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**ROA
NATIONAL SECURITY
REPORT**



*Compliments of the Reserve Officers
Association of the United States*

*Reserve Officers Association
Defense Education Committee
1 Constitution Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002*

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
ROA NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT

The National Security Newsletter of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States

Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1987

Soviet-style Communism Abuses Cubans

By Ambassador Vernon Walters



Cuban commandos deploying from a Soviet-built Cuban Air Force AN-26 transport plane during training exercises. Photo from DoD Still Photo Collection.

For 200 years the United States has rested on the principles of the people's right to select their government, of respect for the individual and his rights, and the belief that the best way to ensure those rights is to limit government's power.

Our long tradition of democratic rule also leads us at times to take our freedom for granted. It can make us slow to recognize that certain regimes and ideologies not only systematically violate human rights but that they rely upon the power to violate those rights as the principal tool of government.

It took too many people too many years to recognize the horror and danger posed by Nazi Germany. It took many more people even longer to appreciate the horror and danger posed by the Soviet Union.

Many today, in the West and



Mr. Walters, a retired Army lieutenant general, is the United States ambassador to the United Nations. This is drawn from a recent UN address.

elsewhere, have not yet awakened to the danger that Soviet communism poses to freedom. Those who still have doubts should talk to the millions of refugees, orphans, widows and bereaved parents and siblings produced by that system, all of whom know what communism does to those it has conquered. They cannot ask the millions who have been murdered or who reside in labor camps, prisons and mental "hospitals" for daring to think.

Those who did not believe that concentration camps and plans for the extermination of whole peoples existed in Nazi Germany came to realize their error — again, too late for the victims.

What will be said about us: That we refused to see what was in front of us? That we ignored the pleas of millions of victims?

Let us consider the question of human rights in Cuba. If there is a regime guilty of the human long-term, flagrant, and massive violations of human rights envisioned in past resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, it is the regime of the Castro brothers in Cuba.

No other regime in this hemisphere has as dismal a record as that compiled by the Castro government. Since it took control on Jan. 1, 1959, this regime has become a brutal dictatorship. Unlike the evolving democracies throughout the

Americas, Cuba is, according to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, "a totalitarian political system."

For nearly three decades, this regime has abused the Cuban people with impunity without even a cursory investigation by the United Nations. In fact, Cuba has cosponsored a number of UN resolutions concerning human rights.

No one in the UN can claim ignorance of what is happening in Cuba. On at least two occasions — 1961 and 1974 — significant pieces of that evidence came before organs of the United Nations.

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WRAP-UP

Commissary Victory Aids Retention

"Quality of Life" and "Year of the Family" are two slogans that are important aspects of today's military, the "Total Force" of both the active and reserve components.

These two factors have significant impacts on personnel retention in that Total Force. In turn, retention affects readiness and — in the case of reserve components — also the mobilization potential and effectiveness.

It is for this reason — personnel retention's impact on national security — that the Reserve Officers Association this fall took the lead in informing Congress of the need to make practical the authority for drilling reservists to use the commissary system.

The Congress earlier had authorized this use but restricted it to the periods of active duty, regardless of whether a commissary existed at the location or whether it was feasible to visit any commissary.

Rep. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery and Sen. J. James Exon amended the Defense authorization bill to provide a spreading out of the commissary use based on the number of drill days performed. Even though not every drilling reservist will find it possible to use this benefit, the fact is that the potential for use soon will exist. The perception of even handed treatment of the reserve components of the Total Force should go a long way to aid retention.

When Maj. Gen. William F. Ward, Jr., became Chief of the Army Reserve in December, he cited retention as his "No. 1 priority."

Vice Admiral Cecil J. Kempf, Chief of the Naval Reserve, told this column that retention is his greatest problem. "We used to lose a third of our force, or 33,000, a year," he remarked, "but now it has been cut to 20 per cent or 20,000. A quarter of those who leave blame family matters. The improved commissary program definitely will help in this area."

National security is the name of ROA's mission as spelled out in the Congressional Charter. Improved retention, and how it is influenced by such matters as the commissary legislation, is an integral element of that national security. HMH



Cuban President Fidel Castro, after 26 years, is still committed to violent revolution and a close alignment with the Soviet Union. Photo from DoD Still Photo Collection.

Continued from page 1.

That evidence was ignored. This failure to call the Castro regime to account is beyond understanding.

The United States accuses the government of Cuba of systematic and

"The political structure of the state and the role of the Communist Party in Cuba, however, bear no resemblance to those principles. In Cuba this democratic dream has become a totalitarian nightmare — a revolution betrayed."

flagrant abuses of basic human rights and freedoms so offensive that they demand universal condemnation. We ask the international community to consider, carefully and objectively, the overwhelming evidence supporting this accusation.

Thirty years ago, the 26th of July Movement, fighting to overthrow the Batista dictatorship, issued its "Manifesto" with the goals and principles guiding the revolution.

The "Manifesto" expressed a determination to have the following in Cuba:

- "A democratic republic, inspired by the credo of freedom and founded on the character and capacity of its citizens;
- "A form of the government and a system of public and individual rights that will be fully practiced in real life and not forgotten in written constitutions and laws;"

- An inauguration of "true political democracy; that is, the competition of ideas between political parties and a representative government based on the genuine expression of the general will."

These principles of democracy have taken root throughout most of the Americas. The political structure of the state and the role of the Communist Party in Cuba, however, bear no resemblance to those principles. In Cuba this democratic dream has become a totalitarian nightmare — a revolution betrayed.

How are fundamental freedoms affected? Although the "Manifesto" placed

the Cuban revolution within the liberal tradition, for the past 28 years such freedoms have been abridged or abolished in every sphere of Cuban life. Basic "rights" are limited to the "exclusive service of the working people and the interest of the society," as defined by the party.

Dr. Ricardo Bofill, the Cuban human rights activist now in his third month in the Freedom Embassy in Havana, wrote from prison in August 1983 that "the most frequently violated articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Cuba are those concerning freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of opinion and expression; as well as the right to receive and transmit information and ideas through any means available to the people." The possession or distribution of the Universal Declaration constitutes a crime.

The freedoms of expression and assembly do not exist. An innocuous

"A new generation of political prisoners has emerged, primarily youths who have tried to leave Cuba, insisting on being separated from the criminals and the political prisoners participating in the rehabilitation plans, thus becoming new plantados."

"political" expression can result in imprisonment or death. Membership in private associations is precluded; membership in "mass organizations" is virtually required.

There is no freedom of the press. The state controls all of the media and publishing houses. It censors the news. It subjects authors to rigorous political screening before publishing any of their works.

Artistic freedom does not exist. The official "workshop" system for artists and writers ensures state control. Approved subjects for creative works demand not only ideological correctness but active promotion of state interests. Those who dare to create otherwise spend years in prison.

Repression of religion is as thorough and pervasive as repression of political opposition. The construction of churches is restricted; many old ones have been closed. Believers are denied higher

education and all but menial forms of employment.

Baptism and catechism instruction and attendance suffer from the shortage of churches and priests and from relentless intimidation by the so-called CDR's — Committees for the Defense of the Revolution — or what Armando Valladares has referred to as "vigilance committees."

Pastors and members of Protestant denominations are persecuted and imprisoned for preaching, and the reproduction or distribution of religious materials can mean jail or execution.

The treatment of political offenders is unrelentingly severe: preventive detention, house arrest, forced psychiatric treatment, confinement in a forced labor camp, imprisonment under

strength to survive usually become chronically ill, permanently disfigured or disabled. When the sentence has been served, it is likely to be arbitrarily extended.

Ironically, in spite of the regime's efforts — perhaps because of them — in Cuban prisons, and among a growing segment of Cuban society, to have been a plantado is a badge of honor. We hear of a new class of prisoners, sentenced for crimes committed in the struggle to survive, asking to be confined, not with ordinary criminals, but with the plantados.



Cuban children training with Soviet-supplied AK-47 assault rifles. Photo from DoD Still Photo Collection.

barbaric conditions, or execution by firing squad. Castro has learned well from his Soviet masters.

The political prisoner does not have the privileges available to common criminals nor, often, even the necessities of life. He will have cramped living conditions, poor food, rationed water, and inadequate medical care. He will suffer frequent and sadistic punishment such as deprivation of sleep and sunlight, denial of food and medicine, and psychological or physical torture.

If the prisoner rebels by refusing to participate in "political rehabilitation" programs or to wear the uniform of a common criminal — that is, if he becomes a "plantado" — the brutality of the punishment escalates.

Even those with the faith and the

A new generation of political prisoners has emerged, primarily youths who have tried to leave Cuba, insisting on being separated from the criminals and the political prisoners participating in the rehabilitation plans, thus becoming new plantados. While there are too many who have suffered to list here, I will mention now a few who represent the struggle and suffering of Cuba:

- The founder and president of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights, Dr. Ricardo Bofill, who is now in the French Embassy in Havana, and his colleagues — Domingo Jorge Delgado Castro, Jose Luis Alvarado, Enrique Hernandez, Adolfo Rivero Caro and Elizardo Sanchez — who are in prison for

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The Cuban magazine "Verde Olivo," captions this picture: "The activities of SEPMI ensure that the new generation learns, among other things, to shoot, and shoot well!!" SEPMI is the patriotic military education society that promotes military activities among Cuban children.

having attempted to register their organization.

- Renowned poets Armando Valladares and Jorge Valls, who in verse and personal memoir have told of the clash in Cuba's jails between inhuman cruelty and superhuman spirit;

- Brilliant student revolutionary Pedro Luis Boitel and the distinguished attorney Dr. Aramis Taboada, both of whom were friends of Castro during their youth. Both have lost their lives for opposing communism.

- Jurist Vera Escalona, a judge removed for her independence and sympathy for political defendants, now serving an 80-year sentence on false charges of corruption;

- Labor leader Guido Faraninan Hernandez, one of several who spoke with workers about establishing an independent trade union in Cuba and who, like Dr. Taboada, died in jail.

- Former comandante of the revolution Huber Matos, tried and convicted of being a counter-revolutionary in 1960 for protesting the revolution's betrayal; and

- Legislator Ramon Grau Alsina, a nephew of Cuba's former president, who, after ensuring his family's safe departure in 1960, remained to help thousands of children to escape — a crime described by his tormentors as worse even than to attempt assassination of Castro himself.

But the regime also persecutes countless ordinary people.

- Antonio Frias Sosa, a teen-ager

arrested in Havana last August for having a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Hours after his arrest, his body came home; he allegedly committed suicide.

- Teresita Diaz Gonzalez, the secretary of a judge convicted in the same case as Dr. Taboada, sentenced to 15 years in prison because of her loyalty to her friend.

- Luis Gonzalez, a common soldier in Batista's army arrested on Jan. 2, 1959,

“United Nations investigation into the deplorable human rights situation in Castro's Cuba is also long overdue. We hope that the members of the UN will join us in expressing our concerns over what is happening to the people in Cuba.”

and in jail since then without a trial; he has seen neither his wife nor his children in all those years; whose faith in God, like that of so many other plantados, enables him to go on; and who worries about his friend Ignacio Cuesta Valles, who also languishes in prison.

These are not pleasant things. What


pleasantries can be said, however, about a system that has driven some 15 per cent of its population into exile; that operates a vast network of prisons, labor camps and firing squads to keep itself in power; that still holds some 15,000 political prisoners; that engages in terrorism?

What defense is there for a regime so brutal that ordinary people try to float to Florida on inner tubes — risking death from exposure, thirst and sharks — in order to escape it? Cuba has the highest number of political prisoners, per capita, in the world.

On Nov. 25, the United States UN delegation introduced a resolution on the question of human rights in Cuba. This draft resolution is long overdue. United Nations investigation into the deplorable human rights situation in Castro's Cuba is also long overdue. We hope that the members of the UN will join us in expressing our concerns over what is happening to the people of Cuba. I can assure the world that the United States will not cease introducing the subject of human rights in Cuba into every appropriate forum.

We must not tolerate a “double standard” in human rights. Tyrannies of the left should not be any more immune from condemnation than those of the right. We must shatter the “mystique” that has surrounded the Cuban dictator. We must let him, and those who would follow him, know that the civilized world will not witness their brutalities impassively.

We will not allow the awful truth to be hidden. The world must know. □



Goldwater and His Final Defense Budget

By Senator Barry Goldwater

Retiring Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Goldwater also is a retired Air Force Reserve major general. Official US Navy photo.

In resolving the differences between the House and Senate versions of the Fiscal Year 1987 Defense Authorization bill, the arms control provisions in the House bill proved to be some of the most difficult issues the conferees faced.

The House of Representatives attached a sweeping series of arms control provisions to the defense bill this year. These included:

- A moratorium on US nuclear tests above one kiloton;
- A ban on testing of the US antisatellite system against objects in space;
- A prohibition on the expenditure of funds that would put the US above the numerical sublimits of the SALT II agreement;
- Significant reductions in the binding the US to the numerical (SDI) program;
- A ban on the modernization of the aging and increasingly ineffective US chemical deterrent.

From the point of view of the Senate conferees, the adoption of any one of these provisions would do significant harm to our national security. In each case, the House provisions would con-

“In the midst of important and delicate arms reduction negotiations, the adoption of these provisions by the House of Representatives was ill-timed and ill-advised.”

strain programs that are vital to our national security. As a result, these provisions would undermine the US negotiating posture in Geneva.

The Soviet Union has no Soviet military




programs. Hence, the House provisions unilaterally constrain the US and play into the hands of the Soviet Union and its negotiators.

In the midst of important and delicate arms reduction negotiations, the adoption of these provisions by the House of Representatives was ill-timed and ill-advised.

The task of resolving these issues was made all the more difficult by the insistence of the House leadership that their conferees on the defense bill be stacked in an effort to guarantee an

This article is based on Mr. Goldwater's Congressional remarks in presenting the Defense authorization bill this fall in one of his final official actions before retiring.





Defense budget provides for such sophisticated weaponry as shown in this test conducted by the Joint Cruise Missiles Project in April. At left a Tomahawk cruise missile launched from a submerged submarine off the coast of California approaches its target, a revetted aircraft on San Clemente Island, after a flight of more than 400 miles. Over the target, center the missile's 1000 lb bull-pup conventional warhead detonates at its prescribed altitude and flight path as preplanned at the Theater Mission Planning Center in Norfolk, VA. The subsequent explosion and blast fragments from the warhead destroys the target below, right. DoD photo courtesy of Still Photo Collection.

outcome on key provisions that was favorable to the House. The House had a total of 77 conferees, just 31 of whom were actually members of the House Armed Services Committee.

On the arms control issues in particular, a select group of House members were assigned exclusive responsibility, and most of the House Armed Services Committee conferees were not even allowed to vote on these issues. This deprived the conference of the expertise on defense matters that members of the House Armed Services Committee possess, and it made an already difficult conference process even more difficult.

If the House leadership continues this practice of stacking conferences, our ability to work out agreements on these important defense issues in the future is in grave doubt. This not only threatens to complicate conferences on the defense bill, but to future conferences on all issues and for all Committees.

I strongly encourage my successor as Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and my colleagues in the Senate, to make it clear to the House of Representatives that we will not tolerate their efforts to stack defense conferences in the future.

Under these very trying circumstances, a great deal of credit should be given to Senator Warner and Senator Nunn. They were assigned the unenviable task of trying to resolve these arms control issues with the House. They worked long and hard at this task, which was made all the more important in view of the planned meeting between

President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik.

The Senate felt that it was very important to resolve these issues before this meeting in an effort to send President Reagan to Iceland with strong domestic support and able to deal from a position of strength. The House was also eager to settle these differences before the Iceland summit.

I am not entirely satisfied with the final outcome on these arms control issues.

“The Senate felt that it was very important to resolve these issues before this meeting in an effort to send President Reagan to Iceland with strong domestic support and able to deal from a position of strength.”

However, in view of the number of well intentioned but terribly naive provisions adopted by the House, I believe that the Senate did a good job in limiting the damage done to our national security.

The House agreed to drop its provisions binding the US to the numerical sublimits of the unratified and expired SALT II agreement. Instead, the conferees adopted non-binding sense of the

Congress language urging the President to remain within these sublimits. This provision preserves the President's flexibility to take whatever action with respect to the SALT II Treaty that he judges to be in our national security interest.

It was astonishing that the House conferees insisted that the Senate drop a provision stating that it is not in our national interest to abide by a treaty that the Soviet Union is clearly violating. International law is very clear regarding the rights of one party to a treaty to respond in the event of a material breach by another party. If the House truly believes that the US should unilaterally adhere to a treaty that the Soviet Union is violating, let them make that point in public and not behind the closed doors of a conference.

The House also agreed to drop the binding provision in its bill prohibiting all US nuclear tests with a yield greater than one kiloton. Instead, the conferees adopted a non-binding sense of the Congress provision regarding ratification of the Threshold Test Ban (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNET) Treaties; and negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

President Reagan has indicated that he intends to seek ratification of the TTBT and PNET agreements during the 100th Congress, either with an improved package of verification provisions that he has negotiated with the Soviet Union, or with a reservation stating that the treaties do not take effect until the

Soviets agree to these verification improvements.

Following ratification of these agreements, the President will begin negotiations on further testing limitations in parallel with our arms reduction negotiations.

The Senate agreed to a House provision which extended the ban on testing of the US antisatellite (ASAT) program against objects in space for another year. The Senate agreed to this provision with the greatest reluctance, because the Soviet Union already possesses an operational antisatellite system, and the US has no comparable capability. No limitations were placed on tests against points in space.

The conferees agreed to split the difference between their bills on funding for the President's Strategic Defense Initiative program. As a result, \$3,213.0 million was provided to the Department of Energy, for a total of \$3.53 billion.

The level agreed to by the conferees will delay the development of options to enhance deterrence through the introduction of strategic defenses into our deterrent posture. This figure is well below the level required for this program — the importance of which to US national security was reaffirmed in Iceland.

The House agreed to drop its prohibition on the expenditure of funds for the binary chemical modernization program. The conferees agreed to fully fund production of the 155mm artillery shell, and agreed to provide \$35.0 million for the BIGEYE binary chemical bomb. However, they prohibited the expenditure of funds for BIGEYE until Oct. 1, 1987, and prohibited the final assembly of the BIGEYE bomb until Oct. 1, 1988.

While the President requested \$320 billion for defense in 1987, the Congress has decided to provide only \$291.9 billion in this bill — a reduction of more than \$28 billion. I wish to go on record, stating in the clearest way I can, we are cutting TOO MUCH from defense. I remind my colleagues that last year, instead of providing for some reasonable growth in the defense budget, we actually had negative real growth of nearly four per cent. And this year, we have again set a level of funding which provides negative real growth of almost three per cent.

Now let's not kid ourselves. Anyone who thinks we can go on cutting the defense budget to the point where we actually have declining growth rates of more than three per cent a year without undermining our defense posture, is indulging in happy but entirely unrealistic delusion.

Our defense budgets over the last two years have set in motion a dangerous trend which, if not reversed, may have profound consequences on our future. I have a terrible sense that we are

“I suggest that before anyone gets carried away by the new Soviet image, we first look very carefully at Soviet actions around the world. Until those actions are consistent with Soviet rhetoric, I suggest we pay more attention to their deeds, and less to their words.”

returning to the irresponsible policies of the late 1970s.


I remind my colleagues that despite the fact that Soviet leaders have recently acquired a new and more sophisticated public relations strategy, there is no reason to believe the objectives of that totalitarian government are any different nor any less threatening now than were the objectives of their less artful

predecessors. And I suggest that before anyone gets carried away by the new Soviet image, we first look very carefully at Soviet actions around the world. Until those actions are consistent with Soviet rhetoric, I suggest we pay more attention to their deeds, and less to their words.


I am not at all pleased that we have had to cut so much from defense. However, we have complied with the budget resolution targets adopted earlier this year; and at the same time, have tried to minimize the adverse consequences on our nation's security. This has been a very difficult task.

Our conference was without question, the most difficult conference in which I have ever participated. The House leadership, in an attempt to guarantee the outcome on several important issues (most of which were not even germane to our bill), stacked the conference with several groups of exclusive conferees, any one of which had the ability under the rules to block a final conference report.

Despite this effort to “rig” the conference, we were able to point out that there were more than 1,600 funding differences to be resolved, and more than 400 language differences; that is the greatest number of issues we have ever had to resolve in a defense conference.



Soviets continue to test and manufacture chemical weapons despite world pressure to ban their use. Afghanistan is one Soviet venture in which chemical weapons have been used. This is a sketch of a nerve agent production plant captured by the Soviets during World War II. From DodD's "Soviet Military Power, 1986."



The Soviets' 441 SS-20 LRINF launchers are a constant reminder of the growing nuclear threat from accurate and survivable mobile missile systems. This SS-20 transporter-erector-launcher is configured for operational deployment. Photo from DoD's "Soviet Military Power, 1986."

Soviets Know That SDI Will Work

By Robert M. Gates

One of the most significant developments in the nuclear age was the President's call to the nation in March 1983 to build a strategic defense system to protect the United States and its allies. This visionary concept and the President's determination to bring it to reality initially was greeted with widespread skepticism and a good deal of head shaking over his presumed naivete.

And yet, as the nation's scientists and engineers have been mobilized, the technologies examined, and successful tests carried out a growing number of scientists and political leaders have come not only to accept the validity of the concept but the wisdom of implementing it.

While skeptics and critics continue to



Mr. Gates, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, gave this address Nov. 25 to the World Affairs Council of Northern California.

voice their doubts, there is one person in the world who believes nearly as strongly as Ronald Reagan that SDI will work and that America can build it if it decides to do so — and that person is Mikhail Gorbachev.

Observers are surprised by the breadth and depth of the Soviet program and the long term commitment they have made

"The Soviets believe that nuclear war could occur and, in light of that act, they have designed their military programs to try to enable the Soviet Union to survive and to prevail."

to strategic defense, including advanced technologies. It is ironic that the US effort to achieve strategic defense is the focus of world attention, as if the Soviet program had never existed. Indeed the

principal question is why we have waited so long to create a defense for our country — to prevent nuclear weapons from reaching their targets.

Until March 1983, the United States developed its strategic military programs within the strategic reality that the existence of huge nuclear arsenals and the vulnerability of both sides to those weapons would lead each side to calculate that a nuclear attack would be suicidal — that even if one side preempted, the other side would have enough weapons remaining to destroy the still-vulnerable initiator of the conflict. This is the concept we have known as mutual assured destruction. Even though this has not been out official policy, it has been the reality.

There are two problems with this concept. First, the Soviets never accepted it. The Soviets believe that nuclear war could occur and, in light of that fact, they have designed their military programs to try to enable the Soviet Union to survive and to prevail.

This includes the development over many years, and continuing until today, of a massive national strategic air defense against bombers and cruise missiles, a ballistic missile defense of Moscow and a vigorous R&D program as

JAPANESE POSITION

SDI Aids Deterrence

By Minister Masaharu Gotoda

well as large scale measures for leadership protection, civil defense, and protection of vital elements of the national economy.

It speaks volumes that in a relationship in which for 20 or more years strategic stability presumably has been working to eliminate its own vulnerability and consolidate a unilateral strategic advantage.

Second, the offensive balance has not been maintained. To take just one example, the Soviets have continued to improve their heavy ICBM force in order to be able to take out all of the US ICBM force, other nuclear force installations, and the few hardened leadership facilities we have. Their heavy ICBM force is designed in order for the Soviets to strike first, and effectively, despite their propaganda claim that they would not use nuclear weapons first.

The Soviet concept, an initial strike by their heavy ICBMs, is the essential lead element of their strategic defenses, for it reduces the nuclear threat with which the rest of their defenses have to contend.

Only by understanding the scope of this Soviet effort, our own vulnerability, and

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the destabilizing effect of this imbalance—recognized for years by our own military as a serious flaw—can one fully understand the significance of the President's initiative.

The Soviets have devoted considerable resources to strategic defense. Over the last two decades, the Soviet Union has spent roughly as much on strategic defense as it has on its massive strategic offensive forces.

While estimates of Soviet spending on their military programs are based on an arcane and in absolute terms not particularly reliable science, there is some value in it for comparative purposes. For example, it is our judgement that over the past 10 years the Soviet Union has

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As a nation committed to peace, we earnestly aspire to the enhanced stability in the East-West relations through substantial reduction of nuclear arsenals, and to the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world.

At the beginning of last year, President Reagan explained to the Prime Minister that the objective of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons by rendering ballistic missiles ineffective through the means of non-nuclear defensive systems and we have expressed our understanding for such a research program. We have since received an invitation from the United States Government to participate in this research program and have been carefully considering our response thereto.

In the meantime, Prime Minister Nakasone, at his meeting with President Reagan at Bonn in May last year, confirmed with the President that

- The Initiative was not designed to seek unilateral superiority over the Soviet Union;
- The Initiative should contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of the deterrence of the West as a whole;
- The aim of the Initiative was to bring about substantial reduction of offensive nuclear weapons;
- The Initiative should be carried out in conformity with the ABM Treaty and
- Consultation with allies and negotiations with the Soviet Union should precede deployment.

Since then, the United States has consistently explained to us that the SDI is a research program designed to provide technical knowledge for the future US decision on the development and deployment of the strategic defense systems and that the basic thrust of the

program is to conduct research on sophisticated non-nuclear defensive systems in parallel with the efforts in arms control and disarmament talks, and, ultimately, to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

We think that such basic ideas of the United States are in conformity with the position of Japan committed to peace as described above.

The United States' pursuit of the research under such a program and consequent progress of technologies related to non-nuclear defensive systems would possibly contribute to the deterrence of not only the United States but the West as a whole, including Japan.

Furthermore, our participation in this research program will lead to further enhancement of mutual cooperation between our two countries under the Japan-US Security Treaty, and thus is conducive to the effective operations of the Japan-US security system.

The SDI comprises a multitude of research projects conducted simultaneously and on a large scale to explore the feasibility of related technologies. Furthermore, if our participation in this research program enables us to utilize its fruits in an appropriate manner, it may have substantial effects on the progress of related technologies in our country.

We expect that Japan's participation will be related to particular phases of specific projects designed by the United States. In the light of the significance of our participation as stated previously, we consider it appropriate to deal with the question of participation within the framework of existing domestic laws of Japan and bilateral agreements with the United States, and in the similar way the exchange of defense-related technologies has so far been dealt with.

On such a standpoint, we have decided to enter into consultations with the United States Government on specific measures to ensure that the participation be carried out smoothly.

Although the authoritative interpretation of the Diet resolutions can only be made by the Diet, it is the understanding of the government that Japan's participation in the SDI research program in the manner described here is not inconsistent with the 1969 Diet Resolution concerning the exploration and use of the outer space. □



This is the official Japanese policy on SDI as prepared by Mr. Gotoda, Minister of State and Chief Cabinet Secretary.



JAPAN

Prime Minister To the Diet

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In parallel with its negotiating efforts for arms control and disarmament, the United States is conducting research on advanced, non-nuclear defense systems and promoting Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research in line with the basic ideal of ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons, work which is consistent with Japan's position as a nation of peace. Believing that Japanese participation in SDI research could contribute to the more effective operation of our security arrangements with the United States and that it has the potential for influencing progress in related technological fields in Japan, the administration has recently decided to enter into consultations with the United States on specific measures to facilitate Japanese participation. ”

—Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone to the 107th Session of the National Diet, Sept. 12, 1986.

spent nearly \$150 billion on strategic defense, or almost 15 times what the United States has spent.

And what have they bought for their money? They have the world's only operational ballistic missile defense system, installed around Moscow. Six years ago they began to upgrade and expand that system — actually, to replace it with a completely new system — to the limits allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty.

When completed the modernized Moscow ABM system will be a two-layer defense composed of silo-based long-range modified Galosh interceptors; silo-based, high-acceleration Gazelle interceptors designed to engage targets within the atmosphere; associated engagement and guidance radars; and a new large radar at Pushkino designed to control ABM engagements. The silo-based launchers may be reloadable. The new system will have the 100 ABM launchers permitted by the Treaty and could be fully operational in 1988.

The Soviet system for detection and tracking of ballistic missile attacks consists of three layers — a launch detection satellite network, two over-the-horizon radars directed at US ICBM fields, and two networks of large ballistic missile detection and tracking radars.

The current layer of ballistic missile

detection radars consists of 11 large ballistic missile early warning radars at locations on the periphery of the USSR. These radars can distinguish the size of an attack, confirm the warning from the satellite network and the over-the-



GREAT BRITAIN

Foreign Affairs And Parliament

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It seems that Mr. Gorbachev is now trying to make progress of any sort depend on progress on SDI. He wants a super-restrictive interpretation — more probably a revision — of the ABM Treaty, and a veto over any future deployments before questions about their feasibility are answered.

“This approach carefully overlooks the Russians' own activities in these areas. The United Kingdom therefore continues to support research within the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. ”

—Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to the House of Commons, Nov. 14, 1986.

horizon radar systems, and provide target tracking data.

The Soviets are now constructing a network of nine new large phased array radars — three new ones have been detected this year — that can track more ballistic missiles with greater accuracy than the existing network. Most of these duplicate or supplement the coverage of the earlier network but with greatly enhanced capability. The radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, however, closes the final gap in the Soviet early warning radar coverage against ballistic missile attacks.

Together the nine new large phased array radars cover almost all approaches to the Soviet Union; the Soviets will undoubtedly build one or two more such radars to complete this coverage. (It is the Krasnoyarsk radar, by the way, that violates the 1972 ABM Treaty. It is not located within 150 kilometer radius of the national capital as required of ABM radars, nor is it located on the periphery of the Soviet Union or pointed outward, as required by the Treaty for early warning radars. That is why the Soviets made the preposterous claim that it was a space tracking radar.)

The growing network of new large phased array ballistic missile detection and tracking radars of which Krasnoyarsk is a part, is of particular concern when linked with other Soviet ABM efforts. Such radars take years to

construct and the existence of highly capable radars might allow the Soviet Union to move rather quickly to construct a nationwide ABM defense based on these radars, if it chooses to do so.

The Soviets also are developing components of a new ABM system which are apparently designed to allow them to construct individual ABM sites in a matter of months rather than the years that are required for the silo-based ABM systems going into Moscow.

Soviet activities in this regard potentially violate the ABM system or components. We estimate that by using these components the Soviets could undertake rapidly paced ABM deployments to strengthen the defenses of Moscow and defend key targets in the Western USSR and east of the Urals by the early 1900s.

In addition to these developments, the SA-X-12 surface to air missile system, to be deployed with the Soviet ground forces at any time, can engage conventional aircraft, cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles. It could also have capabilities to intercept some types of US strategic ballistic missile re-entry vehicles. Its technical capabilities bring to the forefront the problem that improving technology is blurring the distinction between air defense and ABM systems. This problem will be further complicated as newer, more complex air defense missile systems are developed.

We are concerned that the Soviets' continuing development efforts give them the potential for widespread ABM deployments. The Soviets have the major components for an ABM system that could be used for widespread ABM deployments well in excess of ABM Treaty limits. The components include radars, an above ground launcher, and the high acceleration missile that will be deployed around Moscow. The potential exists for the production lines associated with the upgrade of the Moscow ABM system to be used to support widespread deployment.

Taken together, all of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM related activities are more significant and more ominous than any one considered individually. Cumulatively, they suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Such a defense, while not as comprehensive an approach as our own SDI efforts, could provide an



UNITED STATES

President Reagan's Official Statement

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In light of the continuing Soviet offensive buildup, the longstanding and extensive Soviet programs in strategic defense, and continued Soviet non-compliance with existing arms control agreements, SDI is crucial to the future security of the United States and our allies.

“Americans recognize that SDI was essential in getting the Soviets to return to the negotiating table, and that it is essential as well to our prospects for concluding an agreement with the Soviets to reduce nuclear arms. Effective strategic defenses would be insurance against Soviet cheating or abrogation of such an agreement. In addition, they would provide a continuing incentive to the Soviets to pursue further reductions in offensive weapons.

“SDI is, therefore, a vital insurance policy that we cannot, and will not, bargain away. That is a commitment which I have made to the American people, and I stand by it.”

—Statement of President Ronald Reagan at the White House, Nov. 12, 1986.

important degree of protection and would fit well into the Soviet scheme for strategic defense — this is the only missing element in their defenses.

Although the United States dismantled most of its defenses against Soviet

“Taken together, all of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM related activities are more significant and more ominous than any one considered individually. Cumulatively, they suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.”

bombers in the 1960s, the Soviet Union has continued to invest enormous resources in a wide array of strategic air defense weapons systems. Currently the Soviets have nearly 12,000 surface to air missile launchers at more than 1200 sites; 10,000 air defense radars and more

than 1200 interceptor aircraft dedicated to strategic defense. An additional 2800 interceptors assigned to Soviet air forces could also be employed in strategic defense missions.

The newest Soviet air defense interceptor aircraft, the MIG-31-Foxhound, has a lookdown, shutdown and multiple target engagement capability. More than 85 Foxhounds are now operationally deployed. In contrast, the US has approximately 300 interceptor aircraft based in the US, dedicated to strategic defense, 118 strategic air defense warning radars and no operational strategic surface to air missile launchers. And this in the face of the modernization of the Soviet heavy bomber force and development of a new Soviet strategic bomber, the Blackjack, similar in design to the B-1 but larger and faster.

Finally, the Soviets also have a wide range of passive defenses to ensure wartime survivability and continuity of Soviet nuclear forces, leadership, military command and control units, war-related industrial production and services, the essential work force, and as much of the population as possible.

The USSR has hardened its ICBM silos, launch facilities and key command and

control centers to an unprecedented degree. Much of today's US retaliatory force would be ineffective against those hardened targets. Soviet leaders and managers at all levels of the government and Party are provided hardened alternate command posts located well away from the urban centers, in addition to many deep bunkers and blast shelters in Soviet cities.

This comprehensive and redundant system provides hardened alternate facilities for more than 175,000 key Party and government personnel. Elaborate plans also have been made for the full mobilization of the national economy in support of a war effort. Reserves of vital materials are maintained, many in hardened underground structures. Redundant industrial facilities have been equipped with blast shelters for the work force and detailed procedures have been developed for the relocation of selected plants and equipment.

As if all these developments were not worrisome enough, since the late 1960s the Soviet Union also has been pursuing advanced technologies for strategic defense — technologies which the US is intending to explore in its strategic defense initiative program. The Soviets expect that military applications of directed energy technologies hold promise of overcoming weaknesses in their conventional air and missile defenses.

The Soviets have been working as long as the United States in laser, particle beam, kinetic energy and microwave technologies applicable to strategic weapons.


The Soviet laser weapons program began in the 1960s. Many Soviet organizations, both civilian and military, are involved. The Soviet laser weapon effort is guided and supported by some of the best scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union.

Yevgeniy Velikhov, the rising vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences made his early mark in directed energy related weapons research. Velikhov is, by the way, the same Velikhov who was one of 200 Soviet signatories of a full page ad in the New York Times which stated that SDI would not work. He, and some of the others, made their mark by demonstrating the value of these technologies.

The level of effort that the Soviets have applied to their laser weapons program is great. While it is difficult for us to measure the size of this program precisely, we estimate roughly \$1 billion per year for the laser effort. It is clear, based on the observed scale and scope of

the Soviet effort, that their program is considerably larger than that of the United States. For example, the Soviets have built more than half of a dozen major R&D facilities and test ranges and have an estimated 10,000 scientists and engineers associated with the development of lasers for weapons.

The Soviets have conducted research in the three types of gas lasers that the



This illustrates the coverage of the Soviet Union's ballistic missile early warning, target-tracking, and battle management radars. From DoD's "Soviet Military Power, 1986."

US considers promising for weapons applications: a gas dynamic laser, the electric discharge laser, and the chemical laser. Soviet achievements are impressive. The Soviets have not only followed suit with the US in their work on these three kinds of lasers, they have continued to work on certain types of lasers which the US abandoned.

The Soviets have been working on other types of lasers that the US has not seriously considered for weapons application until very recently. They also are investing excimer, free electron and x-ray lasers and have been developing argon ion lasers for over a decade. The Soviets appear generally capable of supplying the prime power, energy storage and auxiliary components needed for most laser and other directed energy weapons.

They have developed a rocket-driven generator which produces more than 15 megawatts of electrical power — a device that has no counterpart in the West. The Soviets may also have the capability to develop the optical systems necessary for laser weapons to track and attack their target.

The USSR has now progressed, in some cases, beyond technology research. It already has ground-based lasers that

could be used to interfere with US satellites and could have prototype space-based anti-satellite laser weapons by the early 1990s. We expect the Soviets to test the feasibility of ground-based lasers for defense against ballistic missiles by the late 1980s and could begin testing components for a large scale deployment system in the 1990s.

The remaining difficulties in fielding an operational system will require still more development time. An operational ground-based laser for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be deployed until after the year 2000. If technology developments prove successful, the Soviets may deploy operational space-based anti-satellite lasers in the 1990s and might be able to deploy space-based lasers systems for defense against ballistic missiles after the year 2000.

Soviet research and developments of those technologies that could support a particle beam weapon also have been impressive. We estimate that they may be able to test a prototype particle beam weapon intended to disrupt the electronics of satellites in the late 1990s. A weapon designed to destroy satellites could follow later. A weapon capable of physically destroying missile boosters or warheads probably would require additional years of research and development.

The USSR also has conducted research in the use of strong radiofrequency signals that have the potential to interfere with or destroy critical electronic components of ballistic missile warheads. The Soviets could test a ground-based radiofrequency weapon capable of damaging satellites in the 1990s. Soviet capabilities to develop micro-wave weapons or radiofrequency weapons are on a par if not superior to those of the US.

The Soviets also have a variety of research programs underway in the area of kinetic energy weapons using the high speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mechanism. Long range, space-based kinetic energy systems for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be developed until the mid-1990s or even later. The USSR could, however, deploy in the near term a short-range space-based system useful for satellite or space station defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle to Soviet success in these advanced defenses against ballistic missiles are remote sensor and computer technologies — currently more highly developed in the West than in the USSR. The Soviets are devoting considerable resources to improving their abilities and expertise in these technologies. An important part of that effort involves increasing exploitation of open and clandestine access to Western technology. For example, the Soviets have long been engaged in well funded efforts to purchase US high technology computers, test and calibration equipment, and sensors illegally through third parties.


The Soviets have had a near monopoly on strategic defenses for many years. Their primary motivation for engaging initially in the strategic arms limitation talks with the United States in 1969 was to

“ . . . the Soviets have long been engaged in well funded efforts to purchase US high technology computers, test and calibration equipment, and sensors illegally through third parties.”

kill the US anti-ballistic missile program. Indeed, for many months in the early stages of SALT, the Soviets refused even to discuss limits on offensive strategic systems.

The Soviet effort we see today to kill SDI is of a piece with the effort nearly 20 years ago to kill ABM. The Soviets simply do not want the United States to be able to defend itself against strategic nuclear weapons. Limited though the current Soviet anti-ballistic missile system is, the Soviets are laying the foundation that will give them the option of a relatively rapidly deployable nationwide ABM system — a system that despite deficiencies would give the Soviets a significant unilateral advantage both politically and in time of war.

Through an intensive worldwide propaganda campaign, the USSR hopes that it can dissuade the United States from pursuing the SDI research program and thereby preserve the Soviet monopoly in defense against ballistic missiles. Indeed, the same Soviet covert action structure that was used against the enhanced radiation weapon in the late 1970s and the deployment of intermediate nuclear forces to Europe in



This Dog House radar provides battle management for the antiballistic missile interceptors around Moscow. Sketch from DoD's "Soviet Military Power, 1986."


the early 80s is now being used against SDI.

The Soviets wish that the President's March 23rd announcement had never been made and that they could pursue their own solitary development of an anti-ballistic missile defense and research on advanced strategic defense without competition from the United States. The advent of SDI, however, faces the Soviets with the mobilization of an American effort to build a strategic missile defense in the United States and they are moving heaven and earth to convince or pressure the United States to drop it. They believe we can develop a

highly effective strategic defense, in part because they are doing large elements of such a program themselves.

In the Soviet view, a US decision at this point to give up on defense and to rely solely on offensive weapons for deterrence not only would preserve their monopoly in strategic defense, but would be a key indicator of a loss of US will to compete militarily. Moreover, failure to proceed with an American strategic defense would hand the Soviets a unilateral military advantage of historic consequence — with awesomely negative implications for strategic stability and peace. □

Russia's northern borders are monitored by this installation at Pechora which includes this receiver and transmitter of a large phased-array, ballistic missile detection and tracking radar. Sketch from DoD's "Soviet Military Power, 1986."



Terrorism Will Continue Indefinitely

By Dr. Alvin H. Buckelew

American tourists aboard a Trans World Airlines plane leaving Greece are suddenly thrust into the limelight: one is killed, and the rest become captives in Beirut, Lebanon. Other American tourists on an Italian luxury liner in the Mediterranean become the victims of a terrorist act of piracy on the high seas; again, one American is killed, all other passengers become hostages.

The actions of terrorists command world attention as one incident succeeds another. Most people consider these incidents unjustified, but others regard them as heroic. To illustrate, various radical Palestinian groups have sworn publicly to retaliate for the recent American hijacking of an Egyptian plane taking Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) terrorists, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) officials, and a number of Egyptian security guards and officials to Tunisia. The American action was in retaliation for the Palestinians' seizure of the Italian liner Achille Lauro, which was meant as a retaliation for the Israeli destruction of the PLO's headquarters in Tunisia, which in turn was intended to retaliate for a Palestinian terrorist action in Cyprus.

The ripples caused by any given incident never disappear, for each stone cast into the waters prompts someone else to cast another stone, keeping the waters permanently troubled. It therefore seems certain that the recent cycle of violence did not end with the capture of the Palestinians on the Egyptian plane; terrorism promises to continue indefinitely.

Less-publicized terrorist incidents also take their toll. On July 22, 1985, for instance, bombings at the oldest synagogue in Scandinavia and at a Northwest

Airlines office in Copenhagen, Denmark, wounded 27 persons. An organization calling itself the Islamic Holy War took the credit for the attack. Two months later, on September 23, 1985, three men boarded a yacht moored in a Cyprus harbor, staged a 10-hour seige, and killed three Israelis aboard the vessel. Scarcely a day goes by without some terrorist incident disturbing the peace of western Europe — and of the United States.

All the terrorist incidents mentioned earlier relate to the Arab-Israeli conflict, probably the most intractable current source of terrorism and counterterrorism. There are, however, many more sore spots, and a brief description of the principal terrorist actors currently operating in western Europe may help assess the likelihood of future terrorism in that part of the world.

Of the numerous non-Arab terrorist

“The ripples caused by any given incident never disappear, for each stone cast into the waters prompts someone else to cast another stone, keeping the waters permanently troubled.”

groups, the most dreaded is the Provisional Irish Republican Army, whose members are commonly called Provos. The group poses as the nemesis of British rule in Northern Ireland, but its broader, long-term objectives include establishing a Marxist state that would unite Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland under communist rule. For the past decade, the Provos have murdered, blackmailed, firebombed, and fought with local police and with the British Army.

The innocent bystander cannot escape merely by staying out of Northern Ireland, for the Provos have extended their terrorist campaign to England, periodically perpetrating bombings and murders there. It will surprise no one, in

fact, if the Provos eventually manage to assassinate the British prime minister or a member of the royal family. The Provos have close ties with other international terrorist groups, receiving support from the Soviet Union, its satellites, Arab terrorist groups, and even some American sources.

Many indigenous terrorist groups operate in western Europe, sometimes in cooperation with the Provos and the Palestinians. In Spain the most important of these groups is the extreme wing of the Basque nationalist movement. Since the Middle Ages, Basques living on the Spanish side of the French-Spanish border have regarded themselves as a conquered nation.

The terrorism-oriented Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (“Basques for Freedom for the Basque Homeland”) has gradually evolved into another Marxist group with international connections. Recent government concessions to Basque nationalist sensitivities — legalizing the Basque language and flag, offering certain amnesty measures, and bestowing certain political freedoms — have helped reduce terrorist actions by the Basques during the past few years. On the other hand, various less important regional and political groups are also responsible for continuing terrorism in Spain.

The principal sponsor of terrorism in West Germany is the Red Army Faction of the Baader-Meinhof Gang. Small in number, extremely left-wing in its views, and extensively tied to other international terrorist groups, the Faction has largely been kept under control by the German government. However, the Faction was part of the terrorist team that attacked an Israeli El Al jet plane with a rocket, and part of the group that assaulted the headquarters of the Organization of Oil Producing States in Vienna, Austria. German police periodically arrest or kill most of the organization's members, but it always regroups and strikes again. The Faction is much more likely than the Basques to attack American targets, and it has an affiliated branch in the Netherlands — the so-called Red Help Group. Perhaps as many as a dozen left- and right-wing terrorist groups operate in Italy. The



Mr. Buckelew heads Management Information Research, a San Francisco company specializing in anti-terrorism matters. This is based on his talk to the fall ROA co-sponsored Bay Area national security seminar and an article.

most destructive of these is known as the Red Brigades, a group responsible for, among other things, the abduction and murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, the kidnapping of US General James Dozier in 1981, the assassination of Leamon Hunt, director general of the Sinai Peacekeeping Forces in 1984, and the assassination of trade unionist and Christian Democrat economist Ezio Tarantelli in 1985.


The Brigades receives support from the Soviet Union, its satellites, and Arab terrorist groups, but its closest ties are with the Red Army Faction in West Germany. Like the Faction, they advocate the complete destruction of the existing national social order and its replacement by an extreme form of

briefly. Only Switzerland, with its efficient security forces and tolerance for all shades of political opinion, has escaped comparatively unscathed. Elsewhere, anyone at all can be window shopping, dining in a restaurant, or traveling by car, train, plane, or ship — and suddenly become a victim of terrorist attack.

Statistics maintained by the Rand Corporation show that, while terrorist incidents fluctuate in number year by year, the long-range trend is attributed solely to chance or better reporting techniques. The annual rate of increase in international terrorist incidents during the first three years of the current decade was on the order of 30 per cent, with 1985 another banner year.

beings. By the 1980s, about half of all such attacks had become directed against people. Terrorists have shifted from bombing empty offices to using car bombs killing large numbers of people. The fact that more and more civilian bystanders are dying provides additional evidence of the increasing callousness and barbarism of the terrorists. Over the past two decades, terrorism has expanded in scope and become immensely more dangerous.

As terrorism has become more widespread and bloodier, and as it has been directed ever more obviously against Americans and their interests, the anti-terrorist rhetoric of the United States has escalated. A National Security Council directive issued April 3, 1984,



The remains of American victims of terrorism arrive at McGuire Air Force Base, N.J. Official DoD photo.

Maoist (Chinese) communism. Although the Italian government has experienced some success recently in suppressing that nation's terrorist, the activities of the Red Brigades are continuing.

The steady increase in terrorist activity brings new groups on the scene in western Europe. The past year has witnessed attacks on NATO and other defense-related targets across northern Europe by groups such as France's Direct Action and Belgium's Fighting Communist Cells. These groups have formed a loose working alliance with each other and with West Germany's Red Army Faction. They are also believed to have links to Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, and Middle Eastern Terrorists. A Soviet connection is also possible, although Moscow may be encouraging the anti-NATO attacks only passively.

In western Europe, terrorism may erupt almost anywhere, at any time. Nations such as France formerly tried to escape the scourge of terrorism by providing safe havens for terrorists, but succeeded only in delaying that scourge

Americans have, moreover, increasingly become the targets of terrorism. Nearly two out of every five terrorist incidents now involve US citizens or property. In recent hijacking, American passengers have been singled out for the worst treatment. American victims have included military personnel, diplomats, businessmen, and ordinary tourists. The disproportionate number of American victims is explained by the unusual extent to which Americans serve and travel overseas and by the fact that they present excellent targets of opportunity.

For some of the terrorist groups most active in recent years, identifying the United States with the interests of Israel, Great Britain, or even the capitalist system in general provides a sufficient pretext for attacks on American targets. Furthermore, the chronic unwillingness or inability of the US government to retaliate effectively makes American targets particularly attractive to terrorists.

During the past two decades, terrorism has become progressively more lethal. In the early 1970s, 80 per cent of all terrorist attacks were directed against property and only 20 per cent against human

“Americans have, moreover, increasingly become the targets of terrorism. Nearly two out of every five terrorist incidents now involve US citizens or property. In recent hijacking, American passengers have been singled out for the worst treatment.”

ordered the US government to develop options for using military force against the instigators and perpetrators of terrorist attacks.

American actions have not, however, matched the nation's rhetoric, giving the United States the image of a paper tiger. Even when it knew who had instigated a particular act, the United States shrank from taking the promised action. The bombing of the American Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 was the deadliest single incident in the annals of international terrorism. There was very strong circumstantial evidence that a particular Shi'ite Muslim group supported by Iran and Syria was responsible for the slaughter.

Swift and effective retaliation is not, however, a solution to the problem of terrorism. As a matter of firm policy, for example, the Israelis never negotiate with terrorists and always retaliate immediately. Yet their policy has not curbed terrorist attacks against Israel and its citizens; it has instead resulted in repeated escalation of such attacks, culminating in a series of wars with surrounding Arab states. Israel remains in a technical state of war with most of its neighbors.

While the United States has great military capabilities, it appears incapable of bringing them to bear against terrorists, as much less powerful nations

such as Israel and France are able to do. During each terrorist incident involving Americans, reports circulate that the American Delta Force has been dispatched to the vicinity of such incidents, but the conditions for its use never seem to be quite right, and it has never actually been used.

In the meantime, the United States continues hardening its facilities in Europe and elsewhere. Security measures around official American establishments in Europe have been improved, but many American embassies and consulates remain vulnerable to resourceful terrorist attacks. Even if the security measures taken prove effective, they can only protect those Americans inside the newly created fortresses. Those leaving the fortresses to attend to their duties, and Americans traveling, living, or working in the nations of western Europe, remain targets for terrorist attack.

Is there any solution to this dismal state of affairs? No, there is none.

Most of the terrorism rampant in Europe and the Middle East today is supported by a number of governments, including those of Bulgaria, Syria, Iran, Libya, and Tunisia (which gives the terrorist PLO a safe haven), with possible additional support from the governments of Cuba and Nicaragua. The terrorist activities of these nations are, in turn, supported by the war of international communism against the United States and all other capitalist nations, by the relentless drive of the Soviet Union toward world hegemony, by the intense nationalism of Arab states, and by the fanaticism of Moslem fundamentalists.

The Soviet Union, in particular, is systematically supporting terrorist groups throughout the world as part of a strategic and utilitarian policy aimed at the United States and its western European supporters.

Why has the Soviet Union turned away from conventional warfare, replacing it to a large extent with terrorism conducted by its surrogates? Because technology has made conventional warfare too dangerous. Conflicts between even minor nations invariably involve the vital interests of a major regional power; the interests of regional powers in turn involve those of one or both superpowers; and a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union could end with nothing less than thermonuclear war.

According to one analysis, the Soviet

Union is sponsoring terrorism on a large scale not to cause a world revolution but to destabilize the West. The existence of a stable democratic, and prosperous West necessarily destabilizes the East bloc. Therefore, in order to stabilize its East, the Soviet Union must destabilize the West. According to another analysis, the Soviet Union tolerates, encourages, and supports terrorism on the part of its surrogates, exploiting low-intensity operations around the world, as a way of continuing the revolutionary process against the democratic pluralism of the Free World.

Terrorism is Moscow's indispensable tactical tool in its struggle for power and influence within and among nations. It

"The Soviet Union, in particular, is systematically supporting terrorist groups throughout the world as part of a strategic and utilitarian policy aimed at the United States and its western European supporters."

perceives small terrorist groups, supported by national states friendly to Moscow, as capable of conducting political warfare at the national level and eventually altering the international balance of power. Where conventional warfare is no longer an effective means of advancing international political interests, indirect means take over: terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and subversion.

Since the Soviet surrogate nations have unlimited numbers of terrorists at their disposal, capturing, imprisoning, and killing the perpetrators of specific acts of terrorism, and even destroying specific terrorist groups, can never diminish the volume of terrorism directed against the West. To defeat terrorism, it would be necessary to overthrow the governments of the states sponsoring terrorism. Since any attempt to do so would bring on a confrontation, one that would be unacceptable to either superpower, there is no way of curbing international terrorism.

The West can only intensify what it has been doing: spending increasing billions of dollars annually on improved security and increased protection for its citizens and civilian and military facilities; adopting special defensive measures for the protection of government officials and diplomats; creating commando units designed to fight terrorists and rescue hostages; and encouraging multinational

corporations to spend large sums of money protecting their investments and their executives and employees, including the families of those executives and employees.

These measures have failed up to now, and they will continue to fail, but there is nothing more effective the West can do, especially when most Third World nations are indifferent to the plight of the West. These nations envy and resent the United States for its wealth, culture, and power, and almost automatically side against the West on any issue dividing East and West.

The United States cannot, however, retreat back into Fortress America because of terrorist threats or attacks. This strategy would lead to more terrorism and would carry a higher economic, political, and strategic cost. Terrorism may, sooner or later, spread to the United States, but one must believe the nation will be capable of dealing effectively with international terrorism within its own borders, even if Americans should have to live a far more regimented existence than they do today.

Life in the West is certain to become grimmer in the future. Only an unforeseen collapse of communism, especially in the Soviet Union, could upset that prediction. □

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