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SECURITY INFORMATION

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FAR EAST

1. Polish and Czech governments' attitude on Korean truce unchanged:

[redacted]

The Polish government informed the Swedish 3.3(h)(2)
ambassador in Warsaw on 22 June that, while
President Rhee's release of North Korean
prisoners violated the repatriation agreement,

Warsaw nevertheless hoped that the governments on the neutral nations
repatriation commission would "not spare their efforts" for successful
conclusion of their task in Korea.

The Czech government told the Swedish
charge in Prague that the prisoner incident had not changed its
attitude concerning the armistice.

Comment: This information strengthens the
belief that the Communists desire a truce in Korea. [redacted] 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] the US army attache in Warsaw that the Polish truce team
was already in Korea.

2.

[redacted] 3.3(h)(2)

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3. South Korean assembly questions Rhee's prisoner release:

[Redacted]

American officials in Pusan report that the South Korean National Assembly has asked leading cabinet officials to appear on 27 June to explain why the recent prisoner of war release was effected without consultation with the UN Command.

3.3(h)(2)

While the assembly debate was described as "cautiously noncommittal," Assemblywoman Pak Sun-chon told the press that it was "national suicide" to thwart a cease-fire and "foolish" to attempt to stop it.

Comment: Legally, no action can be taken against a legislator while the assembly is in session. Opposition party leader Chough Pyong-ok, who is not a member of the assembly and who voiced similar criticisms, was severely beaten by Rhee followers and is now reportedly under arrest.

Ambassador Briggs has previously reported that opposition leaders, who are opposed to Rhee's extreme antiarmistice stand, now may have concluded that the time is ripe to speak out for moderation.

4. Chinese Communists augment front-line troops in Korea:

[Redacted]

The Chinese Communists have, at least temporarily, augmented their front-line strength in Korea by approximately 115,000 troops, [Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted] The 21st Army may be in immediate reserve on the west central front and the 16th and 54th Armies are moving to the central and east central fronts. It cannot now be determined whether these movements represent a reinforcement in the area for offensive purposes or a routine relief of front-line units.

Comment: [Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted] there is no evidence of planning for large-scale offensive action. Prisoners captured during the past week have indicated that only limited objective attacks had been planned by their units.

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SECURITY INFORMATION**SOUTHEAST ASIA****5. Significant increase in Chinese aid to Viet Minh reported:**

[redacted] 3.3(h)(2)
 [redacted] Communist China has significantly increased its shipments of military aid to the Viet Minh. During the first ten days of June, 1,720 tons of supplies were delivered, including large quantities of gasoline, machine guns, rifles, trucks, and several Russian 37mm antiaircraft guns.

Monthly deliveries, which averaged 200 tons last winter, had quadrupled by May [redacted] From 3.3(h)(2) 700 to 800 trucks are being utilized in the current supply effort, as compared with approximately 300 last winter.

Comment: Chinese deliveries to the Viet Minh have averaged 400 to 500 tons per month over a period of a year, with monthly totals subject to considerable fluctuations. It appears that China has initiated another summer program to resupply Viet Minh forces for next fall.

In view of reliable reports that both Chinese and Viet Minh transport capabilities have recently undergone considerable improvement, however, the recent increase may forecast a sustained higher level of aid.

6. Planned Indonesian cabinet would depend on Communist support:

[redacted] 3.3(h)(2)
 The latest Indonesian cabinet organizer, Mukarto of the National Party, is apparently planning a cabinet which would depend on the support of the Communist bloc and small center parties, but would exclude the anti-Communist Masjumi and Socialist parties. In order to keep center party support, however, he would include Communist Party members in the cabinet. Thus, the Communists would hold a whip hand over the cabinet in parliament without having to assume any responsibility.

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The embassy believes that Mukarto may be successful and comments that although a cabinet which excluded the Masjumi might be short-lived, it undoubtedly would accelerate Indonesia's leftward drift.

Comment: The former cabinet, based on a Masjumi-National Party coalition, fell when the Masjumi, Indonesia's largest party, withdrew its ministers in protest against the National Party's increasing cooperation with the Communists.

Although President Sukarno reportedly is perturbed over the Communists' emergence in the present crisis, there is no evidence that he is interfering with Mukarto's plans.

EASTERN EUROPE

7. Comment on Hungary's modification of crop collection decrees:

The Hungarian government's modification on 24 June of the terms of this year's crop collection decrees, which follows by two days a similar measure in Albania, suggests an easing of internal policies, as has occurred in the USSR and East Germany. This change contrasts markedly with the unpopular crop collection methods of last year.

The decree was preceded on 21 June by an editorial in the official party newspaper which criticized high government and party officials and trade union leaders as "opportunistic right-wing deviationists" and charged them with neglecting the welfare of the workers. Also on the 24th the Budapest press gave large play to the East German announcement of 21 June of new concessions to the workers.

WESTERN EUROPE

8. Adenauer opposes joint Allied consultations with Semenov:



Chancellor Adenauer has urged that the Allied high commissioners refrain from any joint meetings with the new Soviet commissioner

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in East Germany. He is convinced that such meetings would be interpreted by Moscow as a confession of weakness.

Adenauer also strongly hinted to High Commissioner Conant that his personal appeal on 21 June to the heads of the French, British, and US governments for intervention on behalf of the East Germans was an election campaign move which should not be taken to mean that he has relaxed his opposition to a top-level four-power conference at this time.

Conant accordingly advised the chancellor that the Allied commissioners were considering meeting their Soviet counterpart separately, but planned to restrict their discussions to deploring recent events in East Germany.

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