SAVA 73-99

11 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby

Executive Secretary

CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT

: Covert Psychological Warfare Operations

Against North Vietnam and the National

Liberation Front

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- 1. Mr. Evans asked us to take a look at EA Division's 8 May note to the DCI, forwarding a proposed 40 Committee submission seeking authorization to continue covert psychological warfare operations against North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front at an estimated cost of \$379,000 for FY 1973 and \$390,700 for FY 1974. Also included in the package Mr. Evans asked us to look at is a 6 June note to you (as Executive Secretary of the Management Committee) from Mr. Briggs (Director of PPB) endorsing the EA proposal and recommending that it be forwarded to the 40 Committee.
- 2. As you know, we have worked closely with EA Division on psychological warfare matters over the past year, are strong supporters of this effort and certainly have no quarrel with the basic proposal. In the interests of literal accuracy, however, one point should be flagged to your attention. The extent of one side or the other's compliance with the Paris Agreements is, in some contexts, an attribute rather like beauty i.e., something very much in the eye of the beholder. The Station has certainly taken all feasible precautions to minimize possible inspection problems physically separating from the facilities of the GPWD, which manages the radio operation, the offices of Agency personnel involved therein

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
and adjusting covers so the Agency officers who deal with their GPWD counterparts can do so in the context of intergovernmental relations permissible under the terms of the Paris Agreements. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the other side and its sympathizers (including American sympathizers) would undoubtedly cry "foul" if they ever got wind of the fact that we were providing the GVN's psywar effort with fiscal and advisory assistance. This is not to say we should not do so, indeed I strongly feel that we should. We should recognize, however, that the legality of our doing so could be -- and if the facts became known, would be -- challenged, even though we could (and would) argue that such a challenge was unwarranted.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

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6 JUN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management

Committee

SUBJECT:

Proposal to 40 Committee for Continued

Psychological Operations Projects in

South Vietnam

REFERENCE:

Memo dated 8 May 1973 to DCI from C/FE,

Subject: Covert Psychological Warfare Operations Against North Vietnam and the

National Liberation Front

- 1. This paper proposes a continuation of Agency propaganda broadcasting activities directed against Communist forces in North and South Vietnam. Specifically, it recommends the funding of one gray and two black radio projects at a cost of \$379,000 in FY 1973 and an estimated \$390,000 in FY 1974. These funds are available in the Agency budget.
- 2. Granting the premise that it is in the U.S. interest to remain active in the psychological warfare effort it has sustained in South Vietnam since January 1964, this program appears to be well conceived and offers no unusual problems in terms of security, cover and personnel. The attached status report indicates that the officers responsible for these projects have shown both imagination and prudence in modifying their broadcasting operations to match the shift from full-scale war to uneasy peace that has occurred in the two Vietnams during the past year. The themes currently being carried by the three radio projects should be helpful in promoting present U.S. policy interests by (a) encouraging compliance with the cease-fire agreement, (b) reducing the political effectiveness of the Communist forces by exacerbating differences between Hanoi and the

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NLF and (c) persuading the North Vietnamese people that the time has come to turn their attention from the South and to the reconstruction of their own country.

3. Release of this proposal to the 40 Committee is recommended.

Charles A. Briggs Director of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting

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Approved for Release: 2021/11/15 C05014164 SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO NAME AND ADDRESS INITIALS DATE CB 1 Director/PPB 2 4 5 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROYAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks: For review and recommendations to Mr. Colby. FOLD HERE TO BETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRE S AND PHONE NO. O/ES/CIA MC/BEvans (b)(3)29May73 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET Use previous editions

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SECRET

Executive Registry

8 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Covert Psychological Warfare Operations Against North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

Current CIA psychological warfare operations mounted from Saigon against North Vietnam (NVN) and the National Liberation Front (NLF) include one gray and two black radios broadcasting to targets in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The effectiveness of these radios has been demonstrated by North Vietnamese sensitivity to them and by the testimonials of NVA/VC ralliers and POW's. General Political Warfare Department (GPWD), Ministry of Defense, Republic of Vietnam, contributes to and supports these activities.

PREVIOUS 40 COMMITTEE APPROVALS

These operations are descendants of the program first approved by the Special Group (5412) on 8 June 1961. Higher authority on 11 January 1964 approved OPLAN 34 A, which initiated a broad program of paramilitary and psychological warfare activities conducted by the Government of Vietnam, CIA, and the U.S. Department of Defense. In November 1968 the program was modified to curtail those aspects of the program which took place north of the 17th Parallel. The resulting restricted program was approved by the 303 Committee on 23 September On 10 March 1971 and again on 25 May 1972 the 40 Committee approved a status report and continuation of the program.

SECURITY, COVER AND PERSONNEL

The DRV has long complained of U.S. psychological warfare programs against North Vietnam, but with little effect outside their own country. The radio operation is, in fact, managed and conducted by the GPWD, and the offices of CIA personnel involved are physically separated to avoid any difficulties with international ceasefire inspection mechanisms. These CIA officers

contacts between them and counterparts in GPWD are in the context of inter-governmental relations permissible under the ceasefire agreement.

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WARNING NOTICE SEMSITIVE IMPELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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
4. COORDINATION

These operations have been approved by Ambassador Bunker and the Mission Council. In Washington the activity has been approved by Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.

5. COST

It is estimated that expenditures will total \$379,000 for FY 1973 and \$390,700 for FY 1974. Funds are available within the Agency's budget.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The 40 Committee

SUBJECT:

Periodic Report on Covert Psychological Warfare Operations Against North Vietnam and the National

Liberation Front

1. SUMMARY

This is a status report on CIA psychological warfare operations mounted from South Vietnam (SVN) against North Vietnam (NVN) and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The program consists of one gray and two black radios broadcasting to North Vietnam and to communist military forces in SVN and along the common border areas of SVN, Laos, and Cambodia. The aims of the program are (1) to encourage NVN and the NLF to abide by the ceasefire agreement, and (2) to urge the NVN leadership and people to turn from military adventurism in the South to economic and social reconstruction in their own country.

Current operations derive from the program of psychological warfare which CIA began conducting with ARVN in 1961. The Special Group (5412) approved this original program on 8 June 1961. On 11 January 1964 higher authority approved OPLAN 34 A, which included combined Government of Vietnam (GVN) and DOD/CIA covert psychological warfare directed at targets in NVN. This program was modified in November 1968 to curtail those operations, including air support, which were being conducted north of the 17th Parallel. Certain

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
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psychological warfare activities were retained, and on 23 September 1969 the 303 Committee approved this modified program. On 10 March 1971 the 40 Committee approved a status report and continuation of the program. Effective 31 December 1971, DOD withdrew from the program and it was consolidated under the sole sponsorship of the CIA. The 40 Committee last approved continuation of these activities on 25 May 1972.

All operations have been consolidated into and are conducted with the support of the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD), Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Vietnam. This activity is budgeted for \$379,000 in FY 1973 and \$390,700 in FY 1974. This program has been coordinated in Saigon with the Ambassador and the Mission Council. The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs has approved the continuation of this activity.

2. MECHANISMS

There has been considerable modification of CIA's psychological warfare program since the submission of the last status report to the 40 Committee. With the initiation of a major North Vietnamese offensive in the South, in May 1972 the President directed an intensified psychological warfare campaign against North Vietnam. In response, the Agency initiated a new, gray radio, "Mother Vietnam," which went on the air on 1 June 1972. Its initial broadcasting, for only a few hours a day over then existing short wave equipment, was expanded over the following months to a current total of 49 hours daily over both




short and medium wave facilities. "Radio Red Flag" was terminated with the inception of "Mother Vietnam" so as to provide the initial facilities and transmitter time for the new radio. Its legend, that of a notional pro-Soviet, anti-Chinese faction of the Lao Dong Party, was no longer relevant to the actual situation in NVN. Mimics of Radio Hanoi and the NLF's Radio Liberation continued through January 1973, but were themselves terminated after the ceasefire came into effect in Vietnam. This action was taken because their messages were considered only marginally effective and the facilities they required could be better utilized for a new program, "The Voice of Nam Bo Liberation." This latter radio pretends to represent nationalistically oriented factions of the NLF who resent Hanoi's dominant role in the revolution in the South. Approval to proceed with this new program is the subject of a separate memorandum to the 40 Committee.

The program of mailing fabricated letters to personnel assigned to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) installations abroad was discontinued in the Spring of 1972. There had never been any reactions to the letters, which had been designed to surface ideological vulnerabilities, and the manpower and financial resources involved were required for more productive activities.

As of 1 May 1973, CIA's psychological warfare program in South Vietnam consists of the following gray and black radios:

A. Mother Vietnam is a gray radio (Hanoi has attributed it to






the GVN) which broadcasts four hours of original programs for a total of 49 hours daily over three high frequency and two medium wave transmitters. The medium wave transmissions can be received throughout North Vietnam and in the third and fourth military regions in South Vietnam; the high frequency (short wave) transmissions are received in most of Vietnam and Laos and in some portions of Cambodia. The program centers around a female announcer who addresses her audience with warmth, concern and compassion. She stresses the senselessness of continued conflict and appeals to the North Vietnamese people to join in reunifying the two Vietnams in a spirit of brotherly cooperation. She also blames the ambitious policies of the DRV leader—ship for the estrangement and suffering of the Vietnamese people.

- B. The Voice of Nam Bo Liberation is a new radio scheduled to become operational in 1973. It ostensibly represents a significant faction of the NLF which resents Hanoi's domination of the NLF and the revolution in South Vietnam. Its criticisms of the NLF mainstream leadership and of DRV policies are intended to create strains and irritation between Southerners and Northerners in the ranks of the VC and the NVA. It will consist of one hour of original programming broadcast eight hours daily over short wave.
- C. The Voice of the Sacred Sword Patriots' League broadcasts a one hour short wave program seven times a day, or 49 hours a week.

 The Sacred Sword Patriots' League (SSPL) is a notional NVN "loyal






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opposition" organization. In previous years, this radio assumed a hostile, anti-Lao Dong Party stance, but in the ceasefire era its projection is one of encouraging reconciliation and reconstruction. It still criticizes DRV policies which it considers to run counter to the long range interests of the North Vietnamese people, but in a manner less abrasive and, at the same time, offering constructive alternative policies.

3. RESPONSE

The effectiveness of our radio effort can be measured by North Vietnamese denunciations and efforts to counter our programs and by reactions provided by NVA/VC ralliers and POW's. DRV official publications and Radio Hanoi have warned the NVN people against our radios, identifying each by name. "Mother Vietnam," in particular has been singled out and Radio Hanoi has replayed portions of its broadcasts so that listeners would know what programs to avoid. In a recent and unique incident, a GPWD officer, who went to Hanoi with a Four Party Joint Military Commission team, discussed "Mother Vietnam" with Radio Hanoi personnel. The latter complained that they were under orders to monitor, tape and transcribe all "Mother Vietnam" broadcasts and then send the complete transcriptions to the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party.

Interrogation of NVA/VC ralliers and POW's indicates that approximately 25 percent have listened to one or more of our radios. Several ralliers claimed that "Mother Vietnam" induced them to rally





and that others in their units had been emotionally affected by "Mother Vietnam," to the extent that some had deserted and returned to their homes in North Vietnam.

4. ALTERNATIVES


Under current circumstances, there are no practical alternatives to conducting these radio operations in South Vietnam and in concert with the GVN. A unilateral effort on the current scale within South Vietnam would be physically impossible due to GVN control of plant, facilities, and power resources. To attempt these operations outside of Vietnam would be more expensive, less efficient, and less productive.

5. RISKS AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING

The DRV has long complained of U.S. psychological warfare programs against North Vietnam, but with little effect outside their own country. The radio operation is, in fact, managed and conducted by the GPWD, and the offices of CIA personnel involved are physically separated to avoid any difficulties with international ceasefire inspection mechanisms. The program obviously depends upon cooperation with and the common sense of purpose of the GVN; should relations between the U.S. and the GVN become less friendly, it is conceivable that these activities would be curtailed or terminated.

6. COORDINATION

This psychological warfare activity has been approved in Saigon by the Ambassador and the Mission Council. In Washington, the continuation of this activity has been approved by the Acting Assistant





Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

7. COSTS

CIA estimates the costs of this activity at \$379,000 for FY 1973 and \$390,700 for FY 1974. These funds are available within the Agency budget.

8. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the 40 Committee approve the continuation of these covert psychological warfare operations, including the funding level.

