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SECURITY INFORMATION

4 December 1953

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**Office of Current Intelligence**

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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## SOVIET UNION

### 1. Comment on appointment of new Soviet ambassador to China:

The appointment of Pavel Yudin as Moscow's third ambassador to Communist China in 18 months places a leading party man in what is probably the USSR's most important diplomatic post. His appointment appears to point up Soviet sensitivity to the delicate problems presented by Mao Tse-tung's special stature in the Communist world and Peiping's recently enhanced position in the Soviet Orbit.


Yudin, an alternate member of the enlarged party presidium from October 1952 to March 1953, is a propagandist and theorist who as editor of the Cominform journal and deputy high commissioner for the German Democratic Republic has specialized in Satellite party affairs. In 1952 he was chosen to review the first Russian-language edition of Mao's selected works which he did in glowing terms.

Yudin appears better qualified than Kuznetsov, whose experience was restricted to economic matters, to handle the increasingly complex Sino-Soviet relationship. The fact that Kuznetsov is still referred to as a deputy foreign minister suggests that his removal was not a demotion and has little bearing on the internal Soviet political situation.

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## SOUTHEAST ASIA

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
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
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
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**NEAR EAST - AFRICA**

**4. Iran prepared to resume relations with Britain:**



Foreign Minister Entezam told Ambassador Henderson on 3 December that Iran is prepared to announce the resumption of diplomatic relations with Britain on 5 December.

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Entezam added that he was notifying Foreign Secretary Eden that the joint communique suggested by the latter is satisfactory. He was also inquiring whether Britain is agreeable to the announcement on that date.

Entezam also told Henderson that an announcement concerning the exchange of ambassadors would be made at the same time.

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
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
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**7. Jordan considers UN conference with Israel "impracticable" now:**




According to Ambassador Mallory, Jordan has informed Arab missions in Amman that it will tell the UN secretary general that the proposed UN conference with Israel is impracticable" at this time. Jordan, however, may indicate willingness to conduct discussions with Israel under the more limited framework of the Mixed Armistice Commission. He adds that Jordan has invited the comments of the other Arab governments regarding such a move.

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**EASTERN EUROPE**

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
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SECURITY INFORMATION**WESTERN EUROPE****9. French deputies impressed by Soviet note:**

The American embassy reports that the French public's reaction to the Soviet note of 26 November has been "reasonably skeptical," but that the note's impact on the assembly has been considerable. The embassy sees the ill effects intensified by the Ho Chi Minh "offer," the confused foreign policy debate, and French concern over American intentions in Europe.

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Comment: The ex-Gaullist contingent in the assembly admitted that the Soviet note induced it to abstain in the recent foreign policy vote.

A number of Paris papers interpreted the note as a withdrawal of earlier conditions for talks. One rightist as well as one leftist paper saw in it a softening of the Soviet attitude toward the West.

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