


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
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Office of Current Intelligence

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**



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**SUMMARY**

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
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**GENERAL**


**1. British and French views on Trieste solution:**



The British Foreign Office believes that demilitarization of both zones of the Free Territory of Trieste might afford Tito a way out and facilitate an agreement. A responsible French Foreign Ministry official stated that it was difficult to see how Zone A could be turned over to the Italians unless some demilitarization formula for both zones could be worked out.

3.3(h)(2)

The British Foreign Office holds the preliminary view that if the conference proposed by the Yugoslavs proves advisable, it should probably include France and must aim at a solution of the whole Trieste problem rather than just the prevention of hostilities. Meanwhile, Ambassador Luce reports that obtaining Italian concurrence to a conference would be difficult in face of the diplomatic victory Premier Pella is claiming, and that such a conference could not be held until the Italians had assumed at least administrative control of Zone A.



3.3(h)(2)

**2. Tito regarded as defending personal and party prestige in Trieste stand:**



According to the American charge in Belgrade,<sup>3.3(h)(2)</sup> the Anglo-American decision on Trieste seriously involved the prestige of the Yugoslav regime and Tito personally, and Tito's reactions have been designed to protect at all costs his position as a national symbol. The charge points out that similar circumstances emboldened Tito in 1948 "to defy what in his eyes must have been an even more formidable power complex."

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
4.



Yugoslav military moves in

3.3(h)(2)

Trieste area:



the

3.3(h)(2)

Yugoslavs have sent additional armored elements, one marine and one paratroop battalion to Zone B and have reinforced the areas bordering the Free Territory and Italy with one infantry division and elements of one tank division. The infantry division and some armored elements already in the border area

have allegedly been moved closer to the Free Territory.

The Yugoslav assistant military attache in Rome has told an American official that three additional divisions, one naval and one air unit have been ordered to positions along the Yugoslav zonal boundary.

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Comment: By closing the zonal boundary, Yugoslavia has prevented confirmation of reports of military strength increases in Zone B of Trieste. However, observations by American officials tend to support reports that reinforcements have been moved into the frontier area.

**SOUTHEAST ASIA**

**5. Preparations for large-scale Viet Minh operations against southern Tonkin delta reported:**



Viet Minh civil authorities in the area around the southern edge of the Tonkin delta have decreed a state of alert on important roads leading toward the delta,

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted] a possible indication that preparations for large-scale military operations are under way.

Meanwhile, the Viet Minh 320th Division, located in this area, reportedly engaged in reconnaissance operations with some elements believed to be active inside the French defense perimeter.

Comment: Two regular enemy divisions and elements of a third are stationed just south of the delta. Recent reports of their activities have been conflicting, but seem to indicate that for the present they have been assigned the dual mission of defending the area against possible French attack and infiltrating elements into the delta.



3.3(h)(2)

Recent French operations to counter expanded Viet Minh guerrilla warfare in the southern part of the delta have met with only limited success and at the cost of heavy casualties.


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6. Army uprising in Indonesia possible:

Government plans to remove the Indonesian armed forces chief of staff, General Simatupang, and make changes in army territorial districts that would reduce the strength of certain anti-Communist territorial commanders have caused

3.3(h)(2)

rising tension in Indonesia



"action" by the anti-Communist elements in the army responsible for the demonstrations of a year ago is likely if the government carries out its plans.

Comment: On 13 October the American

naval attache reported information that Simatupang's post was to be abolished and that his duties would be assumed by the leftist minister of defense, who has studied in Moscow. Communist sympathizers, who dominate the present government, have long sought the moderate Simatupang's removal.

3.3(h)(2)

## NEAR EAST - AFRICA

7. Israeli prime minister reportedly may resign:

Widespread speculation that Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion will resign is given substance by statements made to the American charge by the director general of the Foreign Ministry. Local press releases on this subject seem to have some official inspiration and it appears that there has been serious cabinet disagreement, possibly involving Israel's military policy.

3.5(c)

Ben-Gurion has been on vacation since 19 July. He is politically vulnerable on the charge that his pro-Western attitude has not solved Israeli problems and that the present state of relations with the United States represents the failure of his policy. Moreover, many of Israel's military leaders have long been dissatisfied with the prime minister's moderation in Arab relations and his tight control of the army.

Should Ben-Gurion disappear from the political scene, his country will have lost its ablest leader and the West one of its strongest friends in Israel.

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8.

3.3(h)(2)



**WESTERN EUROPE**

**9. France considering proposal for security guarantee to USSR:**

3.3(h)(2)



France is now considering proposing that the West offer the Soviet Union a unilateral security guarantee without prior negotiations, according to a

Foreign Ministry official. Such a guarantee would include an affirmation by all the NATO governments of their adherence to the United Nations and a West German declaration guaranteed by the occupying powers not to attempt modification of its present boundaries by force.

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The Foreign Ministry believes that such a public offer to the USSR would emphasize the West's peaceful intentions and have a salutary affect on world opinion.

Comment: This new French approach apparently supplants Maurice Schumann's 25 September speech before the UN calling for bilateral negotiations on security guarantees between the European community and Russia. The proposed West German guarantee would ease current French fears that West Germany would use EDC in an attempt to regain territories in the East.

West Germany, however, would probably refuse to support any declaration which, in its view, would jeopardize its claims to "the lost territories."

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