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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DIST: 25 MARCH 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: CLAIMS THAT TWO RETIRED ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE A
PLAN TO BRING PRESSURE ON AND ULTIMATELY TO REMOVE
THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN

DOI: MARCH 1985

SOURCE: SEE PARAGRAPHS ONE AND FOUR, BELOW.

SUMMARY:

[redacted] HAVE MADE AN ELEVEN-
POINT PLAN FOR ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL FRONT WITH THE GOALS, FIRST,
TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO END ITS EFFORTS

TO PROSECUTE ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL ACCUSED OF ILLEGAL
ACTIVITIES DURING THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN AND, IN THE
LONGER RUN, TO REMOVE THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN.
[redacted] SAID [redacted] REACHED AGREEMENT ON THEIR PLAN THROUGH
ACTIVE DUTY INTERMEDIARIES. HE SPOKE ABOUT SIX OF THE POINTS IN
THE PLAN. ALSO, EARLY IN THE WEEK OF 17 MARCH, [redacted]
[redacted], WHO SAID HE IS ASSOCIATED
WITH [redacted] PLAN, POINTED OUT THAT THE LONGER

TERM GOAL OF THE PLAN -- THE REMOVAL OF THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT --
WOULD INVOLVE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS IF POSSIBLE, OR A COUP D'ETAT
IF NECESSARY. AFTER LISTING THE TYPES OF GROUPS AND TWO
INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM [redacted] CLAIMS TO HAVE CONSTANT CONTACT, THE
[redacted] NAMED THREE ACTIVE DUTY ARGENTINE ARMY GENERAL
OFFICERS WHOM [redacted] SAID SUPPORT HIM. [redacted] SPOKE ABOUT
EIGHT POINTS IN THE [redacted] PLAN. THE PLAN CALLS FOR
ACTIONS FROM ORGANIZATIONAL STEPS THROUGH INFORMATION COLLECTION
AND PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL ACTIONS TO COERCION AND THE USE OF
VIOLENCE.

TEXT: 1. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

A SECRET ELEVEN-POINT PLAN TO FORM A NATIONAL FRONT FOR TAKING
ACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSIN).

BUT HE DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY OF THESE INDIVIDUALS. HE SAID THAT THE
NATIONAL FRONT HAS TWO GOALS: THE FIRST AND MORE IMMEDIATE OF
WHICH, HE EXPLAINED, CONSISTS IN BRINGING PRESSURE ON THE
ADMINISTRATION TO END ITS EFFORTS TO PROSECUTE ARMED FORCES (FFAA)
PERSONNEL FOR ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES DURING THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE
CAMPAIGN. [redacted] THE SECOND AND LONGER TERM GOAL

WOULD INVOLVE THE REMOVAL OF THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED
THAT ACTIVITIES BASED ON [redacted] PLAN SHOULD BEGIN ABOUT
2 APRIL 1985. [redacted] THE SECOND OF APRIL MARKS THE
ANNIVERSARY OF THE LANDING OF ARGENTINE FORCES ON THE FALKLAND
ISLANDS IN 1982.)

3. [redacted] LISTED THE POINTS BELOW
AS ACTION "AGREEMENTS" INCLUDED IN THE ELEVEN POINTS OF MENENDEZ'
AND HIS PLAN:

A. UNDERTAKING A JOINT EFFORT TO RAISE MONEY.

B. SETTING UP A PARALLEL, BUT CLANDESTINE, JOINT GENERAL
STAFF WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED OFFICERS.

C. UNIFYING AND COORDINATING [redacted] "ACTION GROUPS"
OF ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL, WHO REMAIN LOYAL [redacted]
WHICH WOULD BEGIN CONDUCTING OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO BRING PRESSURE

ON THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT. [redacted] THESE OPERATIONS
WOULD INCLUDE THE BOMBING OF SELECTED TARGETS. HE MENTIONED
SPECIFICALLY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AS AMONG THE SELECTED TARGETS,
AND HE SAID OTHERS WOULD INCLUDE "ANTI-MILITARY" TARGETS.

[redacted] ASSOCIATE SAID THE RETIRED
GENERAL HAD INDICATED THAT THE "ACTION GROUPS" ALREADY EXIST.)
[redacted] SINCE EARLY IN THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION, HUMAN
RIGHTS ACTIVISTS HAVE BEEN TARGETS OF BOMBING ATTACKS. THESE
ATTACKS HAVE BEEN TIMED AND CARRIED OUT IN A WAY TO MINIMIZE THE
LIKELIHOOD OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND, GENERALLY SPEAKING, SERIOUS

*Argentine
Military*

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PROPERTY DAMAGE. THE ATTACKS, THE PERPETRATORS OF WHICH REMAIN UNIDENTIFIED, HAVE CARRIED A CLEAR PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT, AS DO ANY ACTS OF RANDOM VIOLENCE.)

D. LAUNCHING COORDINATED PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

E. COORDINATING THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ON THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION.

F. AGREEING ON A COMMON STRATEGY FOR THE NEAR TERM.

4.

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5. ALSO EARLY IN THE WEEK OF 17 MARCH, IS INVOLVED WITH POINTED OUT THAT THE LONGER-TERM GOAL OF THE PLAN TO REMOVE THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT WOULD INVOLVE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS IF POSSIBLE, OR A COUP D'ETAT IF NECESSARY.

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CLAIMED THAT THE NATIONAL FRONT HAS SUPPORT IN VARIOUS AREAS OF ARGENTINE SOCIETY.

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HE IS IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH CERTAIN ARGENTINE POLITICAL LEADERS, WHOM THE RETIRED GENERAL DID NOT NAME; WITH LEADERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIGHTIST GROUPS; WITH UNION LEADERS; WITH A POLITICAL GROUPING HEADED BY HERMINIO ((IGLESIAS)) AND JORGE ((ARGENTO)); WITH ACTIVE, DUTY AND RETIRED ARMED FORCES AND BT

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

6. [redacted] THE
FOLLOWING POINTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE [redacted]

A. INITIATING A COORDINATED POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST
MARXISM IN ARGENTINA.

B. USING "SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTION GROUPS," AS THE OFFICER
CALLED THEM, TO PROVOKE OR ENGINEER INCIDENTS DESIGNED TO
EMBARRASS THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT AND TO DEMONSTRATE ITS WEAKNESS.
[redacted] THE OFFICER'S DESCRIPTION
OF THE MAKE-UP OF THE "SPECIAL ACTION GROUPS," THEY SEEM IDENTICAL
WITH THE ACTION GROUPS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 2C, ABOVE.)

3.3(b)(1)

C. UNDERTAKING A COORDINATED EFFORT TO GAIN THE SUPPORT

OF THE MAJORITY OF THE MAJOR FFAA COMMANDERS OR, IF THIS EFFORT
FAILS, USING THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTION GROUPS TO COMPROMISE
THE COMMANDERS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THEY WOULD FIND THEMSELVES
WITH NO CHOICE OTHER THAN [redacted]

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D. MAKING A COORDINATED EFFORT TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF A
NUMBER OF UNION AND POLITICAL LEADERS. AGAIN, IF THIS EFFORT
SHOULD FAIL, [redacted] WOULD TURN TO THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS

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ACTION GROUPS FOR THE SAME PURPOSE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

E. TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE TO VARIOUS SECTORS OF ARGENTINE
SOCIETY, TO THE ADMINISTRATION, AND TO JUNIOR ARMED FORCES
OFFICERS IN COMMAND POSITIONS THAT THE FFAA ARE UNIFIED.

3.3(b)(1)

F. SETTING UP A PARALLEL, BUT CLANDESTINE, JOINT STAFF
ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATED
PROBLEM-SOLVING AND FOR DEVELOPING STRATEGY. [redacted]

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G. SETTING UP A PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM TO PROTECT THE
LEADERS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT.

H. COORDINATING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACTS WITH
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT COULD ASSIST THE FRONT. [redacted]

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[redacted] THE FIRST TWO PRIORITIES IN REGARD TO THIS POINT INVOLVE
THE SEEKING OF CONTACTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN WHAT HE CALLED
"ANTI-MARXIST" COUNTRIES.

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8. [Redacted]

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