


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
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 32
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 9/1/80 REVIEWER: 



Office of Current Intelligence

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SUMMARY

SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. Change of Indonesian army chief of staff may affect September elections (page 3).


SOUTH ASIA

2. India concerned over continuing Afghan-Pakistani dispute (page 3).
3. Pakistan reportedly agrees to negotiation of dispute with Afghanistan (page 4).

EASTERN EUROPE

4. Yugoslavs submit agenda for proposed "technical talks" with Western powers (page 5).

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. Change of Indonesian army chief of staff may affect September elections:

It appears likely that Colonel Utoyo, who is the army commander in South Sumatra, will be appointed to replace General Sugeng, Indonesia's army chief of staff, whose resignation the government has just accepted. His appointment would mark a further step in the progressive weakening of anti-Communist factions in the army and may have an effect on the September elections.

Sugeng has been opposed to Iwa, the pro-Communist defense minister, and sympathetic toward the anti-Communist army factions. Utoyo leans politically toward the National Party, which heads the present government. Although he is termed a neutralist with respect to army factions, he may be expected to support Iwa so long as Iwa has the backing of the rest of the cabinet.

Four of Indonesia's seven territorial commanders are strongly anti-Communist. They have been fairly successful in acting independently of Iwa and had been largely counted on by opposition political groups to ensure honest elections. Without a sympathetic army chief of staff in Djakarta, these commanders probably will have less influence on the elections.

SOUTH ASIA

2. India concerned over continuing Afghan-Pakistani dispute:



Comment: India has in the past supported Afghanistan, and immediately following the 30 March incidents in Kabul, Indian propaganda had a pro-Afghan slant. Since that time, however, India has become increasingly alarmed over the course of events and is almost certainly not supporting Afghanistan.

The Indian government [redacted] has no desire to see an armed clash between Pakistan and Afghanistan or the development of a situation that is conducive to Soviet intervention.

3. Pakistan reportedly agrees to negotiation of dispute with Afghanistan:



If it could be assembled, a fact-finding or mediation mission by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran would probably consume several months in investigation and negotiation. There is no reason to believe that it could successfully attack either the Pushtoonistan problem or the issue of Afghan economic ties with the USSR. It is even doubtful that it could produce proposals leading to a satisfactory settlement regarding the looting of the Pakistani embassy in Kabul on 30 March.

Accordingly, while an attempt at mediation might relieve current tensions, the net result of any negotiations would be to prolong existing confusion and to encourage the Afghans to believe that strong resistance by Kabul can eventually overcome even the direst Pakistani threats.

EASTERN EUROPE

4. Yugoslavs submit agenda for proposed "technical talks" with Western powers:

On 10 May Yugoslav foreign minister Popovic handed Ambassador Riddleberger a proposed agenda for a technical conference with American, British, and French representatives on the Western military aid program in Yugoslavia. The conference would include a discussion of detailed Yugoslav proposals to expand aid in the future.

Popovic suggested that this conference be held in Paris at the end of May or the beginning of June. He

added that the Western powers may decide how best to link the technical conference with the conference of the same powers to appraise the international situation which was suggested by Tito.

When reminded by Ambassador Riddleberger of the importance of over-all military co-ordination between Yugoslavia and the West, Popovic stated that this matter could be discussed at the technical conference wherever it might be related directly to the agenda.

Popovic's attitude in the meeting with Riddleberger was aggressive, suggesting to the ambassador that the Yugoslavs have chosen audacity as the best opening gambit in the diplomatic maneuvering on the question of talks and planning with the West.

Comment: Popovic's proposal results from the suggestion for "technical talks" which Tito made to Riddleberger on 27 April. Because of their continued opposition to increased military commitments to the West, the Yugoslavs will probably try to prevent discussion of broader planning problems at either the technical conference or the general appraisal meeting.