

was brought into the picture to run the operation under our control, and his role was aided to by the leading personalities of the Gesellschaft, including its elderly and more or less figurehead chairman, former Major General Volrath von Helldorn.

II. Project Origin

1. Although the Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde was formally organized on 5 January 1952, its roots go back to the previous year when G.D.R.F. was engaged in developmental activities under HEANEY, the master project covering veterans' affairs. There were at that time a bewildering array of budding veterans' organizations. To win them over to Western interests and exploit their psychological warfare potential, it was decided to establish a newspaper for veterans which could serve as an operational springboard toward influence and control over the veterans' movement in general, regardless of which of the several organizations rose to the top in the struggle for pre-eminence. This newspaper was Die Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung (DSZ) and G.D.R.F. control over it was formalized in HEANEY sub-project WIKELIA-ORHACAC. The Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde, in a sense, was an outgrowth of ORHACAC since the idea for such an ex-officers' association apparently developed from discussions held between Case Officer

2. G.D.R.F. chief agent Helmut Demerau and other Germans then connected with the newspaper, including former SS General Felix Steiner.

3. These discussions gave birth to a plan (said by Glasen to be the brainchild of Felix Steiner) to organize an ex-officers' group capable of commanding respect and influence throughout West Germany and which, at the same time, could serve under HOOCH control and supervision as a cold war asset against Soviet Communism and neo-Fascist influences in Western Germany. Included in the basic aim was the rallying of support in former German territory for German participation in the defence of Western Europe.

4. On recommendation of Demerau, Dr. Glasen was induced to resign a responsible position within soft-drink firm in the Ruhr area and come to Bonn to serve -- under HOOCH's control -- as organizer, administrator and public head of the Gesellschaft. A small permanent office was set up in Bonn in late 1951, staffed by Glasen and a secretary, and the work of the organization began. As already noted, the Gesellschaft formally began in January 1952.

III. Operational Development

5. In the recruiting of members and formation of sections in various parts of the Federal Republic, the Gesellschaft, on HOOCH instructions, imposed the following rules of membership eligibility:

a. Loyalty to Western ideals and the concept of integrated European defence. Rejection of neutralism.

b. Rejection of neo-Fascist and neo-Nazi and groups sponsoring these or similar philosophies -- particularly the ultra-rightist and now outlawed DFP.

c. Rejection of Communism and opposition to its front organizations and activities; and

d. Acceptance of the July 1944 bomb plot against Hitler as a justifiable and honorable act.

8. Structurally, the Gesellschaft was headed by its Executive Board under the nominal chairmanship of von Hellermann. Deputy chairman was Felix Steiner, whose tainted SS background, fuzzy political ideas and pushing, bumptious temperament partially contributed to the organization's demise as a WGCN project. Although not personally popular with his colleagues (Classen explains this well in his critique), Steiner, by virtue of his alleged role as foster father of the Gesellschaft, and by his aggressive personality, entrenched himself in the organization's leadership circle. The Gesellschaft also had a Beirat, or Advisory Council, headed by ex-General Hasso von Manteuffel, but this group had only honorary functions and no significant voice in Gesellschaft policy matters. Various specialized Gesellschaft committees (Arbeitsausschüsse) were also set up, each dealing with research and preparation of special papers and studies on technical military matters. Among these committees were those on Military Training and Education, Defense Propaganda (headed by Dr. Classen), Youth and Defense, Military Law, Military Organization, Military Medicine, Armored Troops and Warfare, Partisan Warfare, etc. One objective of the committees, in addition to indoctrination and instruction of section members, was to lay the groundwork for potential future usefulness in research and basic staff work on behalf of the embryo "defense ministry" (known as the Blank Office) at Bonn, charged by the Federal Government with organizing German participation in Western military affairs.

9. Pages 4 and 5 of WGCN-3A contain a list of local Gesellschaft sections formally established or in process of organization by 10 December, 1952. These totalled 107 sections in every part of the Federal Republic. Each contained a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 30 members.

IV. Operational Control.

10. As soon as Dr. Classen appeared on the scene in late 1951 and assumed the function of principal agent, contact between Case Officer [] and the Gesellschaft was, with rare exception, maintained through him alone. A potentially complicating factor was []'s simultaneous role as case officer for TRULFILL/ORGAN, which put him in the difficult position of handling two "cross-fertilized" organizations. Although the control line in one case was to Dameran and in the other to Classen, nevertheless it was inevitable and unavoidable that "informed" personnel of each organization kept in touch with each other, compared notes and generally contributed to a basically unsond situation from a clandestine operational viewpoint.

11. It is necessary to mention here that the origin of the Gesellschaft (as an offshoot, in a sense, of TRULFILL/ORGAN) and the circumstances of its founding, resulted in at least 27 persons connected with ORGAN and/or the Gesellschaft being aware of American support of the latter. (Classen)

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lists this number in his critique -- Annex C, page 3). The focal point of the trouble in this respect was General Steiner, whose notoriously wagging tongue was impervious to all warnings from [] and Dr. Classen alike. Steiner is constitutionally incapable of keeping his mouth shut, particularly since the Gesellschaft was more or less his own idea and this weakness remains a permanent source of potential KUGOWI embarrassment.

12. Mechanisms by which the Gesellschaft implemented KUGOWI policies -- the psychological warfare line was laid down by Mytrow to Classen and faithfully followed by the latter -- were personally managed by Classen and included the following:

a. The internal information bulletin Wahrunde, published bi-monthly and distributed to all sections and members as well as to a number of selected outside organizations. This was a house organ of 20 pages in which Classen, Editor Joachim Ruoff and other designated writers discussed topical military matters with heavy stress on U.S. and KUGOWI objectives; German integration with the Western World; an active military contribution; resistance to Communist pressure and policies, etc. The publication was intended -- and used -- as a formalized set of briefing notes for the guidance of section leaders. Its subject matter provided themes for subsequent local rallies and discussion meetings.

b. Public meetings, conducted under local Gesellschaft auspices in many cities, often with speakers directly assigned by the central office in Munich. Dr. Classen reports that as of 12 December 1952 (immediately preceding termination of KUGOWI support), a total of 87 public rallies of this kind had been held, with attendance ranging from 40 to 350 persons. This is not a bad record considering that the Gesellschaft's basic appeal is to a narrowly specialized and professional audience. Of these 87 meetings, 66 were devoted directly to promotion of German support for the European Defense Treaty, 12 to questions of military training, and 9 to lectures on civilian defense against atomic warfare. Not included in these figures are the literally hundreds of local Gesellschaft discussion evenings to which non-members were invited and debate stimulated on the European Defense Treaty issue.

c. The brochure program. This involved the publication, in series, of attractively designed booklets, usually 50-60 pages in length, on a variety of Cold War themes, including "Yes or No to the Defense Treaty", "The USA in the Eyes of a Soldier" (written by ex-General Himmler), "Armament in the Soviet Orbit", "The Spirit and Structure of the Red Army", "Warfare Can Do It", "Attack on Germany in the Cold War", and "The Road to Satellite Status". Kind each brochure were issued by the Gesellschaft during its year of KUGOWI support. The press run of each varied from 5,000 to 40,000 copies. Altogether 212,000 copies were published and distributed in the regular series, with several thousand reprints necessary to meet demand in the case of at least two of the brochures. For the most part, strict KUGOWI editorial control was maintained over this publication program. The subject matter of each brochure was discussed in advance between Mytrow and Dr. Classen, manuscripts were generally submitted for review and modification (frequent changes were made at SACOR direction), and extensive use was made of source material.

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provided by CADOUR to the Gesellschaft. Distribution of the brochures was made through the local sections and by friendly organizations such as the Bund Europaische Jugend and the Bund Deutscher Jugend, and copies were sent to all higher schools and universities in the Federal Republic, libraries, state headquarters of the coalition political parties, etc. Favorable newspaper review and congratulatory letters received by the Gesellschaft from several offices of the Federal Government, the coalition political parties, other veterans' organizations, youth groups, schools and universities, and from private organizations and individuals gave ample testimonial to the effectiveness of this phase of the Gesellschaft program.

V. Financial Support and Introduction of Funds.

13. The total cost to KUGOWI of this project from start to finish was DM 240,858.-- . Annex D itemizes by date and amount the record of advances made and accountings received from the principal agent. The individual accountings, accompanied by receipts and certificates as appropriate, have been submitted to the Mission Finance Office. With the data still available to him, the undersigned can give only an approximate functional breakdown of overall project costs. Exclusive of termination salary payments, approximately 150,000 DM were spent for support of "regular" Gesellschaft operations; 70,000 DM for authors' fees, and brochure printing and distribution costs; and 14,000 DM for two special Gesellschaft conventions which brought together delegates from various points in West Germany.

14. To camouflage introduction of KUGOWI funds, which were the sole source of Gesellschaft income, an arrangement was set up by the principal agent and [] which provided for the deposit of these funds with the Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (Foundation for the Advancement of German Science), located in Essen. The money was re-transmitted monthly from the Stifterverband as a "contribution" into the Munich bank account of the Gesellschaft. Occasionally, a portion of the KUGOWI funds were deposited by [] into a Hannover bank account maintained by another agent controlled by him. A check for this sum from the Hannover account would then be sent to the Stifterverband. For the most part, however, funds were passed directly from Whybrow to Classen and deposited by the latter with the Stifterverband. The fact that the Gesellschaft received its support from American sources was known to the Stifterverband director with whom the arrangement had been made early in the project's existence. This indiscretion has been attributed to General Steiner.

15. It is interesting to note from recent mail intercepts maintained on the Gesellschaft, that it has been successful in obtaining some degree of covert financial support from the Blank Office of the Federal Government subsequent to termination of our support, and that the transfer of funds from the new sponsor is apparently still being handled in the same way through the Stifterverband.

VI. Termination of KUGOWN Support

16. The decision to terminate support of the Gesellschaft was made in November 1952 as a result of the overall policy change in German operations which, among other things, required a somewhat precipitous withdrawal from the entire field of veterans' affairs. The undersigned, who had replaced [redacted] as Case Officer barely three weeks before, communicated the decision to Classen and termination proceedings immediately got under way. Details of this close-out phase have been fully reported in contact reports transmitted to the Home Office. However, a few aspects are perhaps worth mentioning.

17. The termination came as a stunning surprise to the Gesellschaft and the proffered explanation that we were pulling out because ratification of the European Defense Treaty was approaching and we considered the basic promotional job to have been largely completed, plus the fact that virtually complete German sovereignty was also imminent, was greeted with some skepticism and bitterness by members of the Gesellschaft Executive Board, if not by the principal agent. All members of this Board, as previously indicated, were aware of the past American support. They were also quick to find out, through the "cross fertilization" mentioned earlier, that we were abandoning INTFULFIL/QKNAGNAG.

18. Immediately a scramble started to secure new sponsorship if possible. Exploratory contacts were made at Bonn and elsewhere. To nobody's surprise, it became obvious that the Federal Government was in no hurry to take over the Gesellschaft and was convinced - without proof - that the ex-officers' group had been financed by some American agency. It was thus treated as "tainted" to some degree, although there was no question of disagreement with the Gesellschaft's record of public achievement. However, the Government's greatest reluctance to adopting the Gesellschaft centered around the person of General Felix Steiner, who apparently was as persona non grata to Bonn as he had been to KUGOWN. After some negotiating, Steiner's complete removal from the scene was made a condition for possible support by the Blank Office.

19. Steiner, meanwhile, appeared to entertain personal political ambitions (there was talk that he intended to run for the Bundestag if he could deliver the SS and other veterans' vote to the Deutsche Partei), and threw himself into the effort to line up a new sponsor. It is known that shortly after our termination was completed, he succeeded in promoting a small "loan" from a dubious Rightist organization, the Gesellschaft für Neue Staatspolitik (Society for a New National Policy) of Ulm. Shortly, however, the Executive Board of the ex-officers' Gesellschaft, faced with the alternative of closing down completely, overcame past reluctance (based on outmoded concepts of officer corps mutual protection regardless of personal feeling), and politely ejected the former SS General from the organization. The Gesellschaft, according to monitored reports, was then taken under the financial wing of the Blank Office, to what degree is not known. ZIPPER is also reported to have had some support under consideration.

20. CADOUR termination with the principal agent was amicable in every respect. The undersigned's final contact with Classen was on 17 January 1953. Classen was given a three months' salary payment and a quitclaim to sign. Although Classen obviously wanted to continue in KUGOWI employ elsewhere, it was not felt advisable to retain him because of the wide circle of people aware of his relationship to "the Americans". Classen himself recognized the validity of this point of view -- in his own words, he was "abgestempelt", or marked as an American "collaborator". So far as is known, he has remained with the Gesellschaft under its new sponsorship.

VII. Concluding Comments

21. It would appear from the record that project QKSNITCH was worthwhile and soundly conceived from a policy standpoint, if one considers the German political climate at the time of its origin. As a KUGOWI asset, it accomplished undeniably valuable work. The fact that the Communists found it necessary to create a counterpart rival - the front organization Führungsring ehemaliger Soldaten (Leadership Circle of Former Soldiers) - and to establish an anti-West, neutralist military publication to match the Gesellschaft's Wehrkunde and its brochure program, is indicative of the Gesellschaft's success in solidifying the basically pro-Western orientation of most West German ex-officers. Other contributory factors were at work to create a pro-Western majority among the ex-officers; the Gesellschaft, however, provided an organizational rallying point and a program which would have been otherwise absent.

22. There were undeniable weaknesses in the operational development of QKSNITCH. These are illustrated by the very presence of General Steiner and other SS personalities in the organization, to say nothing of Steiner's unfortunate qualities which, from all evidence available to the undersigned, led to the widespread circle of "informed" persons within the Gesellschaft and on the outside as well. It is indeed fortunate that this widespread knowledge of American support did not lead to a blow-up while the project was alive. It is difficult to blame the founding Case Officer for this unhealthy situation. QKSNITCH was developed under great pressure for speedy action in the veterans' field, and the assignment should probably never have been given to a Case Officer already involved in a parallel project with inevitable cross ties. Also, to the writer's personal knowledge, the original Case Officer was so heavily committed to other operational burdens (he handled at least five other projects of considerable complexity) that it was remarkable he was able to supervise the Gesellschaft as well as he did. And there can be little doubt but that General Steiner was the biggest thorn in the side of this project. Without him, many of the evident weaknesses would not have appeared. Those which are not related to Steiner's presence are well covered in the principal agent's critique attached to this report, and with which the undersigned is in general agreement.

Approved: []

Enclosures: A, B, C and D HERewith

Distribution:

3 - Addressee w/Encls. A, B, C, and D. 2ea.

3 - COM, Frankfurt, Att: C 3 w/Encls. A, B, C, & D. 1ea.

Written: 14 April 1953