

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

16 July 1953

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Copy No. 11

3.5(c)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 21
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2005
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 2-21-71 REVIEWER [Redacted]

3.5(c)

[Redacted]

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]
SECURITY INFORMATION

S U M M A R Y

GENERAL

- 1. Comment on promised Soviet contribution to UN technical assistance program (page 3).

SOVIET UNION

- 2. Comment on dismissal of Georgian MVD minister (page 3).

FAR EAST

- 3. North Korean IL-28 jet bombers have "combat" mission (page 4).
- 4. Loss of Tachens seen certain in event of concerted Chinese Communist attack (page 4).

SOUTHEAST ASIA

- 5. Alliance between Burmese Communists and Karen insurgents believed limited (page 5).

- 6. [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

- 7. Comment on the resignation of pro-Mossadeq Iranian deputies (page 6).

WESTERN EUROPE

- 8. Possibility seen of Soviet moves to block private food shipments to East Germany (page 7).

* * * *

[redacted]

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL

1. Comment on promised Soviet contribution to UN technical assistance program:

The announcement by the Soviet delegate to the UN Economic and Social Council of the USSR's willingness to grant \$1,000,000 and to lend the services of Soviet experts to the UN technical assistance program contrasts with previous boycotts by Soviet bloc countries of all UN meetings dealing with this program. This action indicates that the political struggle within the Soviet regime has not changed the foreign policy of conciliation which followed Stalin's death. It also suggests Moscow's awareness that the American technical assistance program has produced favorable reactions in underdeveloped countries.

Participation in the UN program, to which the US contributed \$11,400,000 last year, will give the USSR a voice in the planning of programs and the allocation of funds and will enable it to claim credit for UN aid extended to "backward areas."

SOVIET UNION

2. Comment on dismissal of Georgian MVD minister:

The ouster of D. G. Dekanozov, Georgian MVD minister, appears to be the first of several expected replacements of Beria lieutenants in the police apparatus. After Stalin's death men classed as loyal to Beria were moved into security ministry posts also in the Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian, Kazakh, Belorussian and Armenian Republics.

Dekanozov, a native Georgian, was appointed MVD minister in the April reorganization in Georgia which reversed the purges carried out under Stalin in 1951-52 and placed several Beria followers in key positions. A Georgian Party Congress called for 25 May to ratify these changes has not been held to date, indicating that Beria's decisions were undergoing review.

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~ []
SECURITY INFORMATION

Dekanozov had worked under Beria in the secret police from 1921 to 1931, as a party secretary from 1931 to 1936, and was brought to Moscow in 1938 when Beria took over the All-Union police machine.

Indications are that the coup against Beria and his followers is proceeding without serious internal disorder. Dekanozov's ouster, following the purge of Beria, may presage a shake-up in Georgia, where the latter was particularly influential.

FAR EAST

3. North Korean IL-28 jet bombers have "combat" mission:

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

Comment:

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

The North Korean air force now has approximately 40 IL-28's, and the crews are believed to have been ready for combat since May.

4. Loss of Tachens seen certain in event of concerted Chinese Communist attack:

[Redacted]

An American general, recently returned from an inspection of the Tachen Islands, believes that their loss will be certain in the event of

3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

a concerted Communist amphibious attack. The general cited the defeatist attitude of the Nationalist commander and his staff, the low combat efficiency of the troops, weak naval support, lack of weapons, and poor defense planning.

Chiang Kai-shek was advised to commit an additional well-trained infantry division and the Nationalist air force to the defense of the islands. Chiang said that he had detailed a more aggressive naval commander to the Tachens, but appeared reluctant to send either air units or better troops there.

Comment: Observers in the Tachen area report that the ultimate success of the Tachen Islands defense effort will depend largely on the Chinese Nationalist navy. To date, all reports indicate a reluctance on the part of Nationalist naval commanders to engage Communist naval units in combat and an unwillingness to conduct patrols west of the Tachens despite orders from Taipei.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

5. Alliance between Burmese Communists and Karen insurgents believed limited:



The American embassy in Rangoon comments^{3.3(h)(2)} that press reports of an alliance between Karen insurgents and the Communists in Burma, which has been mooted for two years, are probably true insofar as they apply to the Karens in southern Burma. It sees no indication, however, that the more important Karen forces in eastern Burma are involved. Their position is not as desperate as that of those in the south.

The embassy points out that most Karen leaders are ardent Christians and that an agreement with the Communists is likely to cause serious dissension among the leaders in the south as well as to further isolate them from the eastern group.

Comment: Karen insurgents in Burma are believed to total about 4,000, of whom perhaps 1,000 are in south Burma.

- 5 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

6.

3.3(h)(2)

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

7. Comment on the resignation of pro-Mossadeq Iranian deputies:

The mass resignation with the prime minister's approval of pro-Mossadeq deputies on 14 July ostensibly leaves him in a stronger power position, but is actually an admission of the failure of his parliamentary maneuvering. The action was reportedly precipitated by the opposition's plans to try to force a vote of confidence and by inquiries of opposition deputy Makki, a newly appointed comptroller of the National Bank, concerning the expanded note issue secretly authorized by Mossadeq.

The move blocks further action on the "committee of eight report," which, if adopted, would reduce the shah to a figurehead. On the other hand, it removes any hope of such opposition elements as General Zahedi that Mossadeq can be eliminated by parliamentary means.

The prime minister is now free to rule by decree until his grant of full powers expires in January 1954. While this has been legally possible in the past, Mossadeq has avoided full responsibility by consulting the Majlis and getting its support for his various measures.

- 6 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION


3.5(c)

The shah has the nominal right under the constitution to remove the prime minister; there is, however, no indication that under present circumstances he would attempt to do so.

Mossadeq, who is not inclined to assume full dictatorial powers, may order new elections if he believes his supporters can be elected. Even if a decree calling for elections were issued immediately, however, some months would elapse before they could be held. During this time Mossadeq's opposition would exploit his dictatorial attitude and might even attempt to remove him by force.

WESTERN EUROPE

8. Possibility seen of Soviet moves to block private food shipments to East Germany:



Any overt action by the Bonn government to increase the number of individual food gift parcels to East Germany may prompt Soviet authorities to cut off the present flow of about 2,000,000 packages a month,

3.3(h)(2)

only parcels which are obviously from private sources are passed by the East German customs. Uniform packaging or the inclusion of American items results in immediate confiscation.



3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Should the West German populace come to consider the Western relief moves as merely cold-war maneuvers, the Adenauer coalition might share the blame in the public eye for any Soviet disruption of current food shipments.

- 7 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)