

TRANSCRIPT
OF
DCI'S INTERVIEW
WITH
PETER MAAS
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Q: I know you are busy, so I am not going to sit around and chat with you, which I would like to do. The last time we had more time. I was just saying to Joe that the one problem you don't have is that once the Agency tried to recruit me, and it didn't work out, so you don't have to worry about me screwing up something. So, shall we get right to it?

DCI: Did we not give you enough time?

D/PAO: Well, Peter Maas originally asked for about two hours sir, but with the war going on, your time is pretty limited.

Q: I may want to do a follow-up, and I even got a new recorder, so I will get right to it. Now, when I said before that you take one tough job after another, I wasn't kidding because here we have Judge Webster post-Hoover, post-Casey, and (inaudible) who was involved in both those cases. What's the message here? I don't mean about you personally, but why is there always this urgency to have someone like you who has to step in? I would like your thoughts on that. Is it that the institution still can't be designed; that it depends on people?

DCI: Well, it depends on people, many of whom don't deserve a bad rap and most of whom are completely deserving of the trust of the American people. But, when an Agency goes through the kind of severe scrutiny that often accompanies one of these situations, like break-ins or the Iran-Contra, the oversight

committees then, rightly or wrongly, begin to develop reservations about the people who have come to testify -- questions of candor and completeness. So, there is a lot of uncertainty about whether they need a change (inaudible) to be sure that what they perceive are old problems and haven't just been covered over and that they will be addressed.

Q: But, it's not just the oversight committees. I think the country as a whole was, at the end of John Hoover's regime, feeling a lot of controversy and certainly the same with Casey. I am not passing a judgment on it, but suddenly in both those instances, a Judge Webster was urgently needed, somebody like a Judge Webster. Integrity seemed to be the issue.

DCI: Well, I would use other adjectives like trust and truthfulness. I think truthfulness builds trust, and if you have a reputation or try to have a reputation of being truthful in your dealings with other officials who have a right to know, trust begins to develop. Now, sometimes that trust will be individual issues where that will come up and settle down, but if you have a consistent pattern of being truthful with those who have a right to know, then I think you get an extension of trust. When you don't have trust -- I may not be saying this very well -- then the legislative approach, at least, is to try to find ways to constrain you

so that you are given, not just guidelines, but statutes and sometimes that is not a good idea for an Agency -- not the best way to address a problem. It takes away the flexibility and it puts the Agency on the defensive when you may want an Agency that is capable of getting up and being aggressive with logical guidelines and rules. So, what I have tried to do -- not always successfully -- is to get the Congress to let us demonstrate our trust-worthiness, rather than to try and solve problems by writing laws.

Q: Of course, their answer is that they trust you -- that there is going to be somebody after Judge Webster who might be different.

DCI: There are ways to deal with that. When you have a President who issues clear executive orders, which you are bound to obey and to report any violations of to the Congress, or any changes where the Congress is left in the dark about the change, those are principles of oversight that can work and they do work.

Q: Judge, let me ask you this. Do you have any concerns about the image of the Agency or the public perception of it? To elaborate -- I just thought maybe bad factual press, say over Contra, but, lets take the popular literature, the movies and so on, with the exception of maybe Tom Clancy's Jack Ryan or Buckley's Black Oats. Generally speaking, the Agency does not

come out looking too good. Does that concern you? I mean, it seems to me that they are on the moral level of the KGB or worse. Does it concern you?

DCI: Well, it does to an extent. There are different kinds of concern about the Agency and each one requires almost a separate avenue of attention. One is how are we reviewed on the campuses and other places where we look to recruit the best and the brightest of the people to come and carry on the tradition of this Agency and its mission. The other is how we are portrayed generally in the public and whether we are seen as a rogue elephant, a loose canon, outside the law -- all of those things which I think in a democratic society make people feel trapped and worried about, particularly where there is an overlay of secrecy and where they can't ask the questions and get the answers. So there they look for their surrogates in the Congress and other places to get their answers. I think it is very important that we demonstrate as much as we can our trust-worthiness and our professional competence. The novels, the movies, and the so-ons, I tend not to put as much weight on that as perhaps I should because I think over time -- Hoover was very much into that. He wanted books written, he wanted movies, he supervised the script. And there you begin to create a kind of fiction about what we really are if you are not careful.

And, I think that since we often work in this area of clandestine secrecy, the novelists tend to have a field day. That's fine; I don't mind. The ones that I would like to address are those who believe that we must be doing something bad, and that could be a writer, a journalist, a novelist, or somebody who sets out to do a work of non-fiction in which their objective is to prove that we are doing something wrong.

Q: Well, when I brought up the popular area, it is because it is like a message being delivered, where you develop a mind-set. But, I am talking about the public now, and I am not suggesting that the Agency should (inaudible), but there must be a concern, it seems to me.

DCI: Let me tell you a story. I don't think I have told it publicly, but I think illustrates it. My youngest daughter was just married a couple of years, living in New Jersey when President Reagan called me and asked me to do this. I was pretty much in my final year at the FBI. I had told the Attorney General that I wanted to leave in that year so as not to have the confirmation process appear during an election year, and I was pretty far down the pike. Well, when the President asked me to do it, I was about to go and testify on the Hill, and I asked him to give me the afternoon, the morning, a day at least to think about it, pray about it, and talk to my family about it because they

didn't think they were seeing enough of me. And, when I got to my youngest daughter, she said, "Oh Dad, she said, I just love the idea. That other place is scary." And this is my own daughter, the only one of my children who lived here at all. It's the uncertainty in a free society about what goes on in an organization that is essentially secret. Then too, as you know, the FBI has had its share of glory and its share of problems, but the glory can always offset the problems, where in this Agency our best successes are the ones we try to keep secret so we can keep on using the techniques and the sources and the methods. So we tend to have our mistakes out in the public domain without very much being told about our major achievements. Now, what do you do about that? And, I don't know that I have the answer, but I try, when I can, to be out where those questions can be raised. I like to visit a certain number of universities every year, where I expect there have been demonstrations and other things, to meet with people who think about world problems and the role of intelligence, and helping our policymakers understand what's going on in the world and meet with them and be accountable. And I try to put up wherever we can the human side of this Agency. Barbara Bush came over to dedicate our Day Care Center, which is a state-of-the-art center for babies for five months to five years, recognition of those who have

given their lives, and there have been quite a few of those -- those stars on the wall that you saw when you came in. It helps people to understand that this is serious business and our people are out there sometimes doing very dangerous work. That tends to give people be a little more of a even playing field. But mostly I have tried to outline the kinds of accountability that we have which people don't realize. The general guy in the public doesn't understand that we are not only scrutinized by the White House and its agencies -- the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Intelligence Oversight Board -- but by a number of committees of the Congress and four of whom see almost everything they want to see about what we do. Then there is another aspect of this and that's covert action. That's what most people think we spend our lives doing.

Q: That's a small part, but it's the part that gets the headlines.

DCI: It's the part that gets the headlines and where we get the flack, but often people confuse policy, which is not ours to make, with what we do to support the policy, and if they don't like the policy, they are very apt to blame us because we have been asked to be the front line for the implementation of that policy. We have very clear rules -- executive orders against assassination. We are not outside

the law. Our law, even when we are operating overseas, our law controls what we do. Obviously we can't be limited by all the rules of the rest of the world, but our law controls us, and people may not understand that, and they may think we are out there doing things that we wouldn't be allowed to do in this country, which is not true.

Q: So it is a concern, in effect.

DCI: It's a concern. It isn't a worry that we are losing the battle; it's a concern that we must never forget that people easily worry about things that they are not allowed to know about and so you have to tell as much as you can. One way of measuring it is recruiting, applications for recruitment and that makes me feel very good. I am talking about applications for employment in the Agency.

Q: Not just this year when it's harder to get a job, I understand?

DCI: No, no. We have been running about a thousand a month, and these are qualified applicants.

Q: Consistently?

DCI: Consistently!

Q: Well I asked that because the editors of PARADE wanted to know if there was some concern about the message of the Agency not getting across and so forth.

DCI: I don't think we are concerned about the message not -- that we have a message we are out there drum beating about -- I think that sometimes we are concerned that the thousands of men and women who work here deserve to be respected. We can tell a little bit about what they do and how well they do it. We can a little bit about them. They are very normal human beings. Most of them are gifted in one way or another, but they are very normal human beings who, in many cases, aren't allowed to represent the Agency in their own community, but they need to know that the public knows that we are on track and we are doing things we should be doing.

Q: Well a lot of things that makes the public uncomfortable -- and nothing has really happened during your tenure -- goes back beyond before that. Anyway, the main theme of this is espionage in the 90's, and I would like to ask you this. You said, on more than one occasion last year or so, that there is an apparent end to the Cold War -- the diminution, if not the elimination of the Soviet threat. Do you still think, by the way, that is the case?

DCI: What I said I standby in terms of the nature of the threat as it existed before will not be the same again. I am talking about the Soviet (inaudible) and the Warsaw Pact. The ground war capability and that's a capability in Europe, and we are generally convinced that the Soviet Union is unlikely to return to full-scale repression while Gorbachev is there. But Gorbachev is facing very real problems.

Q: So that is giving your reflection?

DCI: That is giving it plenty of reflection.

Q: I mean, what do you think -- there is a guy like Colonel Victor (inaudible); is that the way you pronounce it. And his health, does that worry you?

DCI: In what way?

Q: In terms of the return -- of losing the (inaudible). He is a powerful figure (inaudible).

DCI: Well, I think the general.....

Q: Do you see him and his supporters back in power again?

DCI: Well, we don't see it in on our near-term screen, but what we do see is a concern at the center for all of it, and a fear that things have gotten out of control in the reformist movement and while Gorbachev has tried to salvage his economic problems, he is not making progress, real problems that is economic growth is going down, he has had to confront ethnic and national.....

Q: Right, it is a time bomb!

DCI: And, as he has pushed this severity down, it is translating itself into demands for autonomy of the Republic and we have got, of course, Boris Yeltsyn and his very large following directly confronting Gorbachev on a range of issues which is something he didn't have to experience before.

Q: And you have this guy on the right.

DCI: Aside from him, is Gorbachev turning more and more to the army and to the KGB for his support and that broader than one person. You don't do that without a price. There is no such thing as a free lunch and that's where the risk that style of dealing with the order question may only provoke further instability in the Soviet Union.

Q: How serious do you think the threat is?

DCI: I think we think it's serious because the increased power on the right means less reform and means less respect for human rights in that effort and clearly already less for the principle of Glastnost, the freedom of expression. So they had a taste of that and they are not going to give it up easily. So, we have a high potential for internal instability and that's a lot different than starting a war.

Q: A civil war?

DCI: I don't -- that's a word you can use. It's a word I hate to use because it's not defined. You can have a lot of civil wars and that's a big country, it's an empire. You can have some republics trying to follow the slow pattern of succession, some looking for another kind of relationship, clearly the union treaty is in doubt and you can have others just walking away and saying what's going to happen. Look at the states like Georgia, the Ukraine. You have the ethnic ones down in the south, Azerbaijan and Armenia, fighting each other and talking about leaving. So, he has a lot of

problems. They don't translate into war with the West, in my view. There have been times in history when the way to get out of a domestic problem is to go to war, but they really lack the ability -- and I think the desire -- to engage in a that kind of activity. Our warning period has indications in warning for conventional warfare has broadened very substantially, but if we want to see stability in the world, we want to promote the reform that advances human rights and democracy and right now there is a period where it's shifting the other way in the interest of order.

Q: In the Soviet Union?

DCI: Yes.

Q: How about eastern Europe, what we used to call the Balkans?

DCI: If you talk about the northern tier, that's still pretty exciting -- Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia -- they are all working toward it. Particularly Poland who has gone way out in taking big chances with major reform efforts that always carry in its wake the pain of unemployment....

Q: But, they had a head start too.

DCI: They had a head start. There is a real desire -- I was over there in November and had met with some of the folks from one of the other countries I was in. I was in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Turkey. They are confronting major economic problems, they are going to depend on Western aid,

they going to depend on the new relationship with the European community and with Germany.

Q: You are talking about Poland?

DCI: No, I was primarily talking about Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Poland too. Poland has not walked away from its economic relationship with the Soviet Union, but all of them have made clear delineations that they are no longer their intelligence surrogates, they are no longer collecting technology transfer for the Soviet Union. That's going to cause some pain and much will depend on some outside support, in my view. They are worried about the Soviet Union. They are worried will the troops get out in time. They are worried that perhaps the economic conditions in the Soviet Union will slow down the movement of troops back and the housing issues. They will be called upon to share in that process. They worry about that and they worry about their feeling those tensions and they worry about massive immigration from the Soviet Union and that is something they are really prepared to handle now as they are trying to get a grip on the new market economy system. Now with the lower group, they are moving much slower. I am talking about Romania. They have a long way to come and it wouldn't take too much --if their economy doesn't progress -- for them to receive some form of authoritarian government because they

haven't had a lot of experience with democracy. I am not talking about communism, just somebody who can stand up and say I can take care of this.

Q: And then you have Yugoslavia -- but none of these places there is no match, in your opinion, that's gonna blow up the world like World War I?

DCI: No.

Q: Okay. So the Cold War as we have known it is pretty much gone in the old sense of the word, and you have talked about the future in the 90's, what do you see as the intelligence priorities? I would like you to be as specific as you can, and is that why you set up the Directorate of Planning and Coordination?

DCI: Yes, because there is more to this than just identifying the priorities and how to get there. The Soviet Union will still be an important area of interest for the United States in terms of intelligence. More and more, we have tried to have an encyclopedic understanding of the world rather than the very parochial intelligence that we had at the beginning of World War I or World War II for that matter. The Soviet Union and/or its problems will have impact on us economically and politically, so we got to continue to watch it but in somewhat different ways, not as the east/west military threat. Eastern Europe is developing and we've got to see

how they are developing and provide information that will help our policy writers further democratic needs. But what has happened around the world that was reasonably predictable and was predicted and we are seeing it happen, is that with the end of the Cold War which I call the polarization from east and west, we now find regional conflicts and regional disputes, regional problems emerging all over the world. For whatever reason, that previous east/west confrontation covered up a lot of those, held them back. Now people are expressing it. Even in those new democracies....

Q: Right, absolutely, there is a of tribal

DCI: You bet, call it whatever you want, but it's there and there will be a lot of jobs. As in the African Continent, you have democracies that have come up under a slightly different tradition, a single party tradition and South Africa trying to restore itself in the government of nations. You could take almost any (inaudible) where Third World countries have developed the beginnings of industrial capability or more -- rivalries have come. Take India and Pakistan. They were drifting into war this time last year and a series of governmental changes and other reasons have put that off, but that problem remains.

Q: Is there any particular part of the world, aside from the

Gulf, you see as a particular threat to the (inaudible)?

DCI: Let me name three or four of them because that is the problem of the intelligence in the 90's. We are not going to say we go from one to here. We may find ourselves with two or even three potential world crises developing or at least regional ones that have implications to the United States. I think that is what's taking place in the Pacific rim, particularly the relations between South Korea and North Korea presents potential -- it could improve or it could go backwards.

Q: If it went backwards, what would happen?

DCI: Well, of course, we have a military commitment and we still believe South Korea is vital to our national interests.

Q: It is conceivable to think that the North Koreans would try to come in again?

DCI: It is not inconceivable. They are having a change in leadership over there right now so there is less certainty. You have the democracies in Latin America and we have had a major turn toward democracy but many of them are having problems getting their coalition reconciliation governments to function properly. You can see that in El Salvador; we still have the FLMN there. You see the problems in Nicaragua where the Sandinistas still control the military and create uncertainties with Mrs. Chomorro. Mexico has economic problems that Salinas is working mightily to solve, but

they have become one of the avenues of the (inaudible) coming up from (inaudible) and other places. I don't see Mexico tipping, but I think it is very important for us to understand what is taking place there. If you take some of the areas, old hot spots, are either burning out or slowing down....

Q: Southeast Asia?

DCI: Southeast Asia -- we haven't done andthe countries that have tried to influence the outcome of Cambodia have not been successful other than to get Vietnam out of there which was a very important achievement, but it's still has potential. Another coup in Thailand over the weekend.

Q: We're worried about the Khmer Rouge. I never could understand why we were (inaudible). I don't think a lot of people do, if they think about it.

DCI: Well, it becomes a political problem. The problem there that we have is that the people we support are on the same basic side as people we oppose. A very strange set of relationships and it's hard to fish them out. Afghanistan continues to go on as before. Angola is slowing coming to a solution. I think we are going to see a series of countries confronting coups, perhaps not as violently, the same way as Liberia on the African Continent. The Middle East stays with us.

Q: Is fair to say in the 90's you don't see another whatever region of the world a Saddam Husayn causing us some problems. Is there a potential for another one like this?

DCI: You asked about our priorities in the 90's. I have been talking about regional. Another priority is the proliferation of missiles -- nuclear and chemical and biological warfare -- where the by-product of all these wars since World War II in that there is a huge arms market, secondary, secondhand, new and some of these countries with a little bit of wealth have been accumulating weapons and are becoming disproportionate in power to other countries in the region. Others are less responsible. They are not participating in the United Nations pacts and (inaudible). All of that means is that you can't say, no another Saddam Husayn is unlikely. If we learned some lessons in this process of the Gulf is that we have to act quickly and act when we see seminal problems of this kind and we also have to recognize that one day's friend can be tomorrow's enemy.

Q: What can you do about the build-up of chemical and nuclear?

DCI: Well, it's a very tough question.

Q: Look at Pakistan -- there is nothing you can do to stop it.

DCI: From the standpoint of intelligence which is our primary source rather than policy, you have to ask yourself, how well can we enforce conventions and treaties and on nuclear or

chemical proliferation. Chemicals create a problem because production plants look very much like fertilizer plants or pharmacies and so on. It is very difficult. You need good intelligence in order to be reasonably confident that somebody is breaking whatever rules and so that's going to be an important part of our job. Getting people to commit to the destruction of these weapons of mass destruction.

Q: That's something you and the Oval office is going to have to handle.

DCI: But, just like arms control, you have to say, now how can we be sure that they are doing it.

Q: Okay. Now, how do you go about revamping the Agency to meet these new priorities? I mean it is a pretty awesome task. What do you do? Shift personnel. Do you bring in new personnel. You have terrible budget limitations right now. I mean the general feeling is that 50 percent of your efforts were devoted to Soviet military. How do you take people who are spending twenty years, do you let them go, do you bring in new people, what do you do?

DCI: We are finding that most of the shifts can be accommodated within the Agency by retraining in those areas where retraining is necessary. Language skills for instance. We are putting a much heavier emphasis on language, not just for human intelligence, but for the people who have to analyze...

Q: And this is teaching people as opposed to recruiting people who speak Arabic or whatever?

DCI: We are looking -- of course, that's one of the skills that we look for in people that we are bringing in. We have immersion training; we have a whole range of programs for language.

Q: So your thrust is retraining in terms of reallocating because you have a finite number of resources, you have to replace them with other people which is one option or try to retrain them.

DCI: Some of this goes on beyond the Agency. It goes for the whole Intelligence Community.

Q: I will get to that in a minute.

DCI: The reason I say that is, some of the national technical collection was designed primarily with the Soviet Union in mind. We have been adapting the existing national technical collection, the assets, the imagery, the SIGINT, etc., to new roles and new responsibilities just as we have pulled a lot of things into the Gulf. That hasn't been easy, but in terms of priorities for the 90's, we have been using flexibility as our main guidelines. We are trying to make sure that the assets that we acquire for future support of what we do here can be readily adapted to a range of places and types of collection.

Q: But that's in the future, but you have got an agency that

in the last 35 or 40 years is really been pointed in one way.

DCI: Well, I am trying not to get technical.

Q: You say you think can make this retraining because what I am getting to is, of course, it takes somebody like Senator Bourne, he is a fan of yours which I think is -- you know I was saying to Joe earlier, it's a little different when we say the Church Committee which is aggressively hostile and critical and Bourne is a fan of yours.

DCI: We have tried to work together. Our missions -- well he has an oversight responsibility -- he wants us to succeed.

Q: That's my point. So, when I speak to him, which I have, I take him seriously because he is not wild-eyed about anything. He is certainly not a fanatic and he, as you now, wants a complete reorganization of the Intelligence Community.

DCI: Well, that may come.

Q: And assuming you disagree, how do you answer or maybe you don't.

DCI: That's a bigger question than the one I was just trying to answer. What I was saying was we will be hiring and we have been given new positions in certain parts, particularly in human intelligence and we will be drawing on skills and assets wherever we think we need strengthening, so it isn't that we are just going to shuffle what we have. We are looking for more. I don't think that in our present posture

that this represents any wholesale or even any loss of personnel where we say we may find ourselves in the defense scheme when our budget is in (inaudible) and we may find ourselves taking substantial reductions as we get into a more peaceful environment. But, we can handle, I think, most of that through attrition rather than slicing off an arm and a leg in order to maintain the deficit.

Q: Or to bring in new people. What do you think about Bourne saying, he wants

DCI: What he wants to do, as I understand it, is to take a careful, fully considered look at how we do this very complex community business and see if there is anything that can be done to improve it or change it. If in after that kind of review, its clear that there is a more effective way -- the community is a complicated thing because in the first place the Director of Central Intelligence has certain overall responsibilities, including the budget.

Q: That's right, you preside over the Intelligence Community.

DCI: I preside and that's probably a pretty good word because the report cards are written elsewhere and a good part of the community, NSA, DIA, the services inside the Defense establishment, State Department has INR, representatives from Energy, from Treasury, from Justice, the FBI, so we have a system in which I have a special authorities, I have special

responsibilities and they go back home do these responsibilities elsewhere and to make it work involves a word that isn't generally understood by the public, but it's inside the bureaucracy; it's coordination. And you can coordinate through a series of working groups and in the end it's the leaders of these agencies who will or will not coordinate and cooperate to make things happen. And I think we are at a pretty high level of desire right now, that is, I can't identify anybody in the community whose stiffing our efforts to achieve our end goal. In otherwards, our strategy is in place; the question is how to get there with the amount of money that's going to be available, and it is not so much pulling on turf when the last time around when we knew we were going to have to look for ways to take less money, we worked together to say what can we give up and still pursue this strategy. Not, here is your pro-rata share.

Q: You don't think any of your sister intelligence agencies -- I am not out to, I am not even going to ask you to comment on that because I know that they are so that gets back to what Bourne says. You know, I think he is really serious. He's got two years to go and he wants to leave a real mark....

DCI: I believe he will, but he won't construct something just to have a mark.

Q: Well, he believes that, well I think he has decided that

he is right. I can't speak for him but that is my impression. I think he wants to merge the CIA and the DIA for one thing and he says the DIA tries to cut you nine ways to Sunday and he doesn't understand why they can't be merged with one guy put on the top and then he says NSA was not even created when the Agency was formed and he wants the national director at the top. I am sure that if this happened in the next couple of years, he would say you would be the guy.

DCI: I was US Attorney General under Eisenhower and I watched DEA go through a thousand reorganizations. You develop a kind of sense of insecurity after a while and you begin to hang on be suspicious of what the other people are doing. I suppose over time the Central Intelligence Agency is the Central Intelligence Agency. It's been the dominant means of collection and analysis.

Q: Can people in America, right or wrong even though the Intelligence Community is quite large, when you say espionage or intelligence in America, everybody thinks CIA. Can't get away from that.

DCI: Then that creates a kind of counter-ripple from other agencies who are sister agencies and what I have been working hard to do is to overcome natural tendencies and to give our directors of the other agencies the opportunity to participate with me. We meet twice a week, incidentally,

on an informal basis, have lunch. And, we don't meet here except when its our turn. We meet all over.....

Q: Is that right? I though you always meet here.

DCI: Oh no. Each time there is a host and I think that that has been helpful. We got these centers that I put in place which we call DCI centers. We have taken some of the key priorities for the future that are new priorities; counter-terrorism, counterintelligence and counternarcotics.

Q: I want to get to that later.

DCI: But I am saying that this is a way, a vehicle in trying to get the Community to (inaudible), and it is an art form because, as you point out and as I mentioned earlier, they come from different places to serve a common mission, but each one is a little different and each one has certain things they do for their own constituency and so you got to preserve their identities and have their special things to do for their own people and at the same time contribute to our general understanding of the problem.

Q: Well Bourne says, or I am speaking for him so I will paraphrase, that you set up these various things which are terrific, but you may leave and someone else comes and they say why do we want those.

DCI: That's a risk.

q; In this reorganization, what's your position? Are you

dead set against it or are you willing to look?

DCI: I am absolutely to look along with everyone else at every other kind of way to making it work better. I come to it with a basic bias, which may or may not be right. Just as I wasn't in favor of the statutory Inspector General. But that is just an example of where we are making that work now. I think I am entitled to an opinion, but it isn't necessarily the one or even the right one, and in this particular thing, the one nagging concern that I have is that an organizational head who has no troops is apt to have trouble making things happen. And I think that the drug czar has experienced some of those problems. So, you can conceive of an organization that merges all of the intelligence and analyzes it, that's a possibility. But as far as actually directing it and controlling it and making sure that clandestine human intelligence is out there functioning, doing the things that we do on a daily basis, that's a little hard to do off in a suite of offices somewhere. And so, I don't know, maybe someone can design an architecture for us better than the ones we have.

Q: What other things that they bring up is, and when I say they, I am not talking about Bourne anymore, but two or three other sources I consider pretty reliable. Their attitude is, again, I don't know, you don't have to comment on this part

of it, the DIA will always say you never supply with military with what they want to know, which is how wide the highway is, how many trains will enter the station, etc. And the example they use is they all say the Agency was cut out of the Panama invasion and that a lot of assets were lost. The chief of station down there, they say, but basically the Agency was cut out of the loop and maybe a lot of assets that could have been used were lost. And those are people who are on your side.

DCI: I would rather not comment too much on that. It was viewed as a military operation and we were very busy during that time, and, I know from my own experience of involvement, we were supplying exceptionally important intelligence to them and over a period of time added -- it is really not correct to say that we were cut out of the operation -- but there is a tendency when the military takes over, take over completely. Well I see that in the agreements that are signed on terrorism out of control in the United States. The military does (inaudible) and when its asked to do it wants to do it all. But, we should have -- maybe there's lesson learned if there was -- because the opposite of that is the current Gulf situation where we have people in place over at the highest levels of the JIC where we are collecting all the intelligence and the important information,

although it may be closely held is coming to me, is coming to my deputy, and we know what additional work we need to do. They came over and briefed me yesterday on what's going on and we are not privy to the tactical stuff and what you are talking about comes awfully close to that where we lack the manpower and don't have that kind of information or even the objective. At one time, there were some up on the Hill who wanted to take the military out of collecting that kind of information completely for other reasons. But the facts of life are that we could not have handled that kind of responsibility on our resources and so we supported the continued collection.

Q: Of course, they keeping going with the budget overlapping duplication and the argument is that they could be merged and one guy could (inaudible).

DCI: But I think that those are things that ought to be optimally looked at, and looked at carefully.

Q: I am going to bring up a couple of critical points. These are things that people have raised or they are going to raise and one of them involves the Gulf, and again, this is a complaint of Bourne's too, that because of the Cold War mind-set, there has been a lack of long-range strategic intelligence and one of the examples that they, not he alone but elsewhere too, just about a year ago, you testified

before the Armed Services Committee and Intelligence too, and getting your global view of things with the Agency, not yours, and when you got to Middle East Iraq wasn't even mentioned.

DCI: I guess that's right. I don't remember -- I remember some of the things I talked about.

Q: You talked about Iran, you talked about Syria, you talked about terrorism, you talked about Israel and the Arabs.

DCI: That's probably true. That's a fair comment.

q; I mentioned to Joe earlier that someone reminded me that almost a year and a half ago Schwartzkopf was here testifying and they said well what's the biggest danger and he says the biggest danger I am facing is the million-man Iraqi army just across the way and nothing seemed to happen. The White House didn't seem to respond to it. What? Of course, the critics of the Agency blamed this on the fact that you are still looking toward Moscow.

DCI: I don't think it was that we were still looking towards Moscow. I think that the Community assessment, not just the Agency, the NFIB, we all sat down and all signed off on something a year ago September was that Saddam Husayn was going to be a big bully in the neighborhood and we intended to achieve dominance, but that he had taken on so much water, hits, it would take him up to three years to get ready, and

in retrospect we could go back and say perhaps we didn't estimate how easy it would be to reach out and grab Kuwait, nor did we see any sign that he was ready. When we began seeing signs of military activity a couple of months later after I testified, was it March/April or June or July, wasn't it, and then we were able at that point to shift a lot of assets and began getting very good information about the number of troops moving, what they were doing, where the SCUD launchers were, and we had them on the border and we gave them our best judgment which was that they were going to attack.

Q: Right. All the critics say DIA was forty-five days ahead which they thought was just as bad too.

DCI: I am not even sure that's true, but the actual judgment that he was going to do it - I remember talking to Henry Kissinger about Tienamen Square -- and he said you can't know it until Dong Sho Ping knows it. But, there is -- I am not trying to defend it --

Q: No, I think you are being very good about it, as a matter of fact, when you say you are not perfect.

DCI: We really aren't perfect in these things and Iraq is an unusually denied country. Total dictatorship, no dissent tolerated of any kind -- either you get kicked out or you get killed -- and so developing eyes and ears in that kind of

a world where military leaders are executed at the drop of a hat, or ask the wrong question, very difficult (end one side) (inaudible) and we were able to assess what would happen if he would keep on going in terms of that part of the world and what that mean not only to countries and their legitimacy in that area, but also to the economic problems in the world with a domination of world central place for.....

Q: It doesn't matter any more now, did you think your evidence was gonna or was a possibility?

DCI: A very real possibility and our evidence -- to take a slice off of Saudi Arabia where the oilfields were. One also has to consider too that as we are supplying this information, we are supplying it at a time when there was no military capability (inaudible). We had no landing rights in Saudi Arabia, we had no major military forces within range, and no conscious decision had been made to do anything about Kuwait.

Q: So what you are saying is that your passing this stuff onto the Saudis changed any reservations about inviting us in?

DCI: No. No, I am saying that intelligence does not always translate into action and action is not at that time possible. The combination of the threat to Saudi Arabia, which more closely is identified with our vital national interests, galvanized a policy decision to stop it. The intelligence helped convince the Saudis, Dick Cheney helped

convince the Saudis that we had the resolve. Airplanes come and they fly away, but coming over there with a full force made the difference. Additional priorities are: drugs, counterintelligence, economic competitiveness, terrorism as important (inaudible -- Judge getting ready to leave). So we are seeing a world, not only on CNN, but we are seeing a world (tape goes dead).