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	CENTRA	L INTELLIGENCE	AGENCY	

SUMMARY

	GENERAL	
•		3.3(h)(2
	SOUTHEAST ASIA	
•	Danger to Philippine security seen in reported terms for Huk surrender (page 3).	
•	Viet Minh alleges it agreed to French withdrawal from Na San (page 4).	
	NEAR EAST - AFRICA	,
•	Iranian Communists reportedly prepare for armed uprising (page 5).	
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GENERAL

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

2. Danger to Philippine security seen in reported terms for Huk

surrender:

The American embassy in Manila believes 3.3(h)(2)
that the terms for surrender reportedly
being offered the Huks by the Philippine army
commander in central Luzon are extremely

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	an opportunity to i		the	3.3(h)(2
	would cease all milder of their arms.	litary operations in re	eturn for the	, ,,
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Viet Minh all	eges it agreed to I	French withdrawal fro	om Na San:	
		11 770 1 770 1		
		the Viet Minh ganda that its failure	to attack	
		the French evacuation that The Viet Minh a		
	meni with the Fret	ich. The vier winn a	JSO SAVS IDAL	
France plans		key points in Tonkin:		

propaganda could be effective inasmuch as anti-Communist Vietnamese are already worried by the possibility that the French may negotiate with the enemy.

Comment: The Bao Dai government's attempts to attract greater Vietnamese support are weakened by any suggestion that the French might pull out and leave it to meet the Viet Minh threat alone. The anti-Communist effort is also being undermined by Vietnamese doubts as to whether the United States is committed to the defense of Vietnam in the event of a French withdrawal.

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4.		3.3(h)(2)
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5.	Iranian Communists reportedly prepare for armed uprising:	
		3.3(h)(2)
		,
	Comment: Since Zahedi is expected to	
	adopt a vigorous policy against the Communists, the Tudeh might logically attempt a coup before his government is firmly entrenched.	
	The new chief of staff has been alerted, and the security forces are considered capable of suppressing any Tudeh violence.	

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