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16 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Column by Merguerite Higgins

- 1. This memorandum is for information only.
- 2. Miss Higgins, whose syndicated column is carried locally in the WASHINGTON STAR, discussed with me on the telephone on 7 September a column she proposed to write in defense of the Agency. She said she did not want any details from us on what had actually happened in Singapore and in the Dominican Republic (since she was able to get this from other sources) but she did want some facts about how the Agency is controlled in the scheme of Government operations.
- 3. In addition to discussing this with her on the phone I also sent her a copy of our pamphlet which outlines the history and functions of the Agency.
- 4. Attached is a copy of the resulting column, which appeared in the 14 September CHICAGO NEWS. The column has so far not appeared locally; on 15 September the STAR carried Miss Higgins' report of her recent return to Vietnam.

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(b)(6)

John A. Mellin Assistant to the Director

✓DDCI cc: ExDir-Compt E. 496,980

SEP 1 4 1965

Marguerite Higgins

Putting the Record Straight On Singapore CIA Snarl

this moralizing about the Cen- is one of the risks of the tral Intelligence Agency affair espionage trade, and nobody in Singapore unbecoming the is going to give facts and conduct of a sophisticated na- | figures to prove that the ratio tion crucially engaged in cold of faiures to success is 1,000 and hot wars with Communist 1101. enemies who proudly proclaim that any means-however dirty —justify the end? 🧸

Aside from the large quobecause it appears in great part based on insufficient information as to what CIA is in the world. all about.

In a sense, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew picked his outburst against the CIA even if he was suddenly reviving an incident that took place five years ago. For the CIA cannot talk back.

Judging by the spate of editorials across the land, and indeed, around the globe, the Singapore affair is being used as a take-off point for scolding the CIA for all sorts of alleged such as acting contrary to the policy of the U.S. government, jeopardizing relations with a country in defiance of the will of the U.S. ambassador on the scene, to name just a few recent charges.

But, in fact, a reasonably cool look at the Singapore incident discloses that the CIA is guilty of just one thing. It is guilty of getting caught.

WASHINGTON - Isn't all Unfortunately, getting caught Washington's will but was im-

TO PUT the Singapore affair in perspective, one of the anot take the affair very serimandates of the Central Inteltient of hypocrisy, the moral-ligence Agency is to penetrate izing is doubly insufferable forcign intelligence networks. both in Communist areas and Rusk. in particularly sensitive places

. In 1960, Malaysia was just beginning to be organized. There had been considerable a highly satisfactory target in penetration of the Malay pennsula by Red Chinese agents and Indonesian agents (a forerunner of Sukarno's confrontation policy). As of that date, the United States knew very little about the cust of official characters in Malaysia. Since rit was becoming a very sensitive area, the U.S. government the country, especially since -not the CTA- decided to make a special intelligencegathering effort on the Malayan peninsula.

It can be stated on author-, ity that the decision to give priority, CIA's attention to the Malayan area was discussed. and approved by the National Security Council of that era.

Therefore, far from freewheeling, the CIA agent who tried' to penetrate Singapore's Special Branch Intelligence net was not acting contrary to stability since it would

plementing U.S. government. policy.

WITH REGARD to Singapore, even Prime Minister Lee (who was not then interested? in using anti-U.S. tirades as a. stepping stone to membership in the Afro-Asian bloc) did ously at the time and let the eliminate an enemy of the

Hopefully, in light of Lee's flirtations with the Communist bloc, some other American agents have succeeded in penetrating the Singapore intelligence not even if the first attempt failed.

There will probably be another outcry at the involvement of the CIA in an attempt to persuade the Dominican Republic's military strongman. Gen. Wessin y Wessin to leave certain amount of cash (this time the CIA offered to buy the general's house and some property at rather inflated prices).

But it was not the CIA's videa to send Gen. Wessin into exile. It was the decision of the U.S. government that the sacrifice of Wessin y Wessin might enhance Dominican

arrested agent out of jail after leftists and thus possibly induce? a letter of apology from Dean the rebels to accept compronuse. The ClA was 'merely' doing as Washington ordered.

> THE MYTH that the CIA runs U.S. foreign policy overlooks the fact that it is accountable to the President and the National Security Council and is closely and periodically reviewed by the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board headed by Clark Clifford. Other watch } dogs include the special congressional committees and the Budger Bureau.

The myth of ClA insubordination should have died long ago: like, for instance, during' the negotiations involved a the Bay of Pigs. For at that time the CIA canceled an air Birike against Castro's forces at President Kennedy's direction even though the agency. totally and urgently opposed this cancellation.

> And, as it turned out, the CIA's loyalty to Presidential orders helped to seal the doom of the Cuban brigade's expedition to the Bay of Pigs-a failure that stirred an outcry at the CIA.