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**S U M M A R Y**

**GENERAL**

- 1. French ready to approve Greek and Turkish admission to NATO (page 3).

**FAR EAST**

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

- 3. Communists can support 46-division attack for 26 days (page 4).

[Redacted]

**WESTERN EUROPE**

3.3(h)(2)

- 6. British and US officials advise against intervention in Saar issue (page 6).

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3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

## GENERAL

3.3(h)(2)

French ready to approve Greek and Turkish admission to NATO:

3.3(h)(2)

Unqualified French approval of NATO membership for Greece and Turkey will probably be forthcoming this week, [redacted]

[redacted] Although the cabinet had not officially acted on the question, Foreign Minister Schuman had secured enough support to insure approval.

The French representative on the three-power NATO Standing Group reports some progress toward the acceptance of French views on the distribution of command posts in the Mediterranean area.

Comment: The French have abandoned their conditional approval of two weeks ago. France has been jealous of US and UK influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the Foreign Office probably now believes that the Standing Group will extend its control eastward and thus protect French interests in the area.

## FAR EAST

3.3(h)(2)

- 3 -


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3.3(h)(2)

3. Communists can support 46-division attack for 26 days:

3.3(h)(2)

The Far East Command estimates that enemy forces have accumulated sufficient supplies to support the 28 Chinese Communist and 18 North Korean divisions currently accepted south of the 39th parallel in a 26 day attack. This estimate is based on observation of over 35,000 vehicles moving southward in forward areas during the period from 23 June to 22 August and indicates the largest supply build-up during the Korean war.

Although in all previous offensives the enemy has successfully accumulated stockpiles in forward areas prior to opening the attack, the enemy's inability to move supplies forward to exploit any successes has been his outstanding deficiency. The Far East Command suggests that the enemy may have attempted to remedy this shortcoming and that he may be able to launch another offensive with a much improved supply capability immediately behind the front.

3.3(h)(2)

- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

## WESTERN EUROPE

6. British and US officials advise against intervention in Saar issue: 3.3(h)(2)

Both the US Embassy in Paris and the British Foreign Office advise against the injection of the Saar issue into discussions with the French in the near future, on the grounds that it might create an atmosphere unfavorable to agreement on more important problems.

The US Embassy in Paris also believes that even an inquiry on the Saar question might be regarded by the French as further US pressure for French concessions to Germany. Moreover, it would probably lead the French to endeavor to "nail down US support" for their proposed settlement that might be more "generously" formulated if additional time were allowed before definitive positions were taken.

Both the US Embassy in Paris and the British Foreign Office comment that recent public statements by Schuman and Adenauer justify optimism concerning an early solution of the issue.

Comment: The US High Commissioner in Bonn previously commented that the 3 August reply of the Western Allies to Chancellor Adenauer's 29 May protest against the Saar Government's policies settled little, and that the issue remained controversial.

- 6 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)