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13 October 1957

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1. APPARENT DELAY IN ATTEMPT TO LAUNCH A
SOVIET EARTH SATELLITE OR ICBM TEST VEHICLE

Comment on:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] a
delay in the anticipated attempt
to launch a second earth satel-
lite or a third ICBM test ve-
hicle. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


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2. NEW EGYPTIAN MILITARY FORCES ARRIVE IN SYRIA

Comment on:



The arrival of a contingent of Egyptian military forces at the Syrian port of Latakia on 13 October has meaning only as a political gesture and probably does not materially

augment the capability of Syria's 50,000-man army.

Even with the new contingent, organized Egyptian military forces in Syria probably will not exceed a reinforced battalion in size, possibly 500-1,000 men.

Damascus radio stated on 13 October that Egypt had begun in mid-September to send "major elements" to strengthen Syria's defenses. The Egyptian troops, according to the announcement, were escorted by Egyptian naval units and aircraft of both countries.

Egyptian military cooperation with Syria has become closer since the establishment of the Arab Joint Command under Egyptian leadership in late 1955. Egypt has periodically furnished small numbers of military specialists to assist the Syrian forces. In early 1957,

Egypt even furnished six pilots to fly newly arrived MIG-17 jet fighters which the Syrians were then unable to operate.

the presence of an unspecified number of Egyptian military personnel in Syria.

Following the increase in tension between Syria and Turkey in early September, the Egyptians reportedly sent military specialists,

including air force officers, to Syria by air. These specialists, however, may have been destined for Syria in connection with previously planned September maneuvers there.

[redacted] a 500-man contingent of Egyptian "volunteers" had been preparing to depart for Syria in mid-September and another group of unspecified size left about that time.

The American acting army attaché in Damascus reported on 9 October, following a reconnaissance of northern Syria, that Syrian army maneuvers appeared to have ended and that most units had returned to their home stations. No Syrian build-up was noted in northern Syria, nor were there indications of a large-scale mobilization. Reports of recent call-ups were believed to apply only to specialists.

[redacted]

3. EGYPTIAN ARMS OFFER TO GHANA REPORTED

Comment on:


[REDACTED] Egypt is reported to have offered arms to Ghana in a further move to increase its influence in Africa below the Sahara.

[REDACTED] Egyptian military authorities made the offer to former Ghana Interior Minister Adjei during his visit to Cairo in August. The offer reportedly included light weapons and munitions produced in Egypt. Should such an offer become widely known, it would serve notice to the emerging African nations that Egypt stands ready and willing to furnish arms.

Ghana has not evinced any desire to secure additional material for or expand its largely British-officered and wholly British-equipped army of approximately 3,000 men. The country faces no external threat, and the supplies of light arms now at hand are believed adequate for the army's primary mission of supporting the 6,000-man police force.

Egypt's mounting interest in tropical Africa is further shown by the recent increase in the country's Swahili-language broadcasts to east Africa. These broadcasts, which are heard daily for 40 minutes, have been vitriolic in condemning colonialism and the white man's dominant role in the economic and social pattern of Africa.

4. MALIK SAYS LEBANON'S PRO-WESTERN POSITION CRUMBLING



Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik told Ambassador Lodge on 11 October that Lebanon's pro-Western policy is rapidly being undermined. Malik expects parliament may order the Foreign Ministry to declare that Syria constitutes no threat to Lebanon. He fears present attitudes could ultimately lead to the abrogation of agreements with the United States, including those negotiated by the Richards mission.

Comment

The weakening of the Lebanese pro-Western attitude is the prime objective of Lebanese opposition forces which favor the "neutralist" Arab policy of Egypt and Syria. This group plays on Lebanese fears that the Chamoun government is forsaking Lebanon's traditionally neutral position in the Arab world, and that its close association with American Middle Eastern policy will upset the delicate political balance among Lebanese, Moslem and Christian elements.

The Lebanese government has already felt it necessary to issue a statement declaring that "Lebanon will consider any aggression against Syria as aggression against herself." The Lebanese have thereby aligned themselves with the pro-Syrian professions of other Arab states.

5. TRIBAL REVOLT IN YEMEN

Comment on:

[redacted] Additional fragmentary information on the tribal revolt in eastern Yemen. [redacted]

[redacted] strengthens the impression that the rebellion has been undertaken by supporters of the ailing Imam's brother, Prince Hassan, in an effort to depose the Imam and block succession by the Imam's son, Crown Prince Badr.

The Saudi governor of Najran, key post on the Yemeni border, informed King Saud that large quantities of arms and money were being distributed to Prince Hassan's supporters via the Western Aden Protectorate. King Saud was told that informants in Yemen had reported that the conspiracy was supported by the British and the Americans.

Saud was also advised of the emergence of a new political group, the "Liberation party, which is calling for the creation of a people's government"--possible evidence that an Egyptian-supported antimonarchical group may enter the struggle which began between two royalist factions.

King Saud was advised that the Imam had sent one force from the capital to engage the rebellious tribes. [redacted] the Imam's attempts to raise armed forces from northern tribes may be encountering difficulties. One district decided to assemble only 1,000 armed men instead of the 4,000 initially ordered by the Imam. [redacted] many of the northern tribes as well as those in the south and east are partial to Prince Hassan. Troop movements throughout Yemen are continuing, but the development of the action and extent of the uprising are not yet clear.

[redacted] one tribal leader who received instructions from the Imam to raise an army for action against the rebellious tribes sent a message to King Saud denouncing the Imam and asking King Saud to extend his "protection" to Yemen. Saud responded in noncommittal terms. [redacted]

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6. FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS

[redacted] The invitation to former premier and Independent leader Antoine Pinay to form a new French government was probably intended primarily to kill

[redacted] time until Socialist ex-premier Guy Mollet feels the crisis has ripened sufficiently to make a second try. President Coty, concerned by the political implications of the continuing crisis and by the gravity of the financial situation, reportedly favors Mollet, who would probably muster a majority on most key issues but whose economic and welfare views remain anathema to the Independents.

[redacted] each day's delay in ending the crisis increases the prospect for a "De Gaulle solution." They consider that De Gaulle's return to power is a "serious possibility" if a new government is not invested during the next two or three weeks, and that he could be recalled sooner if the present situation suddenly deteriorates--for example, through incidents arising from Communist demonstrations set for 17 October to protest the Algerian war.

This Communist "day of action" is expected [redacted] to be a very extensive nationwide propaganda effort. [redacted] the demonstrations will not be violent. Nevertheless, widespread violence might easily result if Poujadist toughs also turn out and succeed in provoking incidents which crystallize the widespread non-Communist sentiment against giving up Algeria.

[redacted]

7. PRE-ELECTION TENSION INCREASING IN GUATEMALA

Comment on:

[redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] an antigovernment demonstration is planned for 14 October by the Communist-infiltrated Revolutionary party, which was recently barred from the 20 October presidential elections. [redacted] the demonstration is intended to help prepare sentiment for a revolution after the expected victory of the moderate administration party presidential candidate, Miguel Ortiz Passarelli.

The chief danger of leftist-inspired disorders is that they might provide a pretext for a rightist coup. Defense Minister Juan Francisco Oliva insists that constitutional procedures will be observed and that he is in full control of the army. [redacted]

[redacted]

8. PHIBUN APPRAISES THAI SITUATION

[redacted] Former Thai premier Phibun [redacted] stated in a conversation [redacted] that the provisional government under Pote Sarasin should be relatively stable in that its members will be unified by fears of possible countercoup attempts. Phibun expects opposition to the government from moderates and royalists to be slight because the moderates are pleased with the dismissal of Phao as police director general and the royalists are satisfied with Pote as premier.

Phibun believes the leftists have been disappointed by Marshal Sarit's actions to date because they had expected him to switch Thai policy toward neutralism. Phibun expects Sarit to take harsh measures against the left-wing press and leftist spokesmen if they become too objectionable.

Phibun doubts that Sarit has any long-term political ambitions and believes Thailand's new ruler will concentrate on eliminating all high-level support of Phao in government circles. [redacted]

Comment Phibun's ostensibly dispassionate, but probably overoptimistic, appraisal of the situation and the equanimity with which he seems to be accepting his ouster suggest he hopes Sarit will in time invite him to return to Thailand, perhaps as premier.