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1. "RESIGNATION" OF MOLOTOV

The "resignation" of Soviet foreign minister Molotov, who had been losing influence since Khrushchev's ascendancy, appears to have been timed to precede the visit of
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Marshal Tito to Moscow as evidence of the Soviet leaders' sincere desire to secure a full rapprochement with the Yugoslav Communist Party. Molotov, who strongly opposed the reopening of Soviet relations with Yugoslavia last year, was closely associated in Yugoslav eyes with Stalin in responsibility for the 1948 break with Tito.

Molotov's successor, D. T. Shepilov, editor of Pravda since 1952 and a top-ranking party ideologist, has been active in Soviet foreign relations since at least 1954 when he accompanied Khrushchev and Bulganin on their trip to China. He accompanied them again on the trip to Belgrade in 1955 at which time there were rumors that he had been picked to succeed Molotov. In July 1955, he represented the Soviet leadership in Cairo in concluding the arms deal with Premier Nasr. He was elected a Communist Party secretary under Khrushchev in July 1955 and in February 1956 was also made a candidate member on the party presidium. He will probably relinquish his secretariat position and the editorship of Pravda in order to devote himself to his new duties.

Molotov's resignation will remove a figure long identified in Western opinion as the uncompromising executor of Stalin's foreign policy. The top Soviet leaders may believe that Shepilov will be more effective in carrying out the more flexible diplomatic program which the USSR has been developing since March 1955.

	Although Molotov retains his posts as first
deputy	premier and probably as a member of the party presidium
he has	long since lost any influence he may have had on Soviet
policy.	

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2.		SHES OFFICES TO PLACE SOLDIERS IN JOBS
		The USSR announced on 26 May that it recently established special commissions to help place former servicement in civilian jobs.
	of these specia	Since there is already an established placing unassigned personnel, the setting up I facilities suggests that the USSR intends to nnounced reduction of its armed forces on a (Prepared by ORR)

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3.	HATOYAMA-	CHOU	MEETING	MAY	BE IN	OFFING
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Both Chou and Hatoyama have expressed a desire to meet to discuss common problems, particularly the question of official relations. Chou recently told a visiting Japanese delegation that the Chinese Communists 'would reserve Peiping airport exclusively' for Hatoyama if he should visit China.

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J	HIS PARTY
	20 Liberal Party assemblymen have resigned from President Rhee's Libera Party since the 15 May elections, and
	about 50 more have threatened to resign. The Liberal
	Party had controlled about 140 of the 203 seats in the National Assembly.
	LUIIAI ASSCIIIDIY.
	Liberal Party dissension stems from concern over the recent election results and dissatisfaction with party policies.
Cor	nment President Rhee probably will be succe
- 1 -	ful in forestalling any large-scale switches of allegiance within the assembly. Since the party resignations began, the government has removed two high officials who had be under attack by the assembly and promoted two Liberal Passemblymen to cabinet posts.
	Dhee in concentrating on nexty harms
;	Rhee, in concentrating on party harmonis ignoring the more serious problem of popular dissatisfaction, which manifested itself strongly in the elections.
	He has indicated that he plans no changes in government policy.

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5. SAAR PROBLEM UNRESOLVED ON EVE OF ADENAUER-MOLLET MEETING

French premier Mollet and West German chancellor Adenauer will meet on 4 June at Luxembourg with important aspects of the Saar problem still unresolved by the technical specialists. Meetings since mid-May on the problems of the Warndt mines and the Moselle Canal have failed to reach the settlements which France has declared

are a prerequisite for the transfer of the Saar from French to West German control.

According to a French Foreign Ministry spokesman, one of the greatest difficulties is the French Finance Ministry's haggling over details. Mollet may have to intervene in order to avoid a stalemate.

A Bonn Foreign Ministry spokesman has concluded that the lack of progress makes it unwise for Adenauer and Mollet to discuss the Saar in the coming meeting. Since, however, Adenauer desires to reach agreement with the French on EURATOM and the common market, he may feel constrained to make enough concessions on the Saar to establish a basis for further negotiations.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 1700, 1 June)

The wording of the joint Jordanian-communique announcing conclusion of a military agreen tween the two countries indicates that Jordan continues Syrian and Egyptian pressure to become a full member Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi alliance. The Jordanians have, taken a significant step in that direction by agreeing to tablishment of a "military council" and a "permanent jo tions organization." Such an organization presumably we counterpart of the existing Syrian-Egyptian joint command	nent be- to resist of the however, the es- oint opera- vill be the
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