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*Chapman*  
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*1/10/51*

10 July 1951

[Redacted]

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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**SUMMARY**

**FAR EAST**

- 1. Reds in Korea continue build-up for July offensive (page 3).
- 2. Submarine flying Chinese flag sighted in Dairen harbor (page 3).

**NEAR EAST**

- 3. Iranians continue search for foreign oil technicians (page 4).

**WESTERN EUROPE**



3.3(h)(2)

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## FAR EAST

1. Reds in Korea continue build-up for July offensive:

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted]

The US Far East Command reports that a significant increase in the number of south-bound enemy vehicles has occurred during the past few days, approaching the volume of enemy vehicle traffic sighted immediately prior to previous enemy offensives. According to the US 8th Army, purely tactical considerations suggest that the period from 15 to 25 July is the most likely time for the enemy to resume the offensive. Although the enemy is capable of earlier offensive action, present indications point to the continuance of screening tactics and active defense, pending completion of cease-fire negotiations. A new Communist offensive probably would follow immediately after any unsuccessful termination of the talks.

The US 8th Army estimates that the enemy's main effort may be expected in the west and west-central sectors along the previously employed axes converging on Seoul, with a secondary effort in the central sector towards Chunchon and a supporting attack in the eastern sector.

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

2. Submarine flying Chinese flag sighted in Dairen harbor:

[redacted]

[redacted] sighting a submarine flying the Chinese flag in Dairen harbor on 20 May. The British Admiralty does not regard the flag as conclusive evidence that the submarine is in fact Chinese, pointing out that the flag may represent merely a Soviet courtesy extended to the Chinese while USSR naval units are in Dairen.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: [redacted] the Hong Kong press have alleged that the USSR transferred submarines to the Chinese Communists at Dairen about the end of May; [redacted] Taipei gives little credence to these allegations. While such reports may be true, the evidence remains inconclusive. It is believed that the Chinese Communists have personnel qualified to operate at least one submarine.

3.3(h)(2)

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NEAR EAST

3.3(h)(2)

3. Iranians continue search for foreign oil technicians:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] experts formerly employed by the Leuna refinery near Magdeburg have offered to go to Iran immediately, take over the Abadan refinery and keep it running. 3.3(h)(2)

Comment:

[Redacted]

[Redacted] of progress in the Iranian search for foreign technicians to operate the oil industry. [Redacted] firms in Switzerland and the US have already offered sizeable numbers of technicians, and the Soviet administration in Austria is allegedly searching for oil personnel who might be made available to Iran. However, it is doubtful if the Swiss and US firms are capable of implementing their offers, and Prime Minister Mossadeq would be unlikely to employ Soviet technicians except as a last desperate resort. While the acquisition of 34 "experts" would not begin to solve the Iranian dilemma, the above offer may encourage Iran to remain intransigent in its dispute with the oil company. 3.3(h)(2)

WESTERN EUROPE

3.3(h)(2)


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