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Tuesday 21 June ? KUTZBACH leaves by car for Stuttgart.
Decision made to assign V-2665 to case.
Decision made to have CANINIUS return to Giessen
POB extracting COM files to give report to ZIPPER

Wednesday 22 June 1100 Conference between KUTZBACH, [] []
Briefing of V-2665 planned for 26 June.
Our reports given ZIPPER.
[] start translating reports.

Thursday 23 June 1100 KUTZBACH announces briefing of V-2665 postponed until
29 June.
1300 KUTZBACH agrees with need to push case, receives per-
mission to deal directly with V-2978, V-2665's chief.
Meeting arranged for 26 June.
Translation work continues.
CANINIUS returns to Giessen.

Friday 24 June 1200 Translation completed. KUTZBACH receives high evalua-
tion from ZIPPER Economic Staff for oral report given
V-3194 by CANINIUS.

Saturday 25 June 1400 [] picks up KUTZBACH on way to Stuttgart.

Sunday 26 June 0815 Meeting between V-2978, V-2665, KUTZBACH, Harbn.
1330 Briefing ends.

Monday 27 June ? V-2665 goes to Giessen to pick up CANINIUS.
KUTZBACH learns ZIPPER contact, SIEMENS security
officer, will cooperate in placement CANINIUS at
Karlsruhe-Knielingen plant.

Tuesday 28 June ? CANINIUS, V-2665 leave Giessen for Karlsruhe.
CANINIUS original documentary reports given ZIPPER
for evaluation.

Wednesday 29 June Eve. Meeting planned in Munich between V-2665, V-2978,
KUTZBACH, [] []

POB CHRONOLOGY OF UJDROLLERY-125:

Thursday 16 June 0830 [] discuss turnover with []
Frankfurt.
0930 Call to [] POB, to see if ZIPPER interested.
0945 SFRAN-0517 sent POB adding further details.
1130 [] unable reach [] KLAUSNER, [] MERTENS until after-
noon.
1400 [] briefs [] KLAUSNER, MERTENS
1630 ZIPPER agrees to meet [] CANINIUS
1700 MERTENS, [] BAYERLE meet [] SZELLER on Autobahn, brief him.
1930 BAYERLE calls [] confirming meeting details in
Frankfurt.

Friday 17 June 1145 V-3194 calls in in Frankfurt.
1215 V-3194 met by [] Frankfurt Hauptbahnhof,
drive immediately to Giessen.
1415 [] meet ODOPAL representative.
1500 [] leave Giessen. CANINIUS not expected
at hotel until early evening. [] informed.
2000 CANINIUS receives letter from wife; is met by V-3194.
2245 [] unable reach MERTENS,
meets KLAUSNER. [] leaves for Munich with COS's
CANINIUS file.

Saturday 18 June 0100 [] ZIPPER unwilling handle case
if facing opposition from BfV.
0815 [] meets V-3194 in Giessen.
0900 [] study COM files.
0945 ODOPAL Giessen told their responsibility ending at 1200.
1015 [] informed that V-3194, CANINIUS leaving Giessen.
1200 [] calls V-3194 from Frankfurt, confirms afternoon
meeting arrangements. CANINIUS insists on driving.
1300 [] brief BAYERLE. (KLAUSNER, MERTENS
unavailable)
1415 V-3194, CANINIUS leave Giessen.
1530 V-3194, [] meet Frankfurt Hauptbahnhof. V-3194
receives 300 DM. CANINIUS released from obligation at
noon by ODOPAL. V-3194 gives [] letter from
CANINIUS's wife. They leave immediately for Munich.
1610 [] informed.
2230 V-3194, CANINIUS arrive Munich area.

Sunday 19 June 1000 [] meet; try to locate KLAUSNER,
MERTENS.
1400 KLAUSNER arrives at POB for conference.
1900-2000 Attempts reach V-3194 by phone unsuccessful.

Monday 20 June 0830 MERTENS, RODERICH, BAYERLE briefed.
1530 Meeting at Stadthaus with above plus KLAUSNER, [] KUTZBACH,
ZELLER.
? CANINIUS released from V-3194 control. V-3194 leaves
for Stuttgart to await KUTZBACH.

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: CANINIUS

DATE : 16-20 June 1955

SYNOPSIS: The following covers for the record the negotiations and actual turnover to ZIPPER of BOB's case CANINIUS.

1. On 16 June 1955, [] happened to be in [] office in Frankfurt when [] broached the question of the possible turnover of his case CANINIUS to the BfV or to ZIPPER. We indicated that we thought ZIPPER would be in a better position to exploit the case for positive CE results than would be the BfV; we also stated that at a conference on the previous afternoon with Dr. KLAUSNER and company, it was made known that ZIPPER's overall CE position was not of the best. A turnover at this time would have many results favorable to POB as well as to the Organisation itself.

2. [] agreed and immediately thereafter we called [] at POB, asking him to determine if ZIPPER were interested in the case. A cable (SPRAN-0517 to Pull only) was dispatched, outlining our stipulation that KUBARK be kept fully informed of developments in the case and advising ZIPPER that they might have difficulty with the BfV since that office already knew that CANINIUS was of more than routine interest.

3. Late that afternoon [] informed us that a ZIPPERite would meet us the following morning, prepared to travel immediately to Giessen to contact CANINIUS.

4. At 1145 on 17 June we picked up Identity 1 from the Frankfurt Hauptbahnhof and drove immediately to Giessen. During the trip we briefed the ZIPPERite on our suspicions about CANINIUS and also on his background. Arriving in Giessen, we contacted the local ODOPAL office which had been previously informed of our names by []. The ODOPAL representative indicated that contrary to previous information, the BfV was not exerting extreme pressure to see CANINIUS. We explained our new plan to ODOPAL in brief and assured them that their responsibility for CANINIUS would end no later than 21 June. ODOPAL stated that CANINIUS had been refused political recognition in his first attempt, but that a second try had already been undertaken. They also stated that to their knowledge CANINIUS had enough money to carry him through the weekend.

5. We left Identity 1 in Giessen at about 1500 that afternoon. CANINIUS was not at his hotel and was not expected until early evening.

6. By prearrangement we called Identity 1 at 2200 on 18 June. He indicated that CANINIUS had been most cooperative and that he indicated willingness to work, but that he was obligated to another, unspecified agency. Identity 1 urgently requested a meeting for the following morning. (Identity 1 approached

CANINIUS as @WALKE, using the cover of a nebulous German research organization. He stated that he would not disclose himself as a member of ZIPPER at any time).

7. Thereafter, we again called [] who endeavored to persuade @Dr. KLAUSNER that ZIPPER should negotiate the case immediately with the BfV. This was on the assumption that the other agency involved was the Bundesamt. @Dr. KLAUSNER refused, since ZIPPER's contact in the BfV was away on leave. He stated that ZIPPER would be interested in the case only if we could front for them officially until such time as they were able to negotiate satisfactorily through their man.

8. It was agreed early on the morning of 18 June that it would be unnecessary for KUBARK to come into the picture at all vis-a-vis the BfV, since, although they knew of CANINIUS's existence and had an interest, he was nonetheless in "ODOPAL custody".

9. [] met Identity 1 at 0830 on the morning of 18 June at which time the ZIPPERite indicated that the other agency involved was ODOPAL. We are unable to state whether ODOPAL actually attempted to recruit CANINIUS or whether the secrecy pledge that they had CANINIUS sign was purely at our behest. Identity 1 and [] agreed at this point that it would be more secure and more convenient to evacuate CANINIUS to Giessen. Identity 1 indicated that he would like to take CANINIUS to a ZIPPER interrogation house in Bad Toels near Munich. [] agreed to obtain necessary funds to cover the costs of the trip.

10. After the meeting, the Giessen office of ODOPAL was informed that their responsibility for CANINIUS would be at an end as of noon on 18 June. The officer with whom [] talked agreed to this, and did not show any signs of distress at the news.

11. On arrival in Frankfurt shortly before noon on 18 June, [] was told that Identity 1 had called and wished to speak with him. It developed that the ZIPPERite had been unable to persuade CANINIUS to travel to Munich by train or air since the latter refused to leave his 1938 Opel in storage. It was arranged that the necessary money would be transferred to Identity 1 in Frankfurt that afternoon.

12. The ZIPPER interrogator arrived at the Frankfurt Hauptbahnhof three quarters of an hour late, explaining that he had spent the elapsed time inspecting CANINIUS's car and found it in good order. He received 300 DMW against receipt signed in pseudonym and stated that CANINIUS had finally (after being released from his secrecy pledge by ODOPAL at noon) told of his relationship with the unidentified East German intelligence office. Identity 1 at that time indicated that he doubted whether CANINIUS was temperamentally suited to playing a double agent role. He continued that he expected to interrogate the agent for six or seven days and said he would attempt to determine as much about CANINIUS's Eastern connections as he was able. Surveillance determined that CANINIUS's car bore licence plate number KB 049-947.

13. On 19 June, [] discussed the case in detail at POB with Dr. KLAUSNER. KLAUSNER appeared eager to continue, but stated that Identity 1 was a technical interrogator who specialized in scientific subjects rather than being an IS specialist. Preliminary arrangements were made under which we would be able to meet Identity 1 in the future. We discussed in considerable detail a reply which CANINIUS should write immediately to a letter he received from his wife on the evening of 17 June. The letter indicated that a representative of [] himself had called upon the woman, had asked what had happened to CANINIUS, and had directed her to tell him to return to East Germany. The letter seemed, upon examination, very possibly to contain an S/W message. It is now being examined by the ZIPPER technical people with this in mind. We decided that a letter should be dispatched to the wife as soon as possible, indicating that CANINIUS was still in American hands and was being reinterrogated in the vicinity of Frankfurt. The letter would be mailed from Frankfurt.

14. Dr. KLAUSNER gave us the telephone number of ZIPPER's interrogation house in Bad Toels to which Identity 1 and CANINIUS had allegedly gone. Repeated attempts to call this number, however, were unsuccessful.

15. On the morning of 20 June at a conference with SMERTENS, GRODERICH and GRAYERLE, it developed that Dienststelle 62 had not wished CANINIUS to be exposed to the Bad Toels installation and that therefore he was being interrogated somewhere in the neighborhood of Munich.

16. NOTE: Comment by [] It may be that I have an overactive imagination; however, the following two incidents are reported with no conclusions drawn:

a. At about 0800 on 18 June as I turned off the Autobahn and drove through a small town on the way to Giessen, a black Soviet Military Mission BMW sedan driven by an enlisted man with two officers in the back, passed by going in the direction of the Autobahn.

b. At 1610 the same day as I came out of the U.S. RTO in Frankfurt in order to ascertain the license plate number of CANINIUS's car, I noticed a dark grey Pobeda sedan, also with Soviet Military Mission plates, driving away from the side entrance of the Frankfurt Hauptbahnhof.

We have no indication that the Soviets are directly interested in this case. It is further unlikely that if they were, they would interfere in such an overt manner. The above two occurrences may be purely coincidence.

SUBJECT : CANINIUS (UJTIROLLERY 125)

DATES : 16-20 June 1955

SYNOPSIS: This report is undersigned's record of happenings at POB during the transfer of CANINIUS from POB to ZIPPER and should be read in conjunction with [] contact report on the same subject, having the same dates.

1. On the morning of 16 June 1955 [] received a phone call from [] who had been in the COS offices, to the effect that CANINIUS was to be transferred from BOB control to ZIPPER. [] requested that [] query ZIPPER on their interest in the case. This telephone conversation was followed up by a cable, SFRAN-0517. [] immediately reviewed our file on the case and discussed the situation with []. It was agreed at this time to advise MERTENS of ZIPPER of the situation and to get his reaction. MERTENS was involved in a meeting with Buero Bavaria and could not be contacted until shortly after two in the afternoon. MERTENS was also informed that CANINIUS was presently in Giessen where he was being quizzed by ODOPAL. MERTENS was further told that apparently the BfV had an interest in the case. MERTENS immediately called for any name traces available in the ZIPPER Kartei on the individuals mentioned in the affair and requested Dr. KLAUSNER to sit in on the ensuing conversation. KLAUSNER was accordingly brought up to date on the information known at that time; there was some discussion between KLAUSNER and MERTENS as to what Dienststelle should take it over. Dienststelle 62 was agreed to be the obvious choice. Accordingly, BAYERLE was called in and he was also briefed. A Blitz Fernschreiben was immediately dispatched to Dienststelle 62 requesting that they call in.

2. When the Dienststelle called in, arrangements were made for MERTENS and BAYERLE to meet the Assistant Chief, ZELLER (phonetic)(V-12400) (Identity 2) at a Gasthaus on the Stuttgart Autobahn approximately half-way between Munich and Augsburg. It was further arranged that MERTENS and BAYERLE would thereafter notify [] at his home at what time the interrogator could be expected to arrive in Frankfurt to meet []

3. [] immediately returned to the office and contacted [] by phone to request a Frankfurt phone number at which the ZIPPER interrogator might contact him. The number was passed to MERTENS. MERTENS explained that the interrogator would introduce himself as Adolf MUELLER.

4. At approximately 1930 hours, BAYERLE called [] at his home to say that Adolf MUELLER would be in Frankfurt not earlier than noon, Friday, 17 June, and possibly as late as 1600.

5. [] early on the morning of 17 June to brief him on Adolf MUELLER. At about this time [] asked if ZIPPER had undertaken any negotiations with the BfV. Since this had been overlooked in the rush of arrangements, [] again contacted MERTENS about possible difficulties with the BfV. During this meeting, MERTENS stated that the ZIPPER contact, RADTKE, Deputy Chief of the BfV, was on leave and could not possibly be contacted. RADTKE's replacement was violently opposed to ZIPPER and would automatically

answer "no" to any suggestion ZIPPER might make. MERTENS opined that it would be useless to contact the BfV. This information was immediately passed to

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6. [] At about 2230 hours on the evening of 17 June, [] again contacted [] to inform him that Mueller had been put in contact with CANINIUS. MUELLER felt that there was a great deal more to be had from CANINIUS than he had originally believed. MUELLER also stated that CANINIUS was prepared to cooperate. [] suggested that it might again be advisable to contact ZIPPER to determine if anything might be done to call off the BfV.

7. [] accordingly met with Dr. KLAUSNER until about 0030 hours, 18 June. During this conversation it was decided that if possible, CANINIUS would be removed from Giessen by [] or more specifically, by Mueller; the latter would be represented to ODOPAL as an employee of some unnamed American installation; if the BfV were to inquire, all ODOPAL would report would be that some unnamed American organization had been interested in CANINIUS and had removed him for further interrogation. KLAUSNER continued that should it be necessary at any subsequent time to reveal to the BfV that ZIPPER had CANINIUS, it would be very simple to state merely that he had been turned over to ZIPPER by the Americans. [] imparted this information immediately to [] who undertook to discuss the whole thing again with []

8. On the morning of 18 June, [] arrived from Frankfurt with COS's files on the case which shed a great deal of additional light on what had transpired and exactly how BOB had been running the affair. Also, [] called on the morning of 18 June to report that actually the BfV was not concerned with the affair, that the people who were concerned were actually ODOPAL. [] anticipated no further problems with the removal of CANINIUS to ZIPPER custody, with the simple exception that neither he nor MUELLER had any additional money. He therefore requested that [] make arrangements that [] be able to pick up an advance from COS on his return to Frankfurt from Giessen. [] reported that Adolf MUELLER and CANINIUS would depart Giessen at about noon and proceed to a ZIPPER safehouse in South Germany.

9. [] immediately attempted to contact MERTENS, who could not be reached, nor could KLAUSNER. [] therefore told BAYERLE the story, in order that he might keep KLAUSNER and MERTENS informed.

10. [] again reported to [] at approximately 1615 hours on the afternoon of 18 June to inform him that MUELLER and CANINIUS had departed for South Germany in CANINIUS's automobile and that he was returning that evening via air with the latest information. [] suggested a conclave on the morning of 19 June in order that the three Americans who had been handling at least parts of the affair, that is, [] might compare notes and discuss the case with the ZIPPERites.

11. [] met at about 1000 hours, 19 June, and discussed the affair until noon. After lunch KLAUSNER was contacted and was brought up to date on all the latest happenings, as outlined in [] contact report.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on the Future of UJ DROLLERY-125 Held 20 June 1955 in the ZIPPER Stadt Haus.

PRESENT: @Dr. KLAUSNER, @MERTENS, @BAYERLE, @RODERICH, @KUTZBACH, @ZELLE (phonetic), []

1. [] [] briefed @MERTENS, @RODERICH and @BAYERLE earlier in the morning on the latest developments in the CANINIUS case. It was still being handled on this high a level, although there was discussion that KUTZBACH would be assigned as Headquarters' case officer. MERTENS said he would immediately try to reach ZELLE, Deputy Chief of Dienststelle 62, in order to find out what had happened to @Adolf MUELLER and CANINIUS. My efforts to reach MUELLER on Sunday (19 June) and early Monday morning at the Freudenheim, Bad Toelz, Telephone 2362, were unsuccessful. MERTENS said that this was not strange in that Dienststelle 62 had ordered MUELLER not to take CANINIUS to Bad Toelz, but to put him up somewhere in Munich.

2. We waited until 1500 hours before we received word that a meeting had been laid on. Shortly before the meeting began, MERTENS received the results of the laboratory tests on the letter sent to CANINIUS by his wife. There was no indication, according to the report, of any SW system in the letter. However, the laboratory stated categorically that a note enclosed in the letter, allegedly written by CANINIUS's son Wolfgang, was remarkable for the following reasons:

a. The handwriting was that of a person who had either been brought up in the Baltic countries or else who had spent considerable time there; another possibility was that it had been dictated by a Russian who had a good but not fluent knowledge of German.

b. The phraseology and style was not that which would normally be employed by a 14 to 16 year old schoolboy.

c. The penmanship indicates a degree of uncertainty on the part of the writer in that certain letters within words had been joined together as an afterthought (i.e., they had first been printed and then merely strung together).

d. The educated guess of the lab technicians was that the letter had been written by a youth from the Baltic states or that it had been dictated by a Soviet case officer.

3. The meeting at 1530 hours was chaired by KLAUSNER. It was extremely disturbing to learn that ZELLE not only had not seen @MUELLER, but had no information on the case from the time when it had first been brought to his attention on the evening of 16 June. Secondly, I was shocked to discover that

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MUELLER had been ordered to drop contact with CANINIUS and had been sent to Stuttgart to await further orders. I asked where CANINIUS was and was met by a circle of blank faces. He was allegedly somewhere in the vicinity of Munich. Despite the temptation to remonstrate strongly on this point, I felt that I could not do so at the moment and probably also would have gained nothing by tackling such a large group. (Note: It occurs to me that one of the primary reasons that MUELLER was evacuated so rapidly from Munich was that ZIPPER suspected (rightly) that I had gotten close to MUELLER and that I would have liked to work directly with him on the case). The stated reason for his withdrawal was that MUELLER was a technical interrogator, not an Sfs expert and also not a case officer.

4. I spent the first half-hour briefing ZELLE and the group in general on the circumstances of the case. Thereafter a discussion ensued of which the gist was, where do we go from here? KLAUSNER repeatedly bemoaned the fact that ZIPPER did not have a trained capable CE case officer readily available to handle CANINIUS. I suggested to MERTENS that one of the new case officers operating under SACKERMANN of Dienststelle 62 be brought down from Berlin specifically to handle CANINIUS. MERTENS stated, without giving a reason, that those individuals could not leave West Berlin.

5. KLAUSNER finally stated that he thought he would be able to shake a case officer loose from Dienststelle 161. This man is already loaded with five active cases and KLAUSNER was not at all sure that he could be reached on 21 or even 22 June.

6. I asked several times what they proposed to do about replying to the letter from CANINIUS's wife. The response was that nothing could be done given the existing set of circumstances. They merely said that it was unfortunate, but no reply could be made until a new case officer had been briefed and had met CANINIUS. I agreed, but pressed again for a speedy resolution of this embarrassing and extremely unfortunate situation.

7. I pushed again to have CANINIUS's car inspected thoroughly to see if a reason could be discovered for the tenacity with which he clung to it. This, I was told, would be kept in mind but no decision could be made at the moment. Finally, on a somewhat desperate note and in the hope of dispersing some of the stagnation that seemed to have set in, I suggested that once the new case officer was fully in the picture and had met and assessed CANINIUS, he take the agent back to Berlin. (This would also give us the opportunity to take a look at the car). Once in Berlin, CANINIUS should get in touch with his wife through the pre-arranged channel and could invite her to the Western Sectors to find out what the story behind her letter was. This was a dangerous gamble but I also made it clear that unless the case moved rapidly, I was afraid that all would be lost. The ZIPPERites agreed in principle with this proposal but said that if it were undertaken, the strongest security precautions would have to be put into effect. This would involve advance notification by ZIPPER Headquarters of the Berlin Wald Kapelle. The meeting could take place only under surveillance with the protection of a couple of strong arms. The matter has been left hanging in the air.

ATTACHMENT #4
EGLA-14 621
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ATTACHMENT #4
EGLA-14 621
PAGE THREE

8. Comment: This is an extremely unfortunate example of ZIPFER's inability to capitalise on what might be an extremely valuable GE opportunity

9. I promised the Headquarters staff that we would make every effort to get them by the 21st of June a complete extract from our files on the case to date. I also said that we would endeavor to procure the documentary reports submitted to [] in Berlin.

10. [] discovered on the morning of 21 June that KUTZBACH had been sent to Stuttgart, presumably to pick up MUELLER's reports and to get his impressions of CANINIUS.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with KUTZBACH on UJ-DROLLERY #125, 22 June 1955.

1. KUTZBACH had left Stuttgart at 2330 the previous night and arrived back in the Compound at 1000, due to a car breakdown on the Autobahn. He called us as soon as he was free. [] and I met him at 1130.
2. KUTZBACH had received the first part of MUELLER's interrogation report on CANINIUS. He strongly regretted the fact that MUELLER had carried out his interrogations along positive intelligence lines only and that MUELLER had been unable to follow up any leads in the CE field.
3. Most distressing to us, however, was the fact that CANINIUS had been released from the jurisdiction of Dienststelle 62 and had been told to return to Giessen and to await there a case officer who would identify himself by presenting half of a post card. Once again CANINIUS may come to the attention of the BfV.
4. The new case officer is V-2655 (Identity 3) from Dienststelle 161. He is at the moment on vacation and is also burdened with twelve other cases, recruitments, etc. An attempt will be made to bring him back from his vacation by 25 June. We plan to drive to Stuttgart with KUTZBACH that day in order to brief the case officer, (V-2978) (Identity 4), and DIRK (V-2653) (Identity 5) on 26 June.
5. Quite apart from the possibility that the BfV will become aware that CANINIUS has returned to Giessen, we view it as most unfortunate that the agent has once again been allowed to slip from even the slightest shadow of ZIPPER control. It is, of course, conceivable that by allowing him this additional unobserved time, the Eastern service involved will be able to brief CANINIUS thoroughly on his method of operation when he is re-contacted.
6. KUTZBACH noted that V-2665 is a competent case officer, able to conduct negotiations with practically any type of person, but that he fails in his reporting. He asked that we give him our impressions of V-2665 after the weekend meetings. I suggested that we plan to meet V-2665 late next week after he had had an opportunity to talk to CANINIUS, in order to waste as little time as possible.

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ATTACHMENT #6
ECLA-14 621
PAGE ONE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Status of CANINIUS as of 23 June 1955

1. [] and I spent almost the entire day in the 127 Section, translating into German our 28-page history of the CANINIUS case so that KUTZBACH would be sure to have it in time for our meeting with the Dienststelle 161 Case Officer and CE Operations Officer.

2. At about 1100 in the morning, KUTZBACH came in with a downcast expression to announce that the meeting which we had arranged for Sunday, 26 June, had had to be postponed until 29 June.

3. We decided to exert polite but firm pressure on KUTZBACH to see if the loss of time (which had already been considerable) could not be held to a minimum. At 1300 hours we confronted KUTZBACH with the facts that we, POB, had put in a great amount of work in attempting to turn the case over to ZIPPER. We emphasized that we thought V-2665 should contact CANINIUS as soon as possible. KUTZBACH agreed with our position completely and said he would contact Dr. KLAUSNER. Later that afternoon, KUTZBACH invited me into his office while he called SCHUSTER of Dienststelle 161, who is V-2665's chief. KUTZBACH called Stuttgart 53 655 (to the best of my memory) and firmly requested SCHUSTER to schedule the meeting for Sunday instead of Wednesday. SCHUSTER agreed.

4. Comment: The above is an interesting example of the cooperation we are able to get out of Dr. KLAUSNER if we make a strong enough case and if we have previously proven our good will. Apparently, from KUTZBACH's statements, the difficulty lay not with SCHUSTER and the case officer, but with the Dienststelle 161 "chiefs", who, for devious reasons of their own, did not want to be stampeded into action.

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ATTACHMENT #7
EOLA-14 621
PAGE ONE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Progress of UJ DROLLERY #125

1. I picked up SKUTZBACH at 2:00 o'clock on Saturday afternoon, 25 June; we arrived in Stuttgart shortly before 6:00 and put up at the Hotel Ketterer. The following morning, shortly after 8:00 o'clock, SCHUSTER and Hans CRAMER appeared to discuss the case. SKUTZBACH briefed the two of them in considerable detail and turned over our translations of the written reports on the case.

2. It was agreed that CRAMER would go to Giessen the morning of 27 June and would accompany CANINIUS to Karlsruhe/Knielingon. In reply to my request that ZIPPER endeavor to control CANINIUS's movements and contacts as much as possible, SCHUSTER stated that "Der Dicke" (probably V-3030), would be able to assign one and possibly two men to surveil CANINIUS during the times when CRAMER was not with him.

3. CRAMER and SCHUSTER will be in Munich on 29 June and probably that evening SKUTZBACH and I will have an opportunity to discuss the case further with them. CRAMER will bring with him a letter from CANINIUS to his wife, which we hope will keep up the interest of the Eastern service involved, while at the same time give ZIPPER enough time to assess CANINIUS thoroughly and come to some tentative conclusions about the operation.

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ATTACHMENT #8
EGIA-14 621
PAGE ONE

QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS RE CAMINIUS - Handed to SKUTZBACH, OSCHUSTER and
V-2665 on 26 June 1955.

I. Financial Arrangements:

- a. Who can get to the holding account? What arrangement for picking up card? (Sicherungskarte).
- b. What arrangements for wife in future? Has she possibility of actually making own way?
- c. Has she ever worked? Yes? When, where?

II. Family and personal:

- a. What are the children's names?
- b. Who is Wolfgang - was he in Wernigerode? - Educational level, cultural background.
- c. Who actually lives where.
- d. Was his second residence in East Berlin actually Florapromenade 4 or Kastanienallee?
- e. What was his SED function in 1946?
- f. What year and make is the car - 1938 or 1949?
- g. What was his own financial status in the East?
- h. What is his current official party status?
- i. Did wife meet Peter in Baarenklaus - in 1953 - and when was letter written?

III. The Letter from his wife to CAMINIUS:

- a. What is the reference to "Kammer und Technik"
- b. Possibility of open code phrase
- c. Effect of the letter on Giessen authorities; evidence of danger or reverse?
- d. Letter very obvious IS phraseology.
- e. How did wife know to write to Giessen?
- f. Does he believe it written under duress - too stiff and formal?

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ATTACHMENT #8
EGIA-14 621
PAGE TWO

- g. Any explanation for discrepancies in Wolfgang note. Where and when did W. write note?
- h. Why would Peter recall him - blown, whole case off, suspicion, re-briefing or is that only for our consumption.
- i. ~~HARDENKAUER~~ (~~HARTENHAUER~~ in his letter to wife) probably identical with ~~HARDENHAUSER~~, mentioned in case as member of Ministry.
- j. Anything on phone number in letter.
- k. Why letter sent by wife, not in code through Peter.
- l. Does he believe wife wrote letter in West or East? At home of mother, first wife or secretary?

IV. Operational:

- a. When did he actually think of doubling (his statement: 1953).
- b. Why such long delay between desire to double and actual attempt to do so.
- c. Whom did he actually seek out in West Berlin.
- d. Did he actually try to contact ZIPPER in West Berlin? How?
- e. Why didn't he follow RIAS advice on the DGB office?
- f. Why didn't continue contact with Bundeshaus, Gesamtdeutsche Frage Abtlg.?
- g. Why wait from January to March to contact us?
- h. Why come to US Headquarters? - Danger for him.
- i. Motivation: why for us? No adequate explanation. What motivation to work for East? Pressure on family expected?
- j. Has contradicted himself on willingness to work for Germans vs us at first.
- k. Has anything concrete been said to him re his job in East in future?
- l. Anything further than the casual mention by Peter of intelligence activity at Western trade fairs?
- m. Documents: Explanation unsatisfactory of how he got them. Eastern security can't be that lax; how did he get docs he so liberally had sprinkled around his house? Not dangerous to him?

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

ATTACHMENT #8
EOLA-14 621
PAGE THREE

- n. What explanation for so loose a briefing by Peter on CANINIUS's conduct on arrival in Western Germany? Peter not aware he probably wouldn't be recognized as refugee or was story to be strengthened, i.e., by the letter?
- o. Why would Peter return his Lebenslauf (second meeting, 1953).
- p. Briefs: Why the change from guided missiles to radar and electric commo? Who are the people on whom he is to report? Why interest in consumer goods?
- q. Comment by our crypto people: book code is considered low level, common, fairly easy to break.
- r. What courier arrangements made; how often should he write to BERKENKAMP address.
- s. Possibility that Peter and Lautenschlaeger deliberate provocations to excite our interest.
- t. Note extreme validity of documents passed, but then inadequacy of briefing on activity in West Germany; also detailed cover story which he must have lived.
- u. The deadline of year, year-and-a-half residence in West Germany would indicate definite targets? What? Will he be informed later?
- v. Is he suited for resident agent type activity? Probably not - lack of training, experience.
- w. Any training ever given?
- x. Why was Peter in Hannover? - can it be checked?
- y. Did CANINIUS actually meet BERKENKAMP? Why not? Anything further on commo arrangements?
- z. Any arrangements for meetings in West?
- aa. What does CANINIUS think the East German office is?
- bb. Note that he indirectly found out that he probably would not be subjected to second LCFLUTTER.
- cc. What is significance of following statement from Lautenschlaeger: "The Party does not demand too much technically and politically with the carrying-out of this mission"?

SECRET

ATTACHMENT #8
EGLA-1h 621
PAGE FOUR

- dd. Is LAUTENSCHLAGER subordinate to Peter and competent only for operational security (agent vetting?)
- ee. Significance of Prof. Werner ~~LANGER~~.
- ff. What is State Planning Commission Research and Development Dept?
- gg. Is CANINIUS acquainted with any Balts? Are any principals herein of Baltic extraction? Peter? ~~JERR~~? et al? Any Russians in the Ministry of Machine Construction? Who? Where? Position? Contact with ~~SP~~
CANINIUS?

SECRET

4-
KAPOK




COS: ATTACHMENT #9
EGLA 14621

KAPOK



Handwritten text, possibly a name or address, including "Kato" and "Kato".

Handwritten text, possibly a date or time, including "Jan. 9".



Handwritten text, possibly a name or title, including "AHTA".

Handwritten text, possibly a name or title, including "Kato".

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Lieber Papa!
alles geht es, und wir wollen es hoffen, dass beständig ist,
gut. Die Pfingstfesttage war ich in Tegel. Allmählich schreibe
macht wirklich Fortschritte. Von Verweis werde ich wahr-
scheinlich los. Das jetzt habe ich hier von Dir noch nichts
gehört, was daraus schließen könnte, dass die Rettung aus-
wärtig ginge es von mir nicht zu schreiben, was sich in-
teressieren könnte. Ich wünsche Dir mit Deine weiteren Unter-
nehmen viel Erfolg, und verbleibe Dir heute mit den aller-
herzlichsten Grüßen

Dein Wolfgang

KAPPE

Heilingssee d. 16. 6. 55

Lieber Rudolf!

gest hatte ich gestern u. heute keine Besuk-
men. Na, vielleicht ist morgen was da.

Am Freitagabend hatte ich Besuch, ein Herr
von „Kammer u. Technik“. Es kam ~~aus dem~~
Brief, den du an sie gerichtet hast. Er war
sehr enttäuscht, daß du nicht zu sprechen
wast. Er will dich unbedingt zurück holen.
Ich sagte ihm, daß ich ohne Nachsicht bin.
Wenn ich irgend etwas erfahren sollte, wo du
dich aufhältst, dann soll ich zu dir fahren
und dich zurück holen. Solltest du wieder
kommen dann sollst du sofort anrufen.

„Peter“ zu erreichen über Hardenkamer Tel: 232/4405

Ich wirst du ja sicher wissen was das für
ein Herr war. So, das wollte ich dir als erstes
mitteilen. Er bedauerte mich sehr und sagte:
Das wäre sehr hart, wenn ihr Mann sie und
Tobias im Stich lassen würde. Ich habe ihm
natürlich den Glauben gelassen.

Jutta liegt krank, ich war bei ^{Frau} Tobias Hausmann
und habe von ihr Medikamente geholt.

Er ist mit sehr zu getan. Gestern war ich

~~KAROL~~

Ja, so geht es mir. Ich muß überall hin
sehen wo ich was verdienen. Aber das wir
leben können.

Ich werde meine Zeiten beenden ich will schnell
hinsick fahren. Aber die Julia nicht so lange
allein ist.

Sei sehr herzlich begrüßt von
deiner Elisabeth u. Julia.

Arbei ein Brief vom Tiefgang.

SEPARATE OVER ATTACHMENT TO:

NLA-14,621

7 III 1955

IDENTITIES

1. True name probably Franz ~~TUCZKOWSKI~~ (probable @ Franz ~~FALKE~~); issued "E" ID card No. 03651 on 4 Dec 1952. Lives in Dusseldorf or Gelsenkirchen.
2. True name Karl ~~ZEBETBAUER~~, @ Karl ~~ZELLER~~, living in Augsburg, born Neulautbach, Mark/Ost.
3. True name Hans Max ~~CLEMENS~~ @ Hans ~~CRAMER~~, date of birth 9 February 1902, Dresden.
4. True name Carl ~~SCHUETZ~~, @ Karl ~~SCHUSTER~~, born 11 April 1907, Mayen.
5. True name Karl Heinz ~~DIETSCH~~, @ Hans ~~DIRK~~, @ Rolf ~~BREDOW~~, born 7 January 1916, Mannheim. (HQ File)
6. True name Alfred ~~BENTZINGER~~, @ Der Dicke. HQ file born 27 July 1912.

*Please indicate
on all names*

*↓
Zippente connected with
turnover of CANINIUS.*

Dist:
3-EE (DIRECT)
3-COE