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SECURITY INFORMATION

21 November 1953

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## FAR EAST

### 1. Military capabilities of North Korea seen superior to South Korea's:




A study by the Far East Command concludes 3.3(h)(2) that in the event of a renewed conflict between North and South Korea, and in the absence of foreign forces and overt logistical support,

the south would ultimately be defeated. Although South Korea could withstand an offensive for a short period, the FEC believes that North Korean air superiority and long-range covert logistical support would be decisive.

The study notes that while the South Korean army has more manpower, it has a higher proportion of support personnel and lacks armor and antiaircraft artillery. The south's superiority in artillery would be counterbalanced by the north's superiority in mortars, tanks and self-propelled guns. Removal of the UN air threat would also permit the north to use its antiaircraft artillery units in a ground role.

### 2. Sakhalin crude oil deliveries to Manchuria increasing:



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Comment: Total 1953 shipments from Sakhalin have been at least 200,000 tons, far more than in previous years and about one fifth of all Chinese imports of oil products.

Several Manchurian refineries with a combined annual capacity of more than 300,000 tons were built by the Japanese to process imported crude oil. The use of these refineries

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
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suggests that production of crude oil on Sakhalin may be rising beyond the level that can be processed by the two refineries in the Soviet Far East.

3. Chinese Communist bombers arrive at Canton in South China:



Comment: This is the first good evidence of the presence of bombers in South China. MIG-15 jet fighters of the 18th Division at Canton are the only other military aircraft known to be based in the area.

It is typical Chinese Communist air force procedure, prior to mass movements of tactical units, to transfer small numbers of the units' aircraft to the new base. The entire 20th Division and the 1st Independent Regiment may thus soon be moved to South China.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

4. Navarre foresees defensive war in Indochina until next summer:



General Navarre told Senator H. Alexander Smith on 19 November that he must fight an essentially defensive war until next summer, at which time he expects to be strong enough to engage the Viet Minh in decisive battle. In the meantime he will be able to carry out tactical offensives and clean-up operations inside the Tonkin delta.

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Navarre hopes to defeat the enemy's regular forces decisively by the spring of 1955, leaving only a guerrilla problem that can be handled by the Vietnamese army. He emphasized the problem of instilling in these troops a really warlike spirit.

Comment: This more moderate estimate of French capabilities is somewhat at variance with Navarre's presentation to an American group last summer.

Navarre's plans are based to a considerable degree on the build-up of an effective Vietnamese national army. While newly formed light battalions are being activated approximately on schedule, several of those that have seen action have made a very poor showing.

#### SOUTH ASIA

##### 5. Comment on first Afghan reaction to reports of US-Pakistani military aid pact:

The first Afghan reaction to reports of a possible military aid pact between Pakistan and the United States is critical. The Kabul newspaper Anis, which is published by the government press department and presumably reflects official Afghan opinion, foresees that any such alliance will lead to World War III.

Like India, Afghanistan opposes any increase in Pakistan's military strength which would make Karachi less susceptible to pressures such as the Pushtoonistan campaign for the independence of Pakistani tribal areas. The threat of World War III probably looms less large in the Afghan mind than in the Indian, though it makes a convenient talking point.

Despite its opposition, Afghanistan is unlikely to make any move that would materially alter its relations either with Pakistan or the United States. [redacted]

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**NEAR EAST - AFRICA**

**6. Libya seeks financial aid and treaty from Turkey:**

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**Comment:** Libya in its desire to lessen its present dependence on the Western powers has sought aid from Turkey and advice from the Arabs.

Although there is no evidence that Turkey has decided its position in this matter, Ankara's policy is to assert positive leadership in the eastern Mediterranean.

**EASTERN EUROPE**

**7. Finnish foreign minister disturbed by public disclosure of Soviet offers of assistance:**

[Redacted] Finnish foreign minister Torngren considers ex-premier Kekkonen's public disclosure of Soviet offers during his term of office an "incredible development." Torngren fears that it may bring about considerable unrest among the almost half-million displaced Karelians in Finland. 3.3(h)(2)

Torngren told the American minister that his personal knowledge of the matter was limited to one discussion in which Soviet minister Lebedev vaguely referred to a possible loan to Finland and the possible use by Finland of the Saimaa Canal, which is in that part of Karelia lost to the USSR during World War II.

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The American minister in Helsinki believes that the disclosure, which Kekkonen probably made in order to establish himself as the only leader who can ensure continuation of good relations with the USSR, may boomerang.

Comment: If the Soviet Union, which has been highly critical of the new Finnish government, fails to carry out these offers, the disclosure will seriously embarrass the new government. The displaced Karelians may be encouraged to agitate for the return to Finland of parts of their former homeland lost to the USSR in World War II.

WESTERN EUROPE

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9. French Communists press advantages against government:



The French Communist Party is attempting to force the government to drop legal proceedings against Benoit Frachon and other Communist leaders for whom warrants have been issued but not yet served. 3.3(h)(2)

The American embassy in Paris, noting the considerable publicity given Frachon's recent attendance at a labor meeting, believes that the Communists hope to make the government's anti-Communist campaign look still more ineffectual.

Comment: The recent vote in the National Assembly not to lift the immunity of Communist members showed the extent to which the Communist Party has improved its position in the assembly in recent months, partly because other deputies were aligned with it in opposition to the EDC and on the Indochina question.

Communist leaders are probably eager to exploit this advantage both to create dissension in parliament prior to next month's presidential election and to show labor that the present government can be flouted with impunity.

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