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L1 GEORGE BUSH

L1 Address to Association of Federal Investigators

L1 September 10, 1976

L2 Ft. McNAIR Officers' Club, WASHINGTON, D.C.

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GEORGE BUSH: Thank you for that glowing introduction, and General Chapman and other distinguished guests at the head table.

Let me tell you how glad I am to be appearing before the Association of Federal Investigators. If there's anybody that ought to know about being investigated, it's the head of the CIA.

~~[Laughter]~~

And I will say that most of you involved here were not involved in the investigations of the CIA. That was done principally by -- and properly, I might add -- by the United States Congress.

~~The CIA is still here. Some of the investigators aren't. [JOKE]  
One of the -- I was reminded of a story that Senator Norris Cotton used to tell about a United States Senator. When his term ran out, he decided not to run again; and his wife, enjoying the social prestige of Washington, refused to leave until he was -- a man of limited means, and so he sought gainful employment. Nobody seemed to want him, and he kept inquiring. He finally went to the employment office. He said, "Look, I'm desperate. I'll accept anything."~~

~~And they said, "We have nothing, sir, for a man of your prestige."~~

~~And he said, "Well, give me a call if you get any leads at all."~~

~~So he came back a few weeks later: "Nothing, sir."~~

~~Finally he was sitting there one day with the little woman,~~

who's handling these investigations, is kind of out in front and handling the employment. And the phone rang, and she said, "No, no, I don't believe anybody who can...."

"Stop," said the Senator. "Just a minute. What is it?"

She put her hand over the phone like this, and she said, "It's the zoo. A gorilla died and they're looking for somebody on temporary work to go out there and put on a gorilla suit and sit in a cage until the new gorilla arrives."

"I'll take it. I'll take it," he said.

She says...

"I'll take it. I'm desperate."

So they signed the Senator up and he went out and put his suit on, and for the first week or two he was terribly inhibited. He just sat there. And finally people started throwing peanuts at him and kids groups came by, and he started to scratch, you know, like gorillas do and he began to move around the cage a little bit. A high school class would come by, and he pointed to the trapeze and he started swinging. And he did a fantastic job at this thing and he really got to like the work and everything.

And one day it was a particularly receptive audience, and he was swinging on his trapeze, and he flew off and landed in the lions cage right next door, you see. And so the gorilla sees this lion coming at him, charging at him like this, and he backs up against the wire, you know, in the cage, and he finally just thought this was the end of it, so he says, "Help. Help. Get me out of here."

At which the lion turned to him and said, "Would you shut up. You're not the only United States Senate working in this...."

~~[Laughter]~~

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When I think of the investigations of the CIA, I don't wish the investigators anything but good luck, of course. But I -- I should say that I -- before I make a few remarks about the intelligence community, that I'm delighted to be at the head table.

Bob Gambino, who is our, as Mark said, head of security at CIA. It's not an easy job; it's a tough job. He does it exceptionally well. It doesn't necessarily interact with the professional work of yours, where you have -- of course, he has not only responsibility for the premises at CIA, but much for the security of documents, classified information which we're dealing with as an institution and I'm dealing with as the Director of Central Intelligence in the entire intelligence community, as the General knows,

all the time. And Bob handles this with great skill and expertise, and I'm just delighted that those of you haven't met him have a chance at least to see him here today.

My job is an interesting one. That is the understatement of the year. It reminds me only -- you're going to think I'm queer for gorillas, but it reminds me...

~~[Laughter]~~

...when I went to be Chairman of the Republican Party. I was Ambassador at the UN, kind of being nonpolitical and doing my thing up there, I thought with reasonable respectability. And I got summoned to Camp David, and something else was in mind for me. And after about a year and a half of that, all during the Watergate period, trying to walk a very delicate tightrope about being fair to the President, and yet not trying to see the party structure linked into Watergate, Bob Strauss, my illustrious counterpart in those days for the Democratic Party, a man of enormous ability and enormous good cheer and a close friend of mine from Texas, he said, "George," he said, "your job reminds me of making love to a gorilla."

I said, "Oh, really? How come?"

He says, "Well, you can't stop till the gorilla wants to."

~~[Laughter]~~

I thought of that job as I went into the CIA about eight months ago, at the height of these investigations, when the Senate committee was finishing its work, when the House committee was finishing its work. And I didn't really know what I was going to walk into.

I did know what people think intelligence is about, because of a large degree -- largely because of the attention -- of public attention, which to our business, intelligence, which really much of it has to be done not in the public eye.

And the fictional notions of what it is about we're familiar with. I realize that "dirty trick" artist James Bond is far more fascinating than a scholarly analyst of foreign political or economic trends. But in seven months as Director out at CIA, I've never met anybody quite as lucky as James Bond and the things he gets to do in his life, nor anything like him in the way he conducts his business. And yet during any lunchtime visit to our headquarters -- and I hope some of you have been there -- in the cafeteria, I could be sitting there sharing the room with enough scholars and scientists who hold enough advanced degrees in enough different disciplines to staff a university.

That's what I think CIA is. I will readily concede that's not the public perception, for reasons we can talk about.

People, I think, to some degree -- and this perception is changing -- think of 007, they think of hit squads, they think of illegal operations inside the United States, they think of phones being tapped. If one more friend says to me, so help me God, "Are somebody listening in on the telephone?" when I call up to arrange a simple tennis game or something, I going to -- I don't know what I'm going to do. It happens all the time to the Director, and I'm sure it happens to everybody else out there.

I saw a movie, "Seven Days of the Condor," which had Robert Redford rusing around, wiping out his fellow CIA agents in New York. And it ended with a real nice twist. It showed him, in righteous indignation, having been threatened by his colleagues at the Central Intelligence Agency, between New York and McLean, going up to The New York Times to spill all and clarify all. And the final twist on the film was, "Well, maybe they'll print it, or maybe they won't," implying that the Central Intelligence Agency controls The New York Times.

Well, I don't need a group of federal investigators, my priest, minister, or anybody else to tell me that the Central Intelligence Agency doesn't control The New York Times. I read it every day, and it's simply not true. And I would like to refute that part of "Seven Days of the Condor" here an now.

People have -- I think the public has some reason to be concerned and, you know, to have these misconceptions about our agency. The investigation, indeed, pointed out some -- and I say if you're really fair and analyze it and categorize it, a small list, but nevertheless some very real problems.

They laid to rest -- the investigations themselves laid to rest many charges. But some of those charges, officially laid to rest by the Senate and House committees, are printed and reprinted and reprinted as if fact.

I know that no member of the Federal Investigators group would read Playboy magazine. I have that kind of confidence in you. But if you happened to glance at last month's Playboy, you would have seen a story in there replete with absurdities about the Central Intelligence Agency.

Many of my friends ask me, "Why are you....?" We're not. These aren't true. We don't control the Hughes Medical Foundation, worth billions of dollars, for example.

And that story is filled with things that's not true. It's printed, and then it's picked up, and it's newsworthy, still, to put the initials CIA next to something until it's reprinted, not in Playboy, but picked up on and spread around in the newspapers.

Nobody called Andrew <sup>Falkiewicz</sup> ~~[unintelligible]~~, with me here today,

the writer that wrote that story. Nobody inquired at CIA whether there was validity to these charges. But after it was printed, his phone rang off the hook, wanting -- after the stories were all spread out in the country.

Now, we've got some problems because of the misperceptions, in my view, of the Central Intelligence community. One book printed a story, since I've been Director, that -- one magazine -- that the CIA gave Tom Dewey a million dollars when he was running for President in the year 1948.

Well, they had a Democratic President. I forget who the Director was at that time. All investigations indicate that CIA didn't give Tom Dewey anything, financial cash, in 1948, and yet the story is taken by the author, printed, and then is reprinted.

So, I do understand some of the perceptions, what I would say are misperceptions, about this agency. I will say, if you would permit me, this great agency that I'm privileged to head.

I would say that not all of these misperceptions and all of these stories -- they're not necessarily mischievous. They are, many of them that create these misapprehensions, are sensational. There are some people who want to destroy the CIA. There are some who want -- former employees, for example, some far left-wing groups, that are dedicated openly, and they'll tell you this, are dedicated to the destruction of the Central Intelligence Agency, or dismantlement thereof.

There are some honest -- I would give them total credit for that -- I would say, from my vantage point, misguided people who have in common that the way to solve the abuses that I've conceded existed, small in number though they may have been, is to dismantle the agency, to take some parts of it and put it off in some other departments, the State Department or something, and hoping that that will guaranty against abuse.

I don't believe, however honest that approach may be, that it would result in more effective intelligence, and I don't believe it would be more of a safeguard that the American people -- the kind of safeguard that the American people not only demand, but should have, in terms of seeing that this great agency live within the Constitution -- constitutional constraints imposed on it, and that should be imposed on it.

I'm pledged to see that the CIA respects the constitutional rights of Americans, and I'm determined to do that. I'm also dedicated to the concept that we need an intelligence, foreign intelligence capability second to none. And with the help of fantastic professionals, I'm going to fight for that as well.

Let's look now, if we could, just briefly -- Mark is rather

stringent on the time there. He said, you know, "Fifteen to 30 minutes." I don't want to overdo it. Some of you have to go to work.

~~I always remember the story about the kid who went to church with his grandmother, and he said, "Grandmother, what are all those flags along the side of the church there for?"~~

~~She said, "Well, that's for those who died in service?"~~

~~And the kid said, "Oh, really? The nine o'clock or the eleven o'clock service?"~~

~~[Laughter]~~

~~...will try to live by his delicately phrased constraints.~~

But let's look, if we could, for a second not at the misconceptions -- you can sort out what they are; you've got your opinions of what they are. We need to perform to satisfy you that if it is a misconception, it's just that. But let's look at what I think of as reality.

First, our mission. I don't think I need to dwell on it with this group. You're informed, perhaps not so much on foreign intelligence, but your -- the matrix of this group, investigation, would imply that you have an intellectual and professional curiosity, that perhaps you know more about the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency than most other groups.

But our attention to and bringing to the attention of the present policymakers of the Soviet threat is a terribly important part of the mission. We monitor, as best we can, the SALT agreement. We advise the President on what the Soviets can do. Somebody's got to tell him how far we think the missiles go [unintelligible], how far, what the submarines are capable of. It's terribly important to the legitimate national security requirements of the United States. How far and how fast can the bombers go? What's the missile strength? And the new tanks of the Soviet Union, are they better than those of the United States?

And it's our responsibility, it's my responsibility, if you will, under the law, as Director of Central Intelligence, to provide this kind of information to our President.

One thing that worries me, and I suspect it would worry you: the question of nuclear proliferation. If you look around the world and you think, "My heavens, if every country comes up with a nuclear weapon, what's it mean?" Look at terrorism today. What would it mean if somebody had some kind of a small nuclear device to add to this awful arsenal terrorist activity around the world? And we have some enormous responsibility to the President,

in terms of intelligence, to do something about international terrorism.

And as some of you know directly from your work, CIA has a lot to do with the intelligence, foreign intelligence on the control of narcotics. One question that -- I'm just clicking off a few examples, 'cause I find that groups don't focus on the breadth of our mission.

I'm concerned about Cubans in Angola, for example, Cubans in Africa. What's it mean? You know they're down -- you read the debate about Angola. You each have your views as to whether we should have been involved or not. But the policymakers need to know what are the Cubans doing in Angola, and what does it mean when they spill over into other African countries, and who's paying for that?

And these are the responsibilities that I have for briefing the President on this and the policy makers and, indeed, the United States Congress.

What does it mean if OPEC raises its price? This affects every household in America.

What's the significance of the recent Soviet space shot?

Korea, a few days ago: a couple of American kids bludgeoned to death with ax handles. Was this an isolated incident, or did this have some rather longer-range policy implications or indications of policy shift?

And so, I cite a wide array of things that add up to a terribly important mission. And all these things had in common the fact that the DCI, the Director of Central Intelligence, has the obligation, under the law, to keep the President informed of developments. Every President has to make awesome decisions on national security, and they've got to be informed, and it's not easy, and the state of our art is not so definitive that we can guaranty that an assessment is correct.

It's my job as DCI to keep the President totally informed, and with the help, as I indicated earlier, of an enormously competent professional staff, not only at CIA, but in the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, other components of the intelligence community for which I'm responsible. I think we do a pretty darn good job. And I think it's proper to look at how we're doing.

I think we've recovered -- I was telling the General and Mark here at lunch -- somewhat from the battling of a year ago. And by that I don't mean retrench, go back to the old ways. I think it's proper that every agency, the agencies you work for,



the agency I work for, examine itself and find ways to do things better.

The President came out this winter with an Executive Order which, for the first time since the Central Intelligence Agency was founded, resulted in major executive reorganization of the intelligence community. Included in it was not just systems and committees to make the intelligence product better, but was many things to safeguard the constitutional rights of Americans, to guaranty proper oversight. And then along with the Executive Order, the presidential instruction, which we're adhering to to the letter, to cooperate fully in oversight with the United States Congress.

You know, I'll give you an example of what I'm talking about. I don't believe, and my predecessors before me didn't believe, and the President doesn't believe, and two out of every three congressmen and two out of every three senators don't believe, that the CIA ought -- I say this because of the two votes -- ought to make its budget public. Now, that is our opinion. But most people in this country don't understand that, given that position, we still make public every single penny of what we do to the proper committees of the United States Congress.

I report to seven committees in the United States Congress. I've been in this job less than nine months. It could have been -- less than nine months, and I think I've made 35 or 36 official appearances on Capitol Hill, to say nothing of those when you just go up to negotiate with or discuss matters with senators or congressmen. That's a lot of oversight. And I welcome it, but I would welcome consolidated oversight, so we could still do the same thorough job, but not have the duplication that results from briefing seven separate committees.

The new Senate Intelligence Committee, chaired by Dan Inouye, with Howard Baker as the ranking minority member, I think offers a lot of promise. It is an additional committee, it's the seventh one I report to, but it could be the pattern that will lead to consolidated oversight. And I hope they feel the way I feel, and that is that we are having excellent cooperation with that committee.

The intelligence community is vibrant and it's strong. It's been through a great deal, and I'm not about to reorder, re-argue with you the damage or the effectiveness, either one, of the hearings that were held. I've told you I think there were some excesses. I know there has been some diminishing of our effectiveness, in some ways, abroad. I think, however, that diminishment, that caution that came abroad from some who wondered if they cooperated with CIA, would they see their names spread out in all the papers in the United States, I think that is being -- going away somewhat, and I think we're now in a position where we can move forward, shore up those foreign relationships that are desperately

important in the field of foreign intelligence.

I challenge those who claim that secrecy in intelligence work is inconsistent with freedom and democracy to give us a realistic preview of what this nation's freedom and democracy would look like if we alone, the United States alone, in this imperfect world decided to abandon this essential protection against our adversaries. We've got to have secrecy.

We're not going to give out the names of people that cooperate with the Central Intelligence Agency. I'm foresworn from doing that under the law. "Protect sources and methods," says the 1949 act. And if they want a Director of Central Intelligence who's going to give the name of agents or double agents or services that we cooperate with abroad, they can get somebody else to do it, 'cause I take that responsibility extremely seriously. And yet I see nothing inconsistent with my insistence on this, nothing inconsistent with full cooperation with the United States Congress and with safeguarding the liberties of the American people.

And so, this is a rather quick brush at this terribly complicated subject of foreign intelligence in the year 1976. I would be remiss, however, if I didn't end with this comment: I didn't know what I'd expect. I'd had a varied past, as Mark said, some in politics. When I went to the Congress, they said to me, "How can you -- you were involved with politics. You headed one of the great parties. You served, just like us, as a partisan. How can you suggest that maybe you should be the Director of Central Intelligence?"

And I pointed out to them, "Yeah, I did, and I think it's fundamentally important to our system that people who are involved in politics be partisan, work like hell at it for what you believe in. I did it. I'm not ashamed of it. I'm proud of it. But I also served as Ambassador to Peking, United Nations; and I think I did those jobs with an absence of partisanship, and I think I should have. I don't think you should be, when you're in that kind of a responsibility, be partisan."

And the Senate agreed. There was some understandable question. There was some, certainly, as far as I'm concerned, honest and understandable debate. And those who voted against me, I have only one determination, and that is to make them understand that a person who has been involved in partisan politics can indeed devote his life and his professional endeavor to succeeding in a job which calls for total lack of partisanship.

But I didn't know, because of this, you see, what I was going to run into when I went out to the Central Intelligence Agency. I didn't know how -- I expect they were wondering what -- how I was going to look at them after all the publicity. And I

think my colleagues now, my peers now think they were -- certainly had every reason to kind of look at me, although wondering, "What's this guy going to do?"

Well, I don't know what they think, but let me just tell you what I think. I mentioned the numbers of -- the degree of academic excellence we have. I mentioned the graduate degrees. I mentioned my -- if I didn't, I should have -- the respect I have for not only those in the production side of the -- in the production side of intelligence, but those who risk their lives, unheralded, in the collection side. I'm talking about human intelligence, and I happen to be one who thinks the nation need a covert capability to fight against forces that are awfully strong in this world.

But whether it comes from the analytical side, whether it comes from the security side of the house, whether it comes from the administrative side or the spying business or whatever, there's a commonality at CIA. I expect the General and I hope those of the rest of you who've had contact with this agency would agree. There's a commonality, there's a matrix, and the matrix is dedication.

Yes, there were a handful of mistakes made, but there is a tremendous dedication at that agency. They don't get the applause and the accolades that, you know, more-public agencies can get. We are a secret business, to some degree. But I ask you to examine us close enough to make your own determination; and I know you'll conclude, as I have concluded after nine somewhat frustrating but certainly full and fascinating months at this agency, that instead of having the kind of job that Mr. Strauss alluded to about that gorilla, I'm one of the luckiest guys in the United States.

Thank you very much.