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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Public Affairs

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FROM: [redacted]
Chief, Information Services Staff, DDA

SUBJECT: Security Review of Director's Address and Remarks Made at In-House Speakers Program

A written copy of the Director's address and remarks made at the In-House Speakers Program on 24 October 1979 has been reviewed to see what, if any, classified information it might contain. Several points were noted which, particularly in this context, could be expected to cause identifiable damage to national security if they were released and therefore should be classified. A classification level of "Confidential" would be sufficient to properly protect the information involved. The following listing identifies the specific classified points, gives the reasons why they require protection, and cites the legal basis for the classification:

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Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
The DCI Management Advisory Group
In-House Speakers Program
CIA Auditorium.
Wednesday, 24 October 1979

I would like to start by thanking the DCI MAG for inaugurating this program. This is the third in a series. If there is one thing that will help us all in the Agency it is improved internal communications. As large as we are, as spread out as we are around the world let alone in Washington, and as necessary as it is to have some kind of compartmentation, internal communications are really difficult. Anything like this that will help I think is just great.

I really don't want to talk very long. I want to take your questions, your comments, your suggestions. But I thought perhaps you would like me to say a few words on two topics: how I view the internal situation of the Agency today, and what the status of our external relationships are; specifically, how do our customers perceive us and are they using our product? Let me start here at home.

Inside the Agency, I have never been more optimistic, never felt better about the internal state of affairs. I think in the last year we have clearly turned the corner on those years of concern about the investigations and the ensuing adverse publicity we received. I think, as an Agency, and as individuals, we now have put the past into perspective. Some of the criticism was justifiable. Much of it was media exaggeration. I think we all recognize now that while mistakes may have been made, they must be kept in proportion. Today we have the right controls, the right attitudes to ensure that we go forward in the proper manner. I sense throughout the organization today that the spirit, the attitude, the hope, our expectations for the future are where they should be.

One thing that has particularly pleased me over the last year and a half has been the increasing sense of teamwork and cooperation between the four directorates and between the independent offices and the directorates. This teamwork is critical to our success. Most of all, because of the quality of our people, I feel very confident of what we are doing now and of our capability to do our job for the future. We have been blessed for 32 years with top quality people. Today that continues to be one of our great strengths. If there is one responsibility that each of us shares, not just the DDCI, the Director of Personnel, and myself, but also each of you is to ensure that we continue to recruit and keep the same quality of people so that we have as good a CIA in 1989 and 1999 as we do in 1979. That is absolutely fundamental. Consequently, I have felt that personnel matters and personnel management have been my greatest personal responsibility.

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Last winter, as you know, we received some superb assistance from the [redacted], a group with an impressive background in personnel administration from all elements of industry and the government. We are all pleased that the end result of their 3 month study was to reaffirm that we have a basically sound personnel management organization. At the same time they suggested many ways in which we can better use our management system to the individual employee's advantage more. Since that report came in last winter, we have been working on their suggestions. We have instituted a more uniform promotion system, based more on the panels. In fact, we are going to panels in all promotion areas. Clerical panels, for example, have been instituted for the first time. There is still more to be done, but we feel that the uniform, panel-based promotion system will ensure more equitable, utterly fair opportunity for the individual employee to be recognized and rewarded for the contribution which he or she is making. The new performance evaluation report is intended, to be sure that employees put their best foot forward to the panels. 25X1

Inter- and intra-directorate rotation opportunity is being increased. This will broaden employees experience and increase their perspective. It will also improve their chances of finding exactly the right career niche.

More stress is being placed on recruiting the right quality and quantity of people. Recruiting is up in both numbers and quality. We are now working hard to reduce the time it takes from the receipt of an application from a potential recruit to the time we say yes or no. We have sometimes lost good candidates because of the delays that we have particularly with our security procedures.

We are putting more stress on helping low performers. We are counseling them, moving them to areas which are better suited to their talents, helping them to grow so that they can increase their productivity and enjoy a rewarding career.

As we go through the rest of the [redacted] recommendations, rejecting some and accepting others, two basic personnel objectives are always in mind: first, to be sure we have the right mix and quality of people to do the Agency's job in the future, and secondly, to afford a reasonable career opportunity to each individual employee; an opportunity to contribute, to utilize his or her talents, an opportunity for reasonable promotion potential as well as other rewards. 25X1

Each of those goals requires a good personnel management system, which we have. But, we always need to keep sharpening the ability of that system to look at each employee as an individual and ask, what is the next career step? What training? What rotation? What assignments will best help this employee utilize his or her talents to the Agency's and the employees advantage? Are we helping that employee to contribute as much as he possibly can?

Secondly, the personnel management system must prevent employees from being blocked in their promotion opportunity by humps and valleys. As people come into the Agency, if we don't look far enough ahead and make well-founded decisions on whether we need them at the bottom or somewhere in the middle, we can easily end up as we have in some areas of the Agency today with too many people in some grades and qualifications and too few in others. An employee who comes right behind a grade or qualification hump has very little opportunity to advance. One who comes right behind a valley, may be advanced so rapidly that they don't have the experience necessary to do the job they are asked to do. We must be able to level out those humps and valleys; to give all employees the same opportunity to advance. One of the ways is through good planning, as I have just described. Another is to take advantage of the fact that we are one agency, with a uniform promotion and personnel management system. If we have the interdirectorate mobility which one agency implies, we can shift people from a hump to a valley and thereby equalize opportunity.

Let me digress here for a moment to say that my comments at the beginning about greater cooperation and teamwork are part of my enthusiasm for the fact that we are becoming more and more of one agency. That is very important. The profession of intelligence has changed over the last fifteen or twenty years. Being one agency in which each directorate works intimately with the others is a fact of life, and is more critical to us today than it has ever been. The DDO provides HUMINT. Why? Because the NFAC needs it. Then NFAC and the DDO turn to the DDS&T and ask what SIGINT and PHOTINT are bringing in which will help us. How do we bring all three of these disciplines together? Only teamwork enables us to best use an agent; to build on what is known from SIGINT and PHOTINT. It is wasteful and an unnecessary risk to use a spy, an agent, when you can get a picture with a satellite. In turn, you frequently target an agent to find out how best to target SIGINT and PHOTINT. We have had some superlative examples in recent years of this kind of teamwork. This teamwork, this thinking of ourselves as actually being one agency where there is good communication between all of the directorates, is utterly vital. I am very encouraged by the evolution I see in that direction.

Let me shift to the external side. None of us would want to be here if we didn't feel we were making a contribution to the decision making and policy formulation of our government. That is why we are here and without that our work would give us little satisfaction. So let's look at our customers.

Clearly the President, the National Security Council Staff, and the Cabinet members who deal with foreign policy, are our principal customers. People ask me, how are we doing with the President? We are doing very well with the President and his chief foreign policy advisors.

Then someone always says, well what about the intelligence failure in Iran? It was just a year ago now that we had the so-called intelligence failure in Iran and the President wrote a note to the Secretary of State, Dr. Brzezinski and myself suggesting that we could improve political intelligence reporting. The President didn't say, nor is it true, that that situation represented an intelligence failure. That was coined by the American media and was an exaggeration. We would have liked to have done better, but there was no failure. The President's suggestions have helped us improve for the future. Among other things, a fine political intelligence working group has evolved around the DDCI, David Aaron of the NSC and David Newsom from State which today ensures the same kind of communication and teamwork I've been talking about in the Agency. As a result, we are getting a lot more support [redacted] 25X1 25X1 [redacted]

Put the shoe on the other foot. If we had not done quite as well as we would have liked in Iran, and the President had said nothing to me, and incidentally this wasn't the first time he made a suggestion to me, think of the implications of that. To me that would have implied that he wasn't concerned, that he wasn't reading and depending on his intelligence input. The fact that he was concerned and interested is indicative of how important he regards what we do for him. Six mornings a week we give him a Presidential Daily Brief--the PDB--and I guarantee you it is the highest quality intelligence product in this or any town. Regularly I brief him orally both on substantive matters and on what we are doing and how we are doing it. He is intensely interested, and wants to be kept abreast of intelligence activities.

In National Security Council meetings and meetings of subordinate committees of the Council, very frequently it is the Intelligence Community which leads off and sets the background of the situation which is up for debate. I think--though I haven't been here long--from what I have seen and heard, that our product is better utilized today, more visible, more relied upon by the top Executive Branch policy-makers than perhaps ever before in the Agency's history.

Now let me point out that there is a downside, a problem side to that. The more you are responsive to the Administration's needs for intelligence, the more likely it is that somebody will say you are so responsive you are not being objective, detached from the policy process. You are being politicized. There is nothing that is further from the truth today than that. Let me give you an example.

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If you want the best example of all, it is SALT II. If there was ever a case where the intelligence agencies could have been put under intense pressure to make the intelligence fit the policy, it certainly is SALT II, the prime foreign policy objective of this Administration. From the beginning, we have held resolutely to one position: we talk about monitoring SALT, we do not talk about verifying SALT. We don't make judgments on whether SALT monitoring is adequate for verification, adequate for the safety, adequate for the security of our country. Those are political judgments. That permits us to give Congress and the Administration the information that they need to make those judgments, but it does not put us in the position of supporting or not supporting the treaty because it is verifiable or not verifiable. I don't think that you can find anyone in the Administration, on Capitol Hill, or, in this case, even in the media who would seriously contend that the Central Intelligence Agency was politicized thus far over SALT II. I intend for us to stay that way.

If we are ever accused of being politicized, pull some of these examples out of your hip pocket. Would a politicized Agency have disclosed in the middle of the SALT II debates that the Soviets had a brigade in Cuba? Would a politicized Agency have undercut an Administration policy on Korea by revealing a build-up of North Korean military forces? [redacted] 25X1
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[redacted] Would a politicized Agency have published some of the unclassified studies that we have published in the last couple of years, some of which have not been very popular with the policy makers? Of course not. I don't believe we have been politicized, and I think the record proves it. I believe we are supporting the President well and he in turn is supporting us well. Look at his October 1st speech on the Cuban brigade. He specifically mentioned the need to enhance intelligence community capabilities. He specifically mentioned the great importance of measures to protect our sources and methods. [redacted] 25X1
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Another of our important customers is the Congress. This year we've given more briefings, provided more reports in response to more requests from individual members, committees and staff of the Congress than ever before. That's great. For them to be able to benefit from our work is extremely important. Our stock in trade is that we are the one intelligence agency of the government that has no policy axe to grind. Consequently, we are very well received by the Congress. The increasing flow of letters and telephone calls and requests of one sort and another is indicative that the quality and importance of our work is both recognized and appreciated on the Hill.

In the last several years, I believe our relations with the two oversight committees has just been superb. Last week, by unanimous endorsement, the House Permanent Select Committee forwarded to the House a bill that would deliberately and directly attack Philip Agee and the traitorous individuals here in Washingtion who publish the Covert Action Bulletin. Almost every day, the Senate Select Committee pushes in one way or another for more resources, more support for all of our intelligence activities. I don't want to intimate that these committees are in our pocket--they're in my hair half the time--but the relationship is good. They should be and are conducting oversight. They are doing it objectively, but also they are coming to understand us, our needs, and our capabilities. We frequently get the kind of support from them that we had no one to turn to on the Hill before. And we have needed that support, particularly in staving off legislation that, maybe by inadvertence, would have damaged us; and proposing legislation such as I have mentioned, that will help us.

Finally there's the American public. Here again I sense a turning of the corner; a recognition that intelligence is fundamental and very important to our country. A recognition that while we've been criticized, have made mistakes, that on balance the record of the CIA over the years has been superb, and that we cannot and should not be shackled. I think it is terribly encouraging. It's a reaffirmation of my personal basic faith in the wisdom of the American people. It may take awhile, with the distortions they have had to put up with to get their facts, but in the long run they see through this miasma. In part, ironically, this has been because of the adverse media attention. Media investigations have been unrelenting as you all know. There is no way that we can turn that off. But because they have often been so one-sided, the public has sought the other side of the story. From that search, they have recognized that there is something of real value here which could be in jeopardy.

We've turned the corner with the public in part also because we have been more open with them and have tried to help them understand what intelligence contributes to our national security. I know that this is controversial, but let me say with deep conviction that there is no way we can avoid being more open with the American public. The secrecy of the past is gone. The persevering, inquiring reporters are there on the doorstep every day. If they don't get it straight from us, they are going to get it crooked from somebody else. More importantly, there is a basic premise in a democracy that the more the public knows about the functioning of government, the better that government will be. I believe that. I believe that we in the government think we know what is best for the country; that we know best how to handle complex foreign policy and domestic policy situations. But that is not so. The American public knows best. It takes them time, but when they understand what is going on, and when they set their course, they will do a better job than any of us in the government in determining which way the country should be going on major issues. If there is any truth to that premise, then I don't believe we should pretend that everything we own is classified or must be classified and therefore kept from the public. That would be false anyway. It would be dangerous for us to try to withdraw into a total cloak of anonymity because, where there have been mistakes in the past, it has not been because of deliberate, maliciousness. More often than not, it resulted from an understandable over enthusiasm which, because of the nature of our business, could be shrouded in a secret environment where adequate checks and balances could not function.

Our willingness today to share more of what we are about with the American public has brought significant and positive results. We are helping the public to carry on sensible, useful debates on critical topics like the energy issue. We are helping the public to understand the intelligence function and the contribution it makes to good government. In so doing we are banking good will and understanding that we could well have used in 1975-76. But let me reemphasize that what we are talking about is controlled openness; carefully controlled openness. No openness for classified material. No openness for sources and methods. No openness for how we go about our business. But openness by recognizing that if it can be unclassified, there is no reason not to make it available to the public. In so doing we help ourselves to protect what is classified.

Better security goes hand in hand with greater openness. Everyone of us in this room would acknowledge, I believe, that there is too much classified material in all of our safes. As we winnow that down by weeding out what really doesn't have to be classified, we will reduce what we must protect and hopefully we will at the same time grow to respect better what is left.

Improving security is, as you know, one of our major policy initiatives. We are working hard on Capitol Hill and in the Executive Branch for Freedom of Information relief legislation, for identities legislation of the kind I mentioned with respect to people like Agee, for graymail legislation so we can be more confident in court that we won't have to spill everything we are trying to protect to get a conviction. We are working very hard here inside the Agency and throughout the intelligence community to simplify, but at the same time strengthen, the basic security procedures so that we can and will carry them out. Congress and the Administration are supporting us in all of these areas. We must staunch the leaks which have been spewed over the papers just unmercifully and criminally, be they about [redacted] or we won't be as capable and successful an intelligence service as we must be. 25X1

We are the best intelligence service in the world. You, I, all of us are dedicated to doing everything we can to keep it that way. None of us has a monopoly on good ideas on how to preserve further as well as enhancing our intelligence capabilities. I look for your suggestions, for your advice. From the first day I came here I have invited employees to contact me with a simple note in an envelope. I have never guaranteed a response, but I have always guaranteed that I would read each one. We need your help, we need your advice.

I appreciate the chance to be with you and say these few remarks today. Now let us turn to your questions.

QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

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Q. How has the shift toward technical collection affected HUMINT?

A. I don't think we ever shifted away from HUMINT. What has happened may give the perception that we have, but that has not been the case. Communications and photographic capabilities have been burgeoning. The technical systems have been bringing in greater quantities of information faster. But that has not denigrated the importance of the human side one bit. You don't get the same quality answers out of pictures or intercepts as you do out of human intelligence. What I was trying to say earlier is that the advent of greater photographic and signal capabilities means you really must have a teamwork operation. I think what has happened is that human intelligence has become more difficult.

Counterintelligence is becoming more sophisticated, not only in the Communist countries but elsewhere around the world. Therefore, the case officer needs the support of what you can find out for him by the other two systems more than ever. So, teamwork is critical. The bottom line in almost all of these issues is what is going on and what is going to happen next. Where do you get that? Once in a while from signals, seldom from photos, most likely from HUMINT.

Q. Doesn't the release of our unclassified publications lead to the accusation of being politicized at times?

A. I certainly don't question that. But we are not politicized. Take the first energy study. It came out shortly after the President enunciated his war on energy. Part of his war on energy was derived from our work. The study, of course, was well underway before Mr. Carter was elected. It was neither done nor tailored to his needs or to the war on energy that he developed. Should we be reluctant to publish something because policy was built on it? I don't think so. Policy was built from it, not the other way around.

On the other hand, we published a report on the Polish economy that just drove some Administration officials up the wall. So, I have no concern that over the long run these will balance themselves out and people will understand the net benefit to the country. There just isn't a shred of evidence that any of these reports was generated for the express purpose of supporting policy makers.

I had been pushing the last energy study that came out in August for over a year to get OER to put it out. I felt we needed to supplement the previous one. I was frankly distraught that it happened to come out about a month and a half after a second push by the President for energy legislation. I would have preferred that it come out last January for example, and been totally divorced from a policy push. But, we just couldn't reach that degree of readiness on the report. Reports are timed to satisfy the needs of policy makers for substantive classified intelligence. Our product is intended for the Executive Branch of the government, be it the President or the Secretary of State or a military commander or an ambassador in the field. If then, when you take out what has to be taken out to protect particular information or to protect sources and methods, there is enough substance left, then we publish an unclassified version. That publication is done as soon as possible so that the contents are still current. It is not timed to coincide with policy initiatives.

Q. Admiral Turner, although we are working for the Executive Branch, it seems as if we are trying to service a lot of legislative departments. Could you give us some idea of the impact on our workload of resource allocations to satisfy legislative requirements on the one hand, and on the other what you see as the implications of Congressional possession of intelligence.

A. Well, I can tell you that one out of every 12-1/2 of my days this year has been spent on Capitol Hill. The workload I imagine is somewhat heavier in certain sections like OPA in the NFAC. We are doing a study to see what the balance is. I personally think we have reached the point with NFAC where there are requirements, some from the Congress, some from NSC, some from other branches of the Executive departments, that we are going to have to turn down. We'll turn them down on our judgment of whether the net impact, if we do them, is going to be important enough. We

are not able in my opinion to do enough long-range research, foundation work for the energy studies of 1982 or whatever. Enough development of new analytic techniques and approaches to problems. All of which can easily suffer with this rush of day-to-day critical requirements. So, your point is well-taken and we have got to learn to put some balance into it, which occasionally may mean saying no.

Regarding the implications in a broader sense, I remain persuaded that support to the Congress is very important to us and to the country. It is a crime for the Commerce or Fisheries Committee, let alone the Foreign Relations or Defense Committees, to make decisions when the government itself has information relative to those decisions and doesn't share it with them. It just doesn't make any sense to me at all.

It is my experience and belief that there is no reason why we should shy away from giving sensitive information to the Congress. They are no more leaky than we are, or the State Department is. Leaks are geometrically proportional to the number of people who know the information. The Defense Department leaks for one purpose; the State Department for another; the Treasury for another; us for another; Congress for still another. I can predict to you better what may leak more from the Congress than from the Defense Department, or vice versa, but I don't think there is any more hazard in taking information up on the Hill than elsewhere. If it is politically controversial, if it can be used in the political arena, then you know it is going to leak more and we maybe have to take some particular precautions. But, they are just as patriotic Americans as we are.

Q. Admiral Turner, we are primarily to supply foreign intelligence information for policy making foreign intelligence policy makers. Yet, it seems like the openness we are trying to achieve makes us liable to more domestic type intelligence information, such as, what countries are doing vis-a-vis gold, oil, commodities, things that impact directly on domestic policies.

A. I don't really see that. I don't think that deciding what our policy should be towards the Middle East is any less related to domestic issues than are energy proposals. I don't think helping the Defense Department decide whether we need more or less defense is any less related to our domestic policies than these other issues you have cited. How much we support the various countries in the Middle East bears on your pocketbook and your taxes. The Defense budget bears on your budget, on our budget. It has tremendous domestic political overtones. You build an airplane in California or in Kansas. Foreign policy and domestic policy are inextricably intertwined. I don't think we are getting any more into the domestic scene today than we ever have been - or are authorized to be - and we certainly are not studying domestic issues.

Q. Sir, recently the President pointed out that we spend a disproportionate share of our resources on data collection and not as much on intelligence analysis. Is there some explicit formula that we use in deciding how much to spend on analysis versus collection?

A. Absolutely not. I wish there were a formula that would help us with that because it is one of the toughest questions we have. It is like asking are we spending enough on tanks or airplanes--is there a formula for that. No, it is just too difficult, and besides, a judgment factor must always be considered too. That we are spending a disproportionate amount on collection is a common perception. It has some basis in fact. But, while we may collect more than we need today, that information is valuable for how it may help us tomorrow. Let me give you an example of recent vintage.

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So, there is value in abundant collection. No intelligence officer would want to deliberately cut down the flow of data available to him, even if he couldn't handle it all on a real-time basis. You can overdo that, and we have trouble with the Congress sometime because they think we are collecting more than we need and not utilizing it. But, I don't believe there is much that we don't scan, and get some value, negative often, out of immediately.

NFAC is cheap. Compared to one satellite, we can buy a heck of a lot of analysts. I am going to get myself in trouble here. One of the things we must do on the analytic side of NFAC and INR and DIA, is to look at the NFAC analyst more as a soldier. Somebody you hire and train for something you don't think will ever happen. You make them stay alert and ready all the time. Once in a while you use them. We haven't enough analysts working on areas that aren't of immediate use. Six years ago, how many of you would have voted to hire three analysts for [redacted] Not many. I wish you had. We must arrive at a philosophy around here where we do have people on areas that, unfortunately, nobody will pay attention to for a while. You have to somehow keep the analyst challenged despite that. We need them in other areas of expertise - food, population, resources-areas that may determine our foreign policy, our security, in the future. 25X1

I am walking all around your question. You will come back to me and say we need 500 more analysts in NFAC, and maybe we do. Maybe the climate is changing and we can do more in those areas. I can't give you any easy way to balance collection with analysis, particularly because we are in a very difficult financial situation today.

I just came from a Cabinet meeting. I can't tell you the amount of discussion of the problem of inflation and the economy of this country and its place in the world. I personally believe that the greatest security threat to our country today is not Soviet missiles, but the state of the international and the United States' economy. Yet there isn't one of us who sits there with the President who doesn't go in to him and say, boss, I need more money. That doesn't seem to be the answer right now. The Federal budget in 4 years, when we get to the '81 budget, will have gone up by 50%. From 400 billion to 600 billion dollars in round figures, in four years. We all know that a lot of that is inflationary.



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Q. You frequently comment on the need to stop leaks, and as you pointed out most of the leaks on foreign policy come from high levels of government. What can we do to change that situation?

A. I didn't quite say that. I may believe, it but I didn't say it. I think what I intimated, not said, was that leaks on foreign policy come out of the State Department, on defense policy out of the Defense Department, and so on. Some of them come from high levels. I think a lot of them come from medium levels--misguided public servants who believe the way to further a program or kill it is to leak it to the press. I think that is very misguided and it really destroys the established process of our government.

I believe all agencies have some kind of dissent system. We certainly do. I just advertised one to you--me personally. We have a formal dissent mechanism focused in [redacted] and my office. No one should feel that the only way of bringing a problem to the Agency's attention is to release it to the media. I think that happens, but I think when it does there are other, less noble motivations at work than the desire to correct a problem. I can only say to you I am beating my head against the wall against the problem of high level leaks. They will never be stopped, but I will continue to try to whittle it down, because it has got to be stopped. 25X1

Q. Inaudible.

A. It has not been brought up in my time, but I am perfectly open to considering it. We have the DCI MAG and we have a MAG in each Directorate. If we need something else to supplement those forums for passing ideas forward, I certainly would be perfectly willing to consider it. You are asking me for a snap judgment, which I can't give you. I am open minded to any proposal to improve internal communications.

Q. What do you see that we will not be able to do in the future?

A. I had a conversation this morning about one of the things we are not doing well enough today for the future and that is research and development. I just made some comments about tremendous contributions of the Agency-[redacted] 25X1
[redacted] I am worried about whether we are 25X1
plowing enough into R&D today to do that. I have a conviction, which is not very popular, and I have not made one iota of progress on implementing it, that we ought to cut back on military intelligence. I have another conviction that I have made slight progress on implementing, that we have got to cut back on Communist bloc intelligence. That seems like a heresy doesn't it? They are very important. But proportionately, they are less important today than they were. If resources are constrained, you must do two things. You must fight for more resources and you must divide up what you do have to the best advantage of today and tomorrow. I am utterly persuaded that if we received no more resources for the next decade than we have today, we would be very ill-advised to be spending so much on Soviet and military intelligence. I know I am fighting an entrenched set of beliefs when I say that, but I believe it and I will continue try to push us in those directions.

Q. Where would you shift the emphasis?

A. I would shift the emphasis to soft countries where there is a high probability of societal change. The Irans of the future. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] with tremendous natural resources that are going to play an increasing role in the world. We must get in on the ground floor today and find out about them. We won't use it for years, probably, but we must be there when the time comes. We have to understand those countries better so that our foreign policy makers can respond and react to them in the next decade; so that when they are really important countries two decades from now, we will not come in with the approach that we have today to the Caribbean and the Central American countries. We don't understand them. We should know more about food, for example. By 1995, this country may well be rationing food. That may decide whether certain populations in the world starve. That is a terrible thought. Would you continue giving food to a country that you see is going down hill because their population is growing so fast and their productivity is growing so slowiy that the more food you give them the more people there will be to perpetuate their lack of food in the future? I think that kind of a dilemma is entirely possible. Population and overall resource management will grow more important because more than oil will be important to the world in the future.

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Q. Aren't you saying then, because of what you are saying about food, and Latin America, that that would necessitate an increase in human intelligence allocation of resources, and somewhat less to the technical collection?

A. I wouldn't make that judgment. But again, I am not saying that human intelligence input won't be as great in the future. I think with satellites we ought to predict crops from every country in the world in the future. It doesn't take human intelligence to predict what is being grown in the world. If we really organize it as a nation, it is not just our business. We should be able to tell the Burmese what their crops are going to be this year, because they don't know. They don't have an accounting system, a data collection system to do it. We could do that for them with our technical systems. Population control and where it is going probably requires overt human intelligence. I think great expansion is needed in the human intelligence area in detecting societal change. But that isn't necessarily the traditional agent type human intelligence. Agents are good for predicting planned changes, where there is a plan that you can purloin. But with societal change like in Iran, an upwelling of half a dozen different movements that coalesced unusually in a true revolutionary movement, there is nobody from whom to steal a plan. But human intelligence, by having strings into the population at all levels, should have been more sensitive to change than we were in Iran. That was one of the lessons that came out of that experience. So, yes, that particular kind of human intelligence is going to expand. Some of it should be done by the State Department. A lot of it that should be done by the State Department will have to be done by us. A lot of it has to be done by us because it cannot be done as openly as the

State Department would have to do it. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] don't know how 25X1
to prejudge, to be honest with you, if there is going to be any shift of mix because of the shift of subjects that I am talking about. But, it may be a good topic for you and your group in particular to study.

Q. You have just touched on a subject that has troubled me some over the years, and that is, is the analytical capability of the policy making portion of the government growing with the pace that is commensurate with the input of intelligence? In other words, are we turning out more and more information of an intelligence nature that is not adequately being utilized by the policy making analysts?

A. That is another good question on which I wish I could give you a definitive answer, but I really can't. I think the answer is closer to no than yes. That then puts another load on us to be sure that our product is as digestible as possible and is put out in a form that can be assimilated by the existing analytical processes of the policy makers, without it turning into policy advice. Oversimplified, if you are turning out 50 page monographs and they really can't read more than 20, you better at least have a 20 page summary on the 50 page monograph. It means tailoring our intelligence, not the content, to the needs of the policy makers as best we can. There is an explosion of potential for how we might present intelligence in the future which I don't think we have nearly tapped. We may be able to help the underworked policy analyst by giving him material in a way that he can process and utilize more efficiently, therefore one analyst will stretch for one and a half.

My ambition is to send the President his PDB every morning on a cathode ray tube. The President would have a key that only he and maybe 4 other people in the government have. When he puts that key in and presses a button he can get a menu of say the four topics of the day. Press button A, Mr. President, and you will get topic A. If you don't want topic A, press button B and you will get topic B. While you are reading, press this control lever and the text will move faster or slower as your reading ability permits. The key to the President would be all codewords. There would be no hard copies for anybody to Xerox. Different people would have different keys and would get different menus. They wouldn't have to have a messenger to pick it up and deliver it and all that kind of wasted routine, and we would have much greater security. That is a poor answer to your question, but it an example of the kind of thing we might be able to do. Plug one of those into a policy office and people could skip around and get what they wanted instead of having to go through all kinds of things to get to what really interests them. You could probably have a system in your own

little cathode ray tube which would automatically sort for you, if you wanted to screen in advance. Nothing on Uruguay for me, I don't care about that, and so on.

Q. Inaudible.

A. Yes, I have a hard time sometimes myself realizing which hat I am wearing. One of the most successful changes that has come over the intelligence community in the last several years, because of the increased authorities that the President has given to the DCI as part of his interest in and his faith in us as a Community has been the budgetary authority. I believe I can say without much danger of contradiction that all the members of the Community and the Congress and the OMB believe that in the last two years the budget has been put together in a far more effective way by the RMS staff than before; much more equitably and with the key issues better portrayed so that I can make my decisions better and those who then second guess can also do that better. I think it is a real success story for which there is a lot of credit due [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] and his people. And yes, I have to look at the Agency 25X1
budget and then turn my hat around and look at it as a part of the overall Community. It is a very tough job. I try to be as impartial as I can, but clearly I know more about our budget than I do any other budget. I have more sense of pain when I have to cut something out of our budget because I know it came out of you and I know you. I know what you are doing and I know how important it is. But I have to also try to be aware of what is best for the overall Community, best for the country. Those are tough decisions and I don't know if I make them well or not, but I try to be as honest and forthright as I can.

I deliberately stay out of the detail of the Agency budget process. I give guidance to Frank Carlucci in the beginning, I keep track of it in the middle and then I am there for the crunch decisions on the ZBB rankings towards the end. I find that works well. It gives me enough to make the basic policy decisions on our budget without getting so steeped in the internal details of it that I may become overly zealous for us. It is a tough role, but I think it is one that has worked suitably for the Agency and the other Community elements and, as I say, it has only been 2 weeks since the President mentioned to me personally that, with the exception of some small agency whose name I can't remember, we have a record of making the best budget submission under the ZBB process in the government.

The Collection Tasking Staff is off to a good start. It has only been a year this week that it has been an authorized element of the Community. Congressional approval came in October of last year. Just as we got the approval they put a freeze on hiring in the whole government, so it has had its problems getting staffed and going. It is my view that intelligence is two functions: collecting data, and analyzing and producing finished intelligence. NFAC is

my vice president for the latter. Collection Tasking is my vice president for the former. It makes a great deal of sense to me when you have 2 functions in your factory to have a vice president for each one. Between them you put a vice president for comptrollership and budget. I run with three vice presidents, Collection Tasking, RMS for budgets and NFAC for production and I am confident that those three are needed.

I had some very painful experiences in my first months here when there was no way to bring together all of the collection elements necessary to be sure the Community does the job it must. effective and most economical way. The proof that CTS is working The worth of the Collection Tasking Staff can be seen in the tremendous job that Zeke Zellmer did just in the last few days, for instance, in pulling together for me one of the most critical decisions I am going to have to make in my whole tenure here between several collecting elements. It is just very valuable to have somebody who is standing in between the advocacy of system A and system B and not overlooking the fact that an entirely different system that nobody thought of over here in C could also contribute.

So I am excited at the direction the Community is going. I find a much greater sense of community spirit, cooperation, recognition that we do have to pull together.

I would say to you finally, that the more the Community improves, the more the DCI can be the leader of the Community, the more the Agency improves. I may be indiscreet to say this on television, but the Agency improves when the Community improves because in every element we are the best. We are not the biggest in all elements of collection or analysis, but we have the most professionalism. We, as an Agency, cannot thrive today in the intelligence world, without absolute teamwork and cooperation with the NSA, the NRO, the DIA and the other elements of the Intelligence Community anymore than, as I said in my remarks, anyone of our Directorates can survive and thrive and do their job without teamwork with the other Directorates. On the Community level, we are the real sparkplug. Without us it will never succeed. We must maintain the high quality and the high standards that we set for everybody. That is a tremendous responsibility. It is one that sits on all of our shoulders. Working together we are going to keep it that way and ensure that our successors have the same capability that you and I do today. Thank you.