

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

17 April 1953

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

Copy No. 60

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 17
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
FI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2009
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 12-21-79 REVIEWER: [Redacted]

3.5(c)

[Redacted]

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

SUMMARY

GENERAL

- ✓ 1. Molotov agrees to clarify position of Italian prisoners (page 3).

SOVIET UNION

- ✓ 2. Soviet ministerial reorganization causing confusion (page 3).
- ✓ 3. Comment on Pravda attack against dictatorial control of Communist Party (page 4).

FAR EAST

- ✓ 4. Yoshida seen likely to remain as Japan's prime minister (page 4).

SOUTHEAST ASIA

- 5. Declaration of autonomous state threatened in East Java (page 5).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

- 6. Comment on current Iranian situation (page 6).

EASTERN EUROPE

- 7. Czechoslovakia invites members of Soviet bloc to national steel conference (page 6).

* * * *



3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~



3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL

1. Molotov agrees to clarify position of Italian prisoners:



Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov has assured the Italian Ambassador that the recent amnesty in the USSR also applied to foreigners and that he would

3.3(h)(2)

take steps to clarify the position of Italian prisoners sentenced as war criminals. The overture was in response to the Ambassador's inquiry during a recent courtesy call.

Comment: The USSR has repeatedly asserted that it held only war criminals, not prisoners of war. Molotov's statement may foreshadow a token release of German, French, Spanish and Japanese war criminals without compromising the previous Soviet position.




3.3(h)(2)



Although this is the first official notice that the amnesty decree applies to foreigners, a British subject already has been released under the decree.

SOVIET UNION

2. Soviet ministerial reorganization causing confusion:



3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~



3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

Comment: The confusion among lower-level administrators, [redacted] 3.3(h)(2)
is a logical result of the major governmental changes which have taken place since Stalin's death.

[redacted] there may be further ministerial reorganizations in the Soviet Government requiring constitutional amendments beyond those ratified by the Supreme Soviet on 15 March. 3.3(h)(2)

The existing state of confusion within the Soviet Government may thus be prolonged for a considerable period. Such a state of flux might preclude the Kremlin's embarking on an adventurous foreign policy and would provide strong motivation for a continuation of the current "peace offensive."

3. Comment on Pravda attack against dictatorial control of Communist Party:

Pravda's denunciation on 16 April of the principle of "one person decisions" in the leadership of the Communist Party not only repudiates the basic characteristic of Stalin's regime but also in effect warns against any resumption of dictatorial control.

This is further evidence that no one individual has yet achieved the power necessary for Soviet dictatorship and suggests that some members of the hierarchy are making a concerted effort to forestall such a development.

FAR EAST

4. Yoshida seen likely to remain as Japan's prime minister:

[redacted]

The Far East Command believes that Prime Minister Yoshida will be the most likely candidate to head the Japanese Government

3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

following the 19 April Lower House elections. The expected plurality of the Yoshida Liberal Party in the Lower House will give him the largest vote on the first ballot for prime minister, but not a majority. He appears almost certain to win against either a Progressive-Hatoyama or a Socialist candidate on the conclusive second ballot, which is limited to the two candidates receiving the most votes on the first.

Under these conditions the next government would lack the support of a Diet majority and would probably be unstable and of short tenure.

Comment: [redacted] 3.3(h)(2)

Yoshida believes that if he can win 200 seats, he can gain sufficient additional conservative support for a Diet majority, but a single-party government seems unlikely. The Yoshida forces have shown unexpected vigor in the campaign.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

5. Declaration of autonomous state threatened in East Java:

[redacted] [redacted] the Army Command in East Java is expected in the next few days to announce its independence of the government because of the government's failure to dismiss all army leaders involved in the anti-Parliament demonstrations of last October. The proposed action allegedly will be supported by the National Party, the Communist Party, and a covert Moslem dissident group. 3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The American Embassy reports that the Indonesian Prime Minister conferred with the East Java commander on 15 April and that the latter now has a "sound understanding" of government policy. The Embassy, however, sees no immediate solution of the basic army problems of insubordination and bitter political factionalism.

- 5 -

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]


3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION**NEAR EAST - AFRICA****6. Comment on current Iranian situation:**

The failure of the Iranian Parliament to meet on 16 April again underscores Prime Minister Mossadeq's current political weakness. The parliamentary deadlock will presumably continue until enough pro-Mossadeq deputies return to Tehran to offset the opposition's boycott.

Despite this evident weakness, Mossadeq's extensive opposition is disunited and is said to have temporarily abandoned plans for a coup because the Shah has refused active support. The prime minister, on the other hand, controls the Army Chief of Staff, has a large popular following, which the Tudeh has temporarily joined, and commands the support of a compact bloc of parliamentary votes.

Neither the prime minister nor his opposition appears at present strong enough to win decisive control of the government. Until the parliamentary impasse is resolved, the possibility of serious disorders remains.

EASTERN EUROPE**7. Czechoslovakia invites members of Soviet bloc to national steel conference:**

The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs forwarded invitations on 1 April to the Soviet Union and its European Satellites to send delegates to a national conference of steel producers called by the new Czech

Minister of the Metallurgical Industry and Ore Mines. The meeting, scheduled for 16-18 April, was convoked to discuss new methods of steel production in order to increase Czech output in the last year of the present Five Year Plan.

3.3(h)(2)

- 6 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
SECURITY INFORMATION

Comment: The iron and steel industry, which is the key to the Czech Five Year Plan, has been singled out each year for its failure to fulfill production quotas. President Zapotocky has repeatedly criticized the lagging iron and steel production, and within four days of his election on 21 March replaced the Minister of the Metallurgical Industry and Ore Mines with a former deputy chairman of the State Planning Office. The rapidity with which the new Minister acted in calling this conference indicates the seriousness with which Czech steel production failures are viewed.

- 7 -

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)