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On 20 March you will be speaking to a group of about 400 community leaders at a luncheon of the Palm Beach Round Table. As we discussed at our meeting with the speechwriters, your proposed remarks consider developments in the Soviet Union and the spread of chemical weapons.

The speech is similar to the one you gave to the Tucson Committee on Foreign Relations on 5 January. The speechwriters updated that speech by talking with analysts in the Office of Soviet Analysis, the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, and the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research. Bob Blackwell, NIO/USSR, coordinated on the final text.

You may wish to consider the information in footnotes 1 and 2 on your previous remarks to the group and on their special Afghan project as you fashion your introduction. The Soviet section of the speech includes the most recent developments in the Baltic and the reconvening of the conventional arms talks in Geneva last week. The chemical weapons section includes a reference to the speech Secretary Baker made in Geneva, in which he called for an international conference to consider the international trade in precursor chemicals and technology.

After considering the role of intelligence in assessing the Soviet Union and chemical weapons, you discuss the changes you have made at CIA since your appointment nearly two years ago. You also stress the vital importance of people to our success.

Your proposed remarks are attached. If tomorrow's plenum of the Soviet Central Committee produces any unforeseen developments, we will update your remarks.

Bill Baker

Attachment:  
as stated

Regrade as UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachments.

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[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED REMARKS  
BY  
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
BEFORE THE  
PALM BEACH ROUND TABLE  
MARCH 20, 1989

IT REALLY IS A PLEASURE TO BE IN PALM BEACH AGAIN. ((YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS ABOUT THE FIRST TIME YOU ADDRESSED THE PALM BEACH ROUND TABLE IN 1980<sup>1</sup> OR ABOUT THE ROUND TABLE'S AFGHANISTAN PROJECT.<sup>2</sup>))

IT IS STILL EARLY IN THE YEAR AND EARLY IN THE TERM OF OUR FORTY-FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. YET PRESIDENT BUSH ALREADY FACES A HOST OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT AFFECT U.S. INTERESTS -- FROM CENTRAL AMERICA TO CENTRAL AFRICA, AND FROM INSURGENCY TO THE SPREAD OF AIDS. THE PRESIDENT WILL RELY ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR ACCURATE, TIMELY, AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION ON THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND ON WHAT THEY MEAN FOR OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS.

THIS AFTERNOON I WOULD LIKE TO CONCENTRATE ON TWO VERY IMPORTANT ISSUES FOR THE PRESIDENT AND FOR THE COUNTRY -- WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION AND WHAT WE HAVE SEEN DEVELOP WITH THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE ARE WITNESSING MANY

CHANGES IN THE TRADITIONAL THREAT POSED TO US BY THE U.S.S.R.  
AND, AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE SEEING AN INCREASE IN THE THREAT  
POSED TO THE UNITED STATES AND, INDEED, TO WORLD PEACE BY THE  
PRODUCTION AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO  
DISCUSS WITH YOU SOME OF THE CHANGES WE HAVE UNDERGONE AT THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS --  
CHANGES THAT I BELIEVE MAKE IT EASIER FOR US TO DO OUR JOBS.

THE SOVIET UNION IS -- AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE -- THE  
PRIMARY FOCUS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS. ITS  
MILITARY CAPABILITY, ITS EFFORTS TO INCREASE GLOBAL INFLUENCE,  
AND ITS AGGRESSIVE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ARE STILL SERIOUS  
THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS.

GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS TO REFORM HIS COUNTRY HAVE NOT  
FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED THESE TRUTHS. IN FACT, THEY PROBABLY  
MAKE THE SOVIET UNION OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN TO U.S.  
INTELLIGENCE.

LIKE MANY OF YOU, I HAVE BEEN FASCINATED BY WHAT IS OCCURRING IN THE SOVIET UNION. GORBACHEV HAS STIRRED UP THE STEW -- BRINGING NEW LIFE AND DYNAMISM TO SOVIET POLITICS AND PUSHING A SERIES OF REFORMS THAT NONE OF US COULD HAVE FORESEEN FIVE YEARS AGO.

THE FORCES OF DEMOCRACY ARE MAKING SOME POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INROADS -- ESPECIALLY IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS. ALTHOUGH THE U.S.S.R. IS CERTAINLY NOT HEADED TOWARD DEMOCRACY AS WE KNOW IT, TODAY'S SOVIET LEADERS APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEIR SYSTEM IS FALTERING LARGELY BECAUSE IT HAS NOT GIVEN THE PEOPLE ENOUGH BREATHING ROOM -- ROOM TO INQUIRE AND ROOM TO UNLOCK CREATIVITY.

CHANGE IS OCCURRING IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN POLICY AS WELL. THIS SOVIET LEADER HAS SIGNALLED BY WORD AND DEED THAT HE WANTS THE U.S.S.R. TO BE A MORE ACTIVE AND EFFECTIVE PLAYER ON THE WORLD SCENE. HE IS MORE WILLING THAN PAST SOVIET LEADERS TO REEVALUATE THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICIES,

TO MAKE DECISIONS ON THAT BASIS, AND EVEN, ON OCCASION, TO HEAD OFF IN NEW DIRECTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS WITHDREW THEIR FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN BY FEBRUARY 15, REVERSING A POLICY THAT HAD BEEN DIVISIVE AND COSTLY. AND THEY ARE ELIMINATING A WHOLE CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE I.N.F. TREATY -- A PROCESS THAT INCLUDES UNPRECEDENTED ON-SITE INSPECTIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY FACILITIES.

GORBACHEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF UNILATERAL TROOP REDUCTIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS LAST DECEMBER ILLUSTRATES HIS WILLINGNESS TO PURSUE RADICALLY DIFFERENT APPROACHES EVEN AS IT HIGHLIGHTS THE CHALLENGES THAT THESE NEW APPROACHES REPRESENT FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. TWO WEEKS AGO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES RECONVENED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT ABOUT CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN ALL OF EUROPE, INCLUDING THE EUROPEAN U.S.S.R. THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO REDUCE THE ADVANTAGE THEY HOLD IN SOME ELEMENTS OF GROUND FORCES. HOWEVER, THEY ARE DEMANDING THAT, IN RETURN, THE WEST REDUCE

WHAT THE SOVIETS CLAIM IS AN ADVANTAGE IN AIR FORCES. THESE NEGOTIATIONS PRESENT CHALLENGES -- BUT ALSO OPPORTUNITIES -- FOR THE WEST TO MAINTAIN UNITY WITHIN OUR ALLIANCE AND YET WORK WITH THE WARSAW PACT TO MAKE REAL REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

THE DRAMATIC NATURE OF THESE POLICY CHANGES CLEARLY HAS PROVOKED CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. A MAJOR POWER STRUGGLE CONTINUES BETWEEN REFORMERS, WHO BELIEVE RADICAL CHANGES ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM WORK, AND CONSERVATIVES, WHO FEAR SUCH CHANGES COULD DESTABILIZE THE VERY SYSTEM THEY ARE TRYING TO SAVE. THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM DEALING WITH SOVIET AGRICULTURE PROVIDED CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THIS CLASH OF VIEWS. THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF STRUGGLES SUCH AS THIS ONE WILL AFFECT HOW FAR AND HOW FAST REFORM PROGRESSES, THE EXTENT TO WHICH CENTRAL AUTHORITY IS RELAXED, THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE INDIVIDUAL, AND HOW COMPETITIVE THE SOVIET SYSTEM WILL BE OVER THE NEXT FEW DECADES.

THERE ARE STRONG REASONS TO QUESTION WHETHER A SYSTEM DESIGNED TO CENTRALIZE AUTHORITY; MAXIMIZE GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER ITS PEOPLE, AND CONCENTRATE RESOURCES ON BUILDING UP THE NATION'S MILITARY CAN BECOME MORE DECENTRALIZED AND DEMOCRATIC IN ITS DECISIONMAKING AND MORE SOLICITOUS OF ITS PEOPLE.

NATIONALIST UNREST IS CURRENTLY TESTING THE SOVIET SYSTEM'S ABILITY TO MAKE REFORMS WORK. COMMUNAL UNREST IN ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN HAS FORCED MOSCOW TO PUT THE REGION IN A VIRTUAL STATE OF MARTIAL LAW ON A SEMIPERMANENT BASIS. LAST NOVEMBER, THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP OF ESTONIA DECLARED THE REPUBLIC "SOVEREIGN" -- AN UNTHINKABLE DEVELOPMENT EVEN A YEAR AGO. IN LITHUANIA, BOTH THE POPULAR FRONT ORGANIZATION AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH HAVE PUBLICLY PLEDGED TO WORK FOR SOVEREIGNTY.<sup>3</sup> THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE PUTTING INCREASING PRESSURE ON GORBACHEV. IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN -- AND MANY DOUBT IT -- THAT MINORITY ASPIRATIONS FOR AUTONOMY OR EVEN INDEPENDENCE CAN BE SQUARED WITH MOSCOW'S NEED FOR CONTROL.



BUT IF THE LAST THREE YEARS HAVE TAUGHT US ANYTHING AT ALL, IT IS THAT GORBACHEV IS A HIGHLY SKILLED POLITICIAN. ONLY LAST FALL, HE SUCCESSFULLY UNDERTOOK THE MOST SWEEPING OVERHAUL OF THE TOP PARTY LEADERSHIP SINCE KHRUSHCHEV OUSTED HIS CHIEF OPPONENTS IN 1957. WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE CAN, ULTIMATELY, PULL OFF A "REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE" THAT ACTUALLY INCREASES AUTHORITY BELOW.

THE SOVIET REFORM EFFORT PRESENTS THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITH SOME FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES. WE MUST PAY CLOSER ATTENTION THAN EVER TO THE POLITICAL STRUGGLES AND ISSUES BEING RAISED AS GORBACHEV CHALLENGES THE ESTABLISHED INTERESTS OF INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS WITHIN HIS COUNTRY. AND WE WILL PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE NATIONALIST GROUPS IN THE BALTIC AND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE U.S.S.R. WHO ARE INCREASINGLY TESTING THE LIMITS OF GLASNOST.

WE MUST ALSO HELP THE POLICYMAKER SORT OUT HOW REFORM WILL AFFECT SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES AND -- EVEN MORE DIFFICULT -- HOW IT MAY CHANGE MOSCOW'S FOREIGN POLICY.

WE MUST MANAGE THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION THAT GLASNOST HAS PRODUCED WHICH, THOUGH WELCOME, CHALLENGES US TO SORT OUT WHAT IS IMPORTANT AND WHAT IS NOT, WHAT IS REAL VERSUS WHAT MOSCOW WANTS US TO HEAR.

WE MUST PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS FOR U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS. AS THESE NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL BE INCREASINGLY ASKED TO ASSESS SOVIET MOTIVATIONS AND MONITOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS.

AND THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT REQUIRED IS TREMENDOUS. THE I.N.F. TREATY HAS REQUIRED THE UNITED STATES TO MONITOR ABOUT 120 FACILITIES DECLARED BY THE SOVIETS. MONITORING THE START TREATY, WHICH IS BEING NEGOTIATED IN GENEVA, COULD INVOLVE AS

MANY AS 2,500 WEAPON LOCATIONS SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET UNION.

MONITORING AGREEMENTS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS, HOWEVER, WOULD BE RELATIVELY SIMPLE COMPARED TO MONITORING AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MIGHT HAVE TO MONITOR AN AREA ENCOMPASSING ABOUT 10 MILLION SQUARE KILOMETERS -- OVER 6 MILLION SQUARE MILES -- AND LITERALLY THOUSANDS OF WARSAW PACT UNITS AND HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF TANKS, ARMORED VEHICLES, ARTILLERY PIECES, AND OTHER KINDS OF EQUIPMENT. THE COST IN MONEY AND MANPOWER COULD BE STAGGERING.

YET WHATEVER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS THE U.S. MAKES WITH THE SOVIETS, OUR RELATIONSHIP IS LIKELY TO REMAIN ESSENTIALLY ADVERSARIAL. POLICYMAKERS WILL DEPEND ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO MAKE QUICK AND ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS -- AND EVEN TO ANTICIPATE GORBACHEV'S SOMETIMES UNORTHODOX AND UNEXPECTED INITIATIVES.

BUT THE SOVIET UNION IS CERTAINLY NOT OUR ONLY FOCUS.  
ANOTHER MAJOR QUESTION WE ARE CONSIDERING IS WHAT LESSONS IRAN  
AND IRAQ -- AND THE REST OF THE WORLD -- HAVE LEARNED FROM  
THEIR BITTER CONFLICT, A CONFLICT THAT INVOLVED THE FIRST  
SUSTAINED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS SINCE WORLD WAR I.

AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR, THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS  
OUTLAWED BY SIGNERS OF THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL. DURING WORLD  
WAR II -- EVEN DURING THE MOST DESPERATE BATTLES -- BOTH SIDES  
REFRAINED FROM USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- WEAPONS THAT WINSTON  
CHURCHILL REFERRED TO AS "THAT HELLISH POISON."

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ENDED THAT RESTRAINT AND SET A DANGEROUS  
PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE WARS. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS  
CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST  
IRAN AND ALSO AGAINST IRAQI KURDS. IRAN, TOO, EMPLOYED  
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAQI TROOPS.

I'M SURE YOU'VE READ MANY ACCOUNTS DURING THE LAST SEVERAL  
MONTHS ABOUT THE USE OF AND THE EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

YOU MAY KNOW, TOO, THAT CONGRESS IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION. JUST THIS PAST MONTH I TESTIFIED BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THESE WEAPONS ARE THOUGHT TO OFFER A CHEAP AND READILY OBTAINABLE MEANS OF REDRESSING THE MILITARY BALANCE AGAINST MORE POWERFUL FOES. SOME SEE THEM AS THE POOR MAN'S ANSWER TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND MORE THAN 20 COUNTRIES MAY BE DEVELOPING CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

MUSTARD GAS, A TERRIBLE WEAPON FIRST USED IN WORLD WAR I, IS ONE OF THE FAVORED CHEMICAL AGENTS FOR SEVERAL REASONS -- ITS RELATIVE EASE OF MANUFACTURE, ITS LONG LIFE IN STORAGE AND ON THE BATTLEFIELD, AND ITS ABILITY TO INCAPACITATE THOSE EXPOSED TO IT.

SOME COUNTRIES ARE DEVELOPING NERVE AGENTS. THESE AGENTS, THOUGH MORE DIFFICULT TO MANUFACTURE, CAN CAUSE DEATH IN MINUTES BY ATTACKING THE BRAIN AND NERVOUS SYSTEM. OTHER

NATIONS MAY USE COMMON INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS SUCH AS CYANIDE AND PHOSGENE. CYANIDE PREVENTS THE BLOOD FROM CARRYING OXYGEN, WHILE PHOSGENE, WIDELY USED IN MAKING PLASTICS, CAN DESTROY THE LUNGS.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE ABILITY OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THEIR INCENTIVES FOR USING SUCH WEAPONS. AND WITH THE INCREASE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE THIRD WORLD, WE MUST BE ALERT TO ATTEMPTS BY THIRD WORLD NATIONS TO ARM THESE MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS.

THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AFFECTS THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN REGIONS SUCH AS SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE NATIONS OF IRAQ, LIBYA, IRAN AND SYRIA ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN, DUE TO THEIR USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS OR THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IS VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. OUR

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTS GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO RESTRICT THE EXPORT OF CHEMICALS AND OF BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY THAT CAN BE USED TO MAKE CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

THE UNITED STATES ALSO PARTICIPATES IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, AN EFFORT BY 40 NATIONS TO NEGOTIATE A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN. AND IN EARLY MARCH, SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER PROPOSED THAT WE BRING TOGETHER GOVERNMENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRY TO DISCUSS THE GROWING INCREASE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE CHEMICALS AND TECHNOLOGY NEEDED TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS.<sup>4</sup>

ASSESSING THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IS ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT CHALLENGES WE FACE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. I BELIEVE IT IS ALSO ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT TASKS, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE U.S. POLICYMAKERS WITH ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION ON THIS ISSUE.

SO FAR, I'VE TALKED ABOUT TWO CONCERNS THAT WILL CONTINUE TO BE AT THE TOP OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S AGENDA -- WHAT

IS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. NOW I'D LIKE TO TALK A BIT ABOUT THE CHANGES THAT HAVE OCCURRED OVER THE LAST 22 MONTHS -- CHANGES THAT HAVE STRENGTHENED THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND HELPED TO BUILD A HIGHER LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN US AND IN OUR WORK.

AT THIS TIME TWO YEARS AGO, THE C.I.A. WAS AT THE CENTER OF A STORM THAT THREATENED TO DESTROY CONFIDENCE IN OUR ROLE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND TO SHATTER THE TRUST THAT IS SO INDISPENSABLE TO OUR MISSION. THROUGHOUT 1987, WE WERE SUBJECTED TO THE MOST SEARCHING INQUIRY INTO OUR PART IN THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR.

AT THE END OF 1987, I SENT A NOTE TO ALL C.I.A. EMPLOYEES THAT SAID: "IF EVER A TIME IN THE 40 YEARS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REQUIRED THE TALENT AND ENERGY OF THOSE WHO SERVE, THIS HAS BEEN THAT TIME." AND A YEAR LATER, I CAN REPORT THAT OUR PEOPLE HAVE RESPONDED, AND WE HAVE TOGETHER



TAKEN THE AGENCY THROUGH ONE OF THE MOST CHALLENGING ERAS IN OUR HISTORY.

WE HAVE, I BELIEVE, RESTORED PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE C.I.A. AND GREATLY IMPROVED OUR RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS. AND WE HAVE DONE THIS BY ESTABLISHING CLEAR GUIDELINES -- GUIDELINES THAT ARE WORKABLE AND WELL UNDERSTOOD AND HAVE BEEN SCRUPULOUSLY FOLLOWED.

WE HAVE ESTABLISHED POLICIES TO ENSURE THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS REMAIN OBJECTIVE AND THAT ANALYSTS ARE PROTECTED AGAINST THE PRESSURES OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE. AND I AM PROUD TO SAY THAT IN THE TIME I HAVE BEEN AT C.I.A., I HAVEN'T HEARD ANYONE ACCUSE US OF "COOKING THE BOOKS."

I'M ALSO PROUD OF WHAT WE HAVE DONE TO STRENGTHEN THE REVIEW OF COVERT ACTIVITIES. UNDER THE GUIDELINES I HAVE ESTABLISHED, THE AGENCY'S SENIOR MANAGERS MUST REVIEW ALL PROPOSALS FOR COVERT ACTION THAT ARE TO BE FORWARDED TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. THEY MUST APPLY TESTS DESIGNED TO

ENSURE THAT EACH PROGRAM CAN BE DONE, IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR DECLARED FOREIGN POLICY, AND WOULD MAKE SENSE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IF THEY WERE TO BECOME AWARE OF IT.

OUR RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS HAVE ALWAYS INVOLVED BALANCING THE NEED FOR A CANDID RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEED TO PROTECT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. TO HELP OUR OFFICERS BALANCE THESE DEMANDS, I HAVE ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES TO GOVERN OUR DEALINGS WITH CONGRESS. AND I HAVE MADE IT KNOWN THAT IN WORKING WITH CONGRESS THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR DECEPTION. AGENCY OFFICIALS WHO BRIEF ON THE HILL ARE AUTHORIZED TO DEMUR RATHER THAN SKIRT ISSUES THAT THEY ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS. SOMETIMES THESE QUESTIONS COME ALL THE WAY UP TO ME. BUT WE HAVE NOT LEFT CONGRESS FEELING THAT ANYONE IN THE C.I.A. HAS BEEN DISINGENUOUS WITH THEM. AS A RESULT, OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CONGRESS HAS IMPROVED, AND I BELIEVE IT WILL CONTINUE TO IMPROVE.

I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ONE FINAL POINT ABOUT OUR WORK, AND IT IS THAT THE INTELLIGENCE WE PROVIDE TO POLICYMAKERS ON THE SOVIET UNION, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND MANY OTHER ISSUES IS NOT EASY TO COME BY. IN FACT, IT SOMETIMES COMES AT GREAT COST TO THE MEN AND WOMEN OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE.

SINCE I WAS APPOINTED DIRECTOR IN MAY 1987, I HAVE VISITED MANY OF OUR INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES IN THIS COUNTRY AND IN MANY NATIONS AROUND THE WORLD. I HAVE OBSERVED FIRSHTHAND THE SUCCESS OF OUR OPERATIONS IN MANAGING A MYRIAD OF COMPLEX ISSUES -- ISSUES SO COMPLEX THAT WE OFTEN RELY UPON HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED TECHNICAL SYSTEMS. BUT, OUR MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS ALWAYS BEEN -- AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE -- OUR PEOPLE. IT IS THEIR CREATIVITY, THEIR DETERMINATION, AND THEIR COURAGE THAT SPELL THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUCCESS AND FAILURE.

WITH SUCH PEOPLE WE CAN CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE THAT POLICYMAKERS NEED, OBSERVING THE RULES OF

OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY THAT BOTH THE CONGRESS AND THE  
AMERICAN PUBLIC HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT. THIS IS WHAT YOU WOULD  
WANT OF US, WHAT ALL AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD WANT OF US, AND WE  
ARE DOING OUR VERY BEST TO SUPPLY IT.