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SECURITY INFORMATION

1 December 1953

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[Redacted]

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Copy No. 84

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 67
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2009
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 20/12/79 REVIEWER [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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
GENERAL

1.



SOVIET UNION

2. New type of Soviet jet observed:



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two jet aircraft of a new type at Kazan airfield about 450 miles east of Moscow. These aircraft were apparently twin-jet light bombers with an over-all length of approximately 65

feet, and had swept-back wings and tail section.

Comment: The Soviet Union has been expected to develop an aircraft to replace the IL-28 and TU-14 jet light bombers. The swept wings indicate that the new plane has higher performance capabilities than the older types and is therefore less vulnerable to interception.

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
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3.

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4. Ambassador Bohlen comments on Soviet note:



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Ambassador Bohlen believes that the Soviet note of 26 November represents an important shift in the tactical handling of the German question and the general subject of negotiations with the West. There is no reason to believe, however, that the basic Soviet policy of supporting the East German regime has changed. World reaction to the note of 3 November has apparently convinced the USSR that its refusal to confer was more disadvantageous to its position than the risks of a discussion on Germany.

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Bohlen believes that the stated intention to call for a five-power conference is a sop to the Chinese, who must have been displeased by the four-power meeting proposal.

Comment: The note represents a tactical shift on Germany but no retreat from the familiar Soviet demand for Chinese participation in a conference. Verbose arguments to support this demand and the insistence on discussing bases and disarmament would probably be used to forestall substantive discussion of the German issue in a four-power meeting.

FAR EAST

5. Rhee repudiates agreement on observers at political conference:



According to Ambassador Briggs, President Rhee now says that at the 26 November cabinet meeting he did not authorize inviting nonvoting observers to the Korean political conference.

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
Briggs fears that the South Korean government may issue a public statement opposing such participation very soon.

Comment: Ambassador Dean had reported complete oral agreement in the 26 November meeting by both Rhee and the cabinet on inviting observer nations and on authorizing him to make the proposal to the Communists. He notes that Foreign Minister Pyun gave a statement to that effect to the press on 27 November.

It appears that Rhee has again resorted to his familiar tactics of backtracking on agreements already made.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

6.



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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

7. Comment on victory of pro-Egyptian party in Sudanese elections:

The National Unionist Party's decisive victory in the Sudanese elections is a serious setback to the independence movement in the Sudan and a triumph for the supporters of union with Egypt. The victory is also a direct reflection of the strength of the anti-British sentiment.

While Britain will continue to furnish much of the apparatus for governing the country during the three-year transition period to independence, the elections make it clear that it will experience increasing obstructionism from the pro-Egyptian faction.

Cairo may now be expected to expand its activities in the Sudan aimed at promoting union with Egypt. The vote, however, may have been more anti-British than pro-Egyptian, and the National Unionist Party, a newly formed coalition lacking experienced leadership, may not hold together.

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WESTERN EUROPE

8. French reaction to Ho Chi Minh's statement on negotiations:

French government spokesmen and the French press have been very circumspect in their reaction to the ostensible peace feeler from Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh. Premier Laniel withheld comment until the cabinet could discuss the subject. Laniel stated in last week's foreign policy debate, however, that France was willing to accept any offer from the "adversary" to negotiate, and assured the National Assembly that he intended at Bermuda to seek general pacification of Asia through negotiations.

Within the National Assembly there is now little organized opposition to the basic concept of a negotiated settlement. Although the French public will recognize as propaganda Ho's alleged reference to American pressure to ratify EDC, the mere announcement of the "offer" will hurt ratification prospects. Anti-EDC forces will seize on Ho's statement as further evidence that the general relaxation of East-West tension makes German rearmament unnecessary.

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