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# WAR

## BY ANOTHER NAME

**T**he most divisive and controversial part of American foreign policy for nearly four decades has been our effort in the Third World to preserve and defend pro-Western governments, to resist Communist aggression and subversion, and to promote economic development and democracy.

Our continuing difficulty in formulating a coherent and sustainable bipartisan strategy for the Third World over two generations contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union's relentless effort there to eliminate Western influence, to establish strategically located client Communist states, and to gain access to strategic resources.

But while we may debate strategy and how to respond, the facts of Soviet involvement in major Third World conflicts are undeniable. Consider two very painful memories:

- It is clear that the Soviet Union, and Josef Stalin personally, played a central role in prompting North Korea's invasion of the South in 1950, the cause of our first great postwar debate over strategy in the Third World.

- Although the strategic consequences of a victory by North Vietnam were hotly debated in the United States, we now see the Soviet navy well-entrenched in the great naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, and Vietnam's economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union: we recall the Soviet military supply line that made Hanoi's victory possible, and remember Soviet help in the conquest of Laos and Cambodia. The resulting human suffering in Southeast Asia was even more horrifying than predicted.

Somehow, many Americans thought their first loss of a major foreign war — Vietnam — would have no important consequences, especially as it was accompanied by

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so-called "detente" with the Soviet Union and the opening to China. Yet, it was in fact a major watershed in post-World War II history, especially as it coincided with the collapse of Portugal's colonial empire in Africa, revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, and congressional actions in the mid-1970s cutting off all U.S. assistance to the non-Communist forces in Angola, thus signaling the withdrawal of American support for opponents of Marxist-Leninist forces in the Third World.

The effects of American defeat in Vietnam, the revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, and the coming to power of bitterly antagonistic and aggressively destabilizing governments in all three countries undermined the confidence of U.S. friends and allies in the Third World (not to mention in Europe and Japan) and ensured that an opportunistic Soviet Union would see in the Third World its principal foreign-policy opportunities for years to come.

And they moved aggressively to create or exploit such opportunities. Throughout the Third World, the So-

viet Union and its clients for the past 10 years have incited violence and disorder and sponsored subversion of neutral or pro-Western governments in El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, various Caribbean states, Chad, Sudan, Suriname, North Yemen, Oman, Pakistan, New Caledonia, South Korea, Grenada, and many others.

**T**he Soviet Union has affixed itself as a parasite to legitimate nationalist, anti-colonial movements or to those who have overthrown repressive or incompetent regimes and tried wherever possible to convert or consolidate them into Marxist-Leninist dictatorships, as in Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. And now, these same regimes, in the process of consolidating power, are fighting their own people.

Open warfare by invading Communist armies is being waged in Cambodia and Afghanistan. And in most instances of state support for terrorism, the government involved is tied in some way to the U.S.S.R.

These contemporary challenges to international order and stability — and to democratic values — certainly grow primarily out of localized and specific circumstances. To be sure, there are local economic, social, racial, human-rights, and other injustices. And many — too

many — governments have demonstrated their capacity to inflict hardship and violence on their own people. But, that said, we cannot close our eyes to a common theme across the entire Third World, and that is the pervasively destructive role of the Soviet Union and its clients.

In 1919, Leon Trotsky said, "The road to London and Paris lies through Calcutta." This conviction that the West could more easily and effectively be weakened and made vulnerable through the Third World than by direct confrontation remains central to Soviet foreign policy. And if you question how critical this is for Moscow, remember that the Soviets allowed detente with the United States, which was highly advantageous to them, to founder substantially with successive presidents in the 1970s because the U.S.S.R. refused to moderate its aggressive pursuit of Third World opportunities — in Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan.

In the mid-1970s, the new Soviet tactics in the Third World, combined with historic events and opportunities, emerged to challenge Western presence, progress toward democracy, and sound economic development in the Third World.

The new tactics were designed to minimize the chance of a repetition of disastrous setbacks such as their expulsion from Egypt in 1972 and the ouster of a Marxist regime in Chile in 1973. The strategy has five parts:

First, the cornerstone of the new Soviet approach was the use of Cuban forces to establish and sustain the power of "revolutionary governments." They first helped consolidate radical power in Angola. This was followed by the dispatch of thousands of Cuban troops to Ethiopia, where that regime also became dependent on their support.

This tactic of using Third World Communist or radical states as surrogates in the Third World subsequently involved assisting Vietnam's conquest of the remainder of Indochina; Libya's designs in Chad and plotting against Sudan; South Yemen's aggression against Oman and North Yemen; and Cuba's support of regimes in Nicaragua, Grenada, and Suriname, as well as the insurgency in El Salvador.

Second, when radical governments came to power without the aid of foreign troops, as in Nicaragua, Soviets directly or through surrogates such as East Germany helped in the establishment of an internal security structure to ensure that any possible challenge from within would be stamped out.

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supplement these tactics with more traditional offerings such as technical and political training in the U.S.S.R., the rapid supply of weapons, and the use of a wide range of

covert actions to support friends and to help defeat or destabilize unfriendly challengers or governments.

Fourth, the U.S.S.R. proved in Afghanistan that it would still be willing to launch its own forces at targets on its periphery — and perhaps elsewhere — when and if circumstances were right.

Fifth, and finally, the Soviets advised new radical regimes to mute their revolutionary rhetoric and to try to keep their links to Western commercial resources, foreign assistance, and international financial institutions. Soviet ambitions did not cloud their recognition that they could not afford more economic dependents such as Cuba and Vietnam.

**S**oviet support for the radical regimes it has helped establish has been sustained. The Soviets and their East European allies have provided military and economic assistance to Nicaragua over the past five years approaching \$2.5 billion. Compare this with the highly controversial \$100 million American program to assist the resistance in that country. The Soviets have provided a full range of military weapons and support and also have become Nicaragua's major source of economic aid.

In Angola, total Communist military and economic assistance now stands at almost \$3.5 billion, most of it since 1984. Almost all of that assistance is military.

It is in Afghanistan, however, that the full measure of Soviet ambitions in the Third World can be taken most clearly. More than 100,000 Soviet troops are in Afghanistan, with more than a million troops having served. The cost to Afghanistan has been high. Some 4 million people, more than a quarter of the population, have had to flee their country. Thousands of children are being sent to the Soviet Union for education and ideological training.

**Y**et, after seven years, the Soviets are still unable to create a regime that can gain public support — and, in fact, just last week dumped Babrak Karmal, whom they brought in from exile in Moscow after the KGB assassinated his predecessor.

The Soviets' aggressive strategy in the Third World has, in my view, four ultimate targets — first, the oil fields of the Middle East, which are

second, the Isthmus and Canal of Panama between North and South America; and, third, the mineral wealth of Southern Africa.

The fourth target is the West itself — to use conflict in the Third World to exploit divisions in the Alliance and to try to recreate the internal divisions caused by Vietnam in order to weaken the Western response and provoke disagreement over larger national security and defense policies.

Let me now turn to terrorism. Terrorism, including state-supported terrorism, is not a new phenomenon. Unhappily, it is a familiar fact of life in the internal affairs of too many countries — as well as in nearly all wars. And when it becomes the primary means of waging war for smaller states, it becomes a real danger.

Let there be no mistake or ambiguity about it: the Soviet Union supports terrorism. It has directly and indirectly trained, funded, armed, and even operationally assisted terrorist organizations such as Fatah, Abu Nidal, and others. Nearly every terrorist group in the Middle East has links to the U.S.S.R. or one of its clients.

It is this umbrella of Soviet support, and the associated role of Soviet clients such as Syria, Libya, Vietnam, and Nicaragua that allows large-scale terrorist operations to continue. And, finally, in addition to their support of these groups, the Soviets refuse to play any role in international efforts to curtail terrorism.

What is to be done?

As we reflect on the last 40 years of war, subversion, instability, and terrorism in the Third World, it is clear that the Soviet Union and its surrogates have played and are continuing to play a major role. Their involvement is a common feature, as is their ability to sustain their participation relentlessly over many years.

It is imperative that, at long last, Americans recognize the strategic significance of the Soviet offensive — that it is in reality a war, a war waged between nations and against Western influence and presence, against economic development, and against the growth of democratic values. It is war without declaration, without mobilization, without massive armies.

It is, in fact, that long twilight war described nearly a quarter of a century ago by President John F. Kennedy.

What are we to do?

From Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan, our presidents have recognized the importance of this struggle in the Third World — some

sooner than others. But public and congressional understanding and support have waxed and waned.

What we need is a vigorous strategy we can sustain in a struggle Secretary of State George Shultz has said is "the prime challenge we will face, at least through the remainder of this century." I would like to suggest several steps, none of them new, and many of them in train now, that should be integrated into a strategy to meet the long-term Soviet challenge and promote democracy and freedom in the Third World.

1. First, Congress and the Executive Branch, Republicans and Democrats, must collaborate more closely in the setting of strategy. There seems to be more agreement on the nature of the threat than on what to do about it. Cooperation and support in recent years has been good in some areas; not so good in others.

2. Second, more must be done to educate the public, the Congress, and Third World governments about Soviet strategy in the Third World. A continuing information program to inform and tie together developments in areas widely distant is needed and must be pursued over a long term.

3. We must, as a country, give priority to learning more about developments in the Third World and to providing early warning of economic, social, and political problems that foreshadow instability and opportunities for exploitation by the U.S.S.R. or its clients.

4. The United States must establish priorities in terms of major commitments. If our early help fails to prevent serious trouble, for which countries are we prepared to put our chips on the table? Also, I believe we should at least try to make such choices in consultation with key members of Congress so that their support at crucial moments is more likely.

5. We must be — and are — prepared to demand firmly, but tactfully and privately, that our friends observe certain standards of behavior with regard to basic human rights. It is required by our own principles and essential to political support in the United States. We have a right and responsibility to condition our support — but must do so in ways that make it possible politically for the recipient to comply.

6. We need to change our approach to foreign military sales so that the United States can provide arms more quickly to our friends in need — provide them the tools to do the job — and to do so without hanging out all the dirty linen for the world to see.

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7. Covert action can be used, as in the past, to create problems for hostile governments, and to provide discreet help to friendly organizations and governments. Indeed, at times it may be the only means we have to help them.

8. We must be prepared to use overt military forces where circumstances are appropriate, as in Grenada and Libya.

9. We must find a way to mobilize and use our greatest asset in the Third World — private business. No one in the Third World wants to adopt the Soviet economic system.

Neither we nor the Soviets can offer unlimited or even large-scale economic assistance to the Third World. Investment is the key to economic success or at least survival in the Third World and we, our NATO allies, and Japan need to develop a common strategy to promote investment in the Third World. The Soviets are helpless to compete with private capital in these countries.

10. Finally, we need to have a strategy supported with consistency through more than one presidency. This administration and Congress in recent years have gone further than any of their predecessors in developing and sustaining a coherent strategy. But more must be done, and it must endure.

We are engaged in a historic struggle with the Soviet Union, a struggle between age-old tyranny — to use an old-fashioned word — and the concept that the highest goal of the state is to protect and foster the creative capabilities and liberties of the individual. The battle lines are most sharply drawn in the Third World. We have enormous assets and advantages in this struggle. We offer an economic model based on private enterprise for long-term development, independence, stability, and prosperity. We offer a model of freedom and democratic ideals; we offer religious tolerance and spiritual values; and we have democratic allies willing to help.

In contrast, the Soviet Union offers a model police state, a new form of colonial subservience, the morality of the gun, and the austerity of totalitarian socialism.

The East-West struggle to influence the future of the Third World is a classic confrontation of the Soviet capacity to destroy arrayed against the democratic nations' capacity to build.

Americans cannot and must not be indifferent to the outcome.

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## Openness, Changed Environment To Shape Intelligence of Future

Ten trends seen today will dominate intelligence to the end of the century, according to Robert Gates, Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA. As a panelist addressing "The Future of the Intelligence Community," Gates noted that many of the trends are already established, while others are linked to technological development certain to come.

He described the coming revolution in which intelligence will be communicated to policy makers' desks electronically, resulting in promptness, greater interaction between the policymaker and the producer and having significant security advantages. Gates noted also that intelligence data is becoming harder and harder to collect as camouflage, denial, and the inhibiting reaction to unauthorized disclosures force us to seek other collection means for that once available openly. Recruitment of personnel is also becoming more difficult, he said, because the number of people who can meet security standards and pass polygraph screening is declining, resulting in the need for a greater pool of applicants at initial stages. Also influencing recruitment, Gates said, is that government service is becoming less attractive.

There has been a revolution as well, he explained, in the role of intelligence in regard to Congress. Not only is the flow of intelligence information to Congress as heavy as that to the Executive Branch, but the large number of staff on the Hill makes the Congress better prepared to ask questions than the Executive Branch entities receiving the same information. There has also been an increased use of intelligence by the Executive Branch for public education, a tribute to the accuracy and integrity with which the American people view such reporting. In the international arena, Gates indicated, there has been a growing use of intelligence to convince our allies, and certain nations beyond traditional allies, of the rectitude of U.S. policies.

Another challenge has been the dramatic increase in the diversity of the subjects intelligence must now address, far from those early days when the focus was limited to potential adversaries. Today, for example, the Community must serve requirements dealing with nuclear proliferation, international narcotics, foreign technological development, human rights, technology transfer, population, religion and the like. Similarly, there has been an immense growth in the diversity of the users or consumers of intelligence. Gates observed that intelligence in the past decade has become steadily more central to national decision making, noting that in some cases there might not be a national policy without the contributions of the Intelligence Community. He also suggested that it often appears the Intelligence Community is the only part of the government looking to the future; as one sees the withering of long range planning in other agencies. He noted one problem stemming from such progress: the policy maker is faced with addressing future problems when costs are low, yet receives no benefit from doing so. The rewards of such efforts will be seen only by his or her successors.