


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19 October 1956


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
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
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1. NASR ORDERS SLOWDOWN IN RELATIONS WITH SOVIET BLOC

[REDACTED] President Nasr of Egypt notified his cabinet on 15 October that hereafter he did not wish members of the cabinet to visit Soviet bloc countries, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] All scheduled visits are to be canceled gradually, except a visit of the Egyptian minister of agriculture to the Soviet Union. The minister of agrarian reform was specifically ordered to cancel his visit at once. Nasr also told the cabinet gradually to close out all further cultural and technical delegations to the Soviet bloc. [REDACTED]

Comment

Although Nasr will continue to rely on the Soviet bloc for economic assistance, arms and diplomatic support, he probably has genuine fears of becoming overly dependent on the bloc. By suggesting that he might weaken his relations with the Soviet bloc, he probably aims to elicit American sympathy.

Recently there have been signs that Nasr was afraid he was losing some of his maneuverability between West and East. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], he has disregarded some Soviet suggestions on Egyptian tactics and has indicated irritation over Soviet moves, particularly strong Soviet attacks on the United States. [REDACTED]

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2. PATHET LAO ADVISED TO GIVE UP OVERT CONTROL OF NORTHERN PROVINCES

A Viet Minh [redacted]

[redacted] advised the Pathet Lao to recognize that its control of the two provinces "will undergo modification in the course of negotiations." The

Pathets were instructed to continue to consolidate their political position in the two provinces, but to recognize that retention of the province would not involve "administrative and military" control "as at present."

[redacted] assured the Pathets that "we should not be afraid that when we join the coalition government the royalists will use their majority to abolish or water down the terms they have concluded with us. On the contrary, we will be in a better position to make progress in every aspect of our work!"

Comment

Apparent Viet Minh readiness to exchange control of the two provinces and the Pathet army for participation in a coalition government removes the greatest stumbling block to a final settlement with the royal government. The Viet Minh's confidence that the Pathets can advance their interests through participation in the government appears to stem, at least in part, from a conviction that they will be given one of the important ministries such as Defense, Interior or Foreign Affairs.

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3. PROSPECT OF IMPROVED AFGHAN-PAKISTANI RELATIONS FORESEEN

Comment on:


The Pakistani chargé and the British ambassador in Kabul are convinced that Afghan prime minister Daud, who has accepted an invitation to visit Karachi during the last week of November, is seeking a face-saving device for abandoning his stand on Pushtoonistan.

This feeling is apparently inspired by Daud's alacrity in accepting the invitation, his willingness to spend more than a week in Karachi if necessary, and his desire to meet important Pakistani Pushtoon leaders. Both diplomats feel that Daud's prospective visit affords "the chance of a lifetime" to improve Afghan-Pakistani relations.

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4. BOLIVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SEES COMMUNIST INFLUENCE INCREASING IN GOVERNMENT

 The Bolivian foreign minister told the American ambassador in La Paz on 17 October that he had offered his resignation in protest over the reported inclusion of several Communists in the new Bolivian UN delegation which is headed by Vice President Chavez, a leftist. He believes that Communist influence is increasing in the government.

The foreign minister said that the ministers of national economy and agriculture were resigning with him and hinted other rightist members of the cabinet would follow. He quoted President Siles as having said that he would continue in office only on the basis of support of members of the right and would quit if they did.

The foreign minister expressed confidence that in the event of a showdown between right and left, the rightists would have the support of the populace in La Paz, the carabineros and the army, and could defeat the leftists.

Comment

Tensions between the two factions have increased sharply in recent weeks. The seating of a congress after a four-year lapse has provided a public forum for left-wing discussion of administration policy.

An acute food shortage in La Paz and the decline of the boliviano from 8,000 to about 12,000 to the dollar since Siles' inauguration on 6 August are major contributions to general unrest.

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5. TAIPEI FEARS LOSS OF MEMBERSHIP IN UNESCO

[REDACTED]

The Chinese Nationalist Foreign Ministry is concerned over the question of support for Nationalist China's right of representation and right to vote at the general conference of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization (UNESCO), which will meet in New Delhi on 5 November. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

As early as last January UNESCO officials noted the beginnings of a major effort to admit Communist China to UNESCO at the November general conference. The nature of the organization and the fact that the conference is being held this year in India, a strong advocate of Peiping's admission to international organizations, give Taipei additional reason for concern.

Membership in the specialized agencies is not contingent on UN membership. These agencies have the authority to seat Peiping in place of Taipei if a majority of their members so desire. UNESCO, however, has in the past followed the pattern set by the UN General Assembly on the Chinese representation question. Britain's stated intention to support the moratorium at this fall's assembly probably assures Taipei's UN membership for at least a year.

[REDACTED]

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 18 October)

The new Israeli mobilization is now reported to be "fairly substantial," [redacted]

[redacted] The source reported a movement of artillery and armor to the Jordanian borders and southward to the Negev area. [redacted] southern Israel indicates a displacement of Israeli units from their normal stations to forward areas and that the southern command headquarters appears more than usually active. The movement southward may be in anticipation of an Egyptian redeployment to Sinai following the reduced tension over the Suez dispute. [redacted]

UN truce officials believe that there is only a slim chance that Israel will permit an extension of the 31 October deadline for the removal of UN observer posts on the Israeli side of the demarcation line at Gaza. The UN observers stated that the posts have been useful and their loss would mean one less opportunity for exerting an influence for stability along the border. [redacted]

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