Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C02739455

C/FD

	-		14 August 1951	
				3.5(c)
		,	Copy No. C1-9	
				•
		CURRENT INTELLIGE	NCE BILLETIN	
			ILE	
			DOCUMENT NO.	• *
			NO CHANGE IN CLASS.	
			CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C	ad .
			NEXT REVIEW DATE:	27_
			DATE 1.12.7 REVIEWER	3.5(c)
				3.5(c)
				(-)
٠				
•				
		Office of Central I	ntelligence	
		•		
		CENTRAL INTELLIGE	NCE AGENCY	
	<u> </u>	·	•	3.5(c)
				•

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C02739455

SUMMARY

		3.3(h)(2)
	FAR EAST	
2.	US jet reconnaissance aircraft intercepted at 40,000 feet in dark (page 4).	
		3.3(h)
	SOUTH ASIA	
		3.3(h)(1)
	NEAR EAST	
5.	Financial situation causing friction between Saudi Arabia and ARA (page 5).	AMCO
	EASTERN EUROPE	
	Tito government not internally endangered (page 6).	
	LATIN AMERICA	
a	Strike reported in world's second largest oil refinery (page 7).	
	* * *	
		3.5(c)
•		

TOP SECRET

FAR EAST	
	3.3(h)(1)

Q

TOP SECRET

3.3(h)(2)

Four enemy aircraft maintained formation for a period of 25 to 30 minutes while pursuing the RB-45, which was executing evasive maneuvers. At the same time, single interceptions were occurring, including a firing pass from 1,000 feet above while the RB-45 was at 40,000 feet, and a collision course interception by an aircraft that later altered course and pulled ab reast of the RB-45. While being pursued, the RB-45 employed 100 percent power, giving a ground speed of approximately 470 knots. Comment: These interceptions clearly demonstrate the Communists' ability to accomplish a very difficult mission requiring excellent equipment, highly trained personnel and a high degree of coordination. These operations described would require an aircraft with a minimum combat radius of approximately 350 nautical miles and a considerable speed advantage over the RB-45, which is the reconnaissance version of the B-45. These attacks could not have been accomplished with the MIG-15 or the Type-15 with the 33-gallon wing tanks currently known to be in use.	total of seven enemy jets at altitudes of 35,000 to 40,000 feet have recently been reported over the Korean theater. Four enemy aircraft maintained formation for a period of 25 to 30 minutes while pursuing the RB-45, which was executing evasive maneuvers. At the same time, single interceptions were occurring, including a firing pass from 1,000 feet above while the RB-45 was at 40,000 feet, and a collision course interception by an aircraft that later altered course and pulled abreast of the RB-45. While being pursued, the RB-45 employed 100 percent power, giving a ground speed of approximately 470 knots. Comment: These interceptions clearly demonstrate the Communists' ability to accomplish a very difficult mission requiring excellent equipment, highly trained personnel and a high degree of coordination. These operations described would require an aircraft with a minimum combat radius of approximately 350 nautical miles and a considerable speed advantage over the RB-45, which is the reconnaissance version of the B-45. These attacks could not have been accomplished with the MIG-15 or the Type-15 with the 33-gallon wing tanks currently known to be in use.	2	US jet reconnaissance airc		
a period of 25 to 30 minutes while pursuing the RB-45, which was executing evasive maneuvers. At the same time, single interceptions were occurring, including a firing pass from 1,000 feet above while the RB-45 was at 40,000 feet, and a collision course interception by an aircraft that later altered course and pulled ab reast of the RB-45. While being pursued, the RB-45 employed 100 percent power, giving a ground speed of approximately 470 knots. Comment: These interceptions clearly demonstrate the Communists' ability to accomplish a very difficult mission requiring excellent equipment, highly trained personnel and a high degree of coordination. These operations described would require an aircraft with a minimum combat radius of approximately 350 nautical miles and a considerable speed advantage over the RB-45, which is the reconnaissance version of the B-45. These attacks could not have been accomplished with the MIG-15 or the Type-15 with the 33-gallon wing tanks currently known to be in use.	a period of 25 to 30 minutes while pursuing the RB-45, which was executing evasive maneuvers. At the same time, single interceptions were occurring, including a firing pass from 1,000 feet above while the RB-45 was at 40,000 feet, and a collision course interception by an aircraft that later altered course and pulled ab reast of the RB-45. While being pursued, the RB-45 employed 100 percent power, giving a ground speed of approximately 470 knots. Comment: These interceptions clearly demonstrate the Communists' ability to accomplish a very difficult mission requiring excellent equipment, highly trained personnel and a high degree of coordination. These operations described would require an aircraft with a minimum combat radius of approximately 350 nautical miles and a considerable speed advantage over the RB-45, which is the reconnaissance version of the B-45. These attacks could not have been accomplished with the MIG-15 or the Type-15 with the 33-gallon wing tanks currently known to be in use.			total of seven enemy jets at a to 40,000 feet have recently be	ltitudes of 35,000
strate the Communists' ability to accomplish a very difficult mission requiring excellent equipment, highly trained personnel and a high degree of coordination. These operations described would require an aircraft with a minimum combat radius of approximately 350 nautical miles and a considerable speed advantage over the RB-45, which is the reconnaissance version of the B-45. These attacks could not have been accomplished with the MIG-15 or the Type-15 with the 33-gallon wing tanks currently known to be in use.	strate the Communists' ability to accomplish a very difficult mission requiring excellent equipment, highly trained personnel and a high degree of coordination. These operations described would require an aircraft with a minimum combat radius of approximately 350 nautical miles and a considerable speed advantage over the RB-45, which is the reconnaissance version of the B-45. These attacks could not have been accomplished with the MIG-15 or the Type-15 with the 33-gallon wing tanks currently known to be in use.		evasive maneuvers. At the including a firing pass from feet, and a collision course course and pulled abreast	s while pursuing the RB-45, which is same time, single interceptions in 1,000 feet above while the RB-4 interception by an aircraft that I of the RB-45. While being pursue	h was executing were occurring, 5 was at 40,000 ater altered ed, the RB-45 em-
aircraft with a minimum combat radius of approximately 350 nautical miles and a considerable speed advantage over the RB-45, which is the reconnaissance version of the B-45. These attacks could not have been accomplished with the MIG-15 or the Type-15 with the 33-gallon wing tanks currently known to be in use.	aircraft with a minimum combat radius of approximately 350 nautical miles and a considerable speed advantage over the RB-45, which is the reconnaissance version of the B-45. These attacks could not have been accomplished with the MIG-15 or the Type-15 with the 33-gallon wing tanks currently known to be in use.	•	excellent equipment, highly	ility to accomplish a very difficult	; mission requirin
to be in use. 3.3(h)	3.3(h)(
			and a considerable speed a sance version of the B-45. with the MIG-15 or the Typ	ombat radius of approximately 350 dvantage over the RB-45, which in These attacks could not have been	nautical miles s the reconnais- an accomplished
			and a considerable speed a sance version of the B-45. with the MIG-15 or the Typ	ombat radius of approximately 350 dvantage over the RB-45, which in These attacks could not have been) nautical miles s the reconnais- en accomplished s currently known
			and a considerable speed a sance version of the B-45. with the MIG-15 or the Typ	ombat radius of approximately 350 dvantage over the RB-45, which in These attacks could not have been) nautical miles s the reconnais- en accomplished s currently known
			and a considerable speed a sance version of the B-45. with the MIG-15 or the Typ	ombat radius of approximately 350 dvantage over the RB-45, which in These attacks could not have been) nautical miles s the reconnais- en accomplished s currently known
			and a considerable speed a sance version of the B-45. with the MIG-15 or the Typ	ombat radius of approximately 350 dvantage over the RB-45, which in These attacks could not have been	nautical miles s the reconnais- en accomplished
			and a considerable speed a sance version of the B-45. with the MIG-15 or the Typ	ombat radius of approximately 350 dvantage over the RB-45, which in These attacks could not have been) nautical miles s the reconnais- en accomplished s currently known

TOP SECRET

It is accepted that trained Chinese crews may already be available to man several submarines, particularly of the small coastal class. Reports that Russian submarines have been transferred to the Chinese Communists have also been numerous and in part supported by sightings of submarines flying the Chinese Communist flag. The evidence, however, is regarded as inconclusive in view of the possibility that the flag may represent merely a Soviet courtesy while in a China port.

3.3(h)(2)

•				
			SOUTH ASIA	
	ta e		NEAR EAST	
	5. <u>Financia</u>	ıl situation caus	ing friction between Saudi Ara	bia and ARAMCO:
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	,	King Ibn Saud of Saudi	Arabia delivered a dia-
			tribe on his dissatisfac	ction over relations with
			the Arabian American Ambassador in Jidda o	oll Company to the US n 10 August. The King
				3.3(h)(2)
			- 5 -	3.3(11)(2)

3.5(c)

TOP SECRET

feels that his honor has been violated by ridicule and insult on the part of ARAMCO officials. Although he refused to be mollified, the King left the matter in the ambassador's hands, stating that he had previously intended to demand the recall of ARAMCO officials.

US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade reports to although the unpopularity of the Yugoslav Communist regime remains undiminished, the available evidence points to its continued stability. There seems to be a sympathetic popular understanding of the government's military and foreign policies, as well as an unconscious dissociation of certain respected members of the regime, such as Tito, Kardelj and po Pijade, from the lower officials responsible for executing the regime's rigorous policies.	US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade reports the although the unpopularity of the Yugoslav Communist regime remains undiminished, the available evidence points to its continued states. There seems to be a sympathetic popular understanding of the governot's military and foreign policies, as well as an unconscious dissociation ertain respected members of the regime, such as Tito, Kardelj and postede, from the lower officials responsible for executing the regime's prous policies. The ambassador agrees with the US Military che that the Yugoslav Army would fight loyally and, if its organization edisrupted, would resort to localized guerrilla tactics. He concludes the widespread popular discontent is caused by the continued demand for	understanding that ARA	n which he could draw up to 50 million dollars on the AMCO would assure payment when due. Such an would avert the current crisis with the King. 3.3(h)(
US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade reports to although the unpopularity of the Yugoslav Comunist regime remains undiminished, the available evidence points to its continued stability. There seems to be a sympathetic popular understanding of the government's military and foreign policies, as well as an unconscious dissociation of certain respected members of the regime, such as Tito, Kardelj and po Pijade, from the lower officials responsible for executing the regime's rigorous policies. The ambassador agrees with the US Militar Attache that the Yugoslav Army would fight loyally and, if its organization were disrupted, would resort to localized guerrilla tactics. He concludes that the widespread popular discontent is caused by the continued demand the	US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade reports the although the unpopularity of the Yugoslav Communist regime remains undiminished, the available evidence points to its continued states. There seems to be a sympathetic popular understanding of the governot's military and foreign policies, as well as an unconscious dissociation ertain respected members of the regime, such as Tito, Kardelj and postede, from the lower officials responsible for executing the regime's prous policies. The ambassador agrees with the US Military che that the Yugoslav Army would fight loyally and, if its organization edisrupted, would resort to localized guerrilla tactics. He concludes the widespread popular discontent is caused by the continued demand for		EASTERN EUROPE
US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade reports to although the unpopularity of the Yugoslav Communist regime remains undiminished, the available evidence points to its continued stability. There seems to be a sympathetic popular understanding of the government's military and foreign policies, as well as an unconscious dissociation of certain respected members of the regime, such as Tito, Kardelj and po Pijade, from the lower officials responsible for executing the regime's rigorous policies. The ambassador agrees with the US Militar Attache that the Yugoslav Army would fight loyally and, if its organization were disrupted, would resort to localized guerrilla tactics. He concludes that the widespread popular discontent is caused by the continued demand the	US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade reports the although the unpopularity of the Yugoslav Communist regime remains undiminished, the available evidence points to its continued state. There seems to be a sympathetic popular understanding of the governit's military and foreign policies, as well as an unconscious dissociation ertain respected members of the regime, such as Tito, Kardelj and postade, from the lower officials responsible for executing the regime's crous policies. The ambassador agrees with the US Military che that the Yugoslav Army would fight loyally and, if its organization e disrupted, would resort to localized guerrilla tactics. He concludes the widespread popular discontent is caused by the continued demand for	Tito government not inte	3.3(h)(2)
although the unpopularity of the Yugoslav Comunist regime remains undiminished, the available evidence points to its continued stability. There seems to be a sympathetic popular understanding of the government's military and foreign policies, as well as an unconscious dissociation of certain respected members of the regime, such as Tito, Kardelj and po Pijade, from the lower officials responsible for executing the regime's rigorous policies. The ambassador agrees with the US Militar Attache that the Yugoslav Army would fight loyally and, if its organization were disrupted, would resort to localized guerrilla tactics. He concludes that the widespread popular discontent is caused by the continued demand that	although the unpopularity of the Yugoslav Communist regime remains undiminished, the available evidence points to its continued staty. There seems to be a sympathetic popular understanding of the governit's military and foreign policies, as well as an unconscious dissociation ertain respected members of the regime, such as Tito, Kardelj and postade, from the lower officials responsible for executing the regime's prous policies. The ambassador agrees with the US Military che that the Yugoslav Army would fight loyally and, if its organization edisrupted, would resort to localized guerrilla tactics. He concludes the widespread popular discontent is caused by the continued demand for		
Attache that the Yugoslav Army would fight loyally and, if its organization were disrupted, would resort to localized guerrilla tactics. He concludes that the widespread popular discontent is caused by the continued demand to	che that the Yugoslav Army would fight loyally and, if its organization e disrupted, would resort to localized guerrilla tactics. He concludes the widespread popular discontent is caused by the continued demand for	bility. There seems to	munist regime remains undiminished, the a- vailable evidence points to its continued sta- be a sympathetic popular understanding of the govern
- 6 -	- 6 -	of certain respected men Pijade, from the lower	Mbers of the regime. Such as Tito. Kardeli and nose
- 6 -	- 6 -	of certain respected mental Pijade, from the lower rigorous policies. Attache that the Yugosla were disrupted, would rehat the widespread population.	mbers of the regime, such as Tito, Kardelj and poss officials responsible for executing the regime's The ambassador agrees with the US Military v Army would fight loyally and, if its organization esort to localized guerrilla tactics. He concludes that discontent is caused by the continued demand for
		of certain respected mental Pijade, from the lower rigorous policies. Attache that the Yugosla were disrupted, would rehat the widespread population.	mbers of the regime, such as Tito, Kardelj and poss officials responsible for executing the regime's The ambassador agrees with the US Military v Army would fight loyally and, if its organization esort to localized guerrilla tactics. He concludes that discontent is caused by the continued demand for
		of certain respected mental Pijade, from the lower rigorous policies. Attache that the Yugosla were disrupted, would rehat the widespread population.	mbers of the regime, such as Tito, Kardelj and poss officials responsible for executing the regime's The ambassador agrees with the US Military v Army would fight loyally and, if its organization esort to localized guerrilla tactics. He concludes that discontent is caused by the continued demand for
		of certain respected mental Pijade, from the lower rigorous policies. Attache that the Yugosla were disrupted, would rehat the widespread population.	mbers of the regime, such as Tito, Kardelj and poss officials responsible for executing the regime's The ambassador agrees with the US Military v Army would fight loyally and, if its organization esort to localized guerrilla tactics. He concludes that discontent is caused by the continued demand for

6

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The shrewd appeal of the	e Tito
regime to the strong nationalism of the Yugoslav people afforded i	t internal
stability even during the crucial period of the 1950 drought.	
the Yugoslav Government, although bese	t with
numerous internal difficulties, can effectively cope with the situat	ion.

LATIN AMERICA

3.3(h)(2)

7. Strike reported in world's second largest oil refinery:
Workers in the Lago refinery in Aruba, Dutch West Indies, struck on 10 August and the refinery is now operating at reduced capacity on an emergency basis, according
to the US Consul. The workers demanded a 20 percent wage increase, refused the company's counter-offer, and repudiated their bargaining committee which had accepted the offer. The Netherlands Government mediator is negotiating.

Comment: The Lago refinery, owned indirectly by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, is second only to Abadan in capacity, having a normal output of approximately 490,000 barrels daily. Labor dissatisfaction has been present for some time in both Aruba and Curacao, and has apparently been brought to a head by the workers' belief that the current international petroleum situation has put them in a strong bargaining position.

7

TOP SECRET