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SECURITY INFORMATION

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GENERAL

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FAR EAST

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5. Peiping plans to exploit capture of American pilot near Manchuria:

The British Charge in Peiping reports that the Chinese Communist press is playing up the case of an American pilot, allegedly shot down over Chinese territory, as

"living evidence" of American aggression against China.

The Charge believes that the Chinese intend to publicize the case "to the utmost," probably with a "confession" from the pilot.

According to Far East Air Force records, the pilot was shot down over North Korea near the Manchurian border.



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Comment: A major theme of Chinese Communist propaganda has been the violation of Chinese territory by American planes. A "confession" from this pilot could be used by Peiping to buttress claims of this type.

SOUTH ASIA

b.	Appointment of new general secretary of indian Communist Party	3.3(N)(Z)
	reported:	

Comment: A change in Communist Party leadership was foreshadowed by a Politburo meeting in Madras from 11 to 19 August, at which Dange was recommended for the post of general secretary. The Politburo decided at the same time to continue the use of parliamentary methods but to increase agitation among peasant, labor, and student groups, and to make plans for going underground if the party should be banned.

Dange, a Politburo member and veteran Communist leader with wide experience in both political and organizational fields, is probably better equipped to coordinate these activities than any other candidate.



WESTERN EUROPE

	Britain and France accept the American 3.3(h) view that any proposal in the UN for the unconditional withdrawal of troops from Austria must be strongly opposed. The British urge efforts toward preventing such a resolution from being presented in the General Assembly. Should one be presented, they agree that it must be amended to require
prior four-power ag	reement on simultaneous withdrawal.
	Both London and Paris, however, object to hat withdrawal should be further conditioned on the l powers of claims to German assets in Austria.

Four-power agreement for a simultaneous withdrawal would presumably include provision for a "waiting period" until Austrian security forces are established.

negotiations toward a state treaty, but the American Embassy in Vienna believes that the Austrians would support a simple evacuation proposal

8. Letourneau warns of growing French opposition to Indochina war:

should one be made.

	Minister Resident Jean Letourneau is dis-	3.3(h)(2)
	couraged by the growing opposition in the	
	French National Assembly to the military	
	effort in Indochina. He fears that there is	
strong sentiment for an ar	mistice, and is not at all certain that the	
necessary 1953 budget wil	l be approved. He admits that a desire to	

concentrate exclusively on the French position in Africa is gaining ground.



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Comment: Last May Letourneau thought that the Assembly would be willing to shoulder the financial burden in Indochina for some time provided there was a steady return to France of French troops and officer cadres. His present sentiments tend to confirm Premier Pinay's recent warning that the government's most difficult task is to reassure parliament that the financial drain of the Indochina war will not now prevent France from competing successfully with Germany.

NORTH AMERICA

9.	Need seen for increased Canadian contribution to NATO:
	The United States Special Representative in Europe states that the Canadian submission to the NATO Annual Review
	Committee shows the Canadian effort as
	incommensurate with that of other countries.
	Comment: The Canadian Cabinet has
	already refused to approve any contribution of economic and financial aid. The United States Ambassador in Ottawa has suggested that a NATO task force be sent to Capada to discuss the manner in

which production could be coordinated more closely with European NATO needs. He felt such a procedure would strengthen the hands of the two sympathetic cabinet members with their economy-minded

LATIN AMERICA

10.	Prospects	for ratifi	cation of	US-Brazil	military	pact only	fair:

The American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro reports that the chief opposition party in Brazil is now split on the question of ratifying the military pact with the United States. The Embassy

colleagues.

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adds that prospects for ratification during the present session of Congress, which ends in mid-December, appear improved, but that it is not 'all clear sailing.'

estimate of prospects for ratification yet received, and the first suggesting that the ratification is seriously in doubt.

Some misgivings regarding the pact which were engendered in the course of political debate were reportedly dissipated by a meeting of political and military leaders with Foreign Office officials on 31 October.