

Remarks at Association of Former Intelligence Officers

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Director of Central Intelligence

Arlington, Virginia

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Thank you very much, Walter.* It's great to be here and see such a tremendous group that means so much to us in supporting what we're doing today. I'm particularly pleased that you took time to mention Justice Powell's honorary board membership. We've been great friends. Some of you may not know that because of his background in ULTRA and in intelligence I selected him to administer the oath of office when I was making my move from the FBI to the Central Intelligence Agency. He wrote me a letter and said that being DCI was the only job that he had ever really aspired to. I offered to trade, but it was a little late.

I was here in 1986, three years ago, wearing another hat. A great deal has happened since that time. But it's nice to look out and see Ray Wannall and Ed O'Malley and to realize that the FBI is very much a player in AFIO, just as it is in the Intelligence Community. Later, perhaps, I can talk a little bit about what we are doing in the Intelligence Community together—not just CIA and FBI, but NSA and DIA and all the military services.

During these last two years, I have traveled more than I anticipated, and I have spoken with many groups around this country and overseas—from academic forums to congressional committees to groups inside the bubbles in embassies around the world—but I am especially pleased to be here today. This group, I know, understands as I have come to understand the special privilege and the special satisfaction of serving in intelligence. And you, of all others, understand that what we need to produce good intelligence is a clear mission, talented people, sufficient resources, and the ability to protect our sources and our methods. I'd like to talk to you this afternoon about what we've been doing and why we've been doing it, and why, in spite of the occasional slings and arrows of outrageous publicity, more people than ever before are interested in intelligence work.

Before I do that, however, I'd like to take this opportunity to say just a few words about [redacted] who has contributed so much to intelligence and to AFIO over the years. [redacted] couldn't be with us today—I understand he's in Europe—but I'm sure he wouldn't mind my reading you a letter that I have sent to him.

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I told [redacted] "I would like to express my great appreciation for the exceptional support you have given to the intelligence profession during your eight and a half years as Executive Director of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

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* Walter Pforzheimer, Chairman, Board of Directors, Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

"In your dealings with the media, the Congress, and the public, you have done much to promote understanding and support of the Intelligence Community and our vital mission. I would like to especially recognize your instrumental role in managing AFIO's Academic Assistance Program. This program is proving very successful in helping to educate our nation's youth on the role and functions of intelligence. The relationships that AFIO is establishing with college professors around the nation also help the academic community to appreciate how much the Intelligence Community can benefit from their expertise, ideas, and perspectives on the issues we face.

"I commend you for your dedication, your professionalism, and your patriotism in almost 38 years of service to and support of intelligence. Please accept my best wishes for your future success."

I wanted to read that to you because I wanted to congratulate personally for all that he has done for intelligence and for AFIO. And I'd like to congratulate the new Executive Director, Dave Whipple, who I'm confident will build on leadership and accomplishments.

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
I promised earlier to tell you some of what we've been doing. And I want you to know that I deeply appreciate your strong interest in keeping up with what's happened in intelligence since the time you wrote the reports and sent the cables.

You have to be aware that while our mission has not changed, the number of people who scrutinize what we do and how we do it has grown substantially. Earlier in the luncheon, I was talking to Walter, who was telling me about his DCI saying that there wasn't enough to do with congressional affairs, and so he was also making him Assistant General Counsel, reporting to Larry as well. I recall that Dick Helms told me—and I think it is in our figures—that CIA then gave 175 congressional briefings on average a year. Many of you may remember when only a few classified papers went from the Agency or the Bureau or the Pentagon to either house of Congress. You may also recall that classified briefings to congressional committees were given only by the most senior officials. Today a number of congressional committees closely examine the Intelligence Community's activities, and the number of individuals who see classified material far exceeds the restricted number of the past. We gave over 1,000 briefings last year. In my view, that's probably too many, for it increases the number of people who are required to provide this information—some of them younger and not as prepared to take the heat that comes with this kind of responsibility.

Our relations with Congress have always involved balancing the need for a candid relationship with the need to protect intelligence sources and methods. It's my firm view that truth builds trust. But there are many things that we simply cannot safely discuss in large forums of staffers and committee members. And we

have had to work these problems out. Under the current guidelines, when briefing Congress, an officer who feels uncertain about answering a particular question is instructed not to go around it, but to simply say: "I'm not authorized to answer that question, but I'll take it up at headquarters." And I think this approach is working. I've got some beautiful bruises and I've had a few battles, not all of which I've won, but we have managed to protect our sources and our methods in this way. And I think we are building a relationship that is built upon trust, knowing that what we provide, we provide carefully and truthfully. And we work with the committee chairman and vice chairman in trying to limit those things that should only be shared with a very few people, often only the chairman and vice chairman themselves.

Another area that commands enormous press attention is the use of covert action. I want you to know that I support covert action. I believe it is extremely important for us to have this capability to help implement our nation's foreign policy in those areas where overt action simply will not work. And I have consistently conveyed my support for this to the Congress and to others who are interested. I think it's important for us to have a managed covert action, so that we can defend what we do and demonstrate that it was done with the approval of the policymakers of the country, including the President, after careful consideration on our part, and that we should not be accused of being loose cannons, for we are actually a very vital part of our nation's foreign policy.



These, of course, are some of our bread-and-butter issues and my views of how they are changing. The changing requirements of congressional oversight, the continued importance of protecting sources and methods, and the continuing need for covert action are probably no surprise to you.

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I'd like to spend a little time looking at several other current issues where we do see some change. There has been a dramatic increase in the number and diversity of subjects the Intelligence Community is now required to address, the number of consumers who use our product, and the resources we need to provide what is asked of us.

Much of our effort is still focused on the Soviet Union—I recall there were days when over 85 percent of our resources were on the Soviet target—and that focus is not likely to change. Yet we are also spending more time and resources collecting information on Third World nations. A major issue that we're addressing at the present time is the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the spread of ballistic missiles—an emerging problem in the Third World made more complicated by the potential for combining ballistic missiles with chemical and biological warheads. The spread of such weapons and sophisticated delivery systems is a very real threat to regional security and, indeed, to global security.

Intelligence gathered on the Third World now has an impact that extends beyond the borders of a single region, and it calls for knowledge and understanding that transcends a single discipline. Thus, it will not surprise you that we are interested in both the political and the economic stability of countries in all regions of the world. We are also concentrating on interdisciplinary problems such as international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, technology transfer, and hostile intelligence activities.

Interagency efforts have become and will continue to be increasingly important. In addition to the work being done by the Intelligence Community staff and the interagency working groups, I have supported and established a number of centers to coordinate our efforts in key areas. It simply is required today. Centers in counterterrorism and counterintelligence pull together analysis and operations and have produced impressive results.

During the past four years there have been nearly 300 cases in which some form of counterterrorist actions—efforts to prevent terrorism, notifications of threats, and so on—were taken on the basis of intelligence information disseminated by the Intelligence Community. Now we can't say that in all those cases the information we provided or the measures we took were solely responsible for the preventions, but they clearly had a role and that's important to us. The investigation of the explosion on Pan Am 103 is another example of how the Counterterrorist Center is working with other components of the law enforcement and intelligence communities. I think they are doing an exceptional job of reconstructing the cause and the nature of the explosion and pulling together the information that points to who may be responsible.

One of the concerns that I have, frankly, is that policymakers may become impatient with the process and begin to make open statements about those believed to be responsible without having considered the implications of such accusations on our foreign policy and how we will proceed from such conclusions.

Last April, I established a Counterintelligence Center to improve the effectiveness of counterintelligence activities within both the CIA and the Intelligence Community. The Center works to protect our foreign operations and the security of our components against penetration by foreign security or intelligence services. This is a matter of great concern both for us and for Congress, and I believe that we have gotten out in front of the curve on this. I recently talked about these issues with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and I pointed out that despite the political and economic changes under way in the Soviet Union, we have no evidence that the force of their intelligence effort has abated. If anything, it has increased, although it appears to be taking a less visibly confrontational form.

In counternarcotics, we have seen a bit of the future and have even watched it arrive. And again, in an effort to be out in front of the curve, and to be ready to assist Bill Bennett, we have established a Counternarcotics Center to better integrate our intelligence efforts. You may not have known that more than 30 government agencies are involved in our national program to fight drugs and the Intelligence Community provides information to well over half of them. It's been a disorganized effort within CIA; important and valuable work was being done by the various directorates, but without any real coordination or any real sense of thrust, because narcotics had not been thought to be a central part of our mission. But with the 1988 elections, in which both political parties made narcotics perhaps the most important and central issue, it was clear that the Intelligence Community would have to reassess the priority that it was giving to the issue and consider a more coordinated and effective way of operating. I have met with Bill Bennett and talked with him a number of times, and I am confident that the Intelligence Community will continue to have a role—and have an even more prominent role—in this effort. Many problems face us in this area. The use of intelligence in law enforcement efforts is fraught with certain kinds of problems. The use of intelligence as evidence creates problems in protecting our sources and our methods. And I think we have to make an important effort not to allow the Intelligence Community's limited resources to be consumed by producing mere tactical evidence—intelligence that can be supplied by others who are assigned to such work. We can, of course, through our computer spinoffs, direct tactical intelligence as we get it, and that is useful. But basically, our mission must be the broader role of intelligence—identifying sources with information on fields, crop growth, major players in the drug enforcement effort, money laundering, and worthy intelligence of that kind—rather than giving an increasing share of our

resources to the purely tactical effort. That's going to be a matter of discussion. I wanted to talk about it with Bill Bennett and try to get him on board before he began to use his bully pulpit, which I want him to do, but not about us.

Coordinated effort continues to be key to the production of our National Intelligence Estimates. Here we make sure that the entire Intelligence Community is represented—NSA, CIA, DIA, and all the contributing members. This process of give and take, which many of you no doubt remember, still assures us that we are giving policymakers our best assessment. Careful analysis and coordination is our best protection from being accused of "cooking the books," both now and in the future. And we have changed some of the process so that even the greatest cynics cannot assume that anyone, particularly myself, is manipulating it to achieve a personal policymaking end.

While I cannot tell you, in this forum, the number of people who receive our publications, I can tell you that the number reflects a very substantial increase in the demand for intelligence.

And the increased demand for intelligence mirrors the Intelligence Community's increased need for resources. While we have developed sophisticated technical collection systems that provide more and better data, we must recognize that more data is a mixed blessing. We have needed more people to sift through this data, to analyze it and tell us what it means.

I just came back from talking with people who are helping us recognize, sort through and use this increasing volume of intelligence that we are gathering through all the various means that we have. It is encouraging, but it only underscores the problem. And now with glasnost in full run in the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc countries, more and more information in the public print is of interest to us, and it is becoming increasingly challenging for us to collect and absorb it all. And leaders in business and the professions are coming home with information of great value to the Intelligence Community—there's more and more for us. So it's a big challenge, but I think we're on our way to solving it.

We've also had to contend with the current budget reality, recognizing that our ability to fund programs is shrinking, while what is demanded of us in intelligence is growing. Sometimes the choices are really heart rendering. And we do all this in a time when the President and the Administration are very supportive of intelligence and want us to have our share of the resources—indeed, perhaps even more than a pro rata share of the resources from which our budget is drawn. But, we are trying to deal with a major deficit problem, and the money is just not going to be there as we would like it to be.

You all know that budget reductions are being made in order to reduce that deficit, and this is very much on my mind because I presented our Intelligence Community budget to the Congress quite recently. In fact, I have spoken to three congressional committees about our budget in the last three months. And I've had private meetings with senior members of the committees who had particular concerns. You know how difficult these decisions are when it comes to determining which programs must be cut or even postponed or dropped. In the Intelligence Community developing a single satellite is an entirely new program. It's not a question of dropping a squadron or an aircraft carrier, as painful as that may be. It's a question of dropping an entire program, and that makes it very, very difficult and challenging.

After a period of sustained growth in the intelligence budget, we now must do less against a worldwide intelligence challenge that has not abated to suit our tightened budget.

Perhaps the best example of our expanding responsibilities is in the area of arms control and treaty verification. The INF Treaty calls for the United States to monitor about 120 facilities inside the Soviet Union. But a START treaty, if approved, could involve monitoring as many as 2,500 weapons locations spread throughout the Soviet Union. And if we add to that the need to support conventional arms talks and to coordinate that support with our NATO allies, we begin to see the immensity of our task—a task that will involve all parts of the Intelligence Community.

We do, however, have a strong national security team and a President who has a great appreciation for intelligence. Many of you have known him and worked with him and you know that he understands intelligence and he believes in it. He wants to keep it away from policymaking, but he wants to use it as the foundation for determining policy. During his eight years as Vice President, he was briefed every morning by officers from the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. And now, as President, he continues to receive daily briefings from our current intelligence people. I was with him this morning. The President is very good at taking in the information, asking the tough questions, and making sure that we are tasked to keep him up to speed in the areas of interest to him.

Our relationships with Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Defense Cheney have been excellent. As you might expect, we also have an excellent working relationship with Brent Scowcroft and Bob Gates.

Another intelligence professional that I've been working closely with since I first arrived at the Agency—and someone whom many of you know—is Dick Kerr. Dick has been an important part of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Community for nearly 30 years, serving as an analyst, a manager, a

member of the Intelligence Community staff, and Deputy Director for two different directorates within the Agency. And now, I'm depending upon him as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to help me ensure that policymakers have the information that they need. I thought that it was another nice signal that President Bush took time to come to participate in Dick Kerr's swearing-in as Deputy Director.

Not only do we have talented officers, but we continue to attract top people who want to join us. At the CIA alone, some 100,000 men and women each year express an interest in working for intelligence. And the actual applications are coming in at the rate of 1,000 a month. You have no doubt read about the protests on some college campuses where CIA recruits. Interestingly enough, these protests and the publicity they generate often work in our favor. Our recruitment centers are inundated with resumes after every campus demonstration. But we're not responsible for the demonstrations.

I've tried to make a point of testing the waters myself. And in the last two years I have visited a number of college campuses, including Dartmouth and Yale, where protest activity has not been uncommon. I have been treated with respect and interest, and people invariably come up to see me after the program to talk about their personal interest in pursuing a career in intelligence.

The Intelligence Community is selective, and with good reason. We offer an opportunity to be part of a mission—a mission that instills a sense of purpose and provides a sense of accomplishment. There are sacrifices as well. Intelligence is, more than most services, dependent upon individual acts of patriotism, offered without expectation of personal glory.

Last December, President Bush, then President-elect Bush, came back to the Central Intelligence Agency. He spent about three hours with us, receiving briefings, renewing acquaintances, having lunch with some of our young stars at the GS-14 and -15 level. His visit stirred personal memories. And I think one of his most poignant moments was spent as he stopped with Brent Scowcroft and John Sununu in our headquarters foyer to gaze at the stars which represent our fallen comrades—clearly touched by their courage, remembering their lasting contributions.

In the last two years, I have visited over 30 intelligence facilities here and abroad. I've seen tremendously important work being done by dedicated men and women—scientists, linguists, clandestine operators, the whole range of talents. And in a society that is open, delivering on our mission in a secret way is quite a challenge. And I have the greatest admiration for the men and women who are willing to accept the enormous responsibilities of intelligence and still keep the secrets of their successes.

My association here with AFIO has made me realize that intelligence is a life-long commitment. Fulfilling the mission and keeping the secrets does not ever really end. You who have served in intelligence continue to contribute. Your programs, which promote an understanding of intelligence, have done much to build public support for our vital mission.

I hope that we will continue to attract those who are best suited to carry out our mission—those who are risk takers, but not risk seekers. People who are dedicated and responsive to law and discipline. People who understand and play by the rules. People who are not preoccupied by fame or fortune, but who see in our work a way to express their highest aspirations for a safer and a better world. You in AFIO must help us find them, for this is what it is all about. This is why you served, why we serve today, and why, God willing, enormously talented and dedicated Americans will be joining us for the great challenges, not yet entirely defined, that will be waiting for us tomorrow.