

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

~~SECRET~~

CSHP
2,339

INFILTRATION AND RESUPPLY OF AGENTS

IN NORTH KOREA, 1952-1953

Vol I

Draft

by 


December 1972

AirForce/Haas/Korean War 51-53
HS [Mar 95/KCRuffner]
Doc. # 10; page 1 of 12 pp.

~~SECRET~~

Volume

#

1

AirForce/Haas/Korean War 51-53
HS [Mar 95/KCRuffner]
Doc. # 10; page 2 of 12 pp.

~~SECRET~~b. Air

Operational air support was provided by the US Air Force.* ^(USAF) The ^{USAF} Air Force had one flight, ~~the~~ called B-Flight, to support various intelligence activities in South Korea; ^{it also engaged in dropping} as well as flying flares and leaflet ~~drop missions~~. The air support phase appeared to be in the category of early World War II operations. Only one technique was apparently used, which was to penetrate ^{at} during the moon phase in clear weather, ^{making the} and drop on a light pattern. Since the ~~one~~ technique was used during every moon phase by the Korea Mission and various other agencies in the area, a defense of hill watchers was set up, and numerous fires in various patterns appeared on the ground whenever a plane flew overhead. As a result, air crews dropped supplies and even personnel without being absolutely sure that they were over the right drop-zone pattern and that it was not a trap. 14/

~~Historical Paper No. 87, Civil Air Transport, A Proprietary Airline, [REDACTED] relates that [REDACTED] participated in Korean operations during the [REDACTED] period, but no indication of this was found in [REDACTED] Korean operational files.~~

33

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~I. B. 6. Physical Assets~~

c. Cover

With the approval of the Far East
 Command (FEC), ~~OSOs~~ ^{Office of Special Operations} (OSO) and OPC elements were com-
 bined in August 1951 into one mission under the
 military cover of Joint Advisory Commission, Korea
 (JACK), a component of the UN command. JACK employees
 were documented as members of the US Armed Forces
 or Department of Army civilians. Vehicles were given
 a variety of markings in an attempt to thwart
 Communist attempts to monitor JACK activities.
 Bases were normally ^{under the} covered ^{of} as CCRAK, the coordination
 center for all intelligence activities in Korea.

~~SECRET~~~~I. B. 6. Physical Assets~~e. Real Estate 16/

At the beginning of 1952 the Agency had acquired island bases of modest proportions among the multitude of other military and intelligence organizations. The island bases were under the cover of ^{the} Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity Korea (CCRAK).

Bases on the east coast of North Korea were on the islands of Yang-do (EA 500150) and Yo-do (CU 820425). Yo-do was an operations base from which one case officer directed special guerrilla missions, using CIA guerrillas, ROK marines, and Army guerrillas. There were [redacted] tents accommodating up to [redacted] persons. The base stockpiled arms, agent equipment, clothing, and supplies, ^{al} supplemented ~~by~~ supplies ^{will} furnished by the US Navy. The Navy also furnished water transport for Yo-do operations.

Bases off the west coast were on the islands of Cho-do (XC 600650), Paengnyong-do (XC 500040), Taechong-do (XB 500875), and Sochong-do (XB 540820). Paengnyong-do was an operations base from which [redacted] case officers directed OPC E&E activities and coordinated E&E activities with G-3 guerrillas.

~~SECRET~~

Real Estate

~~SECRET~~

Material support was furnished by EUSAK. Sochong-do was an advanced ~~██████████~~ ^{for Project STRIKE*} operations base on which approximately ~~██████████~~ agents were based in January 1952.

In addition to the island bases, a large base at Tongnae, eight miles north of Pusan, housed the principal operations headquarters for CIA activities, including radio facilities for agent communications. The base was used as a storage area for vehicles and stockpiles of agent radio equipment, food, clothing, and other supplies. The headquarters consisted of two Japanese-style hotel buildings.

A maritime base was activated on 16 June 1952 at Inchon (BS 920500), the primary function of which was operational control and logistical support for the E&E program on the west coast. A secondary function which developed later was occasional logistical support for other projects with maritime components. ^{17/}

Three safehouses were set up for use by American case officers and Korean principal agents, ^{in connection} with developing and exploiting Korean and Chinese smuggling contacts.

There was a major OPC guerrilla training base on the island of Yong[?]-do near Pusan. The base was on

* See Chapter II-C-3.

37

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

a 20-acre site which contained approximately [redacted] tents accommodating about [redacted] trainees. It was a major outfitting base, with stockpiles of arms, explosives, trucks, jeeps, clothing, agent equipment, food, and other supplies.

A major base headquarters was in Pusan, staffed with [redacted] OPC personnel, supported all operations under Project [redacted] [redacted] safehouses were also in Pusan. An area on the outskirts of Pusan was reserved for radio operator training.

There was also a guerrilla training base at Kyongju (EQ 200650) and another one at Kadok-do (DP 830750).

A military-type warehouse was maintained at K-9 Airfield in Pusan for the storage of all air^odrop supplies. The Agency kept two aircraft at K-9, a Cessna on contract from Civil Air Transport and a C-45 on loan from the USAF.

In early 1952 a new training camp was being set up at Pohang for the training of Chondokyon personnel.

~~SECRET~~

Real Estate 3

~~SECRET~~f. Logistical Support

Materiel support was furnished by EUSAK through the use of support letters in the name of Department of Army Liaison Detachment (DALD) or Far East Air Force/Technical Analysis Group (FEAF/TAG), which were ~~former~~ cover elements for OSO and OPC activities in Korea. These letters, known as "Jesus Christ letters" because of the reaction they provoked, were issued by FEC under authority given in a letter from Department of the Army to ^{the} DCI, dated 18 January 1951, ^{with} "Logistics Assistance to the Central Intelligence Agency." Requisitions using those letters or other ones subsequently issued to JACK by FEC were honored by ^{the} Army supply depots.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


Cancel

II. INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION AND RESUPPLY ACTIVITIES, 1952

PERIOD: 1952

A. Foreword

Preparations for spring operations in 1952 continued. At Headquarters, ^{at the} North Asia Command (NAC), and at ^{its mission} CIA/Korea (JACK), there was an awareness of ^{fulfillment} the major problems affecting agent infiltration operations as practiced in 1950-1951. ~~The problems were known to be:~~



1. The unrealistic goal of armed harassment of the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces through the infiltration and resupply ^{of} agents from South Korea.

2. The low level of agent material ^{assets} previously recruited and on hand for 1952 spring infiltrations.

3. The basically guerrilla/paramilitary training concepts under which the agent ^{assets} material had been trained.

4. The fading motivation of the agent ~~material~~ on hand (FI, PM, and E&E-oriented) because of a growing indication that the war was ending in a stalemate and that support for North Korean operations might soon disappear.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

← B. 1952 Operational Background

Arthur
During the period, Admiral A. H. McCollum (~~official title not in the records~~), acting to set up naval support for CIA, traveled to Korea and other Far East stations with ~~CIA's~~ *accompanied by* Assistant Deputy for Policy Coordination (ADPC), [redacted] and the ~~CIA~~ Assistant Deputy for Special Operations (ADSO), [redacted].

In a report dated 15 March 1952, the ADPC pointed out, among other things, that the Eighth Army felt their shortage of tactical intelligence was the fault of CIA and that the Commanding General of the Fifth Air Force felt that Army and G-2 dominance of CCRAK was detrimental to CIA's intelligence support to the E&E effort of the US Air Force. A lack of the kind of intelligence on which OPC operations could logically be predicated was a heavy contributing factor to the false starts and misfires. Throughout the entire Far East area there appeared to be a general lack of appreciation of how to get things done covertly. Further, paramilitary operations throughout the Far East were largely abortive. The ADPC report stated that a wide discrepancy existed between the relatively optimistic reports

PHOTO OF [unclear]

~~SECRET~~

7. 8. 1

~~SECRET~~

(2)

[REDACTED]



~~SECRET~~


AirForce/Haas/Korean War 51-53
HS [Mar 95/KCRuffner]
Doc. # 10, page 11 of 12pp.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



~~SECRET~~

AirForce/Haas/Korean War 51-53
HS [Mar 95/KCRuffner]
Doc. # 10; page 12 of 12pp.