


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
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
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
### THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

[ ] (page 10)

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## 1. GREEK ELECTION RESULTS



Preliminary results of the Greek parliamentary elections indicate that Prime Minister Karamanlis will probably have a small majority in the new parliament. However, he polled about 200,000 fewer popular votes than the Popular Front coalition, with more than 3,000,000 votes counted.

The effectiveness of the new government which the king is expected to ask Karamanlis to form depends now on the number of deputies who can be persuaded to defect from the Popular Front. Although the center parties of the coalition insisted that their co-operation with the Communist-front EDA was for the elections only, a strong effort will probably be made by the leftists to maintain Popular Front cohesiveness in parliament. The Popular Front is expected to try to force new elections as soon as possible, arguing that Karamanlis was repudiated by the popular vote.

The government will have less freedom of action on all issues because of its narrow majority. It may be forced to take a more uncompromising stand on such problems as the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations in which popular emotions are deeply involved. 


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## 2. TITO'S MESSAGE TO SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS



Yugoslav president Tito's message of greetings to the "comrades" at the Soviet party congress is the first public response by the Yugoslav Communist Party to Soviet overtures for inter-party ties. His message calls for "all progressive forces in the world" to strengthen themselves to prevent new wars, praises Soviet economic progress, and makes approving references to the visit of the Soviet leaders to Yugoslavia.

Tito, at the same time, appears to add one note of caution in his message. He mentions that a gradual approach to improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations is the best one for the restoration of trust and co-operation and provides for the possibility of eliminating "all those elements which could prevent the strengthening of our mutual confidence."

Preliminary Yugoslav reaction to the Soviet party congress has been gratification that many Soviet views are now similar to those of Yugoslavia. Belgrade has probably gained particular satisfaction from the statement by Khrushchev that socialism could be attained through parliamentary means, since the Soviet leaders, when in Belgrade, are reliably reported to have rejected the Yugoslav concept that socialism can be attained through evolution. 

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### 3. EAST GERMANS MAY SEAL OFF WEST BERLIN ON 1 MAY

[REDACTED] recent discussions in the East German government on the problems of currency control have pointed up the necessity of completely sealing off the GDR (including East Berlin) from West Berlin and the Bonn Republic. The government reportedly is considering such measures as closing the canals connecting West Germany and West Berlin, sealing the intersector border in Berlin, and forbidding East Germans to work in West Berlin. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

#### Comment


If such restrictive measures were taken, the basic purpose would probably be to stem the flow to the West of military-age refugees. The excuse of a need for stricter currency controls would merely be a pretext to justify such measures politically. The weekly flow of refugees at present is almost twice as great as during the corresponding period last year.

The imposition of the above measures would probably not seriously affect Allied access to Berlin through East Germany, or Allied rights in East Berlin. It would, however, bring severe pressure on the West German government to undertake negotiations at a ministerial level with the East German regime in order to preserve Bonn's access to Berlin.


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#### 4. CHOU-SIHANOUK JOINT COMMUNIQUE INDICATES EVENTUAL RECOGNITION

 Although Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk apparently did not agree to immediate recognition of the Peiping regime, in signing with Chou En-lai a joint communique affirming the "five principles of peaceful coexistence," he is quoted as saying that "in the political field, in the future we shall have more and more direct and frequent contacts."

In talks with Chou, Sihanouk agreed that the "resumption" of Sino-Cambodian contacts and relations is desirable, "especially economic and cultural relations." However, he reportedly stated that it is still too early for Cambodia formally to establish diplomatic ties with Communist China.

Sihanouk has previously stated that as long as the issue between Communist and Nationalist China remains unsolved, Cambodia will not consider any procedures tending toward the recognition of Peiping. According to the Cambodian government radio on 10 February, Premier Chou En-lai accepted with "full understanding" Prince Sihanouk's desire to remain uncommitted. 

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**5. EX-PREMIER SEEKING ASIAN SUPPORT FOR  
NEUTRALIST SOUTH VIETNAM**

[redacted] [redacted] a request from Tran Van  
 [redacted] Huu, former Vietnamese premier and  
 leader of the anti-Diem group of Viet-  
 [redacted] name politicians in Paris, for a  
 meeting with Burma's prime minister. Huu wanted to dis-  
 cuss a "democratic national program for South Vietnam,  
 neither Americanized nor Communist."

[redacted]

**Comment**

[redacted]

[redacted]

Following the 1954 Geneva conference,  
 Huu was the Viet Minh's choice for premier in the south in  
 the event Diem were unseated, and he has maintained contact  
 with the Communists since that time. Huu has no popular  
 support in South Vietnam, but the Viet Minh, which occasion-  
 ally broadcasts his attacks on Diem, apparently regards him  
 as having continuing usefulness.


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## 6. BURMESE HOPEFUL OF GETTING AMERICAN AID



The announcement that Ceylon will again receive American aid has encouraged the Burmese government to hope that Battle Act problems

concerning aid to Burma have been eliminated, according to Minister of Industries Kyaw Nyein. He told American officials on 17 February that Burma was basically interested in getting American technicians in exchange for rice, permission to use the local currency proceeds from a proposed surplus commodity agreement, and a \$150,000,000 economic development loan.

The American officials gained the impression from Kyaw Nyein, as well as from other sources, that Burma could still back away from any substantial Russian assistance.

### Comment


Two weeks ago, Kyaw Nyein hinted to Ambassador Satterthwaite that if an American loan were soon forthcoming, Burma would not have to ask the USSR for so much assistance when a high-level Soviet economic mission reaches Rangoon in May. At that time, Burma was planning to ask the USSR to undertake the expansion of the steel mill near Rangoon and the construction of other plants, including one for fertilizer.

Kyaw Nyein's remarks suggest that Premier Nu's refusal to bind Burma to the terms of the Battle Act remains the principal barrier to the Rangoon government's acceptance of any American assistance not paid for with rice.


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**7. COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT REPORTED INTERESTED  
IN CZECH ARMS**



**Comment**



Ever since the armistice in Korea, the Colombians have been agitating for increased and diversified arms shipments from Western sources. Among the items in which they have shown interest is materiel for a battalion of 105-mm and a battalion of 155-mm artillery.



(Concurred in by ORR)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

**THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION**  
(Information as of 1700, 20 February)

[redacted] the  
Syrian air force has eleven jet fighters and four conventional  
types ready for combat. Some of the jets are fitted to carry  
1,000-pound bombs. The American air attaché has noticed  
increased flying training, stockpiling of aviation fuel, and  
strict security measures at the military airfield near Damas-  
cus. [redacted]

[redacted]