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
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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]**1. THE SITUATION IN JORDAN**Comment on:

The resignation of Prime Minister Nabulsi and his leftist-dominated cabinet on 10 April after 11 days of intensive political maneuvering does not necessarily indicate a victory for pro-Western Jordanian forces. It has been accompanied thus far by at least two other key personnel shifts which appear unfavorable to Western interests and may actually curtail the power of King Hussain. By resigning, Nabulsi may have given the king an opportunity to "save face," while assuring that there will be only limited changes in the new cabinet. The Nabulsi cabinet will remain in office until a new government is formed.

The pro-Hussain director of public security and police, Bajat Tabbara, was granted extended leave on 10 April, according to Damascus radio. Tabbara's removal had been a key leftist objective. The loyalty of Tabbara's replacement, newly promoted Major General Muhammad Maayta, moreover, seems doubtful. Maayta is reported to be a supporter of the pro-Egyptian left-wing Baath Party, and of the ultranationalist "free officers" group. He was recently Jordan's military attaché in Beirut, where he worked with Egyptian and Syrian intelligence against conservative refugee Syrian and Jordanian politicians. Despite this background, the king recently expressed confidence in Maayta's loyalty.

Statements by Damascus radio suggest that the directorate of police and public security has been placed under army chief of staff General Nuwar. Although Hussain is reported to have planned to fire Nuwar, the general remains on the job and is consulting with the Nabulsi cabinet. The loyalty of the Jordanian army also remains uncertain, although Hussain has professed confidence in its support. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] the king did not have the support of Nuwar and the "free officers" in his dispute with the cabinet. The moves undertaken thus far appear to have concentrated power in the hands of the army. [REDACTED]

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2. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT

Comment on:



Following institution of a general "alert" of Egyptian military and diplomatic personnel on 4 April, a large-scale redeployment of Egyptian army units has been undertaken--apparently to disperse these forces as a precaution against possible Anglo-French-Israeli moves. Some reserve and national guard personnel have been called up, and units are being deployed to field positions in the environs of Cairo.

Some movement eastward toward the Suez Canal and possibly into Sinai has been reported. While limited additional forces may be deployed into this area, movement of major forces to eastern Sinai near the Israeli border would be unlikely at this time because of inadequate logistical preparations for such a move.

Egyptian air force units are also reported to have been alerted, [REDACTED] Cairo's desire to have a limited number of pilots returned from Syria and the Soviet bloc in the near future. [REDACTED]

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3. THIRD EXPLOSION IN CURRENT SOVIET ATOMIC TEST SERIES

[Redacted]

| | |
|------------|------------|
| [Redacted] | [Redacted] |
| [Redacted] | |

Comment

This is the third atomic test to be conducted by the USSR in the past eight days. [Redacted]

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4. USSR MAY BE CUTTING ITS NUCLEAR ELECTRIC POWER PLANS

[REDACTED]

A recent official Soviet response to a questionnaire from a subcommittee of UNESCO suggests a significant reduction of Soviet nuclear electric power plans. The USSR, according to this information, now plans to construct only three 400-megawatt plants, and to obtain several years of experience with these prior to launching a more extensive program. Plans announced a year ago called for construction of four 400- to 600-megawatt nuclear power plants by 1960. Both the original plan and the new plan call for construction of four smaller experimental power reactors. The Soviet nuclear power program now planned for the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960) apparently calls for a capacity of only 1,400 megawatts, rather than the 2,100- to 2,500-megawatt capacity announced last year.

The USSR also revealed in the questionnaire that it plans to reduce the cost of nuclear power production by using the plutonium obtained from the operation to replace the enriched uranium-235 seed in the power reactor cores. It had been assumed previously that the plutonium produced would be used for nuclear weapons. This new procedure would reduce appreciably the amount of plutonium which would be made available by this source for nuclear weapons after 1960, but would cause only a slight decrease in the total amount of nuclear materials estimated to be available at that time.

[REDACTED]

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5. USSR SEEKS COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH MOROCCO

A Soviet commercial delegation arrived in Rabat on 9 April to discuss the signing of a Soviet-Moroccan commercial treaty. Moroccan officials admitted to a French diplomat that negotiations had already been going on "for several days" in Paris. Press dispatches state that the Rabat discussions are expected to end on 12 April.

Moroccan foreign minister Balafrej assured the American ambassador that Rabat, conscious that its national interests lie with the West, will "hold the line" and try to limit the talks to strictly technical matters. He appeared uneasy, however, and acknowledged that the Soviet delegation might come forward with "other propositions."

Comment

Moroccan trade with the USSR, heretofore carried out within Soviet-French trade agreements, has been insignificant. Since Morocco is a member of the franc bloc and all clearing arrangements are made in Paris, France as a practical matter probably would participate in any agreement, as it did in the Moroccan-Czech trade agreement of December.

The delegation will probably be prepared to offer economic inducements calculated to make it difficult for Rabat to hold the line against establishing full diplomatic relations with Moscow. A disagreement is reported within the Moroccan cabinet regarding expanded trade relations with the Soviet bloc.

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**6. SOUTH KOREAN VICE PRESIDENT MIGHT SEEK ASYLUM
IN SUCCESSION CRISIS**

Far East commander General Lemnitzer believes South Korean vice president Chang Myon lacks the resoluteness necessary to cope with a succession crisis in South Korea.

He notes that plots by the Rhee administration constitute "a very real threat" to Chang's safety, and warns that if Rhee dies or is incapacitated, Chang may well seek asylum in an American installation. Such a move, Lemnitzer notes, would damage Chang's prestige with the Korean people, aggravate the instability which would accompany any succession crisis, and possibly endanger the American position in Korea. Lemnitzer has received reports that opposing Liberal Party officials have ordered the Korean army CIC to maintain 24-hour surveillance of Chang lest he seek asylum with US forces. (NOFORN)

Comment

Although Rhee lately appears to have underscored his desire that Assembly speaker Yi Ki-pung succeed him--which would necessitate getting Chang out of the way--there has been no indication that a move in this direction is imminent.

Chang previously has sought American protection in times of political stress.

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SUMMARY

13 March - 10 April 1957

[redacted]
THE TAIWAN STRAIT

**Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Taiwan Strait Problem**

1. There were no significant combat operations in the area during the period. [redacted]

2. The suggestion was made [redacted] that an oceanographic expedition scheduled for April or May be postponed until 1959 because of the "present state of security in the Yellow and East China Seas." Peiping may feel that, for the near future at least, the expedition would have to risk harassment by hostile patrols. [redacted]

3. Chinese Communist propaganda on Taiwan has been of routine character in recent weeks with the usual appeals for "peaceful liberation" of the island. The propaganda stresses the "unity" of Chinese on Taiwan and on the mainland and attempts to drive a wedge between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek. [redacted]

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

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TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION

| CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND: 10 APRIL 1957 | | | | USABILITY | | | | |
|--|---|-------------|---|-----------|--------|---------|------|---------|
| DESIGNATIONS | PRIMARY AIRFIELD CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN AREA WITH PREPARED RUNWAY GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER. | | SECONDARY AIRFIELD AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE. RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN 5000 FEET. | | + | | ? | ■ |
| | ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT. SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE USABLE BY JETS | ● | OPERATIONAL | ▲ | | MIG-15 | TU-2 | UNKNOWN |
| INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT | ⊕ | SERVICEABLE | △ | | MIG-17 | IL-10 | | |
| CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED | ○ | UNKNOWN | △ | | TU-4 | LA-9/11 | | |
| | | | | | IL-28 | IL-2 | | |
| | | | | | | ETC. | | |

* FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS AT PRESENT.



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