


~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)

EJ




13 April 1955



Copy No. 94


CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 6
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 8/1/80 REVIEWER: 



Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUMMARY

SOVIET UNION

1. Bohlen comments on Molotov congratulatory telegram to Eden (page 3).

SOUTHEAST ASIA

2. Comment on Senator Recto's demand for revision of Philippine foreign policy (page 3).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3. Iraq to give "final" warning to Syria to abstain from new Arab pact (page 4).


THE FORMOSA STRAITS

(page 6)

* * * *



~~TOP SECRET~~

SOVIET UNION**1. Bohlen comments on Molotov congratulatory telegram to Eden:**

Ambassador Bohlen believes Molotov's telegram of congratulations to Sir Anthony Eden may have been a hint that Moscow would not rebuff an approach

concerning high-level talks such as Churchill made last summer. He believes that there has been no comparable Soviet message to a Western statesman since the war.

Bohlen suggests that Foreign Minister Molotov rather than Premier Bulganin signed the message because of the former's personal association with Eden during and since the war.

The ambassador emphasizes the contrast between the telegram and the "mean-spirited and cheap attack" Soviet propaganda made on Churchill when he resigned. He notes that while press treatment of Churchill has varied since Stalin's death, there have recently been savage personal attacks on him in the press as well as in Molotov's Supreme Soviet speech on 8 February. On the other hand, criticism of Eden's speeches has not extended to him personally.

Comment: Molotov may hope to revive the close working relationship achieved with Eden during the Geneva conference with a view to further negotiations on the Formosa question. He has already privately encouraged the British to keep up their efforts to devise a solution to that problem.

**SOUTHEAST ASIA****2. Comment on Senator Recto's demand for revision of Philippine foreign policy:**

Senator Recto is taking advantage of the tense situation in the Far East to challenge

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted] the wisdom of close Philippine support for America's Formosa policy. The senator, who has frequently attacked American foreign policy, sought support in the Philippine Senate on 12 April for a proposal to place Formosa and the Pescadores under UN trusteeship, while in a press interview last week he said he personally was "not opposed" to Communist China's admission to the UN. The senator also urged a "realistic revision" of Philippine foreign policy.

Although President Magsaysay and the Philippine government still firmly oppose accommodation to Communist China, Recto and his followers may embarrass the government on the eve of the Afro-Asian conference.

While Recto, a member of Magsaysay's Nacionalista Party, is now more or less isolated in his demand for a revision of Philippine foreign policy, he has succeeded in creating considerable uncertainty in the Philippines regarding the wisdom of going along with American policies in the Far East. [redacted]

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3. Iraq to give "final" warning to Syria to abstain from new Arab pact:

[redacted] Baghdad instructed its minister in Damascus on 10 April to warn the Syrian government that if Syria signs a new pact with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, it must hold itself responsible for any consequences. The minister was to add that this warning was final and that Iraq would not be prepared to reopen the subject.

The under secretary of foreign affairs, who gave this information to the American embassy in Baghdad, stated that his government was taking this action because of an intimation from Damascus that Syrian foreign minister Azm intends to sign such an agreement at the end of April.

The official defined "consequences" as economic pressures, withholding assistance against Israel, and

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

"other measures deemed advisable." He excluded the movement of Iraqi troops. He believes that the best these forms of pressure can now achieve is to keep Syria inactive in the face of Egyptian blandishments.

Comment: This warning may lead pro-Iraqi Syrians to assert themselves against Azm's policy. It will almost certainly increase doubts within the Syrian cabinet as to the wisdom of going ahead with even a watered-down version of a new Arab pact.

Iraq's action appears to be well timed, since the Egyptian leaders who in the past have sought personally to counter Iraqi pressure are now en route to the Afro-Asian conference in Indonesia.

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE FORMOSA STRAITS



Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group for the Formosa Straits Problem

This report is based on information received in Washington up to 1100 hours 12 April 1955.

1. The Chinese Nationalists on Quemoy fired over 200 155mm artillery rounds at Communist positions and radar sites on Amoy. This was the first use of the recently arrived battery of four US 155mm guns. The shelling provoked 40 rounds of Chinese Communist 152mm artillery counter battery, which damaged one of the Nationalist guns and again demonstrated very effective Communist employment of artillery. [REDACTED]

2. On the night of 11 April, the Chinese Nationalists stationed three naval patrols of two ships each in the sea area north of the Matsus in order to interdict the Chinese Communist coastal logistic effort. If this operation continues and the proper type ships are aggressively employed, these patrols could be a significant naval contribution to the defense of these islands. [REDACTED]

CHINA-FORMOSA SITUATION



COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND

PRIMARY
SECONDARY

- ▲ OPERATIONAL
- ▲ SERVICEABLE
- ▲ UNKNOWN
- ▲ OTHER

USEABILITY

- + MIG-15, MIG-17, TU-4, IL-28
- | TU-2, IL-10, LA-9/11, LI-2, etc.
- unknown
- * Fields not considered capable of supporting sustained operations at present.

DESIGNATIONS

- PRIMARY: considered most important in area, with prepared runway generally 5000 feet or longer.
- SECONDARY: auxiliary or emergency bases, or fields of lesser importance—runways generally less than 5000 feet.
- OPERATIONAL: consistently used by military & civilian aircraft.
- SERVICEABLE: capable of use by aircraft.
- UNKNOWN: current status undetermined.
- OTHER: under construction, abandoned, or unserviceable.

★ NATIONALIST AIRFIELD

