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1. AMBASSADOR BOHLEN COMMENTS ON SOVIET ANTI-STALIN RESOLUTION

Ambassador Bohlen considers valid certain statements affecting the internal political situation in the 30 June Soviet resolution on de-Stalinization. He accepts the resolution's assertion that the downgrading of Stalin began immediately after his death and was not a hasty decision taken on the eve of the 20th Party Congress, and that the party took the step on its

He believes also that the decree is on the whole accurate in describing changes instituted since Stalin's death, namely establishment of collective leadership at the top of the party, a certain degree of decentralization in economic life, and the introduction of a degree of legality and personal security for law-abiding Soviet citizens.

Bohlen believes that some features of Togliatti's response may have been unexpected but doubts that the reaction of foreign Communist parties in general came as a complete surprise to the Soviet leaders. In the ambassador's view, ideological adjustments made at the 20th Party Congress inevitably involve a relinquishment of direct Soviet control of foreign Communist parties even though the USSR hopes to retain its influence. The Soviet government may expect thereby to build a more stable relationship between itself and these parties, but in its growing self-confidence, Bohlen believes, the Soviet Union feels considerably less need of foreign Communist parties than in the past.

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own initiative.



Leaders of the French, Italian and American Communist Parties have accepted the Soviet Communist Party central committee statement of 30 June on the errors of Stalinism, although the Italian and American parties indicated that they did not consider Moscow had answered all of their questions. Other

Western Communist parties are expected to follow suit.

An editorial in the French Communist paper L'Humanité on 4 July described the Soviet statement as a "document of the greatest importance, such as is rarely seen in the history of the international working-class movement, which provides a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis" of the personality cult and fully answers all the expectations of those struggling for socialism.

Italian party leader Togliatti, who was criticized in the statement, called it "an extremely important contribution to the elucidation of questions" raised by various Communist parties. Togliatti reiterated "unreserved approval" for the Soviet action in overcoming the Stalin personality cult, but said that "within this framework" various opinions were possible on the significance of Stalin's mistakes and their influence on the development of the USSR. He urged a "frank discussion" of these questions.

Eugene Dennis, American party secretary, called the Soviet statement "a most welcome development," and said "it goes a long way" in explaining the cult of the personality. The New York Daily Worker said it answered "some" of the questions raised by various Communist parties. It added that while many Marxists "will feel satisfied with the answers," many others "will feel that the final answers still need to be found and that the discussion must continue. Implying agreement with the latter view, the Daily Worker urged a deeper probing of Soviet errors.

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3. US EMBASSY VIEWS ON CONSEQUENCES OF POZNAN RIOTS

The US embassy in Warsaw believes that in light of the Poznan riots the regime may look upon the resumption of repression as the surest means of controlling the populace. It will be reluctant to take this step, however. The embassy believes that although the regime will probably carry out its threat to punish severely those held responsible for fomenting the riots, mass punishment is un-

Some remedial economic measures will be necessary, in the embassy view, if further incidents such as the Poznan riots are to be avoided without renewed repression. Since the Polish press has termed the rioting workers' complaints as "just demands," the government is likely to raise wages and improve working conditions in Poznan, thus probably inspiring demands for similar benefits elsewhere in Poland.

The embassy suggests that the apparently inept handling of the Poznan workers' demands prior to the demonstration may result in the removal of a number of officials.

Although the government appears to be on the defensive, the speed with which it withdrew armed units and visible security precautions from Poznan indicates confidence in its ability to handle the situation.

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likely.

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4.	EAST GER	MANY AN	ID CZECHOS	SLOVAKIA	ALERT
	SECURITY	FORCES	FOLLOWING	G POZNAN	RIOTS

East German coastal patrol units operating in the Baltic Sea east of Ruegen Island were ordered on 28 June to check Polish shipping and to report on suspicious vessels outside Polish territorial waters. Intensified patrolling of areas within East German waters was carried on until 30 June when patrol activity was reduced.

Comment

Poznan riots.

East German coastal patrol units and the Czech border guards were probably alerted to apprehend Poles attempting to escape. The alert in Czechoslovakia, like an earlier East German party directive to provincial party headquarters, reflects the fear of these governments that violence might result in their countries as a result of the

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5.	5. ARGENTINA PREPARES TO SUPPRESS REVOLT ON 8 OR 9 JULY				

Comment

Argentina celebrates its Independence Day on 9 July.

The Aramburu regime became more confident of its ability to suppress violence after the 9-10 June abortive revolt, which failed to attract important labor or military support. The unprecedented summary execution of rebels, however, produced sharp criticism of the regime both within Argentina and abroad.

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6. COUP REPORTEDLY PLANNED FOR GUATEMALA SOON				
Comment	The government of President Castillo			

mment The government of President Castillo
Armas seems at least momentarily
strengthened as a result of army support for its declaration
of a state of siege following serious student demonstrations
early last week.

The exile group, including four prominent military exiles, has been reported plotting actively for several months. In early June a high Guatemalan official stated that the administration did not regard this group's plotting as serious and was awaiting the right moment to round up principals involved within Guatemala.

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7. COLOMBIA REPORTEDLY ACCEPTING ADDITIONAL SOVIET BLOC TRADE MISSIONS

The Colombian government is reportedly processing visa applications for 15 Czech and Hungarian trade officials, according o the American embassy in Bogota. A four-man Polish mission which visited Colombia briefly in May returned on 1 July. Czech and East German trade missions are already in Bogota.

Comment

Earlier press reports indicated that bloc countries, including Hungary, were negotiating for \$50,000,000 worth of coffee--about 500,000 bags. Colombia can be expected to show considerable eagerness to sell coffee to the bloc countries at this time in order to maintain a high price for its chief export in the face of a recently released estimate that the current world surplus equals some 10,000,000 bags. The bloc last year reportedly took only about \$3,000,000 worth of Colombian coffee.

The Soviet bloc countries have also shown a keen interest in expanding their exhibits at the forthcoming international trade fair in Bogota and may bid for the exhibit area used by the United States at the 1955 fair.

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8. DEATH OF INFLUENTIAL JAPANESE POLITICIAN BUKICHI MIKI

The death on 4 July of Bukichi Miki, considered the 'backbone' of Prime Minister Hatoyama's administration, ended the career of one of Japan's most influential political leaders. Miki played a prominent role in merging Japan's conservative parties in late 1955 and was regarded as the key to preserving conservative unity in arranging a smooth succession to Hatoyama.

The loss of Miki's moderating influence may lead to political instability as rival factions in the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party contend for dominant political power. Liberal-Democratic secretary general Kishi probably will now move more aggressively to succeed Hatoyama. Kishi's ambitions may collide with those of Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Kono, who is a leading figure of the Hatoyama faction.

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
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9. INDIAN GOVERNMENT CONCERNED OVER NAGA REVOLT

	The Indian army fears that the uprising of Naga tribesmen in eastern Assam may develop into a stalemate such as once existed between government and insurgent forces in
Malaya,	

the uncovering of new arms in possession of the Nagas and the high level of co-ordination of rebel leadership have convinced the Indian army that the Nagas are receiving guidance and supplies from the outside.



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Comment

season.

Intermittent agitation since 1953 for an independent Naga state has intensified in recent months. Increasingly strong Indian countermeasures, including the use of regular troops and aircraft, have thus far failed to subdue the rebellious tribesmen, who benefit from their inaccessible terrain and the long monsoon

The seriousness with which the Indian government now views the revolt is indicated by the visit to Assam at the end of June of Home Minister Pandit Pant to plan new methods of suppressing the rising.

The Indian

government has publicly deprecated the importance of the Naga disturbances. It has also avoided charges of outside interference--probably for fear of the effect on relations with Communist China.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 1700, 5 July)

The American embassy in Tel Aviv be- lieves that in the recent talks with UN Truce Supervisor Burns,
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion showed that Israel considers it-
self morally and legally free to ignore the General Armistice
Agreements when they are violated by the Arabs, and that Israel
will adhere to a policy of retaliation. The embassy added that
Ben-Gurion's remarks in the Knesset have been made to warn
Jordan against future incidents, and to justify the Israeli posi-
tion if Ben-Gurion decides to move against Jordan. Another mo-
tive may be Ben-Gurion's desire to recapture the initiative and
maneuverability he feels he lost as a result of the Hammarskjold
mission and the subsequent Security Council resolution. Recent
Israeli protests, the embassy believes, suggest that Israel is
conducting a campaign to demonstrate the inability of the UN to
provide durable remedies to complex problems.
The acting director general of political af-
fairs of the Syrian Foreign Ministry reiterated to the American
embassy in Damascus on 3 July that Syria would meet with force
any Israeli attempt to resume work on the Jordan River diversion
project, even though Syria might simultaneously refer the matter
to the UN Security Council.
The American army attaché in Cairo reported
that as of 3 July the Egyptian military did not appear to expect any
immediate Israeli aggression, and that insofar as was known thorough
had been no changes in the disposition of Egyptian forces.
According to a
Beirut radio broadcast on 25 May, Syria plans to strengthen its
navy by equipping it with modern naval units. At present Syria's
naval combat forces consist of three small ex-French submarine
chasers.
The two destroyers purchased by Egypt from
Britain which were fitted out in the United Kingdom departed on
22 June for Alexandria for a preliminary shakedown. The Egyptian
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Egyptian air force squadron stationed in the Suez Canal zone as equipped with 14 or 15 MIG-15 fighters. The American air attaché in Cairo states that this would be the first group of MIG's to be stationed outside the Cairo area and probably the				
irst operation	al Egyptian s	quadron of a	Soviet-bloc	aircraft.
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