

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)


19 June 1957

3.5(c)




Copy No.


CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 47
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
UNDECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 2009
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 02
DATE: 26 Dec 79 REVIEWER: 

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~ []

[]
C O N T E N T S

1. PEIPING RELEASES OFFICIAL VERSION OF SECRET MAO SPEECH [] (page 3).
2. PEIPING PLANS LARGE WITHDRAWALS FROM TIBET [] (page 5).
3. MOCH RESISTS SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION PROPOSAL [] (page 7).
4. YEMEN AND USSR IN NEW ARMS DEAL AS SOVIET TECHNICIANS ARRIVE [] (page 8).
5. COMMUNIST ARMS PROBABLY DESTINED FOR ALGERIAN REBELS REACH NORTH AFRICA [] (page 9).
6. JAPANESE UNITED ON KISHI MISSION TO US [] (page 10).
7. JAPAN RESENTS SOUTH KOREAN STALLING ON DETAINEE EXCHANGE [] (page 11).
8. PAKISTAN SEEKS UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON KASHMIR ON 8 JULY [] (page 12).
9. NEW IRAQI PRIME MINISTER [] (page 13).
10. GREEK PRIME MINISTER CONTEMPLATING VISIT TO EGYPT [] (page 14).

19 June 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 2

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. PEIPING RELEASES OFFICIAL VERSION OF SECRET MAO SPEECH

Comment on:



The text of Mao Tse-tung's 27 February speech released by Peiping on 18 June was described as being "based on the verbatim record." In the interests of intrabloc harmony, Mao seems to have edited out certain passages and made some additions, with a view to minimizing differences in doctrinal viewpoints between the Chinese and other Communists.

References to Hungary in the speech reflect the sharp impression the East European disorders made on the Chinese. Those disorders may have been the primary stimulus to Mao's introspections on the so-called contradictions in Chinese society. As previously stated in press articles appearing in Communist China and other countries, Mao stressed that these contradictions were in the main "nonantagonistic" and could therefore be resolved by education and persuasion rather than by terror.

Despite this promise of a softer hand, the text just released by Peiping shows that Mao was far from sounding any retreat from Communist principles. By and large, he supported Moscow's viewpoint on Hungary, laying the major blame for last fall's events on "domestic and foreign counterrevolutionaries." He justified past terrors employed by the Chinese Communists as necessary to the times, although he admitted that excesses had been committed in condemning innocent people. The underlying mood of the speech is one of unbounding confidence in the socialist system, which Mao called "far superior" to other systems.

In the course of his analysis, Mao revealed that considerable segments of the Chinese population are dubious about Communist tenets and policy. He admitted that some intellectuals are reluctant to accept Marxism-Leninism, but urged

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

that they be given opportunities to work "as long as they comply with the requirements of the state." Referring to cynicism among Chinese students, Mao observed wryly, "Marxism, once all the rage, is not so much the fashion now." After discussing popular complaints concerning the hard lot of the peasants, Mao promised that the amount of grain taxes and state grain would be stabilized over the next few years. He confessed that student and worker strikes had taken place in China last year and that there had also been some "disturbances" among the peasants.

Mao accepted the principle that Marxism could be criticized in China and affirmed his faith in the policy of letting different schools of thought contend. But criticism was acceptable only if it came from friendly quarters; proper punishment was to be meted out to those who "deliberately put forward unreasonable demands...or spread rumors to create trouble."

Perhaps as a counter to the anti-Soviet overtones in unofficial versions of Mao's speech, the official text closed with a tribute to the Soviet Union. While urging that the Chinese learn from all countries, socialist and capitalist, he declared that the "main thing is still to learn from the Soviet Union."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2. PEIPING PLANS LARGE WITHDRAWALS FROM TIBET

Comment on:


[Redacted]

Peiping has decided to withdraw at least 25,000 Chinese Communist troops, specialists, and "workers" from Tibet to Western China, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Peiping has been maintaining 47,000 troops, 20,000 specialists, and numerous construction workers in Tibet, where resistance to the regime has been widespread.

Housing facilities for approximately 25,000 persons are being arranged for at Lanchou, Chengtu and Hsining,



~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Most of the army units are to settle in neighboring Szechwan Province, while specialists and workers go to the Lanchou and Sian areas. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] some Communist-trained Tibetan cadres and students will also go to China.


[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the investment of personnel and supplies in Tibet was a "heavy burden" to Communist China and would have to be reduced as an economy measure. The large withdrawals from Tibet seem to arise from the regime's unwillingness to take strong measures in quelling resistance and instituting all-out control of the country. Several leading Chinese Communist officials, including Mao Tse-tung, have admitted their decision to postpone indefinitely plans for "democratic reform" in Tibet. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

3. MOCH RESISTS SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION PROPOSAL

Comment on:

 French disarmament delegate Jules Moch's speech to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee on 17 June reflected his private statement that "the West was beaten" on the nuclear test suspension issue and that test cessation must be tied to other measures before the West is forced to accept suspension of tests without other accompanying disarmament measures.

Moch told the subcommittee that he was "wary of excessive optimism" about the new Soviet position. He recalled the short-lived optimism which prevailed after the USSR announced to the UN General Assembly in October 1954 its acceptance of the Anglo-French plan of 11 June 1954 as a basis for negotiations. Moch emphasized that controls must be effective and should cover seven general categories, including ground and aerial control, mobile inspection teams, and cessation of manufacture of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

Moch has taken the position that he desires iron-clad controls in order to open up prospects for complete nuclear disarmament, thereby forestalling reported nationalist pressures in France to begin manufacture of nuclear weapons. The possibility exists, however, that his position may rather be an effort to block any agreement until France becomes a nuclear power.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. YEMEN AND USSR IN NEW ARMS DEAL AS SOVIET TECHNICIANS ARRIVE

Comment on:



The Yemeni representative in Cairo was told by his government on 10 June to sign "the agreement for the deal with Russia." The Imam of Yemen also directed that it should be modeled on the Czech agreement with a "30-percent only" feature--probably referring to the 70-percent discount offered Yemen in the arms agreement signed last summer. Both the USSR and Czechoslovakia are involved in the supply of arms to Yemen, [redacted] the agreement under which arms have been delivered was concluded with Czechoslovakia as a "cover."

A Soviet vessel is believed due to arrive at the Yemeni port of Salif shortly to complete delivery of those arms included in the original \$10,000,000 Czech arms contract. The conclusion of a new agreement at this time suggests that Yemen may have negotiated for additional arms--this time directly with the USSR.

On 13 June, a Soviet vessel delivered heavy arms to Yemen. This vessel also carried 19 bloc technicians, eleven of whom are Russian.

19 June 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 8

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

5. COMMUNIST ARMS PROBABLY DESTINED FOR ALGERIAN REBELS REACH NORTH AFRICA

[REDACTED] The SS Juan Illuecas on 13 June offloaded 413 tons of small arms and ammunition of Czech or Polish manufacture at Ceuta, a Spanish city on the northern Moroccan coast, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The arms, loaded at Alexandria, appeared on the ship's manifest as "2,351 cases of agricultural machines and instruments." They were consigned to a firm in Tetuan reportedly controlled by a family long active in the North African nationalist movement.

The Spanish authorities placed the shipment under guard in an ammunition dump in Ceuta and reportedly informed the Moroccan general in command of the sultan's army in northern Morocco of its arrival.

Comment

It is probable that if the Moroccan general receives the arms, he will deliver them to the Algerian rebels.

This consignment is almost certainly the shipment of Czech arms--including 100 mortars, 15,000 hand grenades, 2,000 9-mm. submachine guns, 200 light machine guns and 500 pistols with a quantity of ammunition for each type--which Egyptian agents negotiated in Prague for the Algerian rebels last February. [REDACTED] the consignment arrived in Alexandria on a Polish vessel in early May and that it was to have been transshipped to northern Morocco, "transit Ceuta," aboard a Spanish ship. Cairo authorities described the Czech purchase as an experimental shipment to be followed by others if successful. [REDACTED]

19 June 57


Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 9

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. JAPANESE UNITED ON KISHI MISSION TO US



Prime Minister Kishi succeeded in gaining the support of all elements in Japan, including even the Socialists, for his trip to the United States, according to the American embassy in Tokyo. He was careful, however, not to arouse anticipation of immediate concessions and changes of policy by the United States. The embassy notes that there is a real sense of national pride that Kishi will be given a top-level welcome and be treated as the leader of a "first-class nation."


Editorials in the press have repeatedly emphasized that Japan's desire for "adjustments" and "greater independence" in relations with the United States does not mean that it seeks to loosen ties of friendship and co-operation between the two nations. While there is apprehension that Japan's deteriorating foreign exchange position may make Kishi especially vulnerable to American pressure, particularly on the build-up of defense forces, anti-American comment has been at a minimum.

The embassy believes that unless Kishi can present evidence on his return that he was taken more seriously than his predecessors and that an adjustment of relations is coming, both Kishi and American interests face difficulties.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7. JAPAN RESENTS SOUTH KOREAN STALLING ON DETAINEE EXCHANGE

 Japan bitterly resents South Korea's failure to carry out an agreement at this time on the mutual release of detainees and the resumption of negotiations on an over-all settlement, the American embassy in Tokyo reports. It feels Seoul has used unfair tactics in exploiting Japanese anxiety for an early settlement to extract maximum concessions and in using detained Japanese fishermen as hostages to force recognition of the Rhee Line. Kishi said on 14 June that Tokyo had granted the "maximum possible concessions" and that unless agreement is reached now, a settlement may be postponed for six months or a year.

Comment


Kishi and the Korean ambassador reached a tentative agreement last week on the exchange of detainees and resumption of negotiations for an over-all settlement. President Rhee, however, has delayed a decision on the agreement, possibly to avoid giving Kishi a political victory before he left for the United States. Although the outlook for an early exchange of detainees appears favorable, Rhee is under no pressure to reach, and probably does not desire, an over-all settlement with Japan.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8. PAKISTAN SEEKS UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON KASHMIR ON 8 JULY

Comment on:

 Pakistan, which previously seemed prepared to wait until next fall to raise the Kashmir question again in the United Nations, now is seeking a Security Council meeting by 8 July, according to statements made by Foreign Minister Noon to British foreign secretary Lloyd. Karachi has already prepared a draft resolution it would like to see adopted by the Security Council. The resolution, which stresses demilitarization of Kashmir, induction of a plebiscite administrator, and the holding of a plebiscite, is unacceptable to the British in its present form and would be rejected out of hand by India. British officials, however, are divided as to how far their government should go in supporting Pakistan.

By pressing for an early meeting of the Security Council on the Kashmir question, Pakistani leaders probably hope to exert pressure on the British to support their arguments if the issue is raised during the Commonwealth prime ministers conference which begins on 26 June. The Pakistani government may also hope in this way to increase international criticism of India for obstructionist tactics even though it may not anticipate any real action by the United Nations before next fall.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9. NEW IRAQI PRIME MINISTER

Comment on: [redacted]

[redacted] Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, former prime minister and first Iraqi ambassador to the US, has completed the formation of a cabinet to replace that of Nuri Said which resigned on 8 June, according to press reports from Baghdad.

Ali Jawdat, one of Iraq's conservative elder statesmen, is on good terms with both Nuri and Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah and will probably carry forward Nuri's policies, but with a greater emphasis on co-operation with the United States. The replacement of Nuri will facilitate collaboration between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and other anti-Nasr Arab countries. [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

10. GREEK PRIME MINISTER CONTEMPLATING VISIT TO EGYPT

Greek prime minister Karamanlis told Ambassador Allen on 16 June that Egyptian president Nasr would shortly invite him to visit Egypt and that he had also received a tentative invitation from the Sudan. Karamanlis says he has received several indications that Nasr is feeling increasingly isolated and may be seeking a rapprochement with the West through Greece.

Queen Frederika is displeased with the prospect of Karamanlis visiting Egypt; she feels that Nasr is not to be trusted. To offset such a visit, she is trying to persuade King Paul to visit Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan.

Comment

While Karamanlis' evident interest in visiting Egypt is probably motivated primarily by his desire to enhance Greek prestige in the Middle East, he probably also believes such a visit would further Western interests there. Greek leaders have long resented and sought to counter Turkey's aggressive diplomacy in the area.

The queen may believe that a Greek royal visit to the Arab monarchies would further enhance Greek prestige among the Arabs, as well as maintain the prestige of the royal family vis-a-vis the prime minister.

~~SECRET~~