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SECURITY INFORMATION

22 November 1953

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Copy No. 84

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**

DOCUMENT NO. 61  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2009  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 20/12/79 REVIEWER: [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Office of Current Intelligence

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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**GENERAL**

1. Balkan Pact progress limited by Trieste dispute:

[redacted]

The Greek ambassador in Belgrade informed Ambassador Riddleberger on 20 November that he was well satisfied with the progress made in recent Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav talks on the Balkan pact. Yugoslavia agreed to permit the entry of Greek troops into the Yugoslav Vardar valley in the event of Soviet aggression.

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The Turkish ambassador, however, while confirming this progress, pointed out that difficulties had arisen owing to Yugoslav reluctance to have military information passed on to NATO which eventually might reach Italian hands.

Comment: As a possible move to help solve this problem, the Turkish government indicated to Italian premier Pella during his recent visit to Ankara, that Turkey would offer its good offices to mediate the Trieste dispute if a favorable opportunity arose. This offer reflects Turkish fears that the Trieste situation might hinder the development of the Balkan pact.

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**SOUTHEAST ASIA**

**4. Chinese Communists reported extending influence into Burma:**

[redacted]

**The Chinese Communists have strengthened their military forces along Burma's north-eastern frontier and are extending their influence into Burmese territory,** [redacted]

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[ ] The Chinese Communists reportedly are now in military control of most of the Wa States, a small area in Burma bordering Yunnan province. Communist efforts to win over the local inhabitants along the border are said to be meeting with some success.

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### NEAR EAST - AFRICA

#### 5. Signs of increased political stability reported in Iran:

[ ] Ambassador Henderson reports from Tehran that the downward trend in the prestige of Prime Minister Zahedi's government has been reversed, at least temporarily. The government's greater self-confidence is reflected in Zahedi's recent cabinet changes.

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The public appears impressed by the strict order maintained during the 12 November demonstrations and the apparent solution of pressing financial problems. The initial impact of Mossadeq's demagogic behavior at his trial has been dissipated.

Apparently the shah is now less preoccupied with seeking a potential alternative to Zahedi as prime minister. Effective propaganda is expected to result from wide distribution of a photograph showing the shah and Zahedi smiling at each other.

Comment: This relatively favorable report of Iranian political stability is encouraging but probably not indicative of long-term stability.

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
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7. Egypt reportedly prepared to break off talks with Britain:



According to the Egyptian ambassador in Washington, Vice Premier Nasr told General Robertson, prior to the latter's departure for London, that Egypt would

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feel compelled to break off the talks with Britain unless a new British attitude were forthcoming which would permit an agreement between the two countries. Nasr warned that without an agreement Cairo would no longer be bound by the concessions it had already made and would feel free to take whatever action it thought best. He added that Nasr was prepared to tell the British "take up your base and go."

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Comment: This strong statement by the most influential member of the Egyptian military regime reflects the impatience of the Cairo government and increases the possibility of a break since Egypt, like Britain, is apparently not willing to make further concessions on the major points of difference.

**WESTERN EUROPE**

8. Paris embassy comments on French foreign policy debate:



Reporting on the French National Assembly's foreign policy debate, American minister Achilles commented that all factions seemed to welcome a showdown on the government's European policies. He emphasized that the Assembly is increasingly aware that a final decision on ratification must come early next year.


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Achilles stated that the government-sponsored motion on foreign policy seems likely to meet Socialist demands regarding EDC and that the outcome of the present debate will bring a reasonably clear indication of the Assembly's attitude. He pointed out, however, that this motion presumably would produce a break with the ex-Gaullists which Premier Laniel is still trying to avoid.

Comment: The ex-Gaullists have repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the cabinet coalition over the EDC issue. Their withdrawal would not necessarily cause the fall of the present government, particularly in view of the presidential election scheduled for mid-December.

**LATIN AMERICA**

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