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1. SUEZ DEVELOPMENTS

Comment on:
President Nasr's top advisers estimated, prior to the nationalization action, that the West would apply economic sanctions against Egypt. They also seriously considered the possibility that Britain would be a prime mover in military action to seize the canal and inspiring Israel to attack and destroy their army and regime. Egyptian leaders, are confident they can weather the political and economic action, but hope and believe that the United States will
A circular message of 31 July from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs states that India has as yet made no representation to the United Kingdom regarding the Suez Canal: "News emanating from London implying Commonwealth solidarity with the United Kingdom is not correct, at least so far as we are concerned. We are considering the situation, and it is not our intention to make any statement on this
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subject at this stage. Meantime, we have not given support either to the United Kingdom or to Egypt. You should be careful in your talks with the government to which you are accredited and with your diplomatic colleagues not to commit us to any particular line of thinking."

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	COMMUNIST :	LEADER	REPORT	IS ON	
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3. TOP INDIAN SOCIALIST CALLS FOR CO-OPERATION WITH COMMUNISTS IN ELECTIONS

Comment on:	
	Jai Prakash Narain has called on his
	Praja Socialist PartyIndia's second-
	largestto reverse its long-standing
	anti-Communist position and co-operate
with the Com	nunists in an effort to oust the Congress Party
	l elections scheduled for early 1957. This pre- und for formation of a strong leftist united-front
	oppose Nehru's Congress Party. Narain, one of
the most intel	lligent and respected politicians in India, appar- rs that for the first time there is an opportunity
	opular movement, similar to that in Ceylon, to
defeat the Cor	

During the election campaign, any remaining opposition among the Socialists to formation of a front with the Communists is likely to crumble if united-front tactics in such major states as Andhra and West Bengal appear to be headed for success.

Leftist groups are already actively engaged in united-front drives, and have begun to announce programs based on local issues which will appeal to local voters. There is as yet no real sign that the Congress Party is preparing to meet these groups on their own ground at the village level.

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4,	NEHRU'S	VIEWS	ON	RECOGNITION	OF
	EAST GE	RMANY			

.1	ing the last t	interest in the G	nister Nehru, whose erman unification of the major points of on has increased dur- tly so impressed with at he has decided to
	abandon any	thought of recognizing t	the East German regime.
			Nehru's rather super-
•	versed withing the second in t	n 24 hours after his arr v	West German in-
	dustrial prod by the Germ	duction, by the Krupp in an offer to build an Indi	on and steel works, and an science institute and
1	to give schol	larships to Indian stude	nts. Nehru was
	fleeing to the Germany. I	e West and refused an in He decided that recognit	mbers of East Germans nvitation to visit East ion of East Germany at ust" to the West Germans.

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5. BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS FEAR DISTURBANCES IN PORTUGUESE INDIA ON 15 AUGUST

terrorists are preparing to blow up the radio station at Goa and two bridges and possibly to attack government authorities in Portuguese robably on 15 August.

Comment

During the past few years, there have been minor incidents within and on the borders of Portuguese Indian territories on 15 August---India's Independence Day. Though similar incidents may occur again this year, the Indian government is unlikely to sponsor a largescale attack.

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6.	CHIEF OF ITALIAN LA	BOR CONFEI	DERATION CAL	LS
	FOR FREEDOM FROM	COMMUNIST	PARTY CONTI	ROL

The 1 August statement of Secretary General Giuseppe Di Vittorio that the Italian General Labor Confederation (CGIL) should be freed from party control suggests that the Communist Party hopes to avoid withdrawal of the Nenni Socialist faction.

Di Vittorio, a Communist deputy and mem-

ber of the party central committee, published his statement in the Communist organ Unita. He argued that since several parties—some Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Republicans, in addition to the Communists and Nenni Socialists—are represented in the CGIL, it must be independent of all. He called for a return of non-Communists to the federation in an attempt to lure back the membership of the Social Democrat—oriented labor union, UIL, and possibly also some members of the Christian Democrat—dominated confederation, CISL.

It was suggested at a meeting of Nenni Socialist CGIL leaders in late July that the organization ought to become autonomous.

The apparent decision to free the CGIL from Communist control appears to be another attempt by the Italian Communist Party to avoid losing the leadership of the Italian left to the Nenni Socialists.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 1700, 2 August)

Israel's Foreign Minister Golda Meir on 1 August rejected requests by members of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee for urgent measures in response to Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal. In testimony before the committee, Mrs. Meir declared that the Israeli government would maintain a "wait and see" attitude on the canal. (Press)

New violence occurred on the Jordan-Israel

border on 2 August. Jordan announced that two home guards were killed in a clash with an Israeli patrol which allegedly was operating one and a quarter miles inside Jordan. A Jordanian army spokesman said that the Israeli force apparently also suffered some casualties. (Press) Syria has recently transferred an undetermined number of military vehicles to Lebanon, possible that Syria has transferred some of its older materiel to Lebanon following receipt of new equipment from the Soviet bloc. Such action would improve Syrian relations with Lebanese military leaders, and is possibly designed to gain support for a military agreement between Lebanon and Syria.

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