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
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


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
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
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1. AMBASSADOR BOHLEN COMMENTS ON TITO-KHRUSHCHEV TALKS

 Ambassador Bohlen speculates that the Tito-Khrushchev conversations relate to policies which the Soviet leadership is considering with reference to the Satellites and for which it is most anxious to obtain Yugoslav approval and participation. He feels that the Soviet leaders in the interest of "bloc solidarity" may be telling Tito that his retention of ties with the West is unrealistic and is causing great harm to the Communist cause as a whole, and that he must make his choice. The ambassador thinks they fear that continued close Yugoslav economic ties with the West will encourage some Satellites to try to follow this example. He recognizes the likelihood of growing dissension between the USSR and Yugoslavia regarding the interpretation of the "many roads to socialism" concept. He doubts, however, that the Soviet Union is attempting to re-establish Moscow discipline over the Yugoslav party.

The ambassador is of the opinion that the length of the discussions, besides indicating the importance of underlying differences, suggests that a most serious effort is being made to reach agreement. He believes that some form of compromise, the exact nature of which cannot be foreseen, is likely to result. He finds no evidence in Moscow to support the thesis that differences with Tito have produced a major crisis in Soviet leadership.

2. HUNGARIAN NEWSPAPER SUPPORTS TITO POSITION




In the first substantive comment on the Soviet-Yugoslav talks in the Crimea yet to appear in a Satellite, a Hungarian trade union daily on 2 October claimed that these talks will strengthen both


Hungarian-Yugoslav friendship and the post-Rakosi liberalization trend in Hungary. This article apparently reflects the thinking of the increasingly powerful moderate elements of the Hungarian Communist Party and is tantamount to a public declaration of their alignment on the Yugoslav side of the current dispute.

The Crimean talks, the article asserted, represent "the weightiest corroboration" of the Hungarian party's post-Rakosi July resolution--viewed by party moderates as their "emancipation proclamation." They "make it clear once and for all for everybody that our country's progress is unimaginable without the consistent implementation of the July resolution and the defeat of all opposition to it."

The article said that the "straightforward" attitude of the Soviet party and government had "started the progress of healing and clarification" with Yugoslavia, but complained that this process has been "slow and protracted and advanced only in the face of difficulties and obstacles." Although the USSR reportedly warned the Satellites on 3 September that Yugoslavia's ties to the West were too close, the article strongly implies that such ties are acceptable.



**3. NATO ATTACKED IN FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE**

 A Radical-Socialist spokesman for Mendes-France attacked the NATO alliance in the French National Assembly foreign affairs committee in mid-

September and advocated that France find a workable substitute, according to Maurice Schumann, a Popular Republican leader and former under secretary for foreign affairs. Schumann told Ambassador Dillon on 3 October that no one except himself was willing to defend NATO at the meeting which was held just after the second London conference.

Schumann believes that NATO has lost a great deal of its popularity in France and warned that the UN Security Council debate on Suez was of exceptional importance because France would view it as a test of American intentions.

Comment

Irritation over what the French consider to be inadequate American support on the Suez issue has risen to an unprecedented peak in the last week. There are indications that the Mollet government may exploit the current wave of anti-Americanism to encourage West European integration as a counterbalance to American influence in the Atlantic alliance.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 4 October)

An Israeli passenger train traveling from Haifa to Jerusalem on the night of 3-4 October received rifle and machine gun fire from Jordan as it passed near the border, according to an Israeli announcement. The train's engineer was reported wounded in the incident, which is the first involving casualties since the Israeli raid near Husan south of Jerusalem on 25 September. (Press)

The American consul general in Jerusalem reports that there is no evidence to support the Israeli claim of demoralization and disintegration in West Jordan. On 2 October he reported that there was no sign of panic and no evidence of exodus of Jordanian civilians from the border areas involved in the 25 September raid. The consul general also stated that there was no drastic lowering of morale in the Jordanian National Guard following recent raids, and that civilian morale had been bolstered by the government's claim that the Husan incident was a victory for Jordan. Tension in West Jordan is reported to have decreased in recent days.

Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion conveyed "additional views" on the Iraqi-Jordanian situation through the chief of the American Division of the Israeli Foreign Ministry on 2 October. Ben-Gurion wished to make clear that his previous comment that Israel would take no action against the entry of token Iraqi forces into East Jordan applied only if such entry were to assist King Hussain to maintain internal stability. Ben-Gurion sought assurances that an Iraqi token force in Jordan would be of a temporary character--lasting only until after the lower house elections at the end of October, or until the end of the year. Any Iraqi force should be limited in size and without heavy armor. He also requested information on the size and location of any Iraqi force in Jordan. Ben-Gurion emphasized that under no circumstances should an Iraqi force come near the Israeli frontier.