1. RENEWED MOB ACTION EXPECTED IN INDONESIA

Comment on:

The second phase of Indonesia's drive to "regain" Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian) is scheduled to start 10 November, a national holiday commemorating the beginning of Indonesia's military struggle for independence.

Inflammatory demonstrations and destructive mob action which may involve Westerners are likely. The minister of information announced some days ago that this phase will be "executed more fiercely." Although moderate forces in Indonesia have spoken against excesses and have warned that care should be taken to prevent mob action, the police and army are reported not to be taking any extraordinary precautions. The campaign is apparently building toward the General Assembly debate on the subject, which will take place sometime after 18 November when the third phase of the drive will be activated.


The Communist party is trying to capitalize on the West Irian drive and is being aided in its efforts by its influence in the government and by President Sukarno's own emotional preoccupation with the issue. The party's secretary general recently proposed either armed action against New Guinea or seizure of Dutch interests in Indonesia if Indonesia fails to get the area through UN action. He emphasized expropriation as allowing not only the army but all elements of Indonesian society to participate in the effort.

Sukarno has in general tried to link the West Irian issue with the need for nationwide economic development and national unity, apparently believing he can use the

emotionalism generated by the West Irian drive to develop loyalty to Djakarta. Although he has left the more inflammatory statements to his subordinates, he stated on 7 November that if UN results are unfavorable, Indonesia will take action "which will startle the world."

2. LARGE-SCALE GOVERNMENT PARTY COERCION SEEN POSSIBLE IN PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS

Comment on:



The final days of the Philippine election campaign have been marked by bitter countercharges and sporadic outbursts of terrorism. Although Nacionalista candidate President Garcia is still widely believed to have an edge over his opponents, an upset is possible if the elections on 12 November are free. Despite current indications that the Commission on Elections and the constabulary are making efforts to ensure clean elections, traditional patterns of political coercion and fraud are expected to develop.

A source close to President Garcia has told the American embassy in Manila that victory for Garcia, and possibly also for his running mate Laurel, Jr., will be virtually assured through last-minute bribery and intimidation. The US embassy fears that blatant illegal efforts could well provoke bloodshed of serious proportions.

3. MALAYAN COMMUNIST TERRORISTS OFFER TO SURRENDER

Comment on:



Malayan Prime Minister Abdul Rahman reported on 8 November that the Communist terrorists have agreed in principle to surrender and thus end the nearly ten years of "emergency" in Malaya. According to press reports, Rahman received a letter on 12 October from Communist Secretary General Chen Ping calling for a preliminary meeting aimed at obtaining a "just and fair agreement" and stating he expected that "agreement can be reached."

Although it has long been evident that the Communists wish to abandon guerrilla warfare and concentrate their resources on subversion, they have demanded recognition of their party and guarantees against detention or investigation of terrorists who lay down their arms. Now, however, since Malayan independence has further isolated the Communists from the masses by removing the party's main propaganda weapon, Chen Ping may feel that he must retreat from these demands.

Despite the government's apparent optimism that this will bring an end to the "emergency," there is still likely to be a wide initial divergence between the positions of the two sides. The Communists, however, probably believe that settlement at this time, even if it involved considerable sacrifice, might provide a considerable boost to their goals of promoting neutralism in Malaya, achieving recognition of Red China, and undermining the UK-Malaya Defense Treaty by appearing to remove any need for Commonwealth troops in the Federation.



4. YEMENI CROWN PRINCE BADR'S VISIT TO LONDON

Comment on:



Britain's plan to give Yemeni Crown Prince Badr the "red-carpet treatment" during his 10-day visit to London beginning on 9 November is presumably intended to facilitate future relations with him in the event he is chosen as the present Imam's successor. A Foreign Office official's statement on 7 November that Britain's underlying purpose in the talks is to detach Yemen from its pro-Soviet orientation suggests that London now feels the long-standing Anglo-Yemeni animosity may actually be reduced, with consequent advantages for British interests elsewhere in the Arabian peninsula. London is also developing contacts with Prince Hassan, the other principal contender to the throne.


The British appear somewhat more optimistic than formerly that the talks will have beneficial results. They are especially anxious to set up a procedure for investigating incidents along the Yemen - Aden Protectorate frontier. Hoping that implementation of the 1951 agreement providing for border demarcation can now be agreed upon, London is prepared to accept the present border despite recent Yemeni encroachments. London is also willing to carry out technical assistance provisions of the 1951 agreement by sending a few technicians to Yemen and training some Yemenis in Britain. Britain's capacity for maneuver is limited, however, by commitments to sheiks in the Aden Protectorate.

The Imam has actively promoted the visit for the purpose of enhancing the prestige of the crown prince. There is reason to believe, however, that the Imam might maneuver his way out of any commitments undertaken by Badr.



5. DIFFICULTIES IN IRANIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS

Comment on:



Britain has rebuffed the Shah in his efforts to discuss cooperation in the Persian Gulf, and will turn down Iran's long-standing request for destroyers. This will block the Shah's plan to expand Iran's influence in the Persian Gulf through cooperation with Britain and increased naval prestige.

Although an agreement was reached in principle with the British in late September to discuss Persian Gulf questions, the later British restrictions on the talks would make them meaningless from the Iranian point of view. The Shah reacted angrily to these limitations. Britain said the discussions could not include sovereignty over Bahrein, the establishment of an Iranian consulate in Kuwait, or the designations "Persian Gulf" versus "Arabian Gulf." Furthermore, Britain insists that Iran acknowledge Kuwait sovereignty over Farsi Island, occupied by Iran since 1956.

The London Foreign Office has instructed the British ambassador to Iran to explain to the Shah that the costs of an initial destroyer would have to be met from Iranian funds and that its crew would have to be trained by the British navy. The American ambassador in London has been informed that Britain hopes this will end its discussions with Iran concerning the supplying or selling of a destroyer.

6. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDAN

Comment on:

The stepped-up Egyptian and Syrian propaganda campaign against King Hussayn appears, in the judgment of the American embassy in Amman, to mark the beginning of an all-out effort to create chaos in Jordan. Cairo's thinly veiled exhortations to Jordanians to assassinate the King have already made a deep impression in Amman, where the Egyptian attacks are recognized as incitement to Jordan's half million Palestinian refugees to act against the monarchy and the government.

Among other charges, Cairo has accused Hussayn of negotiating secretly with Israel to solve the Palestine refugee problem in exchange for \$30,000,000 in American aid. The similarity of the current Egyptian campaign to that which preceded the assassination of Hussayn's father, King Abdullah, in 1951 is regarded as particularly ominous in Amman.

Despite the inability of King Hussayn and the Hashim-Rifai government to attract support from the majority of the population, Hussayn appears to be confident that he will be able to continue ruling as long as he has a loyal army. The basis of Hussayn's control in the army is the loyalty of the Bedouin elements, who occupy the most sensitive posts although they comprise only 35 to 40 percent of army strength. A revival of activity by antimonarchical "free officers" in the Jordanian forces, however, could eventually threaten Bedouin control.

7. SPAIN REINFORCES IFNI


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Comment on:

Spain is rushing reinforcements to its enclave of Ifni on the Moroccan coast, presumably in an attempt to resist a challenge to its position in West Africa by the irregular Moroccan Army of Liberation. On 5 and 6 November, 200 soldiers were flown to Ifni from Madrid, and five Spanish warships, one of which carried 800 men, left Ceuta for Ifni on the night of 5 November. The Spanish government is further reported to have requisitioned a private vessel, which will leave Spain about 10 November, to ferry troops and equipment from the Canary Islands to Ifni.


Although the situation in Ifni has been quiet since last July, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Spanish authorities were upset over the reappearance of the



Army of Liberation around Ifni and believed that Rabat's deployment of royal army troops there indicated connivance between the two.

Reinforcement of the Spanish forces may also be designed to strengthen Spain's position in nearby Spanish Sahara.



Spain has denied a Rabat announcement that it had agreed to cede the northern portion of Spanish Sahara to Morocco.

