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1. THE SITUATION IN SYRIA (as of 1500, 18 November)

	1
	A concentration of Syrian tanks and
	troop-carrying vehicles in the suburbs
	of Damascus
	prior to the parliamentary session of
	17 November, provides further indi-
	cation that an internal Syrian crisis
	may be near.
	the equipment was ordered to
Damascus by the left	ist army G-2 and military strongman,
	arraj, to intimidate the legislators and
	lated antileftist action.
	s preparing to arrest a number of con-
	head off a rightist coup.
.	and the second second
	''there are the mak-
ings of a crisis betwe	een the army and the politicians," appar-
	be taken as a consequence of the recent
	chiefs of state in Beirut.
Sv	rian intelligence had uncovered a plan to
stage a rightist coup	in Syria, which was to have commenced
in early November w	ith a riot in Aleppo, accompanied by an
	ia, and an uprising of the Druze minority
	ving arms from Iraq.
	D
	a new crisis
is developing in Syria	a, and both leftist and rightist groups
are known to be well	armed.
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2. TURKISH MILITARY ALERT MEASURES

ıcan emoassy m strengthened.	The Turkish government has instituted a series of measures to increase the readiness of its armed forces on the Syrian frontier, according to the Amer-Ankara. Internal security has also been

Leaves for all personnel have been canceled and all training that interferes with operational readiness has been dropped. An armored battalion has been moved to southern Turkey, reinforcing a division stationed near the Syrian border. The Turkish air force is on stand-by alert. The antiaircraft units, hitherto grouped in gun parks, have moved to assigned sites and are manned on a 24-hour basis.

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3. EGYPT TO INCREASE TERRORIST PRESSURE ON ISRAELIS AND BRITISH

	Egypt has decided to undertake increasingly bold terrorist operations against Israel and agains
may be to support from Egyptian terr the Nasr regime's	ns in the Near East. Although the purp demands for withdrawal of foreign tro ritory and to appease dissatisfaction w conspicuous lack of military success, ative increases the possibility of renev
sabotage, particul	arly against power stations, and comn
operations inside I	Israel be resumed "immediately."
who previously ope	rorists would have arrived in Jordan Control over most of these individual erated out of the Gaza strip, would be ind the balance would be integrated with guard.
	thonor
	there w
objection to encour	raging Libyan volunteers to proceed sen western Egypt near the Libyan borde
objection to encour	raging Libyan volunteers to proceed se

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4. BOHLEN REPORTS RUMORS THAT KHRUSHCHEV MAY BE SHIFTED

 secretary of the	The American embassy in Mo ports that it has received run the past few days that Khrush trouble and may be removed party. One rumor relayed on 1	nors during nchev is in as first 4 November
		Khrushchev
	'' and that ''Malenkov's star is r	ising. On
15 November, an		visiting in
Moscow claimed had informed him	that a member of the Gomulka of that Khrushchev 'is stepping o	delegation lown.''

Another rumor is that Khrushchev would be replaced by Molotov as first secretary and that Khrushchev would take charge of agricultural affairs; Malenkov would be reappointed as chairman of the Council of Ministers, replacing Bulganin.

The embassy points out that it has no confirmatory evidence for these rumors and notes that Khrushchev has continued to be much in evidence and was identified as first secretary on 16 November. He met Gomulka on the arrival of the Polish delegation on 15 November and has since headed the Soviet contingent in the negotiations with the Poles.

The continuing ill effects of Soviet liberalization policy toward the Satellites has probably put the Khrushchev leadership squarely on the defensive and made Khrushchev, as architect of this policy, the most vulnerable to attack. At the same time, other Soviet leaders who may have long favored a tougher line probably now regard their position as vindicated by events in Hungary, and their views may have greater influence in "collective" decisions of the near future. Accordingly, some shift in the balance of power within the party presidium may be taking place, although there are no other indications that Khrushchev is scheduled for quick removal.

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5. USSR SEEKS TO RECOUP PRESTIGE THROUGH NEW DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS

The Soviet statement of 17 November
on disarmament and easing interna-
tional tension is a major propaganda
maneuver designed to divert world at-
tention from the setbacks sustained by

Soviet policies and prestige in Eastern Europe and to recapture the diplomatic initiative. It was aimed particularly at reassuring neutralist governments and the USSR's friends throughout the world that Moscow's threatening posture in the Middle East crisis and its suppression of the Hungarian uprising do not foreshadow the abandonment of the "soft" approach in foreign affairs of the past eighteen months.

The Soviet leaders have seized upon the Swiss government's proposal for a five-power conference of heads of government to call for another summit meeting to consider this latest omnibus disarmament plan. They probably believe that new moves in the disarmament field offer the most effective means of exploiting widespread concern over the Middle East conflict and of striking a blow at the NATO alliance.

The statement was intended to show that the USSR is exercising restraint in the Middle East crisis in contrast to the "reckless adventures" of the Western powers. This theme of restraint, however, is accompanied by a pointed reminder of Western Europe's vulnerability to Soviet military power. The statement contends that if the USSR had in fact been guided by the aggressive intentions which the West has ascribed to it, it could have used the present situation "for coming out against the armed forces of the Atlantic bloc and could accomplish the military aims with regard to Western Europe ascribed to it, even without the use of up-to-date nuclear and rocket weapons."

The Soviet leaders probably expect this reminder, together with the announcement of the nuclear weapons test, will have an inhibiting effect on the actions of

Britain and France in the Middle East and promote neutralism in Europe. They were probably encouraged to deliver their implied threat by a belief that the cease-fire in Egypt was the direct result of Bulganin's threatening notes of 5 November to Eden, Mollet and Ben-Gurion.

The only new feature in the statement's disarmament proposals is the expression of Moscow's readiness to "examine" the question of using aerial photography "in the area of Europe where forces of the Atlantic bloc and Warsaw pact member states are stationed to a depth of up to 800 kilometers (about 500 miles) to the west and east from the border line of the above-mentioned forces." This shift on aerial inspection was intended to create the impression that the USSR has made an important concession to the West in an effort to break the deadlock on disarmament, whereas almost no Soviet territory is involved and much of Western Europe is included.

The statement's seven-point program was drawn from various Soviet disarmament plans over the past eighteen months. Unlike the proposals of 10 May 1955 and 27 March 1956, this latest package plan does not offer a logical and coherent disarmament procedure. The seven points selected were those calculated to produce the most favorable immediate impact on world opinion. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. LATEST SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST

	The USSR announced that on 17 November it had conducted a successful nuclea weapon test at great altitude.
Comment	
	an explo-
	n the vicinity of the Semipalatinsk nuclear
	g ground at about 0820Z on 17 November.
Preliminary da	ta
altitude not gre	the weapon was detonated at an ater than 10,000 feet. The yield is tenta-
	d to fall within the high kiloton or low mega-

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7. NASR'S COMMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH USSR

and 20 armored very equipment. He act at his forward ma	President Nasr in commenting on British allegations of a huge military build-up preparatory to a joint Soviet-Egyptian attack on Israel told that He said he had lost about 30 Soviet tanks ehicles and quantities of other non-Soviet limitted he had also lost the military stores intenance base, but he insisted his losses at in Sinai had not been heavy.	
Regarding Soviet volunteers, he state that he had oral and written assurances from the USSR of subject and he would only have to ask for assistance and Soviet Union would come to his aid or "lose face." Nasr serted he had decided to go it alone, except for such ass ance as he might get from the UN, not bringing the Russ in and running the risk of World War III.		
Comment		
	tend to sup-	
port Nasr's assertion that he is still maintaining considered in his dealings with Moscow. It is probable to the Nasr hopes ultimately to assume an independent position tween the Communist bloc and the West. Israel apparently has captured a larguantity of materiel in Sinai. It has not, however, reverthe capture of a stockpile of modern equipment such as be expected had the USSR planned to use this materiel major Middle East action.		

8. ARAB LEAGUE MEETING

The meeting of representatives of nine Arab states on 13 and 14 November, which was called to review the situation resulting from the British-French-Israeli action against Egypt, again revealed basic Arab disunity and did not achieve solid Arab alignment behind Egypt. The final communiqué was couched in generalities and vaguely threatened joint military action but did not even include an unequivocal decision that all Arabs break diplomatic relations with France and Britain, something Egypt reportedly pressed for. Apparently no decision was reached on financial aid to Jordan.

Lebanese premier Yafi fell as the conference adjourned.

the government fell over the question of breaking diplomatic relations with Britain and France. Yafi wished to break relations but President Chamoun did not.

In Washington the Egyptian ambassador, commenting on the conference said, "the results were not very good." The Israeli press and radio, usually well-informed on Arab affairs, is reporting the meeting as a serious setback for President Nasr of Egypt.

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9. STRIKES CONTINUE IN HUNGARY

The regime of Janos Kadar has tightened restrictions on the delivery and distribution of food in Budapest in an effort to exert increased pressure on workers, who have apparently largely ignored a call by the Central Workers' Council of Budapest to end the general strike. Only government food trucks are permitted to enter the city and no individuals may go into the country for supplies.

The American legation in Bucharest reported on 16 November

the pas-

sage of sealed freight cars loaded with young Hungarians through Cluj, Predeal and Ploesti en route to the Soviet border. The

Budapest legation says Kadar told worker groups on 16 November that he was powerless to stop deportations. The Soviet Military Command has said reports of deportations were "in error."

In an attempt to reorganize the remnants of the army, Minister of Armed Forces Muennich on 16 November ordered all army personnel who were still away from their places of duty to report by 1900 on 18 November or be considered deserters. This move may be a forerunner to a purge of military personnel who supported, and continue to support, the insurgents against the Soviet troops.

10. RESUMPTION OF LONG RANGE AIR FORCE OPERATIONS IN SOVIET ARCTIC APPEARS IMMINENT

Tiksi

airfield in the central Arctic was open to TU-4 (BULL) and TU-16 (BADGER)

medium bombers, M-4 (BISON) jet heavy bombers and TU-95 (BEAR) turboprop heavy bombers. Such serviceability reports usually precede use of the airfield by the specified types of aircraft.

Comment

The use of Tiksi airfield by TU-95's and M-4's would mark the first appearance of Soviet heavy bombers in the central Arctic.

During the spring of this year, small numbers of TU-4's and TU-16's operating out of Severomorsk and Amderma made long overwater flights in the western and central Arctic as far east as Tiksi. Since October there have been indications

of a resumption of Long Range Air Force operations in the Arctic. Recent preparations suggest that the impending operations extend as far east as Cape Schmidt on the Chukotsk Peninsula.

Operations in the Soviet eastern and central Arctic by medium and heavy bombers would represent a further development in Long Range Air Force training.

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