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
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


Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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**1. EGYPT ALERTS FORCES ON ISRAELI FRONTIER**

[redacted] Cairo is reinforcing its forces in the Gaza strip and is issuing additional military equipment such as live grenades and barbed wire.

Egypt's military command has restricted leaves, and raised its state of readiness to "number one." [redacted]


**Comment**

Egypt's actions, which are probably defensive in intent, spring largely from immediate concern over Tel Aviv's delay in implementing the Israeli-Egyptian agreement that both sides withdraw from the El Auja demilitarized zone. Egypt considers General Burns' request [redacted] for a further delay to be an indication that Israel is maneuvering to gain time to prepare for further aggressive action.

Defense Minister and Prime Minister-designate Ben-Gurion has recently issued several blunt statements to the effect that he would break the Egyptian blockade of the Israeli port of Elat at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba.

Egypt is also aware that its arms deal with the Soviet bloc has roused strong Israeli concern and may anticipate Israeli border action on that account.

## 2. FRENCH WILL LIMIT AIR SUPPORT OF LAOTIAN ARMY IF HOSTILITIES FLARE UP

 The French High Representative in Vientiane has told Ambassador Yost that in the event of stepped-up hostilities in northern Laos, French aircraft will be available for use behind the lines but will not drop troops or munitions directly into combat. The French will take no action that might subject them to charges of violating the Geneva accords.

The American embassy notes that the situation could become critical any time after 11 October, the break-off date for government-Pathet Lao negotiations, and fears that last-minute qualms in Paris on the use of French planes might lead to fatal delays.

### Comment

The Laotian forces in the two northern provinces are almost wholly dependent on air supply which has been provided by French C-47's. During a Pathet attack in July, the French refused to fly in reinforcements and commercial planes were chartered at heavy cost. Not enough of these are immediately available for full-scale support.

In August the commander of the French air force in the Far East reportedly stated that French air support of the Laotian army would be withdrawn in the event of a major conflict with the Pathets.

### 3. COMMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF FRANCE'S UN DELEGATION

[REDACTED]

The French government's decision to withdraw its UN delegation following the General Assembly's vote to debate the Algerian situation probably sprang more from immediate domestic political reasons than from France's long-standing objection to what it regards as international interference in a strictly internal problem. There is little likelihood that France will sever its UN ties, and the delegation may still return to this session of the General Assembly after the Algerian debate is over.

Premier Faure was probably relieved to have an excuse for a forceful step which will be backed by most Frenchmen. France strongly resents foreign criticism of its conduct in North Africa, and most non-Communist elements can be expected to rally to Faure's support on this issue. The premier will be the target of some attacks on the ground that his vacillation on both Morocco and Algeria brought on the General Assembly's action, but most of the pressure will be directed toward hastening an Algerian political solution entirely under French auspices.

At the UN, the General Assembly can probably go no further than debate on the Algerian question, since any resolutions or recommendations require approval by two thirds of the members present and voting. France's withdrawal from the UN subcommittee on disarmament will have little immediate effect since the subcommittee had already tentatively decided to recess on 8 October until after the Geneva conference.

In Algeria, the General Assembly's action probably will strengthen nationalist opposition to French policy. Terrorists and rebels will probably increase their activities in an effort to influence UN debate.

[REDACTED]

4. **FURTHER DELAY SEEN IN MOROCCAN SETTLEMENT  
DESPITE SULTAN'S DEPARTURE**

[REDACTED] The American embassy in Paris does not think that Sultan Mohamed ben Arafa's departure from Rabat means immediate institution of a council of the throne in Morocco--the next step in the reform program for Morocco. The embassy believes that Resident General Latour won rightist acquiescence in Ben Arafa's removal only by concessions on the throne council.

**Comment**

The Moroccan nationalists will probably refuse to accept any change in the throne council agreement reached in their conference with Premier Faure at Aix-les-Bains in September. American officials in Morocco estimate that the nationalists by mid-October could again be in position for large-scale demonstrations.

The rate at which Faure implements the remaining provisions of the Aix-les-Bains agreements will probably be determined by the reaction of the nationalists. He will seek National Assembly approval of his Moroccan program, asking for patience pending its completion and relying on the assembly's reluctance to oust him while France's Algerian policy is under attack from abroad. [REDACTED]

## 5. COMMENT ON INDONESIAN ELECTION RETURNS

[REDACTED]

The substantial lead piled up by the Indonesian National Party on the basis of unofficial returns from about one third of a total of 80,000 polling stations points to the possible re-establishment of a Communist-supported government in Indonesia. The National Party, which has actively co-operated with the Communists since mid-1952, assumed first place in the provisional national count as the result of its heavy vote in Central Java. The Communists also did well in Central Java, and so far hold a strong third place in the national count. In fourth place is the Nahdlatul Ulama, a Moslem party which is supporting the present government but which supported the National Party in the previous government.

Central Java is the home of President Sukarno, who has largely identified himself with the National Party. It is also a stronghold of nationalist sentiment, on which the National Party apparently capitalized.

The Masjumi, the Moslem party which leads the present government, had been confident of winning a plurality, but held only a narrow lead before the Central Java returns were counted. It is now running second in the national count. Available reports do not indicate what part of the total so far counted is from East Java, the country's most populous district and a Moslem stronghold. Even if the Masjumi regains its plurality, however, it is likely to be a small one, and its political allies, on the basis of the present count, are polling badly. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]