

FRAME-UP IN MOSCOW



Head spy among the power elite: In fur hat, KGB boss Viktor Chebrikov reviews troops in Red Square

THE KGB'S NEW MUSCLE

■ Viktor Chebrikov is a bespectacled, heavy-jowled, 63-year-old Russian whose name hardly resonates outside his own country. Viktor Chebrikov also is one of the most powerful men in the Soviet Union—a tough-minded bureaucrat who runs what one Kremlinologist calls “a kingdom within a kingdom.” His empire, the KGB, runs an army of security-and-spy operations at home and abroad. Its success is a matter of some dispute: On the one hand, the KGB has managed one of the most damaging espionage coups against the U.S. in anyone's memory and has effectively undermined CIA spying efforts in the Soviet Union; on the other, its overseas operatives still blunder, often demonstrating how little they know about Western values. But one thing is certain: The agency's power is increasing dramatically.

The arrest of American journalist Nicholas Daniloff is the latest example of the KGB's growing clout within the Soviet leadership. But the signs of KGB resurgence are everywhere. Chebrikov, like Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, was a protégé of former Communist Party chief Yuri Andropov's, and he



now sits as a full member of the ruling Politburo; Moscow's Defense Minister, in contrast, is only a candidate member. The KGB in recent years has defied an international outcry and crushed the “refusenik” and dissident movements, jailing many of the Jews who seek to emigrate and sending into internal exile Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov.

More important, a spate of tough new laws has bolstered the KGB's control over Soviet citizenry. It is now a crime, for instance, to put up foreigners overnight—or even give them a ride in a car. A vague but harsh new ban on passing “official secrets” to a foreigner can bar discussing virtually anything about a Soviet citizen's work. And a 1983 statute gives labor-camp commandants the power to extend the sentences of prison-

ers—the punishment most feared by those serving time in the *gulag*.

Abroad, the KGB has unleashed a whirlwind of spy recruitment and technology theft. The organization's increasingly brazen style outside the Soviet Union has triggered a rash of new spy cases and a soaring rate of expulsions of overseas Soviets accused of being KGB agents—135 in 1983 alone.

The KGB—its acronym stands for *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*, the Committee of State Security—has more than half a million staff members and agents, and its tentacles reach into every corner of Soviet life. The shadowy organization is showing more muscle at home and abroad than at any time since the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953.

It is in the Soviet political arena that the KGB's influence is most apparent—which probably explains the organization's ability to have its way in arresting Daniloff, no matter what the diplomatic repercussions. Chebrikov was selected to give the keynote speech at last year's anniversary of the October Revolution and also spoke to the Party Congress last March—both unprecedented honors for a KGB boss. Instead

of repeating the usual assurances that the KGB would observe legality and party control, he spoke forcefully of clamping down on corruption. "It was a terribly threatening and aggressive speech, a way for the KGB to say to the party, 'We're going to have an influential role,'" declares Amy Knight, a Capitol Hill expert on the KGB.

Some analysts think the Daniloff affair may be the KGB's way of reminding Gorbachev of its independence. Other experts believe the KGB is in fact Gorbachev's chief ally in his efforts to shake up the party structure and achieve economic reform. Even as he consolidates his position as party leader, he needs the KGB in his battles against alcoholism, corruption and social decay. Meanwhile, he can court the loyalty of other elements in the Soviet power structure: The military, party apparatchiks, technocrats and intellectuals. "He may not agree with every idea the KGB produces, but he is married to the KGB if he wants to bring his own perception of order to the country," says Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB major who defected to the West in 1979.

Tradition of terror

Such reliance on a secret police is not a Communist invention. Russia's Czars institutionalized clandestine coercive methods more than a century ago to retain their grip on an oppressed society and, later, to fight the revolutionaries who eventually overthrew them. But 1917 didn't bring an end to the Czar's secret-police network: His successors simply adapted it to their own objectives. The czarist Okhrana was reborn as Lenin's Cheka, later called the GPU, which turned into the OGPU, followed by the NKVD and the MGB.


It was Stalin who brought the secret police horrifyingly into the modern era, expanding its power and using it as a tool of mass terror in which millions perished. Inevitably, the terror force became a potent political force as well—so much so that, after Stalin died in 1953, secret-police chief Lavrenti Beria cordoned Moscow with tanks and maneuvered for supreme power. He lost out to rivals, who later ordered his execution.

In the aftermath, state security was reorganized as the KGB—and defanged. Nikita Khrushchev, the next Soviet leader, further weakened the agency during a decade of de-Stalinization. Rehabilitation of the KGB began when Yuri Andropov took it over in 1967 during Leonid Brezhnev's reign. Andropov upgraded the quality of the agency's personnel and administration, forced it back into the framework of law, eased strong-arm thuggery and

beefed up modern means of information gathering. The KGB began shedding its coarse image as bully boys in baggy suits. With the inducements of salary, privilege and the opportunity for a bit of the good life abroad, today's KGB agents, especially those stationed overseas, are often urbane, well educated, socially adept—and the children of prominent party members.

Andropov became the first KGB boss since Beria to be appointed to the Politburo. Then, after 15 years as the country's chief spy, Andropov in 1982 was able to accomplish politically what Beria had failed to do with tanks: Make himself party chief and national leader.

In its contemporary form, the KGB is a gargantuan bureaucracy with a structure more like that of the Pentagon than the CIA. It embraces all the duties performed in the U.S. by the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, Coast Guard, National Security Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service—and has many divisions of elite troops as well.



Lubyanka prison on Dzerzhinski Square housed

SCOTT THOMAS—USNS/WFR



SPY RECRUITMENT—The KGB's global espionage effort included a code-breaking U.S. spy ring run by former naval officer John Walker



ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE—KGB listening devices decorate Soviet Embassy rooftops around the world. In Washington, antennas are aimed at the State Department and CIA

The KGB is headquartered in the Lubyanka building on Dzerzhinski Square in central Moscow—an edifice charged with infamy as the site of executions in the Stalinist purges. The agency has major branches in all 15 Soviet republics.


With an annual budget of \$6 billion to \$12 billion, the KGB employs 90,000 career officers supported by 150,000 technical and clerical workers. An elite, 250,000-member uniformed KGB force patrols the country's 40,000-mile-long frontiers with its own fleets of helicopters, armored vehicles and patrol boats. The KGB also runs think tanks specializing in such varied fields as computer sciences and parapsychology. It investigates major crimes, runs a vast prison system and manages a captive labor force. Even the passport-control officers

greeting foreigners arriving in the Soviet Union are KGB members.

Organizationally, the KGB is a labyrinth of ominous-sounding directorates and services. The eight men who pounced on journalist Daniloff were agents of the Second Directorate—the huge apparatus of domestic repression that employs 70,000 to 100,000 and touches the life of each Soviet citizen. Its army of informers reaches into every apartment building, office, factory and school and is backed by a sophisticated system of electronic surveillance.

Duties of the Fifth Directorate overlap the Second. Dealing with dissidence and political crime, it was the Fifth Directorate that subjected Sakharov, the nuclear physicist and dissenter now exiled in the closed city of Gorky, to

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Stalin's terror police—now it's KGB central

where the Soviet Consulate closely monitors developments in Northern California's Silicon Valley. KGB members are also salted into the staffs of Aeroflot Airline offices, trade delegations and Soviet news organizations. One expert estimates that fully half of all accredited Soviet reporters abroad are KGB agents—which makes it hard for the Soviets to believe Western newsmen are not also spies.

It was the First Directorate that presumably oversaw the work of Gennadi Zakharov, the U.N.-based Soviet scientist arrested in New York on August 23 while making an alleged \$1,000 payment for classified documents on a U.S. jet engine. The First Directorate also recruits Soviet citizens to serve as "illegals," agents who assume fictitious foreign identities—sometimes concocted from the records of deceased persons—to melt into the society on which they will spy.

For this duty, the KGB's Directorate S prefers young couples who are trained

the most serious security breach in U.S. history. One illegal posing as a legitimate immigrant, Svetlana Ogorodnikova, recruited her lover, FBI agent Richard Miller, to obtain classified documents. He was sentenced to two life terms plus 50 years last July.

T for technology

But the rising star of the foreign-espionage department is Directorate T, charged with scientific intelligence—gathering foreign technology by legal or illegal means. Technology theft has displaced political and conventional military espionage as the No. 1 goal overseas. "Gaining access to our advanced technology continues to be their top priority," says CIA Director William Casey.

Without Western technology, the Soviet Union would fall even further behind in weapons development, computer science and space exploration. Soviet spy successes have yielded designs for the NATO Leopard tank, the joint European Tornado jet fighter and, some officials say, plans for the U.S. space shuttle, the Soviet version of which will be a carbon copy. "Soviet scientific collection orders have targeted dozens of American firms and over 60 universities," reports a CIA study prepared last fall. The prime targets: Most major aerospace companies—all likely to be involved in research for President Reagan's Star Wars Strategic Defense Initiative.

It is not only in the U.S. that high tech is pursued. Former West German intelligence chief Heribert Hellenbroich contends that the KGB has sharpened its focus on Europe so much that "industrial espionage has taken an overwhelming role." In France, the man fingered by security forces as the KGB's station chief, Vladislav Nitchkov, works undercover as the embassy's science-and-technology counselor, giving him entree into academic and industrial circles. The leaking of a dossier detailing Soviet technological espionage led to the expulsion of 47 KGB agents from Paris in 1983.

In Japan, called a "spy paradise" because the outright purchase of technology seems so easy, half of the estimated 40 agents in the Soviet Embassy are thought to focus on stealing semiconductor blueprints, optical-fiber information and the latest research into ceramics.

In the U.S., the KGB is equally skillful at exploiting an open society. It legally gathers information about the economy, public utilities, agriculture and politics—as well as about individual citizens. The FBI, which oversees counterintelligence, estimates that 90 percent of the KGB's intelligence comes from open sources, beginning with each day's *New York Times* and

If necessary, the United States would undertake to dispel any anxiety in connection with Spain's new role which may arise on the one hand, for the Mediterranean powers, and, on the other, for the part of the over-sensitive North African states with reference to Spanish territories in Africa and the Canary Islands.

I hope this message will strengthen Your Majesty's belief that Spain will benefit immensely by joining NATO. Such an act would enable Spain to once again assume the place she merits among the major World Powers. I urge Your Majesty to act with dispatch to remove the forces obstructing Spain's entry into the NATO.

Yours truly,

Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan

DISINFORMATION—KGB forgery aims to stir up trouble between allies. A 1981 letter allegedly from President Reagan to Spain's King Juan Carlos suggested blatant U.S. interference in Spanish affairs. Distributed to European diplomats and journalists, the letter was quickly exposed as a hoax

months of brutal treatment that nearly cost him his life.

Other directorates control other parts of the population. The Third handles surveillance of the Soviet military, the Seventh watches all major embassies in Moscow, the Eighth develops cryptographic systems for codes and code breaking, and the Ninth guards party leaders.

But to Westerners, the KGB means spies. And it is the First Directorate, with its many services and subdirectorates, that manages KGB operations abroad. Some 10,000 officers are involved in foreign activities, 2,500 of them stationed overseas. About 500 are believed to be in the U.S., most under cover of diplomatic postings in New York, Washington and San Francisco,

intensively for several years to shed their Russian accents and become familiar with the sports, movies and music of their target countries. "They can play golf and drink Scotch, and they are very, very patient," says an FBI agent who has conducted surveillance on KGB agents in New York and Washington. "They know they can wait." Directorate S also has responsibility for sabotage and assassinations—called "wet jobs"—as well as terrorist training at its Balashikha complex 15 miles outside of Moscow.

The same directorate recruits Americans for spying. The John Walker-Jerry Whitworth spy ring, exposed in 1985, netted the Soviets 1 million documents on U.S. naval codes and submarine operations, according to the FBI. It was

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Washington Post. Soviet agents comb the Library of Congress, subscribe to hundreds of technical magazines and go to high-tech trade shows. In late August, a visitor appeared at a booth at the American Political Science Association convention in Washington, D.C., and ordered a \$50 book entitled *U.S.-R.O.K. Combined Operations: A Korean Perspective*. The unclassified volume contains a detailed analysis of potential military threats to troops in South Korea. The name on the order form: Vladimir O. Rakhmanin, third secretary, Soviet Embassy.

Dealing in disinformation

The KGB has also stepped up what are called "active measures" in recent years. These include organizing demonstrations, establishing front organizations, fostering ill will with forged letters and articles and other types of disinformation. CIA Deputy Director Robert Gates estimated last year that the Soviets spend \$3 to \$4 billion annually on these sorts of overt and covert activities. In the late 1970s, for example, Moscow launched a campaign to whip up opposition in Europe to U.S. plans for a neutron bomb; President Carter subsequently shelved the project.

A number of Soviet forgeries and false news stories have been exposed in recent years, often because of clumsy execution. An article alleging U.S. complicity in spreading the AIDS virus to Third World nations was "reprinted" in the Soviet literary magazine *Literaturnaya Gazeta* before the KGB remembered to plant it in India's *New Delhi Patriot*.

Days after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, several reporters received copies of a letter supposedly from a high U.S. Information Agency official to Senator David Durenberger (R.-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It boldly recommended that Durenberger exploit the disaster for propaganda by spreading exaggerated claims of death and damage—an evident attempt to discredit the USIA official. Reporters called U.S. officials, who termed the letter a Soviet-inspired fake.

Heavy-handedness still underlies the smooth veneer of the new KGB, as correspondent Daniloff himself noted in his last dispatch on the KGB three months before his arrest: "KGB agents are, at least initially, polite and correct. However, they are not above planting evidence or organizing entrapments to get their man." ■

by Peter Ross Range with Miriam Horn, Charles Fenyvesi, Steven Emerson, David Whitman, Dennis Mullin and James M. Hildreth in Washington and reports from the magazine's foreign bureaus