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B/ED

16 August 1951

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Copy No. *C 1-9*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 45  
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. *X*  
 [ ] DECLASSIFIED  
 CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S *2001*  
 NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
 AUTH: HR 70-2  
 DATE: *7-12-79* REVIEWER: [Redacted]

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY

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EASTERN EUROPE

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
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## GENERAL

1. Embassy Moscow anticipates submission of Japanese peace treaty "counter-draft" by USSR:

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Embassy Moscow considers Soviet attendance at the Japanese peace conference not surprising in view of Moscow's basic objective of delaying the treaty, of previous indications that it would present new views, and of the new Soviet pretense of a desire for settlement on major issues with the West.

The Embassy anticipates that the USSR will demand Chinese Communist participation at the conference and will restate its past criticisms, probably by submitting a counterdraft. Such a counterdraft would be coordinated with attempts to capitalize on reservations of India, Burma and other states to the US-UK draft.

The embassy reports that in a conversation with the British, Ambassador Gromyko stated that "it would be incorrect to assume that Soviet views will differ from those previously presented on the subject of the Japanese treaty."

The Department of State is informing the Soviet Government in a note acknowledging Soviet acceptance of the US invitation that the San Francisco conference is not being held to reopen negotiations on peace terms.

**Comment:** There are several indications, among them Gromyko's remarks on 20 July to Ambassador Kirk on possible Russian suggestions, that a Soviet draft for the Japanese peace treaty will be submitted. The 10 June note from the Soviet Foreign Office concerning the Japanese treaty negotiations proposed a conference for "consideration of available drafts" of the peace treaty.

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2. Philippines concerned over Soviet presence at San Francisco:

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 Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Romulo seriously concerned over Soviet participation in the Japanese peace treaty conference, fears that Russian maneuvers may leave the Philippines as the only Asian nation prepared to sign the treaty. He considers the position of his government would then become untenable, from a domestic viewpoint, in the face of demands for reparations. Romulo recommends that any modification of the reparations clause, that the US and the UK are prepared to make in anticipation of this difficulty, be made now in order to forestall the expected Soviet maneuvers.

US Ambassador Cowen comments that he does not regard Romulo's concern as merely a device to reopen the reparations question and believes the Filipinos will stand by their acceptance of the present draft.

Comment: The reparations clause of the treaty has been criticized by Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines, although the Philippine Government has finally accepted a slightly modified draft despite extensive public opposition.

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
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
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## NEAR EAST

4. USSR takes no action to revise Turkish Straits convention:

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
The USSR has failed to request a revision on the Montreux Convention. The deadline for submission of revisions was 8 August. There have been no comments in the Turkish press

Comment: According to the terms of the Montreux Convention governing the passage of shipping through the Turkish Straits, any of the nine signatories may request revision at the end of each five year period. During an exchange of notes on the subject in 1946 by the major powers, the USSR made strong demands for revision of the status of the Straits. However, the final Turkish note expressing willingness on the part of the West to convene a conference to negotiate revisions was never answered by the Soviet Union.

In April 1950, a Soviet newspaper charged Turkey with allowing US naval units into the Black Sea and termed the Montreux Convention prejudicial to USSR security. For the past year, however, only minor attention has been paid the subject of the Straits and no references made to the Convention.


Russian inaction relieves some of the concern that has been voiced by Turkey and other interested nations over an anticipated Soviet demand for revision.

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
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**EASTERN EUROPE**

**7. Trieste Military Commander opposed to election postponement:**

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The British Commander of the Allied Military Government is opposed in principle to postponing the Trieste elections. He feels that an indefinite postponement would allow the

Italians to undermine AMG's authority and sees no genuine Italian effort to compromise with the Yugoslavs. The commander indicates that he will risk postponement to the end of the year, however, if there is any real prospect of opening negotiations for a Trieste settlement.

Comment: In view of the currently inflamed state of Italian public opinion on Trieste, it is unlikely that the Italian Government would make sufficient concessions at this time to effect a settlement.

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
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
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


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