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# INTERROGATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	: SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)	NIC REPORT NO	: 353/68
SUBJECT	: Comment to the TET Offensive and Indications of a Future Offensive	NIC CASE NO	: CHIEU HOI
DATE OF INFO	: 28 January 1968 - 9 February 1968	DATE OF REPORT	: 21/3/68
DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION	: 11 March 1968 (X - U) SAIGON, Vietnam	NO. OF PAGES	: 2
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3.3(h)(2)

## SUMMARY

Source did not believe the TET offensive in his sector of KONTUM Province would succeed due to their inadequate force of 250 men. The VC lost their objective (TAN CANH Town) because they failed to destroy a bridge over which GVN reinforcements would come. Indications of future offensive were apparent when Source left his base camp to rally. The VC were being told by their unit commanders to prepare for a new TET offensive.

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NIC REPORT NO : 353/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pages : 2

1. The TET offensive was first heard of on 28 January 1968 at 1500 hours. A Political Officer (name unknown) told Battalion 2 that every VC unit must launch an attack on the enemy that night. Battalion 2 was to attack TAN CANH Town, TAN CANH District (Called District 80 by the VC), KONTUM Province. There were three objectives for units attacking TAN CANH Town: a). To capture the Pagoda, which had one guard squad of GVN troops, who were to warn a GVN garrison outside of town in case of a VC attack; b). Attack the town and GVN troops home on vacation, and rally the townspeople to their cause; and c. destroy the bridge over which GVN reinforcements would have to come. (NIC Comment Source did not think the offensive would succeed; they only had 250 fighters.)
2. Battalion 2 left the base camp for the TET attack on TAN CANH Town at 1700 hours on 28 January 1968. The town was three hours walking distance from the base camp. 3.3(h)(2)
3. On the second day of TET (31 January 1968), Battalion 2 returned to its base camp at 1600 hours after losing the town of TAN CANH to the GVN forces and remained there until Source rallied. Source heard from the men of Battalion 2 about the attack. The Pagoda was taken easily since it was only guarded by four or five GVN troops. The bridge, however, which was crucial, was not destroyed as the man with explosives disappeared. When the GVN reinforcements appeared, the VC tried to tell the people to stay in the town, since they knew the GVN would not shell the town with so many civilians in it. However, the people listened to the GVN which told them to evacuate; in the ensuing attack the VC were routed from TAN CANH Town at 1500 hours on the first day of TET (30 January 1968).
4. Source rallied because he no longer felt like dying for the VC. Ever since he was wounded he had been accused by the political cadre of inflicting the wound himself so he would not have to fight. 3.3(h)(2)
5. When Source departed the base camp to rally there were indication of a new offensive. He was sure they would attack with new plans learned from their past mistakes, since the TET offensive was generally considered a defeat by the men. Units were being reorganized and unit commanders were criticizing VC who had not done well in the TET offensive. They were all told "they must all prepape for a new TET offensive, and this time the bridge of TAN CANH Town must be destroyed".

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5

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