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SECURITY INFORMATION

28 May 1953

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**SUMMARY**

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
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SECURITY INFORMATION**GENERAL****1. Belgrade embassy discounts Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement:**

The American embassy in Belgrade notes that a Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia based primarily on Soviet concessions would cost Moscow heavily in prestige, both in the Satellites and in the West European Communist Parties. Any conciliatory gestures toward Yugoslavia, it believes, will be designed merely to appeal to such elements as the Cominform sympathizers in the Yugoslav Communist Party. Tito could be expected to control these disruptive forces.

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In the embassy's opinion, Belgrade would assess the value of any rapprochement with the USSR in realistic terms. In view of the material support and international standing acquired by Tito since his break with the Soviet bloc in 1948, it is difficult to see what inducements renewed membership in the Cominform might offer.

Although a Soviet offer to establish a Balkan Communist federation under Tito's leadership might be such "tempting bait that Yugoslav leaders could not resist rising to it," the embassy considers that such a basic change in Soviet policy in the near future is not likely.

**FAR EAST****2. South Korean army reported planning independent offensive:**

The acting chief of staff of the South Korean army has ordered plans prepared for an independent offensive. The operation is to consist of an amphibious landing on the east coast in the vicinity of Hamhung and a frontal attack toward Anju. The objective is to establish a line across the narrow neck of the peninsula.

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The American army attache comments that it is questionable whether the chief of staff is seriously considering going through with the operation, since it was discussed in the presence of an American, who could have been expected to report it to his superiors.

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Comment: A high-ranking South Korean army officer earlier informed American officials that President Rhee on 21 April had urged army officials to prepare plans to carry on the war alone. While it is probable that Rhee has ordered such planning to support his opposition to the armistice, it is unlikely that he could gain the cooperation of the army leaders for an undertaking which they recognize as unrealistic.

### SOUTHEAST ASIA

#### 3. French seen facing two alternatives in Indochina:



The counselor of the French embassy in Saigo 3.3(h)(2) Raymond Offroy, told an American embassy officer that he believed France might eventually have to negotiate a settlement with the Viet Minh or "turn the Indochina burden over to the United States." He believed that French disillusionment with the Indochina war might reach a critical point in six months.

Offroy added that support in France for the Indochina war came from elements who were opposed to granting further political concessions. These elements, he believed, lacked the foresight to support a policy designed to obtain increased native support by granting concessions to Indochinese nationalism.

### WESTERN EUROPE

#### 4. Bidault reported strongly critical of Churchill's 11 May proposal:



On his recent trip to Athens, French foreign minister Bidault denounced the Churchill proposal for four-power talks without prior agreement on the agenda, according to the Greek foreign minister. Bidault approved the United States position. 3.3(h)(2)

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The Greek foreign minister told the American ambassador that both Greece and Turkey believe the time is not ripe to carry out Churchill's proposals.

Comment: While Bidault's dissatisfaction with the Churchill speech had been expressed earlier, this is the most forthright statement of his attitude. Most European government spokesmen expressed private disapproval of the speech, which they regarded as untimely and impractical.

With the Bermuda talks pending, Bidault's close connection with French foreign policy over the past eight years suggests that he will continue as foreign minister in the next French government.

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