CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

29 January 1982

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Deputy Director, Office of External Affairs

SUBJECT: Turner Interviews with the Media

1. Here are the clips you requested of Turner's interviews with the media. The first batch are with news magazines such as "U.S. News and World Report," the second are interviews on major T.V. shows.

2. Notice that by 1980, that being an election year, Turner refrained from granting any such interviews.

Lavon B. Strong

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

IS WORST OVER FOR CIA?

Stansfield Turner
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SPECIAL REPORT

IS WORST OVER FOR CIA?

Scandals over assassination plots and spying on Americans are a thing of the past. But new troubles now are cropping up to plague the agency that is Washington's eyes and ears around the world.

President Carter in March of 1977 plucked an Annapolis classmate out of the Navy and gave him the job of reviving a battered and demoralized Central Intelligence Agency.

It was a daunting assignment that Adm. Stansfield Turner took on—to repair the damage caused by revelations that the 32-year-old intelligence agency had spied illegally on Americans, planned assassination attempts against foreign leaders and experimented with mind-bending drugs without the knowledge of the people involved.

Now, two years later, a new controversy is raging around the CIA. The basic question: Has Turner set the agency on the road to recovery after five years of turmoil—or is he plunging it into an even more crippling crisis?

On one side, critics charge that, under Turner, the agency today is in deeper trouble than ever before, with plummeting morale, a large-scale exodus of key officials and serious strains in the CIA's relations with the rest of the nation's intelligence community. They point out that President Carter himself has complained about the quality of political intelligence, particularly in connection with the revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran.

On the other side, Turner and his supporters contend that the current turbulence is insignificant and, in effect, healthy. They maintain that it merely reflects an overdue basic reorganization that is adapting the CIA to cope with vast political and technological changes in today's world.

What, in fact, is happening to the agency that is this country's eyes and ears around the globe?

Why have there been "intelligence failures?" Have there been any recent successes?

Have restrictions designed to avoid misdeeds of the past emasculated the CIA, rendering it impotent to gather information and influence events abroad?

Over all, is the CIA on its way up—or still on the skids?

To find answers to these and other questions, staff members of *U.S.News & World Report* talked to scores of persons in this country and abroad—veteran officials at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va., CIA operatives overseas, foreign intelligence experts, military commanders, members of Congress and White House advisers. Here, told largely in their own words, is how these insiders see what has happened to the CIA and where it is heading:

Turner: Triumph or Disaster?

Comment from within the intelligence community begins, and often ends, with one man: Stansfield Turner. He took over the CIA after a brilliant career in the Navy—from Rhodes Scholar to Pentagon "whiz kid," from innovative commandant of the Naval War College to commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's southern flank.

"There were some misgivings about Turner from the beginning at the CIA," says one intelligence professional. "But he came in with as much good will as he could conceivably get. No one had more open doors around town."

Many of those doors, this associate adds, are no longer open to Turner. "He wants very tight categorical control over the entire intelligence community and the CIA," the expert reports. "He gets frustrated by any resistance. When there has been resistance, there has been instant outrage, great trauma. He is abusive, abrasive, autocratic."

Early in his tenure, Turner moved to consolidate his control over the intelligence community—something none of his predecessors had succeeded in doing. He received a major boost when President Carter signed an order giving him control over the budget not only for the CIA but for all the intelligence activities of the Pentagon and other government agencies.

"Amateurs" at the top. "Turner has built a separate corporation with a deputy and four senior vice presidents," says a military-intelligence official. "They operate as though they feel they are entitled to run the whole intelligence community. All these six people are new guys on the street. There isn't a one who knows anything about running an intelligence operation. It doesn't work." He adds about Turner: "He's the busiest director of central intelligence I've ever seen—and the least accessible. He has three offices—in the Executive Office Building, another near the White House and Langley. What does he do with three offices?"

Reports another intelligence executive about the CIA chief: "Turner moves from one event to another with quickly assembled fact sheets. He is prepared to be very glib. But ask three questions, and you've exhausted his knowledge. If anyone tries to tell him that, he becomes intensely angry. You then see his essential and basic arrogance and ego. His judgment of his own capabilities is not shared by close observers."

Mass exodus. Within the CIA, frustrations over criticism, new restrictions and Turner's style of operating, coupled with government incentives for early retirements, have contributed to a flood of departures: 400 retirements in 1977, 650 in 1978, nearly 200 just in January of this year. Typical comments by those getting out: "The mystique is gone." "Our teeth have been pulled." "We've become pussycats in a den of lions."

One man with a good vantage point in the agency took a look at the names of those retiring in January and termed the situation "a disaster."

"The best people in the organization, the new generation of leadership that Turner ought to be building and relying on into the 1980s, are fading out because it has just gotten flatly intolerable," he says. "I would say half a dozen of the best people out there who should have been at the very top of that agency in the early '80s have left within the last six months. I know of at least six more who told me they might. That's an indicator of how bad it is."

Frank Carlucci, Turner's deputy and a career foreign-service officer who has served as ambassador to Portugal, argues

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that most of the early retirements are caused by quirks in the pension law, not unhappiness with the CIA chief or with the agency.

"This is not to say that the problems involving the CIA have not had an impact," notes Carlucci. "But relatively few seem to be because people are unhappy with our management. I have gotten one bitter letter; Stan has gotten two or three."

One persistent rumor in the intelligence community is that Carlucci has come close to resigning in the year since he came to the CIA. Carlucci says his relationship with Turner is "evolving well," and adds: "We all have our ups and downs in jobs. It is fair to say I have not contemplated resignation."

A remote boss. Part of the problem at the CIA is blamed on what some see as Turner's remoteness. "He has acted like a Navy captain isolated on the bridge," comments an intelligence veteran. "Communications have been appalling."

Another insider tells this anecdote: "In the summer of 1977, Turner finally went down to the agency dining room one day. He expected people might stand up, maybe clap. They didn't do anything. It finally dawned on him that they didn't know who he was. He was a stranger."

Philip Agee, ex-CIA man, now attacks agency.

Not everyone in the intelligence field is critical of the CIA chief. One recently retired specialist gives Turner some good marks: "The advantage Stan had is that he understood the necessity for operational support to the tactical commanders. Intelligence came out better in the budget this year than the Office of Management and Budget wanted it to. It is one of the best budgets I've seen put together. He has done a creditable job. He is very intelligent, confident and self-assured, and he has the confidence of the President."

Legal straitjacket. A CIA veteran who has moved into a top position under Turner cites two laws that have "heightened the anxiety level the operators must contend with." They are the Freedom of Information Act, which has opened many agency files to the public, and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974, which restricts the agency's covert activities.

Says Deputy Director Carlucci: "The grimmest side in its darkest form is that our people see the most essential tool of their trade being eroded. The heart of this business is protecting your sources and methods. It is increasingly difficult for our staffers to look an agent in the eye and say, 'I can protect my sources.' That, to me, is the most serious

A Spy's Life Means Long Hours, Lots of "Contracts"

Working as a CIA operative means long hours, frustration, some danger—and very little actual spying.

"I wouldn't walk down the street past the Kremlin," says one intelligence official, whose open Irish face would be an instant giveaway in any event. "We get Soviet nationals to do that. We don't steal documents; we have someone else get them for us."

Says Frank Carlucci, deputy director of central intelligence: "It is a misconception that our people spend most of their time moving around trying to pick up information in bars and photographing documents with secret cameras. Actually, their mission is to establish what is essentially a contractual relationship with people in key positions who might otherwise be inaccessible to our diplomats overseas."

From chauffeur to administrator. CIA officers involved in espionage work for the Directorate of Operations, headed by John McMahon, who has spent his career with the agency. Overseas, CIA operatives are almost always under cover. The thickness of the cover depends on the sensitivity of the assignment. In some foreign capitals, the station chief is widely known as such. Other CIA personnel work openly for the U.S. government in roles ranging from chauffeurs to foreign-aid administrators. Many work under even deeper cover in occupations that have no obvious connection to the government.

"Our man is a case officer or staffer," explains a CIA official. "The agent is a foreign national, a spy."

The CIA staffer receives intelligence targets as the result of a bureaucratic process that may begin with the President himself. He or she is told what information is required and who is likely to have it. Sometimes the requests are urgent, perhaps involving information needed to make sense of something seen by a spy satellite. It is the staffer's job to develop sources of information, provide them with tools of the trade such as miniature cameras and recording equipment and to serve as their clandestine contact for getting the information back to Washington.

Basis for policy. Much of the data obtained overseas goes directly to top government officials. It also goes to the CIA's Directorate for National Intelligence, headed by Robert Bowie, a former Harvard professor. There, hundreds of analysts, working in an atmosphere much like that of a university, search for trends and write reports that often serve as the basis for long-range government policy.

Because they have to put in enough time at their routine jobs to make their cover appear plausible, CIA case officers often work long hours in the evenings making contact with their strings of agents. Says one CIA insider: "Running agents takes a lot of time; you have to be very careful."

Some operatives who work in sensitive positions even keep the nature of their jobs secret from their children. Others can be more open. One wife of a military-intelligence officer tells of the time her husband was assigned to a Balkan country. On rides through the countryside, the family would play a game: The prize went to the one who spotted the most radar sites.

For their work overseas, CIA staffers receive the same pay and allowances as other government employes. Base pay ranges from $17,532 for a beginner to $47,500 for a station chief.

Few CIA operatives enjoy the satisfaction of public recognition for a job well done. There may be a medal presented by the President, but it will be pinned on in secret.

For others, the end may simply be anonymous death. One wall of the entrance lobby at headquarters in Langley, Va., bears 35 stars in memory of CIA employes who lost their lives in the service of their country.

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Gathering Secrets—a Crowded Field

A dozen separate agencies, spread throughout the government, make up the U.S. intelligence community:

Central Intelligence Agency
Collects intelligence overseas, coordinates work of other agencies and disseminates intelligence.

Defense Intelligence Agency
Provides military intelligence, primarily for Pentagon officials.

National Security Agency
Monitors radio, telegraph and radar traffic of other countries, cracks foreign codes.

Air Force Intelligence
Gathers intelligence of special interest to the Air Force, including bombing targets.

Army Intelligence
Gets intelligence of interest to the Army, including order of battle of potential foes.

Office of Naval Intelligence
Gathers information on foreign navies.

National Reconnaissance Office
A secret agency that operates the country's spy satellites.

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Keeps track of foreign spies and collects foreign intelligence in the U.S.

Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Arm of the State Department that gathers foreign political, economic and political-military data.

Treasury Department
Collects foreign financial information and, through the Secret Service, protects the White House.

Energy Department
Monitors foreign nuclear-weapons tests and collects data on foreign energy matters.

Drug Enforcement Administration
Collects and disseminates intelligence on foreign and domestic aspects of narcotics traffic.

problem we face." Carlucci adds that the agency has three employes working full time to provide information demanded from his personal file by Philip Agee, a former CIA official who now is writing books and articles disclosing names and addresses of agency personnel in foreign cities.

Agee, however, is not the only problem for the agency. A CIA official who recently completed a tour of agency offices aoroad complains of leaks of sensitive information. "I have never seen leaking like this," he said. "You pick up the newspaper, and you see things directly out of the *NID*—the *National Intelligence Daily*. Just quoted, verbatim."

As a result of one recent leak, the official says, two sources were lost in one country—one of them presumed killed—and another source was lost in a second country.

Intelligence Hits and Misses

What do CIA "customers" think of its information?

A top Pentagon official says: "I have to say they do a good job, although never perfect. They're great on current events. The problems come with long-range interpretations. There, they don't do as well. Some of the fault may lie with policymakers like myself. Maybe we should be smarter in asking our questions in the first place."

From an influential White House aide comes this complaint: "We get lots of facts and figures and not enough interpretation and assessment of what they mean. It's getting more and more difficult to find people who can write a good, clear analytical sentence."

Turner himself admits that the agency must bear down on its long-range forecasts, saying: "I think the U.S. has got to play its role in a longer-term, more subtle, more fundamental way than putting a finger in the dikes—to anticipate problems rather than react to problems."

Gun-shy agency. A top White House official offers this overall assessment of the CIA: "Sixty to 70 percent of the problems over there have nothing to do with Admiral Turner or this administration. The CIA has been through a very rough period the last five years and as a result they are gun-shy, less willing to stick their necks out on forecasts."

Despite these problems, he adds: "What they give us is good; it's very good. They were right on top of the China-Vietnam thing, for example."

A ranking military-intelligence expert reports another agency success: "When Argentina and Chile were disputing over the Beagle Channel islands, Argentina was all ready to go to war. But we had that covered. We passed the information on to the State Department, which was able to get the Vatican to mediate and settle the dispute. This was a case where good intelligence prevented a war."

From a key administration official: "The CIA does a remarkable job on strategic intelligence. The whole technical intelligence side, while not without some problems, is remarkable. We couldn't even think of having a SALT agreement without this capability." The same official complains, however, about the cutback in covert activities by

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the CIA to influence other governments rather than to gather information. He contends: "The CIA's capability to execute covert maneuvers has been largely neutralized. This reduces by one whole dimension the community's ability to effectively do its job."

Spies vs. technology. Does the CIA rely too much on satellites and other gadgets and not enough on people—that is, spies?

Senator Daniel P Moynihan (D-N.Y.) thinks so. Noting that the CIA needs permission from the President and must report to seven congressional committees to launch a covert operation, he argues: "It means that what you have is a place in Langley, Va., doing research—research that might well be done by the Library of Congress." And a top Pentagon official says: "Our technology is far better than that of the Soviets. But human intelligence is so very important. Technology can tell you about capabilities, but it takes human intelligence to know intentions."



204 Who Peer Over CIA's Shoulder

The CIA must report on its activities to no fewer than eight congressional committees—

House	Members	Staff
Intelligence	13	11
Armed Services	45	3
Foreign Affairs	34	3
Appropriations	10	3
Senate		
Intelligence	11	3
Armed Services	17	12
Foreign Relations	15	3
Appropriations	18	3

ALL TOLD, 163 members of Congress and 41 committee employes have regular access to CIA secrets.

Another defense expert disagrees that too much is being spent on technology at the expense of human intelligence, declaring: "The charge that we are relying too much on machines is a red herring. The hardware always looks like it's dominating the intelligence operation because it's so big in the budget. You could pour as much as you could into analysis and human intelligence, and it still wouldn't change the percentage very much."

Turnaround on Capitol Hill

"Congress is in full retreat from the notion that it should impose strict and detailed restrictions on the activities of the CIA," an experienced analyst reports.

A key Senate staff member sums up the feeling: "With the almost daily revelations of wrongdoing by the agency a couple of years ago, there was real doubt up here about whether we should even have something like the CIA. But there seems to be a feeling now of trust in the CIA by people in the House and Senate—that the agency is being run in a manner that won't allow abuses to occur."

Congress is still debating details of a new CIA charter that will outline what the agency may and may not legally do. An influential House staff member says of the legislation: "In the short run, it will free up the CIA in an operational way. Right now, because of the abuses of the past several years, the agency is hunkered down, afraid to do anything. It is being overly conservative, to the detriment of our interests. We've seen the effect of this in Europe, with our capability to collect data about political terrorists. And, in the long run, absent a charter bill, the CIA could slip back into ways of the bad old days."

Representative Charles Rose (D-N.C.), a member of the House Intelligence Committee, says: "There's no doubt about it—the mood, the pressure for curbs is not at all what it was a couple of years ago. Most of us—and I've been a real skeptic—were ready to throw a few babies out with the bath water. But they are keeping their skirts clean these days out at Langley."

Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), a member of the Senate panel and an outspoken critic of the CIA, reports: "Sentiment for restrictions—at least the closely detailed kind—is ebbing fast now. The idea now is to help the agency get back on its feet, not discourage it from doing a more competent job."

The View From Overseas

Europeans are dismayed by the damage inflicted on the CIA by public criticism in the U.S. and exposure of agency operations. The Germans call it *Selbstzerfleischung*, which means self-laceration.

An analyst in the Mediterranean area reports: "Senior foreign security men have complained privately to American officials, and at least one European agency chief reacted by starting to hold back certain information he had previously shared routinely with the CIA."

One European official says: "We are also worried about all the books and magazine articles by former CIA officers in which they spill the agency's secrets. Such exposés can compromise our sources and embarrass our governments."

Another European expert on intelligence makes this observation: "The disclosures in Washington seriously weakened effectiveness of the agency. The security services of other countries and individual contacts have been much more reluctant to cooperate for fear of themselves being exposed."

"No one minimizes the importance of what U.S. intelligence chooses to concentrate upon," reports an Allied spokesman. "It is what it misses, or in the end dismisses, that worries foreign governments. The U.S. has yet to show that it fully understands the importance in today's world of 'soft' intelligence—the reporting and analysis of not only political, but also social, religious and economic developments affecting ordinary people."

Overage agents. Cutbacks in personnel have changed the way the CIA operates overseas. In the Far East, for instance, agency manpower was slashed by nearly half shortly after Turner took over. Part of the gap was filled in Japan by increased cooperation from Japanese intelligence agencies.

Despite reductions in manpower, a top CIA official in Washington asserts that the agency still has the world well covered. He says: "We can do the job with the resources we

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have. There are lots of parts of the world that make me nervous, but not because we are absent from them."

Of more concern to CIA executives than the number of agents overseas is the fact that many of them are relatively old for the cloak-and-dagger business. Twenty-seven percent of field personnel are over 50. Says one agency official: "Where we are short is on young blood. We let the pipeline dry out. But we will remedy that."

What's Next for the CIA?

With all its troubles, most American and Allied intelligence experts rate the CIA as the best in the world at what it does.

From a senior European security officer: "The CIA works hard and digs deep. Probably nobody else, including the Russians, amasses a greater volume of information. Yet there appear to be specific gaps and weaknesses in the final product."

The CIA's Carlucci says: "I don't think there is any question but what we are the foremost intelligence operation in the world—over all. In technology, we're ahead. On the analytic side, we're clearly ahead."

A top Pentagon official notes: "Our intelligence is still by far the best in the world, far better than the Russians'. You're never as good as you would like to be, but we're the best in the world—better across the board."

A ranking military-intelligence specialist has some reservations: "We clearly have the best intelligence-gathering technology in the world. But I think the Soviet Union may have the most effective intelligence apparatus in the world. Their leaders know better what we are doing than we know of what they are doing."

From these wide-ranging conversations with intelligence "producers" and "consumers" in the U.S. and abroad, what overall conclusions emerge concerning the current health of the CIA and its prospects?

The intelligence agency under Turner has recovered much of the trust Congress had lost in it. The lawmakers are less interested in imposing new restrictions to guard against excesses than they are in preventing any further weakening of the nation's espionage capabilities.

But there is still no sign that Congress is prepared to allow the agency to engage again in the kinds of covert operations abroad that a decade ago constituted a major U.S. weapon against Soviet machinations around the world.

Recapturing the confidence of potential agents overseas and of foreign intelligence organizations is a tougher proposition as long as former agency staff members, as well as members of Congress and administration officials, continue to leak CIA secrets.

The jury is still out on the long-term impact of the "Turner revolution"—whether it actually will lead to a more efficient and effective intelligence operation. But many doubt that the potential benefits will justify the continuing turmoil throughout the intelligence community.

There is a consensus that controversy will dog the CIA as long as the former admiral remains at the helm. But the prospect of a change is widely discounted. For Turner still seems to command the confidence of the one man who counts most—his former Annapolis classmate now in the White House. □

This article was written by Associate Editor Orr Kelly, with assistance from other staff members in Washington and overseas.

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Interview With CIA Director Stansfield Turner

Admiral Turner's View: Turmoil "Has Been Worth It"

Sagging morale, mass resignations, too many leaks, failure in Iran. To understand the charges, says the nation's intelligence chief, it's necessary to grasp revolutionary changes in the business of spying.

Q. Admiral Turner, has the CIA been emasculated in the past several years, as critics allege?

A. Actually, I think it's much better than in the past. The technological collection systems have come along, and they're constantly growing in capability. And our sophistication in utilizing them is increasing.

There is more productive activity in the human-intelligence field today than there was last year or the year before. It's just as important to us, and it's being emphasized more and more.

Q. You have been criticized for filling most of the top jobs in the agency with outside amateurs. Why have you done that?

A. I brought in a group of seasoned people, not amateurs. Frank Carlucci, the deputy director of the CIA, played an intelligence role as an ambassador, as head of a country team. John Koehler, who's in charge of budgets, came from the Congressional Budget Office and from the Rand Corporation. He's well familiar with the budgeting process. Gen. Frank Camm, who is in charge of tasking, is a man with 30-some years of military experience. No military man ever has been in command without commanding intelligence assets as well as combat assets. So my "vice presidents" are not inexperienced in the kinds of things that are needed here.

But the operating elements of the CIA—the clandestine collection, the scientific collection, fields where you need people who have been there for years—are run by CIA professionals.

In addition, I believe that it was a good time to give a new perspective on intelligence because there are profound changes that affect the intelligence world.

Q. What are these changes?

A. First, the U.S. role in the world is changing. Second, technology is changing in the way you do intelligence. Third, the American public is much more interested in what we in the intelligence community do than it was 10 years ago. And fourth, the CIA is maturing. It's graduated its first generation. We're coming into a new era in the agency.

In light of these changes, I think it has been important at this stage to have people with an open mind.

Q. Why do we hear so much about morale problems at the CIA and early retirement of so many of your people?

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A I've tried to point out there are a lot of frustrations as you make substantial changes. And, yes, some people get discouraged because they just don't know how to adjust to these changes.

One of the factors is the maturing of the CIA that I mentioned earlier. Twenty-seven percent of our clandestine professionals are 50 years of age and older. We can't tolerate that, because there's going to be a gap somewhere. That's why I peeled some off a year ago—because I wanted to start filling that gap sooner, instead of letting them all stay another three or four years and then suddenly finding I have over 30 percent who would be leaving within 2, 3 or 4 years of each other.

We've got a real problem here in that we've matured without bringing along the replacements in adequate measure. And because of that, there are a lot of people leaving.

And, lastly, let me say that our government induces people to leave. Take one of the fellows who retired last January 12—that was the magic date around here for a lot of technical reasons. If he had stayed another year and a half, his annual retirement for the rest of his life would have been a couple of thousand dollars less every year.

Q Your critics say that you've created a great deal of turmoil in an agency that already was demoralized. Was it necessary?

A Oh, no question it's been worth it, in my view. You don't adapt to the forces of change that I've described without some unsettling.

Take, for example, the greater openness and control. I don't think any public institution can thrive that doesn't have the support of the American people. We lost a great deal of that support because of a strong suspicion that we're doing things we shouldn't be doing.

We've become more open—publishing more, giving more interviews, answering press responses more—so that the American public will understand better what we are doing.

On top of that, the country has established a set of controls for intelligence today such as has never been exercised before in any intelligence operation in the world of this magnitude. We have to expose much more of what we do to the intelligence-oversight board, to the National Security Council and to the two oversight committees of the Congress. These are very traumatic experiences for intelligence professionals to go through.

Q Can you run an effective intelligence organization with so much accountability and openness?

A I think we can. But it'll be two or three more years before I can say we are doing it. It will take a refining of the procedures in our dealings with the intelligence committees, with the oversight board and so on. In my opinion, this is moving in a healthy direction.

Q Are foreign intelligence agencies, such as the British and Israeli, reluctant to cooperate with you for fear of compromising their secrets?

A There's no question that people are nervous about that. Where we are most vulnerable is in what's known as covert action—influencing events, not collecting intelligence. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment requires us to report to seven committees on covert actions. We would like to see that narrowed to the two congressional oversight committees. That would help.

But let me suggest that other countries are beginning to face the same problem. In Britain, the Official Secrets Act is now on weaker ground. The Germans have a Bundestag committee that came over and talked to me about what we are doing. The Italians have moved part of their intelligence out of the military into the Prime Minister's office.

In short, democracies are no longer as comfortable with unaccountable intelligence people around. We're blazing the trail in finding out how to get the right balance between necessary secrecy and accountability. I think we're coming out well.

Q With so many congressional committees in the act, have covert actions become impossible?

A No. But it is most difficult to undertake a covert activity where there's a high probability of a lot of controversy over it.

Q So, for all practical purposes, potentially controversial covert actions have been turned off—

A Yes. On the other hand, what this means is that there's more likely to be a national consensus behind any covert action undertaken today than there was in the past. I think it should be that way.

Q Turning to the criticism of the agency's political analysis: What do you say to charges that you are devoting too much of your resources to day-to-day developments—competing with daily papers—rather than working on long-term trends?

A They're right. We've been working for two years to start shifting it. But it can't be done overnight. The intelligence community—more so in Defense than in the CIA—has a culture that's oriented toward current intelligence. The rewards go to the quick-response people.

It's taking a while to shift that emphasis, and it's causing turmoil. Some people are unhappy because they don't want to get shunted off in what they think is a closet where they'll be doing long-term research. That is just one of the fundamental changes that must be made in the way we handle the analytic process. And, of course, it's disconcerting to people.

Q Wasn't President Carter expressing dissatisfaction with the job you've done by writing a memo complaining of inadequacies in political intelligence in the Iran crisis?

A The memo was addressed to three people—Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski and myself. The thrust of it was: "Are you guys bringing it all together?" Most of the information that was lacking was available without a spy in the system or a satellite. I'm not trying to absolve myself or the agency or the intelligence community. This memo isn't the first I've had that's been critical.

Critical memos are not the only ones I have received. I've received handwritten memos in both directions, over and above this one that got blown up unnecessarily. And I would hardly think that I could go through two years in this job without some constructive suggestion from my boss.

Q Where did you go wrong in Iran?

A It wasn't as though we were sitting here and saying to the President, "Gee, it's sweetness and light in Iran." We were reporting there were all kinds of problems. But most of us felt they wouldn't coalesce into a big enough problem that the Shah couldn't handle. I think most people felt that here's a guy with a police force, with an army, with a one-man government. What inhibitions does he have in suppressing these things? The Shah himself didn't judge it right.

So the fact that we misjudged that the situation would boil over is not a true measure of whether the intelligence community is serving the country properly. I don't guarantee that I'll predict the next coup, the next overthrow of government, the next election surprise.

More than making those predictions, what we're here for is to be sure the policymakers see the trends that they can do something about. Even if I'd told the policymakers on October 5 that there was going to be a major upheaval on November 5 in Iran, there was nothing they could do.

Q We've been hearing a great deal lately about a "mole" in the CIA—that is, a KGB agent who has penetrated your agency. Does that worry you?

A Well, it's an annoyance. I have no evidence that makes me concerned that we've got a mole. But I'll never say that we don't have one, because I don't want to be complacent. □

For Agents in Moscow, Snooping Is Risky Work

MOSCOW

Here in Russia, operations of the CIA are shrouded in mystery even more than usual.

Identities of CIA employes working out of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow are a tightly guarded secret. It is doubtful that most personnel in the embassy, let alone outsiders, know who the CIA officers are.

Nevertheless, incidents in recent years have disclosed enough about the nature and scope of the agency's activities in the U.S.S.R. to make it possible to put together this partial profile:

- Much of U.S. intelligence here involves electronic surveillance and interception of Soviet communications.
- CIA agents are routinely assigned to the U.S. Embassy under cover as political, defense and consular officers. Estimates of just how many of the embassy's 98 staff members work for the CIA range from 10 to 45 percent.
- Classic cloak-and-dagger espionage is still part and parcel of the work done by Moscow-based CIA operatives. In one recent case, ampules of poison were involved.
- Contrary to general belief, the CIA does appear to have a number of Russian citizens working for it as agents inside the Soviet system.

In theory, the enormous diversity of the U.S.S.R., the strains between Russians and Soviet minorities, the tens of thousands of disgruntled Jews who wish to emigrate, the ruthless nature of the Soviet state and the suppression of many basic human rights argue that there should be plenty of scope here for foreign intelligence services.

In practice, the CIA and all other Western agencies here operate under enormous handicaps—far greater than those limiting KGB activities in the U.S.

All travel and contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners are tightly circumscribed. About 85 percent of the U.S.S.R. is effectively off limits to foreigners. The Soviet KGB employs unlimited resources to keep tabs on all resident foreigners.

Closed and secretive by instinct, Soviet society itself acts as a natural barrier to the eyes of prying outsiders. What evidence there is suggests that the CIA tries to get around this problem by recruiting Soviet citizens while they are abroad and by befriending potentially anti-Soviet Eastern Europeans stationed in Moscow.

In at least one area of life in the Soviet Union, the CIA has been embroiled in controversy for some time. This is the matter of dissidents.

Many dissidents have had access to valuable information on closed scientific-research institutes. Soviet authorities frequently accuse the CIA of trying to subvert dissidents to obtain such data, and the CIA just as often denies it has infiltrated the movement. Whatever the truth, the allegation that the CIA has been involved with the dissidents has helped to destroy them as a real force in Soviet society, since they have become linked in the minds of Russians with a hostile foreign organization.

Twice in the last two years, the U.S. Embassy has been publicly embarrassed by revelations—neither confirmed nor denied in Washington—of CIA activities here. In July of 1977, Martha D. Peterson, supposedly a consular official in the embassy, was caught delivering espionage equipment to a Soviet citizen. She was subsequently expelled. Two months later, another embassy employe, Vincent Crockett, who was listed as an "archivist," was expelled after he was caught trying to collect material left at a "drop" in Moscow by a Soviet citizen later convicted as a spy.

In the nature of things, it is the failures of the CIA rather than the successes that become public knowledge. But confidence that his identity will not be disclosed is essential before any Soviet insider would come forward to help the West, as did Oleg Penkovsky, a colonel in Soviet military intelligence, who gave the British important information in the early 1960s—before being found out and shot. After all that has happened in the last few years, it would take a brave Russian to emulate Penkovsky.

This report was written by Robin Knight, chief of the magazine's Moscow bureau.

Questions and answers
on reverse page

NEWSWEEK
Article appeared on page 41-44

Is the CIA Hobbled?

The Central Intelligence Agency is under fire once again. For years, the CIA was accused—often recklessly—of doing too much, of hatching too many plots against too many foreign leaders and violating the rights of too many Americans. The abuse-of-power issue is rarely heard anymore. Now, in the aftermath of intelligence failures in Iran, Afghanistan and other countries, the CIA stands accused of doing too little. "We don't have a lot of good intelligence," charges one of the government's highest ranking intelligence officers. "The value of what we have to analyze in almost any part of the world is far less than satisfactory—and far less than most Americans think we have."

The most critical failure came in Iran. In August 1977, the CIA reported that "the Shah will be an active participant in Iranian life well into the 1980s." A year later, an agency study said that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a 'pre-revolutionary' situation." Once the extent of the debacle was clear, President Carter and a House committee sharply criticized the CIA's performance. The agency's top Iranian analyst and his two immediate superiors chose to retire. "When people hash over what has been known about Iran, the most significant things were in newspapers—and not necessarily our own," complains one Administration official.

HAMPERED BY POLICY

In part, the CIA was hampered by America's support of the Shah, which prevented CIA agents in Iran from infiltrating the opposition. Policy also interfered with the analysis of intelligence, encouraging experts—at the State Department, the National Security Council and the CIA—to underestimate the Shah's vulnerability. At one point, the CIA even dismissed direct warnings from at least one foreign intelligence agency that the Shah faced serious internal unrest and the threat of Soviet destabilization.

There are also serious questions about Washington's ability to keep intelligence secrets. Some foreign intelligence agencies are holding back information they once freely shared with the CIA, and their chiefs complain privately about the potential for leaks from the eight Congressional committees that oversee the CIA. They are also claiming that former CIA men are able to publish books containing sensitive inside information. Beyond that, the theft of a highly classified manual by a young CIA employee named William Kampiles last year, and the apparent suicide of John Arthur Paisley, a veteran specialist on the Soviet Union, have raised new concerns over security at the CIA.

CIA director Stansfield Turner, 55, gets a large share of blame for the agency's problems. In his two-year tenure, Turner has presided over the most thoroughgoing shake-up of the CIA since its creation in the cold-war days of 1947, and the mood in some corners of the agency is bitter. Soon after taking office, Admiral Turner sent pink slips to some 800 veteran employees, and since then, hundreds of experienced agents have taken early retirement, draining the agency's clandestine operations of veteran spies. Some sources inside and outside the agency agree with Turner that the house cleaning was beneficial, clearing out an intelligence Establishment too set in its ways and finally permitting the advancement of younger people. But others, like a veteran station chief in Asia, say Turner has "gutted" the CIA's operational division and created a "disastrous morale problem."

In his shake-up, Turner decided to appoint outsiders—from Harvard, the Rand Corporation, the Congressional Budget Office and even the Social Security Administration—to run almost every CIA division. "It goes down hard when a whole new set of guys comes in with, if not hostility, at least deep skepticism about the CIA's capabilities and good sense," says one displaced agency official. And the newcomers generated more hostility by farming out some important assignments. "Any time the agency has to go out and have Rand or TRW write an estimate for us, we ought to go out of business," says another senior official.

Bruce Hoertel

Turner: 'I'm a controversial person'

RESOURCES AND PRIORITIES

But the weakness in U.S. intelligence goes far beyond Turner's alleged managerial shortcomings. For one thing, all the intelligence agencies are limited by a budget that has not grown in real terms for several years. And some experts believe that too large a portion of the remaining resources are used on military studies of the Soviet Union—at the expense of important economic and political developments elsewhere. "The U.S. really hasn't caught up to the very ordinary business of learning a great deal about what has become a very large world," says one top Pentagon official.

For another thing, the CIA seems plagued by a bureaucratic emphasis on

Making maps, analyzing radio signals



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quick factual studies at the expense of long-term analysis. "Our intelligence is mainly interested in facts and hard data, [not in] projecting trends," says a top-ranking foreign policy official. "We're doing a better job of collecting intelligence than analyzing it," adds Sen. Walter Huddleston of Kentucky, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

LIMITS OF TECHNOLOGY

Other critics say the CIA relies too heavily on technical intelligence—"hard copy stuff" from a vast array of spy satellites, reconnaissance planes and radio-intercept stations—and not enough on judgmental human intelligence from agents on the ground. Technical intelligence provided some advance warning of the current Chinese attack on Vietnam and last summer's offensive by Ethiopian military forces in Eritrea, plus solid assurance that the Ethiopians were not preparing to invade neighboring Somalia. But it was not much help in gauging the upheavals in Iran and Afghanistan.

Turner has tried for more than a year to redress the imbalance, reports a White House source, but the problem persists. "It's so much easier to gather technical intelligence than it is to probe into political and social processes and into the minds of people," explains this source. "You can show photos to the boss day after day and tickle the hell out of him," adds a veteran analyst. "But you can't go back to your human source day after day or he won't be there for very long." By avoiding human sources, the agency also avoids the risk of an embarrassing involvement in another country's affairs.

AP

Counterspy Angleton: Out in the cold

In the past, foreign intelligence services helped fill the gap by sharing their own cloak-and-dagger information with the CIA—but these days they are far less forthcoming. The standoffishness is partly a reaction to changing U.S. foreign policy. South Africa's intelligence agencies, for example, began withholding information when they sensed Washington's growing support for black African nations. The CIA still maintains close ties with Israel's Mossad, which passes on information about Russia from new Soviet immigrants. But Israeli intelligence officials have also grown more cautious since President Carter took a more evenhanded approach with their Arab enemies. "Time and again they find that American technical advisers who work in Israel turn up in Saudi Arabia, and that disturbs them," says one intelligence source.

DESTABILIZATION OPERATION

In Europe, intelligence directors are appalled by what they see as an increased potential for leaks by staffers who serve on Congressional oversight committees. NEWSWEEK'S Arnaud de Borchgrave reports that European intelligence agencies, afraid of such leaks, have withdrawn from several covert operations they had proposed to run jointly with the CIA. Sometimes the CIA itself has been forced to drop out. On one occasion, there was a chance of thwarting a Soviet destabilization operation in black Africa, if the CIA could supply just three cargo planes without insignia. Because of the CIA's need to clear this with Congressional committees, Turner refused to go along. West German intelligence directors still share informa-

A TALK WITH TURNER

In an interview with NEWSWEEK *at his Langley, Va., headquarters, director Stansfield Turner said that the CIA had improved considerably in the past year—benefiting from new management procedures and from more specific direction by the National Security Council. Despite the failures in Iran, Turner said that the CIA's analytic efforts won more plaudits from Administration officials than in the previous year. The CIA is also recruiting on college campuses again. "We're not hiding our light under a bushel basket," said Turner. More excerpts:*

NEWSWEEK: ***What went wrong in Iran?***

TURNER: What was wrong was something that was wrong with our country's approach to Iran for four or five years. It was wrong in the CIA, it was wrong in the State Department, it was wrong in the American media, it was wrong in the military. We were not sensitive enough to the cumulative effect of the rate of change in Iran. And if we had been more sensitive. . . American policy might have been different.

Q. *What lesson have you learned from Iran?*

A. This agency has had to expand into economics, politics and the psychology of leaders around the world—a multitude of new disciplines and geographical areas of interest. There's also a problem of how to deal with a very close ally; the thought of prying into his private national affairs is something you don't consider, because he'll tell you what's going on.

Q. *Are you getting more cooperation today than a year ago from the French, British or Israeli intelligence services?*

A. I think we're a little better off, but I wouldn't make it a major improvement. The sense of disquiet as to whether we can contain information has improved some. There have been very few leaks out of Congress, which was their major worry. The leaks have been books by former CIA agents Philip Agee, Frank Snepp and John Stockwell. The people in other countries just don't understand why we can't keep classified information out of the public domain. They don't think we will inhibit the next Stockwell if we don't take action [now]. But the laws of this country don't permit us to prosecute [a man] just for releasing classified information . . . unless he deliberately gave it to a foreign power.

Q. *What about internal security? Have you reassured yourself that the Kampiles espionage case has not gone deeper—to some sort of high-level traitor or "mole" inside the agency?*

A. Around Kampiles, I find no evidence whatsoever of a mole. I won't say there is no mole in the agency, because if I did, I would show a complacency that would be dangerous. We sit here and try to be constantly vigilant.

Q. *Why are there so many reports of antipathy between you and people in the White House and Congress?*

A. I'm a controversial person. When you are taking an organization like this through major change, there is resistance. In this job, my responsibility is to bring objectivity to the analysis of foreign-policy problems—and that frequently means I am the bearer of bad news.

CONTINUED

UPI

Iranian students demonstrating in Teheran: A critical failure of intelligence

tion—but without sensitive details about their sources, de Borchgrave reports.

The thought that CIA headquarters itself has been penetrated is even more chilling, and it has become a staple of popular journalism and Washington cocktail conversation. During the trial last year of Kampiles, who was found guilty of selling the Russians a secret manual on a sophisticated surveillance satellite, the agency disclosed that more than a dozen copies of the manual were unaccounted for. Former CIA Director Richard Helms suggested that Kampiles might have been an unwitting dupe of some traitor on a far higher level at the agency. The speculation about such a "mole" grew more heated after the mysterious death of John Arthur Paisley, a retired Soviet analyst who was still working as a CIA consultant.

DESTROYED FROM WITHIN?

The paranoia has gone so far that former CIA director William Colby sometimes tells audiences jokingly: "I am not a mole." And a station chief in Asia says, with utmost seriousness, that the mole theory is "the only explanation for some of the things that have been happening in the past few years. The CIA is being destroyed from within." Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Birch Bayh vigorously disagrees. "The agency has done everything humanly possible to find out if it's true," Bayh says. "They are confident, as I am, that it's not."

Mole madness seems to be a recurring malady at the CIA. In the mid-1960s, under the direction of former counterintelligence chief James Jesus Angleton, a score of CIA officers came under suspicion. Though nothing was ever proved, the careers of some high-ranking officials suffered, and the agency's Soviet operations were paralyzed. Angleton himself even came under suspicion at one point, NEWSWEEK has learned. A special mole-hunting unit was permitted to spend two years dissecting Angleton's career, and drew up an extensive case against the brilliant but abrasive counterspy. It stressed Angleton's heavy reliance on a defector from the Soviet intelligence service (KGB) named Anatoli Golitsin, and many instances in which CIA files showed no action by Angleton on important leads.

No investigation—surveillance, bugging or wiretapping—of Angleton was ever authorized. And in 1974, sources said, the top brass at the CIA dismissed the case against him as too circumstantial and speculative. But Colby forced Angleton into retirement that same year, along with three of his aides. Colby said he simply had no faith in Angleton's "tortuous conspiracy theories" about Soviet penetration. "Any allegation that Angleton was a Soviet agent was not a factor," Colby insisted to NEWSWEEK.

Given the wholesale house cleaning at the CIA under Turner, the notion of a top-level turncoat planted years ago at the agency seems more unlikely today than ever. But all the talk about it, and the criticism of American intelligence generally, present a problem for officials who are trying to frame a charter to govern the behavior of intelligence agencies. Some critics say the charter will be yet another restriction on the CIA's ability to do its job. As a result, support for it is waning, and Bayh reckons that unless the charter is passed by at least one house of Congress this term, it will never become law.

The biggest problem is how to protect the rights of U.S. citizens during intelligence probes. A group of Administration officials and Congressional staffers is trying to set ground rules that will require top-level approval from the Justice Department—or perhaps a court warrant—for a variety of investigative techniques ranging from a check of bank records to physical surveillance.

'WHAT IS EXPECTED OF US'

Restrictions on covert activities overseas would probably match fairly closely those already in effect under a White House Executive Order. Still under debate is just how much information must be given to the Congressional oversight committees—especially when such operations involve allied intelligence services. The CIA has cut sharply the number of covert operations, but a small number still take place. There aren't more, says Turner, "not because we are not allowed to do them but because we can't find the applicability of covert action to our country's needs at this time." Turner says that the new charter is essential if American intelligence agencies—and the public—are to know precisely "what is expected of us and what is not expected."

What is expected of the CIA boss himself is a clear demonstration that he can produce top-grade intelligence within the new constraints. Some Congressional leaders still remain to be persuaded, and the Senate Intelligence Committee has sent staff members to half a dozen countries to evaluate the operations of U.S. intelligence agencies. And even though Turner is an old Annapolis schoolmate of Jimmy Carter, his future at the CIA may well depend on "the strength of Congressional concerns and the depth of Congressional investigations," says one Administration aide. "The President can't go into the 1980 campaign with the baggage of discredited people." Turner's CIA has been put through some hard times, and now it has to show it can still do its job effectively.

AP

Paisley (below), Kampiles: Fears of an internal security breach



—DAVID M. ALPERT with DAVID MARTIN in Washington, ARNAUD de BORCHGRAVE in Europe and bureau reports

BOSTON GLOBE
1 DECEMBER 1978

CIA chief: Not all at Harvard tell of ties

By Al Larkin
Globe Staff

Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner said yesterday that certain Harvard professors are ignoring university guidelines by refusing to reveal their relationship with the CIA.

Turner did not indentify the professors or say how many are involved or what services they provide, but said they have chosen not to honor a university request that certain relationships with the CIA be reported to the university administration.

Turner said that, while he "reminds" prospective CIA candidates of the guidelines, "if that individual elects not to (comply) because he may think it's an infringement of his right of association, I'm not about to force him ..."

The remarks came during an hour-long interview at The Boston Globe during which Turner defended the agency's use of academics in intelligence work and suggested that it ought to be expanded rather than further regulated.

And, although he plans to have breakfast with Harvard President Derek C. Bok this morning, Turner's comments indicated that the differences between the two men have continued to simmer since the guidelines were released in May 1977.

Daniel Steiner, Harvard's general counsel, said yesterday that the guidelines don't prohibit consulting relationships with the CIA, and he wasn't sure it was those relationships to which Turner referred.

But, even in consultant relationships, the Harvard guidelines do recommend that "the individual should report in writing the existence of such an arrangement" to the dean who would then report the matter to Bok.

Turner said that "a suggestion has been made that I should not deal with academics out there unless they do that. In short, that I should insure compliance with Bok's rule. My position is that his rule applies to Harvard and not to me."

Steiner agreed that it was not Turner's responsibility to enforce the guidelines. But he said he hoped that most professors would comply with the guidelines, although they are voluntary, "for the university's sake and for their own protection."

Steiner explained that while Harvard "sees nothing wrong," with consulting relationships, he believed that prior disclosure of them would protect the individual professor from unwarranted criticism if the relationship was revealed later elsewhere.

But Turner specifically objected to the Harvard guidelines because they single out only CIA contracts for disclosure. Some other schools, Turner said, require disclosure of all outside contracts.

"That, I don't object to at all," he said. "But here, this close to Salem, Massachusetts, we have an example where you're isolating a particular segment of American society and saying we are pariahs and an association with us is different than anybody else and I think that's dangerous."

Steiner called Turner's claim that a relationship with the CIA is the same as a relationship with a business or law firm "a false analogy," and said that Harvard acted as a result of CIA abuses on American campuses.

"It was the CIA that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said was engaging in improper activities on US campuses and it was the committee that suggested that universities look and see if guidelines were needed," Steiner said.

In fact, Harvard's primary concern in drawing up the guidelines was to prevent any covert presence of the CIA on campus, especially in the area of recruiting where professors were sometimes asked to submit the names of foreign students as potential contacts.

But Turner, while not detailing just how such recruiting is now handled, said that "there's nothing in the laws of this land that say we couldn't recruit foreigners in the United States to work for us overseas."

Turner's insistence on having the right to use academics, even in instances where universities have tried to discourage it, reflects the agency's continuing reliance upon the human element in intelligence gathering.

Although the CIA has begun to rely more and more on technological surveillance and intelligence techniques — methods that appear to work well in military and economic areas — human contacts have proved more reli-

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able in the more sensitive political arena.

Turner denied reports that the agency has not maximized the role of human intelligence gathering in recent years, a factor which, some critics claim, played a role in the CIA's poor advance warning about the recent political upheaval in Iran.

In the wake of the Iran disturbances, President Jimmy Carter was critical of the CIA's performance and suggested a review of intelligence gathering problems.

Turner, again touching on the value of academics who travel frequently and often freely in countries where they have particular expertise, said that "if I regret anything in the Iran thing, it's maybe that we didn't tap the academic talent as much as could have."

He also pointed out that the CIA's interests are not limited to the academic community, but extend to businessmen and others with some expertise in foreign affairs.

Asked whether the agency still used members of the news media as sources of information, Turner said "I won't answer your questtion specifically," but added that the agency has a written rule prohibiting "paid relationships" with accredited US news personnel unless first approved by him.

"I respect the fact that it's not a good idea to cast your (journalism) profession in doubt," Turner said, but he added that he was reluctant to grant blanket exemptions regarding CIA work to anyone but the Peace Corps.

"Where does it end?" he asked. "If we exempt you, exempt the academics, the clerics, the Peace Corps, pretty soon business will come in and it will just drive us out of the human intelligence business."

Turner said that while "I've tried to open up the agency and disclose more," leaks of classified information have been "very harmful," and that he is "doing everything I can to close the loops and cut you people (the media) off from what is properly classified information."

Nevertheless, Turner said he believed that the CIA is now being viewed in a more favorable light, adding that "there's been a marked shift in the last 10 or 12 months in the Congress, in the public and even in the media."

He said that, except in the Ivy League colleges, recruiting for the CIA has remained stable and improved in some cases.

Even at the Ivy League schools, he said, "I've insisted that we ... that shingle up that says 'CIA, I'm here to recruit' ... the young people of the country ought to know that we're proud to be in the CIA."

BOSTON GLOBE
1 DECEMBER 1978

The CIA and Harvard

CIA Director Adm. Stansfield Turner's acknowledgement yesterday that some members of the Harvard faculty are willfully violating Harvard's rules on faculty relations with the CIA, combined with his suggestion that the situation really does not bother the agency much, is extremely troubling.

First, it should be noted that Harvard's decision to draft rules governing the relations between its faculty and the agency was hardly prompted by some fuzzy-headed thinkers jogging along the banks of the Charles. It was the Senate Intelligence Committee that suggested the CIA's covert use of academics — both to supply intelligence analysis and to recruit foreign students for possible CIA employment — raised troubling questions, and it was the committee that recommended the CIA should be more forthcoming with universities.

Second, the rules were drafted by persons not blind to the needs of government. They included Archibald Cox and Don Price, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government. The committee on which these men served succinctly summarized its reasoning:

"The existence on the Harvard campus of unidentified individuals who may be probing the views of others and obtaining information for the possible use of the CIA is inconsistent with the idea of a free and independent university. Such practices inhibit free discourse and are a distortion of the relationship that should exist among members of an academic community, and in particular of the relationship that should exist between faculty members and students."

Proceeding from that rationale, the committee proposed — and the university eventually adopted — relatively straightforward rules governing the behavior of its faculty. Faculty members who consult on contract with the CIA should report that to their deans; faculty members who recruit students for possible CIA employment should publicly notify the university of that activity; recruiters should not recommend the name of any student to the CIA for possible employment without the permission of that student.

Adm. Turner suggests these rules are discriminatory because they don't apply to any other potential employer of university personnel; further, he argues, they are Harvard's rules, not the CIA's, and it is up to Harvard, and not the CIA, to enforce them. Finally, Turner notes, nothing in federal law prohibits the secret activities of the CIA on college campuses.

Of course, Turner is correct in all respects. Yet, even he must see at least the potential for a chilling effect on academic discussion if it is thought that faculty members are quietly in the employ of the CIA, a chilling effect that simply would not exist if faculty members were thought to be employed secretly by, say, IBM or the Agricultural Department.

Beyond this, there is a serious question whether the CIA, in dealing with the employees of a private institution, should knowingly countenance activities that violate the wholly legal employment policies of that private institution, just because it is not the CIA's obligation to enforce those policies.

Harvard President Derek Bok has declared, "I do not believe that an agency of the United States should act in this fashion." We agree. The congressional committees drafting a charter for the CIA must weigh the Bok view carefully.

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE C-1
WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
27 NOVEMBER 1978

Turner comments on Page 3

Sturdy Stan at the CIA

By Joy Billington
Washington Star Staff Writer

When Jimmy Carter went out to CIA headquarters at Langley recently to give intelligence agents a pep talk, he urged them to be "more pure and more clean and more decent and more honest" than practically anyone else. They must be as Caesar's wife, he told them.

Such orders, of course, were delivered in the context of a widespread public impression that the agency had been less pure, less clean, less decent and less honest than many might wish.

CLOSE-UP

And, while many of the excesses of the past seem to have been curbed, the agency is currently under new fire — on the fundamental question of how well it is doing its job. Critics now are saying that Washington was caught off guard by the events in Iran, that something is deeply amiss at the Central Intelligence Agency when one of its personnel is found guilty of selling critical information to the Soviets.

At the center of the storm is Stansfield Turner — a 54-year-old admiral who neither smokes nor drinks, a deeply religious man in a world of cunning and stealth — who has been tasked to point the CIA in a more virtuous and efficient direction.

Turner's command began dramatically enough. It started with the so-called "Halloween Massacre." The admiral ordered 212 employees to hang up their cloaks and put away their daggers — the number ultimately would reach 820. That same night, Oct. 31, 1977, as pink slips were carried home all over town, Turner threw "a Halloween party for spooks," and guests ducked for apples.

This twist of Turner humor — to begin the overhaul of the clandestine service on the night of ghosts and ghoulies — must have appealed to the director's sense of irony. For there was much about the tweedy, expensive clothes and the convoluted mindsets of the clandestine people that went against the grain of his own straight-arrow mind.

This year, the Turners' Halloween party featured "graves" of agency enemies, dangling skeletons, and a game for the 60 guests of guessing how many pumpkin seeds there were in a jar. There were 667. Iran's Crown Prince Reza guessed 650 and his prize was a packet of jelly beans. There are those who would argue today that the Crown Prince's jelly beans are more of a reward than the CIA would earn for its Iran estimates.

* * * *

"My father left a small mill town in Lancashire called Ramsbottam when he was eight or nine." Turner says. "His older brother and an uncle had emigrated to Chicago and he and his widowed mother joined them." Oliver Turner didn't finish high school. He started out as office boy, worked his way up, and eventually founded a real estate company and did well.

Turner's family were sufficiently well off enough to give their children good educations. Stansfield attended Amherst, Annapolis and Oxford.

He admits to being "more of a cut-up" at Amherst than at Oxford later, although his pranks were clearly in the Good Clean Fun category: "One thing I did that was fun was getting hold of the master key and locking the whole fraternity in their rooms one night."

At Amherst, Turner broke briefly with his lifelong teetotalism. "I was opposed to drinking when I went to Amherst but pretty soon I gave in and went out with the boys for a beer and I was a regular drinker from then until 1949 when my brother was killed in an automobile accident where drinking was involved. I decided then that the dangers weren't worth it and gave it up. I surely never missed it."

As CIA chief Turner is now having "a running battle" — albeit gentlemanly—with the current president of Amherst. "He wants to know what relations the CIA had in the past with Amherst, before we foreswore dealing with campuses. We feel that if we made an agreement in the past and said we'd keep this secret that we won't disclose our past sources any more than our present sources."

His old friend William H. Webster, now head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, laughs when asked if he led Turner astray at Amherst. "Probably! But Stan was a very straight-arrow. His nickname was 'Sturdy Stan'. My wild days were after Stan left. Maybe my role model cut me loose and I misbehaved after he left."

They were both members of The Sphinx Honor Society, and wore the black pork pie hats with purple stripes that marked members of what Webster calls "the epitomy of what was best at Amherst, the junior leaders. I think Stan was president."

The fact that Sturdy Stan was steadily climbing the rungs of the Navy ladder is something Webster would have expected. What neither could ever anticipate, however, is that one day they would head the CIA and FBI respectively — "Mr. Inside and M them.

Today they meet at Webster's 'shop' or Turner's — a friendship must make J. Edgar Hoover, who resented the CIA, turn in his grave. They see each other at the security coordinating meetings at the White House. And play tennis together regularly. Webster refuses to say who wins. "It's very close," he says tactfully.

At Annapolis, Turner was a guard on the Navy football team. He graduated 25th academically and first militarily in a class of 820. He remembers his fellow midshipman Jimmy Carter as "a quiet, very friendly Southern young man" but they didn't know each other well. "You don't, when you live in a 4,000-man dorm, unless you have clubs in common or live near each other." They came to know each other later when Turner was head of the Naval War College at Newport. He invited the governor of Georgia to lecture, as part of his policy of broadening the education of naval officers studying there.

Turner went to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar in 1948 for two and a half years. There, he says "I was just another blooming Yank." There wasn't much tearing down to London. "We had three very intensive terms, and a lot going on at Oxford. You're supposed to do a lot of your serious studying on your vacation. We Americans would pack up a bunch of books, head for the French Riviera and chase around. We stayed away from England for vacations because right after the war the food was bad, the climate was bad, so as soon as we got out of school we'd grab the boat train and head for the sun."

He found it intellectually stimulating. "Every evening there were so many things you could do: the Anglo-Israeli Club learning one side of what now is the Camp David issue, the next week the Arab Club where you'd hear terrible things about Lord Balfour and his role in setting up Israel. (Then Palestine.) I'm proud of myself, too, because Kenneth Clark was a teacher and I used to go to his lectures. I wasn't taking art. I was reading PPE (Philosophy, Politics and Economics). But that was the kind of broadening opportunity Ox-

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ford offered. And unlike American universities there was no stigma about wanting to study."

Asked if he did any hell-raising, Turner demurs, and then says: "I pushed the present chairman of Honeywell up a drainpipe to get into his college after hours one night. And one evening after an all-night ball, the former president of the University of Virginia, Edgar Shannon, and I went punting. My friend negotiated a curve in the river very deftly and two couples in another punt applauded his remarkable feat. You have to understand that we're in white tie and tails. And Edgar Shannon, standing in the stern of the punk, bowed to the applause and went right in the river."

A fellow Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, Pittsburgh University Chancellor Wesley Posvar, admits he was was a bit surprised when the Carter administration chose Turner for the CIA. "I was surprised they were that smart! He's was an obvious choice, a balanced internationalist with a military background, a scholar and intellectual and a man who understands national security far better than many others whose names were mentioned."

Posvar calls his old friend "a pretty straight guy. He behaved then, at Oxford, as he does today. The only difference is a little gray hair."

Turner retells an Oxford experience vividly:

"My tutor, Herbert Nicholas, was writing a book about the 1950 election when Churchill unsuccessfully sought to unseat Atlee. I had an automobile and I drove him all around the country to interview politicians. One night we were in the Rhondda Valley — a very poor coal mining area which was very Communist oriented.

"We went to hear Harry Pollitt, the secretary general of the British Communist party, whose constituency it was. We went with my tutor's two sisters who were spinster schoolteachers. Pollitt described Mr. Forrestal, the American secretary of defense, as so typical of the paranoid American capitalist that he'd jump out of a window if he heard a siren go by, thinking it was the signal for the Russian invasion.

"I challenged the statement and he put down a five-pound note and said 'I'll bet you five pounds it was in Time magazine. That's my source.' Well, later I checked Time and there wasn't a scintilla of evidence that would give Pollitt something to work on. It was just a total lie, which was very illustrative to me of my now-long experience of dealing with communism.

"That was one of my first rubs with it. Here was a man who was willing to lie where he couldn't be proved wrong — in the middle of the night in the Rhondda Valley.

"The next day there was a two-column headline in the Daily Worker: 'Chicago Gangster Invades Rhondda.' It was about me 'invading' with my gun molls . . . my tutor's two spinster sisters. I had a Morris Minor but they accused me of riding in my big black limousine with my molls. It was very, very revealing."

* * * *

Stansfield and Pat Turner live in a pleasant admiral-size house on the grounds of the U.S. Naval Observatory. It is the first time a CIA chief has lived in such a "safe house," Pat Turner explains, which makes the CIA security people "very happy . . . we benefit from the security that goes with the vice president living up here."

A comfortable placid woman, Pat Turner says she has little curiosity about "the secrets" her husband carries. This even extends to their son, Navy Lt. Geoffrey Turner, who is presently doing post-graduate work at the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, Cal. "I don't know the subject of his thesis: He can't tell me. He and my husband talk but I have to go out of the room," she says. Asked if she isn't tempted to listen at the door Pat Turner laughs: "It's all gobbledygook and code words I couldn't understand."

She has been a voracious reader of spy yarns for longer than her husband has been in the nation's No. 1 spook. While John Le Carre is somewhat complicated, she admits, pointing to "The Honorable Schoolboy" which she is reading, "it gives you a feel for the dreary part of the espionage business which contains so much tedious work."

Pat Turner has instigated the first organized wives meetings in the history of the CIA. Some 28 wives of "top section leaders" now meet for lunch once a month. "A lot of the lesser woman just can't do it because their husbands are not acknowledged as working for the CIA.

"I felt they needed a little togetherness, they've been picked on so much and taken so much criticism. I think they're wonderful, dedicated people who've been unjustly treated by the press."

Pat Turner 'dabbles' at sculpture, painting, collage; she can unstop sinks, garbage disposals and toilets; wire plugs and re-wire lamps; hang wall paper and paint walls. "The hardest thing a Navy wife has face is the change from being very competent while the husband is at sea to giving up the bankbook and the keys and becoming a nice little *hausfrau* when he comes home," she says.

During their marriage they have lived in Washington, San Diego, Newport, Long Beach, Honolulu and Naples, Italy, the last post before the CIA. There, where Turner was in charge of NATO's southern flank, they had a magnificent villa overlooking the Bay of Naples — "the most elegant I've ever lived in," she says calmly, without any note of nostalgia.

They courted in Carmel, Cal., where Pat was secretary to a Christian Science lecturer. Ten years earlier in Highland Park, near Chicago when they were both 12 years old, they had attended the same Christian Science Sunday school class. Their courting ran to dancing on the beach at Carmel, both dreamy after seeing "An American In Paris" and to walking by moonlight along the beach in Chicago.

During their first years together they managed well enough on his Navy salary, together with "what he'd saved at Oxford." She had "a small inheritance" that helped some with the children's education. In 1963 "his grandmother died and left him a third of her estate." Turner's salary today is $57,500.

As an active Christian Scientist — they attend the Sixth Church of Christ Scientist-Pat Turner does not take medications, even aspirin. "I don't need it. I've only had five headaches in my whole life. We do go to dentists and I wear glasses and my father-in-law had hip surgery", she adds as an illustration that they are not such strict Christian Scientists as those who refuse any medical aid. They both pray regularly and read a weekly lesson. Pat Turner says she has found prayer helpful in healing "many physical problems".

Turner is an intensely religious man. "A few minutes of contemplation and prayer at the beginning of the day helps you off to the right start and puts things in perspective," Turner says. "You're not as important as you thought you were."

They like "to be in nature together" and still manage to walk in the woods here in Washington without a security man trailing along. And while they no longer dance on moonlit beaches, now they're in their 50s, there is some frivolity-such as the sled he gave her last Christmas, Pat Turner sledded over the hills of the Observatory compound last winter with their golden retriever Hornblower at her side.

Then, every evening before bed, there's a 23-year-old tradition of the three games of double solitaire. "He gets off all his inhibitions and lets off steam. On mother's day he beat me in 17 games. Hornblower sits under the table and Stan tells him what mistakes I'm making."

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The Director: 'Times have changed'

After having five directors in as many years and surviving a four-year battering that turned into a national debate about what kind of intelligence service Americans want, the CIA is beginning to get its act together again, insists the Director of Central Intelligence. Others are not so sure.

Stansfield Turner thinks the agonizing public debate over the CIA is over. "I think we've turned the corner. And we're on the offensive, not the defensive. We've got an important mission for the country. We're doing it well. We're doing it legally. We don't have to take any more guff."

But to many, Turner personifies a CIA hamstrung with restrictions, a cold depersonalized operation with its own captain but with all orders coming from the White House and Congress. What some would prefer is a skipper who would take the ship down to lie quietly on the bottom while the depth charges exploded above them.

Opinion on Turner varies. A former National Security Council staffer says: "He's intelligent, a good field commander, but he leaves a lot of distressed people in his wake. The main charge I've heard is that he suppresses dissenting views. This makes the material less reliable to the wider intelligence community. And there's the feeling that he'll do whatever the president wants."

Ray S. Cline, director of Soviet studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says Turner is moving in the right direction in analysis of intelligence. "The criticisms you get all have to do with the *other* role of the CIA, the clandestine operations. The impression is that Turner isn't interested in the operations side and that he hasn't been able to counter the deterioration of the last five years and get the clandestine services working again."

"Covert operations," Cline says, "the intervening in political events abroad, are virtually dead, except perhaps for feeding a little propaganda to foreign newspapers to counter Soviet manipulation of the news."

"But I'm not sure anyone could do much better, considering the hamstringing of the agency," he adds. "A new bill containing 250 pages of restrictions and monitoring provisions demonstrates a punitive attitude in the administration and Congress to the CIA. I don't think we can live with that. You have to take some risks. There are a lot of crises coming in the next few years. Turner would say that his intelligence is still very good because of the technical intelligence. But that mostly relates to large countries. It gives no information about the intentions of people. You need human intelligence for that. You can't take satellite pictures of intentions."

Turner disagrees. "Only the newspapers — and Ray Cline — say I rely too much on technical intelligence. Ray's a fine fellow. I like him. He's out of date. He hasn't understood what I was trying to do. But I've fought for the clandestine service. And they're stronger and better than they were a year ago. I have no intention of downgrading them. I'm here to make this a strong clandestine service for 1988 as well as 1978. I'm not playing for just the short run."

Turner denies the agency is being hamstrung. "Having to report to eight committees of Congress on covert action is confining but the rest of these restrictions people are talking about are all involved in the protection of the rights of American citizens and this really is not a major part of our activities. These restrictions, which we all want, are not that hamstringing."

Complaints from the Old Boy net, largely centering on the clandestine operations issue, remain nettlesome to the director.

"I've been a staunch supporter of the clandestine service and have gone to bat for them. Like that speech at the National Press Club. What am I doing there? I'm defending the clandestine service's right not to reveal its sources. I don't do that to promote morale but because that's what's necessary to have an effective clandestine operation. And if they continue to believe they're effective their morale will be good. But it is up, much up."

Reductions in the clandestine service "gave the younger clandestine people more opportunity, and that's percolated down. As a result of this we've cleaned out . . . not dead wood, but excess wood. They were good wood, but excess. They had too many of them. So there are more promotions in the clandestine service this year than ever before."

Regarding 'risk-taking' in the clandestine service the Admiral says flatly: "the clandestine service is out of business if it doesn't take risks. Most of the Old boy network is subconsciously upset because covert action is more difficult today. But I've been here 19 months and there's only one covert action I would like to have undertaken that we didn't. In short, there are not many covert action opportunities today that would be useful and effective for our country.

"The times have changed since we could overthrow a government in Guatemala or Iran. The country neither wants to do that kind of thing nor is it really as *do-able* as it was 30 years ago.

"The Old Boys are upset because the elan, the fun of going out and not only finding intelligence but influencing events is over. It was more vibrant here in the past. It was more vibrant in the military in the past! Every time there was a smoke signal we sent the fleet off over the horizon. We don't do that any more. And they're just beginning to learn that here.

"It's interesting because so many experiences here are just five or 10 years behind my military experiences. The attack on this agency came about 1974. The attack on the military came in 1970. The elan of charging off into the wild blue yonder in the military has changed too. But they'll get used to the changes. Because what's left to be done is more important than it was in the past . . . intelligence as opposed to covert action.

"I don't feel circumscribed in taking the appropriate risks. I think we're being more judicious in evaluating those risks. Now maybe the Old Boys also sense that. But I tell you, when you look at the mistakes that have been made here in the past because people didn't ask *'Is it worth it?'* Some of the things for which they were most criticized weren't worth doing. They didn't measure the risk against the benefit. Now we're doing that. And if they think that means we aren't willing to take risks they're full of baloney!

"I sat at that table recently with all CIA professionals around the table and I said 'I want to do this, now vote!' Every one of them voted *no*. I said 'OK gentlemen, you win. I just want the record to show that I — the only outsider — am the guy voting to take the risk.'

"Now I don't say they were wrong and I was right. If I really thought I was right I'd have over-ruled them. But I'm perfectly willing to take risks, that's what I'm paid for. And the whole organization knows that. If I let you talk to the clandestine people they would not produce many instances where they suggested a risk that I wouldn't take. I've turned some down, of course."

Turner refrains from comment on what even President Carter considers a serious intelligence failure in Iran. "His argument is how can we prove we had good intelligence without showing it to you," CIA spokesman Herb Hetu says. And on another current anxiety, the question of whether or not a "mole," a double agent, has worked himself into the top ranks of the CIA, Hetu says: "It would be foolish for the director to be absolutely categorical in denying that a 'mole' exists, but in his best judgment he believes there is not."

A top Pentagon official sees CIA directors as "reflecting what administrations want at any given time. There have been more 'outsider' directors than 'insiders', so Turner isn't unique. Four star admirals like to run the ship from the bridge. The idea of a strong command line never leaves them. He likes everything to fit into that tight little line . . . *bing, bing, bing*. Also he's a systems analyst who likes to condense every-

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thing to a neat statistical matrix. Turner's uneasy with words, which means he has tendencies opposed to those intelligence agents who want to caveat everything."

Retired Admiral Elmo "Bud" Zumwalt recommended Turner for several important Navy posts in the past. But he sees the CIA as "increasingly acting as a propaganda arm of the presidency rather than absolutely ruthless about coming out with objective criteria." This tilting towards presidents began with Henry Kissinger, Zumwalt says, and today "Carter makes public statements and the next CIA analyses lean in that direction."

CIA morale in the field is so low, he insists, "that if you evaluate on a one-to-10 scale in comparison with the KGB, the CIA would have gotten a five at its highest effectiveness. Right now they operate at the level of one. The KGB operates at eight."

Zumwalt blames Carter rather than Turner. "I don't think anyone at the CIA could perform differently given a president who operates from the naive base Mr. Carter operates from, who thinks that the same ideological and theological orientation effective at Camp David with two religious men can be applied to the Soviets. So they're taking him right and left. And Admiral Turner is giving the president exactly what he wants, which is what one should expect from a loyal presidential appointee."

Turner flatly denies that he has politicized the agency's intelligence reports for the benefit of the administration: "What you are seeing is a greater openness regardless of whether it supports or detracts (from administration positions). I'm not in the policy game. I'm declassifying what can be de-classified. Sometimes I'm praised and sometimes I'm damned. I'm not here to undercut the president but I'm not here to support him in a political sense, because I have to be objective."

He also denies the accusation that he restricts dissenting views in CIA analyses. "If there is one thing I have done successfully it is to emphasize minority views in the intelligence reports. You can't find anybody that would deny that I've driven footnotes out because before I came here I never read the footnotes. I assumed they came from some wild guy who had to dissent.

"Today if a dissent is necessary it goes right in the text of the estimate. You *have to* read it. Then the decision maker's got the whole picture. I am just excited what it's done to improve the estimating process and I'm curious to know who accused me of suppressing minority views. If I knew I'd probably hang him up by his thumbs . . ."

He is not embarrassed by the Arkady Shevchenko case in which it was revealed that the former Soviet diplomat had spent large sums of CIA-provided money on a woman. "I don't want to be a prude. I don't approve in my own life of the kind of things Shevchencko was doing. But it's his private life. He's an unmarried man. He has the right to do what he likes with his money and his spare time. We're trying to help him transition into being an American, without invading his constitutional and legal rights to privacy.

"He hasn't done anything criminal. We had no part in his private female companionship relations. We did not pay him to pay her. We paid him what he deserves on the grounds of what he is doing for us. I'm proud we have a country that will attract a man of his high caliber and reputation and promise inside the Soviet Union. I mean, it really shows that when he lived here for a few years . . . He had everything going for him in his country, he was the youngest ambassador they ever had. He leaves everything behind in order to accept our way of life. We all ought to be proud."

However Turner is embarrassed over the case of an employee, William Kampiles, having been convicted of selling satellite secrets to Moscow. "I've tightened security procedures here. I'd like it not to have happened. It's very difficult to establish such tight procedures that it can't happen. All the papers on my desk are highly classified. It's the medium of doing business. If I have to sign for each one we can get ourselves tied in knots. So you have to compromise between efficiency and security. I think the whole government in the past 10 years has leaned a little bit much toward more efficient ways of handling their paper rather than to secure ways of handling them."

— Joy Billington



The CIA in all its awesomeness

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-6

SAN DIEGO UNION
20 AUGUST 1978

Soviet Harassment Of Americans Reflects New Flowering Of Arrogance

Adm. Stansfield Turner, U.S. director of central intelligence, pointed out several signs of continuing Soviet pressure against the United States in an exclusive interview with editors of The San Diego Union.

Turner's comments focused on the latest incidents of Soviet harassment of American reporters and businessmen in Moscow, the discovery of a KGB tunnel into the American Embassy and harsh prison sentences given in the latest trials of dissidents. He called the harassment of Americans an apparent response to the U.S. arrest of two Russians caught spying in this country.

The CIA director also expressed concern about what or who may be behind what he described as continuing efforts to undercut America's intelligence gathering services. He included former CIA agent Philip Agee's threat to reveal the identities of as many overseas CIA agents as he can, saying that such a disclosure would jeopardize the lives of these agents, as well as seriously damage U.S. ability to collect needed intelligence data. The interview follows:

Question: Admiral, why is the Soviet Union harassing American businessmen and newspaper people in Moscow?

Answer: The Soviets have taken these unconscionable actions apparently in retaliation for the perfectly proper arrest of two Soviet spies who were caught in the process of spying in this country.

Q: What is the realtionship of what's happening there to detente as a whole?

A: I think you have to recognize that detente has never meant that there is no competition between our countries. It has tried to dampen the military element of that competition there are bound to be ups and downs in the relationships over periods of time. I don't view this particular series of events as a major impact on detente.

Q: Is the KGB being more arrogant or more open?

A: When we discover a tunnel that the KGB has dug into the United States Embassy in Moscow and they file the protest with us, they're damned arrogant.

Q: What should the United States response be?

A: That's a question for the Secretary of State and the President.

Q: Do you think the trials of dissidents are going to result in harsher sentences because of the worldwide attention than otherwise would have been the case?

A: I think that it is very difficult to speculate on what the legal processes in the Soviet Union might do or might not do. They are certainly carefully controlled, as contrasted with our country. I don't read the sentencing of Shcharansky, for instance, as having been terribly influenced by the publicity. I think perhaps the fact that he was brought to trial was a rejoinder to the public criticism; they were showing that they were not going to let the public criticism completely control their internal domestic activities as they see them.

Q: Do you think the Russians will be more tough as the Soviet leadership changes and Brezhnev disappears?

A: That's a real sixty-four dollar question. And I don't really believe there's a way to speculate in a very informed manner as to whether they will be tougher or less cooperative. Brezhnev clearly has been one of the leading exponents of detente and of SALT, so one has to be concerned whether with the loss of his influence there will be as much emphasis on those.

Q: Phillip Agee, the renegade CIA agent, recently announced his intentions of exposing every CIA agent abroad. How much of a danger do you regard this as being?

A: A very serious one and one that I can do very little about. I'd like to see you do something about it. I'm not allowed to investigate Americans, quite properly, but I'd like to lay before you the question for a good investigative reporter. What is going on here? We've got Agee publishing a very smooth, expensive but free distribution publication strictly against the CIA. We've got a world youth festival in Havana with Agee on the forum and others who have been brought down for that purpose. We've got other activities in this country directly pointed at undercutting our intelligence activities. They are not cheap; somebody's behind this, somebody's funding this and moving it. I think it's insidious, but within the limits of the law I have no authority to go out and try to either find out who's doing it or to curb it.

"I don't really believe there's a way to speculate in a very informed manner as to whether they (the Soviets) will be tougher or less cooperative."

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Q: In your reports to the State Department and to the President, I assume you warned of this danger that you are talking about. Is there anything our government can do in a formal way to draw attention to this problem?

A: Rather little, in view of the fact that Agee is unwilling to come back to this country and come under our legal jurisdiction. Even then there are severe inhibitions on what we can do without some questions whether he has broken the law or whether he has not. We have been attempting in many ways over the last year or so to tighten our overall security procedures; the trial of Frank Snepp for violating his secrecy agreement with the Central Intelligence Agency was in part to indicate our government's strong concern with these unauthorized releases.

Q: Could you outline the damage caused by unauthorized release of CIA secrets?

A: The long term damage to our country is that people who are willing to work with us and support us overseas, individuals or foreign government agencies, are losing their sense of confidence that a relationship with us can be kept confidential. Therefore, to some extent our sources of vital information can be dried up by this process. Some of the factual data released is also injurious. We've had specific complaints from people whose interests were gored by these releases.

Q: Frank Snepp maintains that he decided to write his book only after he could find no one within the CIA management who was willing to hear his complaints on the American withdrawal from Vietnam or to even admit that there were mistakes made by the CIA. What is your assessment of this?

A: Snepp's allegation is basically untrue. He had opportunities to get a hearing. He did get some hearing before he left, he raised some complaints. They weren't that well founded, in the agency's view at the time. On top of that, we have an Intelligence Oversight Board to which he could have gone with his complaint, or he could have gone to Congress. He came to see me personally and I gave him my assurance that I wanted to find out what was wrong. He lied to me in saying that he was going to give me his book to review before he published it.

Q: Snepp maintains that literally thousands of pacification program employees were left behind — men whose very lives may have depended on their getting out of Vietnam with the Americans. Could you comment?

A: I have not really probed into the details of how the CIA performed back then, but my view was that it was not all done as perfectly as it could be. But it was not a case of gross negligence, as Snepp alleges. There were a lot of mistakes made in Vietnam by the military, by the CIA, by others, but I think Snepp did not have a big enough view of the problem when he was there and has focused his criticism on a small part of it.

Q: Getting back to the long term threat to intelligence gathering posed by the release of names of agents and contacts overseas, could you tell me how you're dealing with it and what, in your view, the future is for the safety of your contacts and your agents overseas?

A: We're being as scrupulous as we can in protecting their identities and refusing to respond to media inquiries about them. Sometimes this is very difficult because you're taking a brickbat that you don't deserve, but you've got to. It runs into difficult legal issues when you prosecute a case that might disclose some other activities orsome other agents that were not even the primary subject of the case. That's one reason, incidentally, that it was very helpful to take Snepp to court on a non-criminal charge, not a violation of secrecy — on a contractual issue, we didn't have to reveal a lot of secret information in order to prove that there was other secret information released..

Q: The handling of the Snepp case has troubled a lot of journalists and journalism professional groups in that it's being interpreted as a gag against writing of any sort about governmental service. Could you deal with that problem?

A: Mr. Snepp had signed an agreement as a condition of his employment with us. It's a voluntary thing. If you don't want to sign one, you don't have to, but you don't have to work for us either. And all it restricts him on in the future is his handling of information gained during his period of service with us. If he wants to go out and write about what's going on in the Department of Labor since he left us, there's no control over that. In point of fact, there's no control over what he writes in his book. It's only that he must submit it to us for prior clearance. If we say he should take something out and he insists not, then we have to go through legal procedures in which we get an injunction and the courts decide whether or not we're correct. We have no arbitrary authority to prevent him from printing anything.

Q: What is your view of Soviet military intentions at this point, vis a vis are they going to be satisfied with arms parity or are they just interested in superiority across the board? Also, are you satisfied that the CIA has adequate sources of information so that the view that you give the President about the Soviet Union's military position is accurate?

A: No intelligence officer ever feels that he's got enough information. I would answer your question, though in saying yes, I think we have a very good concept of the Soviet military strength in almost all fields. Clearly, we always would like to have more detail in the area where it is obviously most difficult — intentions. It's a lot easier to count missiles than it is to know what the purpose in their thinking is for having them. I think the basisc intention of the Soviet Union is to compete with the United States. When you look at the assets that they have to do that they don't have the ecomomic wherewithal, they don't have the political entree and acumen that we do, so they have resorted to competing in an area where they have almost unlimited potential over time, and that's the military. Whether that means that they are determined to be so far ahead of us that they could possibly

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take us on in a military conflict is a different question. I don't think that's very likely. I think they hope they can achieve their objectives by less than military means. But I think that as long as they feel they need the leverage of military strength, they are going to continue trying to use it, and how far they will go in matching or exceeding our military capabilities will very largely depend on the resolve and the military response of the Western nations.

Q: Do you think they are driving for superiority?

A: I don't really want to answer that question that starkly because it is easy to be misunderstood. I think they are driving for a strong enough military position and enough perception around the world of their military strength that they will gain politcal advantage from it. They have over the last ten years gotten tremendous mileage out of a smaller, less capable force because they were coming from nowhere and challenging us.

Q: What's happening in Cambodia today?

A: Cambodia is a pawn here between the aspirations of the Vietnamese to be the dominant power in Indochina and the position of the Chinese not wanting to see an expansion of Vietnamese authority in that area. Cambodians have a very strange political regime that's very repressive and is causing problems on both of its borders to the west in Thailand and to the east in Vietnam. I think its part of the overall settling of the political relationships in that area.

Q: Admiral, is there a kind of battle in the administration over who will run the overall intelligence programs in the United States, the CIA, the DIA or any number of other military intelligence agencies?

A: There's no battle. The President on Jan. 25 of this year in a new executive order laid out exactly how it was to be done and I've seen no resistance to it since he signed that. The President decreed that I would be in charge of all the budgets of the national intelligence activities. I would also be in charge of what we call tasking all of the national intelligence assets, telling them what information they are to collect. But he did not put me in charge of the interpretation, the analysis of the information collected. We want competing analysis but we don't want a lot of competition — three spies going to the same place to do the same thing, or two expensive collection systems that overlap unnecessarily.

Q: Criticism of U.S. intelligence support arose over the Cuban role in the Katangan invasion of Zaire. One was that CIA intelligence was faulty; two, was that CIA intelligence was misused; and three, was that you and the President don't talk to each other often enough. Are any of these correct?

A: I talk to the President once a week at least. That is, I have a scheduled appointment with him once a week, and I think that's often enough, plus such ad hoc things as Cabinet meetings.

Q: But he didn't know, for example, that you were testifying in a congressional committee, as I recall.

A: No, that isn't it. He didn't know I went to see Senator Clark on a related matter. I was directed by the National Security Council to go see Senator Clark because we were laying out for the President all the alternatives he had. One of them could have involved the Clark amendment. We needed a first hand interpretation of what the amendment meant before we decided on the alternative to present to the President. On the Katangan situation, I was daily supplying the President with written briefings which included Katanga. I believe that the record will show that there was no conflict between my briefings to him and what he was saying in the public forum.

Q: Several weeks ago one of your predecessors, Mr. Colby, said in a speech, that he felt that because of the tremendous poverty in Mexico and the doubling of population there in the next 20 or so years, that Mexico represents a potentially tremendous threat to the security of our country. How do you feel about that?

A: I hadn't heard that Bill had put it in those terms, but it's very indicative of one of the changes, the challenges that we face in the intelligence organizations of our country today. We have to deal not only with Soviet missile threat, we have to deal with population, immigration, natural resources exchange problems between us and a country as close to us as Mexico. Clearly, the illegal immigration problem between us and Mexico is a very important one that you here in San Diego are much closer to than most of us. And we have to hope that we can work out ways such that with the growing affluence of the Mexican economy through its oil and gas finds that they will be able to channel those resources into ways that will prevent this immigration from being necessary. I don't view it in quite as cataclysmic terms as Bill, but I certainly think that we have to be very alert to working with the Mexicans to solve these problems amicably and I think that President Carter has particularly made an effort to work closely with President Lopez Portillo.

Q: Who's in charge of counter-intelligence program along the Mexican-American borders, the CIA or the FBI?

A: The CIA conducts counter-intelligence outside the United States, the FBI inside the United States.

"I think they (Russia) are driving for a strong enough military position and enough perception around the world of their military strength that they will gain political advantage from it."

TURNER - Interv

FEBRUARY 6, 1978 $1.00

TIME

The CIA
Mission Impossible?



Intelligence Chief
Stansfield Turner

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TIME/FEB. 6, 1978

COVER STORIES

Shaping Tomorrow's CIA

The embattled agency is opened up, aired out and trimmed down



Never before has a secret agency received such public scrutiny. It is indeed a unique event that a modern nation is exhaustively examining one of its chief weapons of defense for all the world to see—including its adversaries. Yet this unprecedented exposure of the Central Intelligence Agency is perhaps the inevitable result of attacks on a vast bureaucracy that operated too long out of the public eye. America's premier defense agency has been under intense fire both at home and abroad for violating what many critics felt were proper standards of international conduct.

Once a proud company of proud men acting with the confidence that not only would their accomplishments serve their country but that their fellow citizens would support them, the agency has found its very functions and rationale severely questioned. It has had five directors in five stormy years. Its chiefs seem to spend more time before congressional committees than in planning and administering. Its agents, never public heroes because of the secrecy of their work, are now portrayed in the harshest of press accounts as conspiratorial villains. Somehow the rules of the spy game changed and, as the CIA men keep telling themselves, changed in the middle of the game.

The result has been inevitable—sagging morale, deteriorating ability to collect intelligence, and declining quality of analysis. Increasingly, this has worried Government policy framers, who are all too well aware of the need for prime intelligence sources and evaluation.

It has also, not incidentally, comforted those who work against the CIA. A Soviet KGB agent told a TIME correspondent in Cairo last week: "Of all the operations that the Soviet Union and the U.S. have conducted against each other, none have benefited the KGB as much as the campaign in the U.S. to discredit the CIA. In our wildest scenarios, we could never have anticipated such a plus for our side. It's the kind of gift all espionage men dream about. Today our boys have it a lot easier, and we didn't have to lift a finger. You did all our work for us."

In an effort to restore the CIA's esteem, reorganize the U.S. intelligence community, and deflect further criticism from the agency, President Carter last week signed an Executive order that places all nine U.S. intelligence agencies under the direct budget control and loose coordination of one man: CIA Director Stansfield Turner, 54. Incorporated in the order were sharp curbs on the kinds of clandestine practices that brought the CIA much of its criticism.

The new appointment and the new directives were received with mixed emotions in the U.S. intelligence community. There was skepticism that the overall problems of intelligence, coordination and direction could be cured either soon or simply. In addition, since taking over the CIA last March, Admiral Turner has become one of the most controversial men in Washington. His unpopularity in his own agency stems in part from the brusque way in which he eliminated 212 jobs in the Directorate of Operations, the arm that deals with covert activities and intelligence gathering (the other arm handles analysis). The sackings reflected a longstanding desire to reduce the size of the CIA and scale down its covert operations.

It was the exposure, and to some extent the misrepresentation, of these covert activities that got the CIA into so much trouble. While zealous agents sometimes overstepped legal limits, the agency more often took the rap for activities that were ordered or approved by higher authorities. The abortive Bay of Pigs invasion was approved by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. It is still debated whether Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson knew of or supported assassination attempts against foreign leaders, such as the bizarre plan to supply poisoned cigars to Fidel Castro. L.B.J. approved Operation Phoenix, in which agents directed the killing of Viet Cong terrorists. In Chile, the CIA gave money and other help to opponents of Marxist Salvador Allende. But there is no evidence connecting the CIA to the coup that overthrew and killed Allende in 1973, though the episode gave the U.S. a black eye. The CIA's surveillance of American citizens was grossly exaggerated by much of the press. One clear abuse by the agency, which it apparently carried out totally on its own initiative, was experimenting with LSD and other drugs on unwitting victims.

Paradoxically, more is expected of the CIA just when its capabilities are being restricted. Last week, when a Soviet spy satellite broke up over Canada and invaded the atmosphere like a streak of fireballs, it served as a blazing reminder that the world remains a dangerous place, far from a Utopia where a democracy can conduct all its business openly.

Détente or no détente, the Soviet Union is a formidable antagonist that continues seeking power and influence, or at least the ability to apply pressure, all over the world. Spending a higher percentage of its gross national product on weaponry and troops than the U.S. does, Russia is striving to outstrip American military prowess in many areas. This means that a secret service capable of ferreting out Soviet intentions as well as capabilities is vital to U.S. security. Says Cord Meyer Jr., a much-decorated retired CIA official: "We need a very, very alert advance warning capability, not only for weapons but for times when Soviet leaders may have reached a decision or when they are tending toward a decision."

Good intelligence has made it possible to cooperate with Russia to contain the arms race. Mutual spying by satellite enables the U.S. and the Soviet Union to monitor the weaponry in each country and provide some prospect that the other side is not cheating. Says a State Department official: "The SALT initiatives would not have been possible without intelligence."

The rise of Third World forces has put an additional burden on American intelligence. Most of the new nations have authoritarian regimes that do not freely supply the kind of political and economic information that is routine in the West. If the U.S. expects to stay abreast of developments in these vast areas of the globe,

continued

Entrance hall of CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., with agency seal on floor; inset: Admiral Stansfield Turner, the nation's intelligence chief

More need than ever for sharply focused political and economic analysis in a dangerous and increasingly complex world.

it needs a sophisticated and sensitive intelligence apparatus. Says a former deputy director of the CIA: "Totalitarian countries can use naked power; an open society has to depend on its wits." On top of the normal tensions of national rivalry, there is now the added danger of international terrorism. The U.S. has escaped serious incidents so far, but it needs intelligence to help protect its allies from this latest scourge of political fanaticism.

Among their responsibilities, the CIA and the other U.S. intelligence agencies have provided psychological profiles of such key leaders as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Premier Menachem Begin. Intelligence has supplied background information to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on every step of his diplomacy in the Middle East. The CIA is probing the likely consequences of the French and West German elections later this year, the course of Sino-Soviet relations, the ethnic conflicts that could rend Yugoslavia after Tito dies, and the possibility of intervention there. Attempts by the U.S. to prepare for world political developments would be inconceivable without intelligence.

All this work is jeopardized if the intelligence community is unreasonably weakened by public attacks. Policymakers and intelligence officials abroad are especially worried that outside pressures could all but incapacitate the CIA. They fear that Americans are too susceptible to periodic bouts of moral outrage, that they fail to understand their cherished democratic freedoms must be protected from a world that in large part does not cherish them. Appearing on the *David Susskind Show* in January, Jack Fishman, a British expert on intelligence, said he was "appalled by the way the American public is falling into the trap of slander-

The Motto Is: Think Big, Think Dirty

When Soviet Cosmos 954 naval reconnaissance satellite plummeted from its orbit and disintegrated over northwestern Canada last week, it underscored an inescapable fact of the space age: we are never alone. Nor, for that matter, is the other side. Day and night, little is hidden from the intelligence-gathering techniques of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Information is plucked from space, from the ground, from under the sea. A rundown of some of the most sophisticated methods for gathering data:

SATELLITES. In 1972 the U.S. and Soviet Union agreed that a "national means of verification" could be used by both sides, without interference, to police arms control pacts. In plain English: spy satellites were legal.

The star of the U.S. spy satellite stable is the Lockheed "Big Bird," a 12-ton technological marvel orbiting as high as 250 miles above the earth. Big Bird, 55 ft. long and 10 ft. wide, is equipped with electronic listening equipment along with black-and-white, color and infrared television and still cameras. It is able to make a low orbital pass at an altitude of 90 miles and take extraordinarily detailed photographs, which give U.S. intelligence information on Russian and Chinese harvests as well as clues to secret weapon construction. On one mission over the Soviet Union, Big Bird snapped the make, model, wing markings and ground-support equipment of a group of planes stationed near Plesetsk, Russia's key military launch center. Exposed film is stored in six cannisters that are periodically ejected into the earth's atmosphere, descending by parachute toward a point in the Pacific Ocean north of Hawaii, where they are snatched from the air by a giant Y-shaped sky hook bolted to the nose of an Air Force cargo plane. If that fails, the cannisters float on or just under the surface of the Pacific, giving off radio and sonar signals, and are recovered by frogmen.

Big Bird's coverage, though steadily improving, is still limited by the amount of propellant aboard to about 220 days a year. Meanwhile, the Soviets have gained an intelligence edge by again manning their Salyut space station, which passes over the U.S. twice a day. U.S. intelligence officials believe the Russians are likely to keep cosmonauts in space from now on. American astronauts, on the other hand, will not revisit the Spacelab system until the new space shuttle is launched in 1980. The Soviets have another advantage in space: the "hunter-killer" satellite that can track an orbiting vehicle, sidle up to it, and detonate like a hand grenade, blasting its victim to bits. The satellite killer's main potential target: Big Bird.

PLANES. After the embarrassing U-2 incident in 1960, President Eisenhower promised the Kremlin there would be no more U.S. spy flights over the Soviet Union. Three years later, however, Lockheed unveiled another super flying machine that could probably make the trip with impunity: the needle-nosed SR-71 (for strategic reconnaissance), a 12-ton aircraft that travels three times the speed of sound at more than 85,000 ft. Armed with electronic "spoofing" gadgetry capable of disrupting enemy tracking systems and even wiping its own image off a radar scope, the plane is nicknamed "Blackbird" for its sooty heat-resistant paint job. The world's highest-flying and



Lockheed-built SR-71 spy plane, nicknamed "Blackbird" for its sooty coat of paint, the world's fastest and highest-flying manned aircraft

Plucking information from space, from the ground and even from the sea with gadgets limited only by the human imagination

Continued

ing and smearing its own security organization. The CIA may have made many mistakes, but that does not mean you should smash your own security in the name of freedom of speech. You can't destroy yourself."

Last week former CIA Director Richard Helms made much the same point: "If we treat people who do this kind of work as second-class citizens, we are not going to be able to get anybody to do our dirty work for us."

Most foreign intelligence officials do not think the damage has gone so far that it is not containable. Says a top West German intelligence officer: "The CIA's work is still very good, but it's not up to past lev-

to settle down, get a clear sense of direction and confidence again. This is vital for all of us, not just those in intelligence work."

Carter's Executive order on intelligence is intended to restore this balance and confidence. The President said that his reorganization directive was the product of the most extensive and highest-level review ever conducted. Just under a year in the making, the order expresses a rough consensus among the intelligence and defense communities, the White House and Congress.

Carter, characteristically, had been hard to please. He returned four drafts to

Says a top Administration official: "Only practice will tell if the reorganization works, but there was plenty of anguished howling as well as celebration in drawing up the order." The controversy suggests that, like any other bureaucratic reshuffle, this one will work only as well as those involved want it to work.

The document aims to achieve greater efficiency by streamlining the intelligence community under Turner, and to curb misdirected actions by imposing new restraints on covert activities. Says David Aaron, deputy director of the National Security Council: "It was important to end once and for all the notion that ef-



DRAWING FOR TIME BY CAL BRACH

Artist's conception of U.S. "Big Bird" reconnaissance satellite

fastest manned airplane, the SR-71 can travel more than 2,000 m.p.h. Though the U.S. has honored Eisenhower's promise, in 1967, as Communist Chinese nuclear technicians triggered their first hydrogen bomb, they were stunned by a blip moving across the radar scope; Blackbird was photographing the whole show. The plane carries high-powered cameras that can map most of the U.S. in three passes, as well as three-dimensional filming equipment that can cover more than 150 sq. mi. so precisely as to locate a mailbox on a country road.

"BUGS." Last month the Pentagon warned defense contractors to be wary of what they said in messages carried by commercial satellites because the Soviets are listening to every word. Using innocent-looking vans or "ferret" satellites or balloon-supported towlines, trailing from submarines, that act as 2,000-ft. antennas, the Russians pick up microwave transmissions from telephones, radios and satellites. Last year they installed huge eavesdropping antennas near Havana to intercept messages sent from the U.S. overseas. At KGB headquarters in Moscow, 30,000 workers specialize in computer analysis of miles of taped transmissions. The U.S. can scarcely complain; some 4,000 Americans employed by the National Security Agency, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency and secret private contractors are doing exactly the same thing. Both Soviet and American technicians use advanced computers programmed to react to trigger words; a Soviet analyst, for instance, might sit up straight on coming upon words like Cobra Dane, a new radar installation in the Aleutians, or Trident, the giant U.S. submarine now under construction.

Microwaves, the short radio waves that have been adapted to cook roasts and heat frozen dinners in compact kitchen ovens, are also used to bug conversations in nearby rooms or vehicles. Metal resonators buried around a room will vibrate from sounds in the air. The microwaves are bounced off the resonator, carrying the vibrations back to the eavesdropper's receiver. The spoken words are then reproduced electronically. Such gear has allegedly been used for a U.S. surveillance project called Gamma Guppy that has tried to eavesdrop on conversations conducted by members of the Soviet Politburo in their limousines. Another James Bondian device: a laser bug. The laser shoots a narrow stream of light against a window, which will vibrate from the sounds in the room; the beam grabs an "image" of the vibrations, which is then converted back to sound by a special receiver.

CAMERAS. If a spy wants pictures to go with the dialogue he has bugged, all he needs is an unobstructed view of his target, a little quiet, and either a Starlight Viewer with a camera adapter or an Intensifier Camera, both made by Law Enforcement Associates, Inc., a New Jersey electronics firm. Compact hand-held devices, they retail for about $3,000 and can be operated along with earphones and a parabolic reflector or "dish" that can pick up normal speech up to 800 yds. away in an open space or in a room across a noisy street. The Starlight Viewer amplifies light 50,000 times and is perfect for nighttime surveillance; the intensifier needs some light but produces more sharply detailed photographs.

What the spy trade calls ELINT (for electronic intelligence) seems limited only by the range of the human imagination; it is a tinkerer's dream so long as intelligence wizards bear in mind the unofficial motto of space age spying: think big and think dirty. But all their gadgets, no matter how effective and sophisticated, are unlikely to make the man in the trenchcoat obsolete. Satellites and planes and bugs might dig up secret information faster, but HUMINT (for human intelligence) is needed to interpret it, and to decide what to do next.



BOB ADELMAN FOR TIME

Hand-held viewer used with "dish" eavesdropper

Day and night, little escapes the intelligence gatherers.

continued

fective intelligence can't be carried out within constitutional limitations."

Under the new Executive order, responsibility for CIA and other intelligence operations is clearly lodged with the President and his top aides. Presidential passing of the buck for any unsavory covert activities will now be much harder, if not impossible. The National Security Council remains at the top of the intelligence pyramid. Two of its committees, set up last year by NSC Director Zbigniew Brzezinski, will have expanded powers. The Policy Review Committee will continually examine all intelligence operations. Chaired by Turner, the committee will include the Vice President; the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense; the National Security Adviser; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Special Coordination Committee, chaired by Brzezinski, includes the members of the NSC, along with other senior officials who are chosen to attend. It will be responsible for special intelligence operations, thus sharing with the President the supervision of all sensitive covert activities carried out by the CIA.

This committee will also take over coordination of counterespionage, an activity that is handled by the FBI within the U.S. and by the CIA abroad. No one is sure how this change will work, since counterespionage has become the unwanted stepchild of intelligence. The FBI admits flatly it no longer has the manpower to keep track of all the Soviet KGB agents flowing into the U.S. and its efforts, like the CIA's, have been impeded by growing restrictions on surveillance. Admits one Carter aide: "Counterintelligence is still a mess. We haven't resolved anything except to deal with it in the classic bureaucratic sense: move the function and rename it."

The new set of prohibitions is extensive and severe. Perhaps most important, the Attorney General is drawn into the heart of intelligence to ensure a legal basis for all domestic operations. His approval is needed for an intelligence agent to open mail sent through U.S. postal channels, to join any domestic organization, or to contract for goods and services in the U.S. without revealing his identity. Surveillance of American citizens within the U.S. can be conducted by the FBI only in the course of a formal, lawful investigation; surveillance of a U.S. citizen abroad is allowed only if he is thought to be involved in some activity inimical to national security. The Attorney General is instructed to make sure that any "intelligence activity within the United States or directed against any United States person is conducted by the least intrusive means possible."

Assassinations are flatly prohibited. So is any experimentation with drugs, unless it is done with the subject's consent under Health, Education and Welfare Department guidelines. U.S. spies will not be permitted to join any other federal agency without their identity being disclosed—a directive that has drawn fire from CIA officials, who rightfully claim there are very few places left where their agents can get secure cover.

When last week's executive order was finally hammered out, Admiral Turner, perhaps only half in jest, threw up his arms, sighed and told Brzezinski: "They call me the intelligence czar, but you're the boss." The admiral had a point, but then he has nothing to complain about from the reshuffle. For the first time, one man has been told to take charge of the nine all too often freewheeling, intensely competitive and sometimes overlapping intelligence agencies.

Precisely how much power Turner will wield remains to be seen. The legislation establishing the CIA in 1947 gave the

INTELLIGENCE CONTROL



TIME Chart by Nino Telac

CIA
Budget: (1978) est. $800 million
Employees: est. 20,000
Mission: To collect foreign intelligence and provide support for other U.S. intelligence agencies. Domestic intelligence activities must be coordinated with FBI and have approval of the Attorney General.

FBI
Budget: $513 million
Employees: 20,000
Mission: To investigate federal crimes and conduct counterintelligence within the U.S., and coordinate such activities with other agencies.

National Security Agency
Budget: est. $1.2 billion
Employees: est. 24,000
Mission: To monitor U.S. and foreign communications coming from satellites, land-based transmitters and submarines. To break foreign codes and ensure the security of the Government's own communications.

State Department Intelligence
Budget: $11.5 million
Employees: 315
Mission: To collect—overtly—foreign political, economic, scientific and sociological information, and coordinate with the CIA director to ensure that U.S. foreign intelligence activities help U.S. foreign policy.

Defense Intelligence Agency
Budget: est. $200 million
Employees: 4,300
Mission: To provide and coordinate military intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and non-defense agencies.

Military Intelligence
Budget: Unavailable
Employees: Unavailable
Mission: To provide tactical and strategic intelligence and counterintelligence for each branch of service (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps), coordinating foreign work with the CIA and domestic duties with the FBI.

Treasury Department Intelligence
Budget: est. $926 million
Employees: Unavailable
Mission: To collect—overtly—foreign investment and monetary information, and produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to U.S. economic policy.

Energy Department Intelligence
Budget: $24.7 million
Employees: Unavailable
Mission: To produce and disseminate intelligence about foreign energy supplies, production, intentions and policies.

Drug Enforcement Administration
Budget: $188 million
Employees: 4,365
Mission: To collect, produce and disseminate intelligence on foreign and domestic narcotics production and trafficking.

continued

director, as his title suggests, a certain degree of authority over all the intelligence agencies: he was charged with "coordinating" their activities. But he only loosely performed that function. The new executive order considerably enhances the director's authority and responsibility. He has control of the total intelligence budget (an estimated $7 billion a year) and the right to give assignments to all the agencies. Turner's position ultimately depends on the power realities of Washington and his own abilities.

No one who knows Stan Turner doubts that the driving, fiercely ambitious admiral will make the most of his new job. He is one of the armed services' new breed of activist intellectuals who pride themselves on their grasp of nonmilitary matters: politics, economics, psychology. Born in Highland Park, Ill., a Chicago suburb, Turner decided on a naval career instead of joining his father in real estate. After graduating 25th in his class at Annapolis (Jimmy Carter finished 59th out of 820 in the same class of '46), he studied at Oxford on a Rhodes scholarship. He served on a destroyer during the Korean War; from 1972 to 1974 he was president of the Naval War College, where he gained a reputation as a man of unconventional opinion. As he wrote in an article in *Foreign Affairs*, he preferred to "focus on trends rather than statistics."

Named commander of the Second Fleet in the Atlantic in 1974, Turner resorted again to unconventional tactics. He checked on the readiness of his ships by making surprise visits by helicopter. Then he would toss a life preserver into the ocean and order sailors to save a hypothetical man overboard. His ambition was to become Chief of Naval Operations, but his plans were interrupted last March by his Commander in Chief. Since Turner remains in the Navy, he is accused by critics in the CIA of using the intelligence post as a steppingstone to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The truth is, he probably could have found a safer route.

Powers hearing sentence in Moscow (1960)

A world that does not cherish democracy.

Castro's Cuban troops firing at advancing rebels during ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion (1961)

Taking the rap for a series of secret operations that were approved by higher-ups.

At the office through long days and into the night (his average work day is 12 hours), Turner spends his remaining time with his wife Patricia at their home in northwest Washington. His son Geoffrey is a Navy lieutenant stationed in Monterey, Calif. Daughter Laurel is married and lives in San Diego. Turner, who seldom drinks and does not smoke, likes to play tennis and squash or swim when he has the chance. His social life usually involves old friends from the Navy, not new ones from the CIA.

Turner's difficulties at the agency come, at least in part, from his carrying out the duties assigned to him. It has been common wisdom in recent years that the CIA had become too large. Staff reductions began under James Schlesinger, who was director in 1973, and continued under his successor, William Colby. When Turner took over, he found various options on his desk for eliminating some 1,500 positions over five or six years. Rather than leave people in suspense for so long a period, he decided to make a quick cut of 820 jobs over two years.

He did it none too diplomatically. With scant regard for the feelings of people who had served their country unsung for decades, he permitted a photocopied memo informing 212 employees of their dismissal to be distributed last Oct. 31. Some of the people fired thought he bore them a personal grudge. Says one of his former aides: "Stan is deeply suspicious of the clandestine services. He is very uncomfortable with their basic uncontrollability. He doesn't like their fine clothes and accents, their Cosmos and Yale and Georgetown clubs. They're simply not good sailors. He finds them sneeringly elliptical. It drives him crazy. He just can't get hold of this maddening quicksilver."

Turner could not have been pleased with his victims' undisciplined response. They dubbed the occasion the "Halloween massacre" and passed around a takeoff of the admiral's song in Gilbert and Sullivan's *H.M.S. Pinafore:*

"Of intelligence I had so little grip
That they offered me the directorship.
With my brassbound head of oak so stout
I don't have to know what it's all about."

Only 45 people, in fact, have been fired outright. Others have been retired, and the CIA personnel office is looking for Government jobs for the rest. Sums up Turner on the agency's cutbacks: "What do you want—happy spies or effective and well-controlled spies? The gripes are mainly from those who were asked to leave. It is ironic that the media are so enthusiastic about all those good old experienced spies—who brought all those things that the media railed against for all those years."

The CIA boss has support where it counts the most. At the signing of the executive order last week, Carter went out of his way to stress "my complete appreciation and confidence in Admiral Stan Turner." Carter sees Turner more often than previous Presidents saw their CIA chiefs. The admiral has briefed the President once or twice a week in hour-long sessions, usually alone. Turner prepares the agenda and spends ten to twelve hours reading background material for each session. According to a presidential aide: "Carter likes Turner's crispness, his grasp, his 'yes sir, no sir,' no-nonsense naval officer's style."

All the furor over the CIA's real and putative misdeeds has obscured its solid accomplishments over many years. Except for rare periods of war, the U.S. did not even have an overall intelligence service until the Office of Strategic Services

continued

was created in 1942; it provided Americans with a hazardous and exhilarating cram course in espionage. OSS members formed the nucleus of the CIA, which was started in 1947 in response to Soviet expansionism. The agency attracted talented recruits from campuses in the 1950s, and its activities spread adventurously, and occasionally recklessly.

Now, as the 1980s approach, what kind of CIA can—and should—the nation have? To hear Turner and other intelligence authorities, the agency will be smaller, with more sharply focused analysis, and with covert operations scaled down and sparingly used.

While the quality of CIA analysis in general is not what it used to be, the agency is still unsurpassed in interpreting technological data. The American public was exposed to the awesome possibilities of aerial espionage when a U-2 spy plane was brought down over the Soviet Union in 1960, and its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was put on trial and jailed for two years. Since then the U-2 has been supplemented by an ever expanding array of observation satellites and eavesdropping devices. As a senior member of the National Security Council puts it, "The agency is best when there's something very specific that you want to know, preferably a question that can be answered with numbers, or, if not with numbers, then at least with nouns. The fewer adverbs and adjectives in a CIA report, the better it tends to be." But since this is a world of adverbs and adjectives—that is, of emotions that cannot be measured scientifically—more subjective analysis is needed. "We're neglecting soft input, the human factor," says a top foreign policy adviser to the White House. "There is insufficient keen political analysis."

White House officials complain, perhaps excessively, that the agency has failed to give them advance warning of crucial developments. Why, they ask, was the CIA not better informed about the reaction Vance would receive when he took his SALT proposals to Moscow last March. Common sense, however, might have indicated that the Secretary would run into trouble because the proposals were too sweeping to be acceptable to the Soviets. The White House felt that the CIA should have had some inkling of Sadat's decision to go to Israel; yet U.S. intelligence had warned that Sadat was frustrated and looking for a bold step. The CIA had satellite photos of a secret South African nuclear facility in the Kalahari Desert, but had not interpreted them. The White House was considerably embarrassed when it learned that the Soviets had already discovered the installation.

Vietnamese being led to CIA plane (1974)

New safeguards against excesses.

Policymakers sometimes fail to use sound intelligence when it is offered. President Johnson disregarded the discouraging CIA reports on Viet Nam; they were not what he wanted to hear. The White House rejected CIA warnings of a Middle East war in 1973. Why would the Arabs want to start a war they could not win? reasoned the policymakers. It did not occur to them that the Arabs could win something just by fighting better than they had the last time.

As the CIA has grown bigger, it has become more bureaucratic. Too much superfluous paper is circulated. Analysts are more conscious of job and status, and less daring and imaginative than they were in the '50s and '60s. Says an Administration official: "There's a lot of bureaucratic ass-covering that goes on when guys write long-range stuff. They don't want to be wrong, so they tend to be glib and platitudinous."

Though covert operations involving intervention in the internal affairs of other countries are being reduced, some have been successful. The CIA-backed overthrow of Iran's Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and of Guatemala's President Jacobo Arbenz the following year headed off threats of Communist takeovers and stabilized conditions to the benefit of the Western world. Other operations were more dubious. In the Dominican Republic, Dictator Rafael Trujillo was assassinated in 1961 by rebels supplied with guns by CIA agents. The ensuing chaos forced President Johnson to send in the Marines four years later. Notes New York University Law Professor Thomas Franck: "By using dirty tricks that backfired, we set ourselves up as the universal scapegoat for every disaster caused by either God or incompetent governments."

But not all covert CIA operations can—or should—be ruled out. "There is a mean, dirty, back-alley struggle going on in which many other governments are participating," says former Secretary of State Dean Rusk. "If we withdraw unilaterally, they aren't going to stop. We must maintain a first-rate covert capability."

Potential dangers exist in many parts of the world, especially where the ever expanding KGB is active. What if a revolutionary group with Soviet ties were plotting a coup against the government of Saudi Arabia, thereby threatening the world's oil supply? Surely the U.S. would need a clandestine force to support the legally constituted government and oppose such a disruptive act. Says former CIA Director Colby: "There really has to be something between a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines."

It is difficult to prescribe exact behavior for a covert undertaking. Strict rules of conduct could be damaging in certain situations. Suppose terrorists manage to obtain and hide an atomic weapon, then threaten to blow up a city—a not inconceivable happening in the decades ahead.

Allende in presidential palace (1973)

Hard to prescribe clear-cut rules.

Says Telford Taylor, a law professor who served in intelligence during World War II: "If the safety of a city were at stake, I'd say go ahead and burn up their toenails. Absolute morality is a little hard to swallow in this kind of thing."

But all agree that proper authority must be exercised over covert operations. It is much debated whether—and how much—successive Presidents knew about the various CIA projects; practically everyone else was kept in the dark. "I didn't learn about the Castro assassination plots until two years ago," admits Rusk. "That is intolerable. The Secretary of State must know what is going on. There has to be an inventory of ongoing things."

Yet former CIA Director John McCone, among many others, argues that only a few leaders of the Administration and Congress should be informed of sensitive intelligence projects, and other officials should be let in on secrets only if they "need to know." After the rush of disclosures about the CIA, everybody on Capitol Hill wanted to find out what the agency was doing. Oversight was spread among eight, sometimes sievelike, congressional committees. The eight still exist, but Turner increasingly is reporting to only two intelligence committees, one each in the House and Senate. The new executive order confirms this arrange-

continued

ment. The trend is toward reducing the number of people involved in oversight, though they will be more watchful than their predecessors in the '50s and '60s.

With the new supervision and tougher regulations, the national uproar over the CIA can be expected to subside. Damage has been done, but the U.S. intelligence community will survive. Jonathan Moore, director of the Institute of Politics at Harvard, feels that the attacks on the CIA might have "put us at a disadvantage under certain circumstances, but I'd put it in the category of runnable risks. After the debate is ended, after Chile, Viet Nam and Watergate, we say we are going to clean up our act, but we sure as hell are going to have an act. We might be more potent than before."

There even seems to be a swing of public opinion in support of the CIA, a recognition of the basic point that it is not a contradiction for an open democracy to have a secret intelligence agency. Senator Daniel Inouye, the Hawaii Democrat who formerly chaired the Senate intelligence committee, feels that: "If a poll were taken today, it would find spying is still essential. We hate wars, but we must maintain our defense posture. Our spies are not monsters." Nor will they be saints in a world and an occupation that produce very few. A certain realism and perspective is necessary. Intelligence must be recognized for what it is: occasionally dangerous, sometimes dirty, sometimes exhilarating, often tedious, very necessary work.

Turner: "I Will Be Criticized"

In an exclusive 90-minute interview, Stansfield Turner discussed the changing nature of spying with TIME *Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott.*

Excerpts:

On the mission of U.S. intelligence. American intelligence today is moving away from the two focuses of intelligence for its first 20 or 25 years [after World War II]. The first focus was on covert action, and the second was a preoccupation with the Soviet Union, particularly the military aspects of the Soviet Union. Let me not leave any doubt. The Soviet military is the No. 1 intelligence issue and must remain so. But without neglecting the cardinal line of defense, we've got to be able to tackle a much wider range of subjects. Today we've got to look at most of the 150-odd countries of the world. We have legitimate needs for good intelligence information on many of them. That transcends military matters. It gets into the economic as well as the political area. So the character of the whole organization has got to shift to accommodate these new factors.

On congressional oversight. There are clear risks in the process of oversight. The first is that we will end up with intelligence by timidity—we won't take any risks because somebody might criticize us. The second is exposure. If you have too many people viewing a sensitive operation, it may become publicly known and cost somebody's life or abort the operation ... I'd like to see us notify fewer committees of Congress; now we technically report to eight of them.

On the changing demand for covert action. I don't think the country wants us to interfere as much in other people's affairs by covert means today as in the past. I don't think it's as effective today as in the past—and it wasn't all that effective then. The batting average is not big league.

But I'm dedicated to preserving for this country the capability to turn to political action when it suits the purpose and when it is properly authorized. We have not by any means abandoned covert action. While it has been much scaled down from the height of the '50s and '60s, it does continue.

On how a covert action is undertaken. I'm not the guy who should push covert action. I'm not a policymaker, but if someone who is a policymaker asks, "Turner, what can you do for us in the way of covert action here?" I like to reach in my pocket and have a plan there, ready. A couple of times it [a plan] has been accepted. But on the whole I have not found it a very attractive option.

On clandestine financing of foreign political forces. Let's say Country X is having an election tomorrow, and we like Party A but don't like Party B. If we go into that Country and start feeding money to people in Party A, even assuming we're totally free of leaks in the U.S., there's still a high probability that there'll be a leak in Country X.

You could say that we got away with it in the past, but today you probably wouldn't get the politicians in Party A in Country X to accept the money, for fear it would become public knowledge and they'd lose more than they'd gain.

So I'm saying that some of the tools that have been used in the past have different effectiveness in a different world climate. Evidence of external tampering, particularly from one of the major powers, has tremendous internal ramifications that it didn't have 25 years ago.

On the proposal that a separate agency be set up to conduct covert operations. That would be costly and perhaps dangerous. You would end up constructing an organization, with people overseas, just for covert action, whereas today we get dual service out of people [those in covert operations engage in intelligence gathering as well]. If there were a separate bureaucracy with good people in it, they would end up promoting covert action —not maliciously, but because they would be energetic. We should be ready to do what we're asked to do, but not be out drumming up business.

On assassination. I am categorically prohibited from doing it. If we were in some *extremis* situation where it was justified to take human life for a good cause, like a hijacking, why, at least we could get the President to make an exception. Now, if it [the presidential prohibition] becomes law, we are going to have to be very precise on how that law is worded so we don't get into an absolutely absurd situation. But nobody wants to do assassinations.

On paramilitary operations. We are retaining a paramilitary capability on stand-by as part of our covert action kit.

On antiterrorism and antinarcotics operations. We have put more emphasis on both in this past year by allocating some increase of resources and by re-emphasizing to our chiefs of station that those objectives are high on our list. We have had some important successes. We have been able to abort intended terrorist operations from time to time by alerting people to them.

On the CIA's policy of making some of its studies public. I'm just so proud of what we have contributed in the past nine months to the public debate on major issues. Look at this morning's newspaper: there's a long story on Soviet oil-extraction problems. We triggered that last April by releasing a study on Soviet oil. We've put out several studies on the Soviet economy and its prospects, a study on the world energy situation, a study on terrorism. All these have given the taxpayer a greater return on his investment in intelligence. I intend to keep on with this program. I will be criticized sometimes for supporting the Administration's policy and sometimes for not supporting it. I'm doing neither. I'm giving the information we have.

TIME
6 February 1978

KGB: Russia's Old Boychiks

The Soviet secret service is getting bigger—and better

Panama City, Fla., 1971: Carrying a hefty attaché case, U.S. Air Force Sergeant Walter T. Perkins walks to a commercial jet destined for Mexico City, where he plans to rendezvous with an agent of the KGB, the Soviet intelligence service. In the attaché case are top-secret U.S. plans for defense against a Soviet air attack. Air Force security men arrest Perkins as he boards, and his KGB contact, Oleg Shevchenko, flees Mexico for Cuba.

Damascus, Syria, 1974: Hidden KGB cameras click softly, and a secret microphone records the tender dialogue as an Arab diplomat dallies with a male paramour in the city's infamous Turkish baths. Threatened afterward with disclosure of his homosexuality, the diplomat agrees to pass information to the KGB.

Jerusalem, 1976: The Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church makes his pilgrimage from Moscow to the Russian Orthodox Church in Israel, the sole building in that country allowed to remain in Soviet hands after Israel's 1967 break with the U.S.S.R. Accompanying the Patriarch on his mission, as usual, is a squad of KGB agents bearing communications equipment and funds for local agents. Vladimir Ribakov, the administrative manager of the church in Jerusalem, is the KGB's chief agent in Israel.

These are only a few of the thousands of known incidents that shed a sliver of light on the sweep of Soviet intelligence activities round the world. Western authorities view the KGB as a worthy and persistent foe. Says a former high CIA and State Department official: "They're a lot better than we think: I think they're damn good."

The KGB's budget has grown to an estimated $10 billion (*v.* the $7 billion that the U.S. spends on the CIA, NSA and other intelligence agencies), and its roster, which approaches half a million employees, has grown dramatically since 1974. Western experts believe it has five times as many people involved in foreign intelligence as the CIA and Western European spy agencies combined.

A major European intelligence service claims 24% of the Soviet diplomats accredited to embassies in Western Europe are KGB agents; there are 87 such agents accredited in West Germany, 53 in Italy and 98 in Finland. About 35% of the 136 diplomats accredited to the Soviet embassy in Washington are believed to be KGB agents, and others serve as Tass correspondents, trade representatives and employees of the Soviet airline Aeroflot.

International agencies, including the U.N., are another favorite KGB cover. European intelligence experts estimate that 105 to 135 KGB agents are assigned to the U.N. in Europe. One is Alexander Benyaminov, appointed in 1976 to the data processing section of the International Atomic Energy Agency, a post that puts him in contact with those who possess nuclear secrets. Often the Soviet ambassador to a country is a full-fledged KGB agent. In Greece, he is Ivan Udaltsov, who, while serving as counselor at the Soviet embassy in Prague, helped to crush the Czech reform regime of Alexander Dubček in 1968. Three months after he arrived in Athens in 1976, Ambassador Udaltsov was accused of funneling $25 million to the Greek Communist Party; unfazed, he called a press conference to declare: "I was not upset by those reports. The KGB is a highly respected organization set up by Lenin to protect the socialist revolution and the Soviet state."

TASS/SOVFOTO

KGB's Andropov (standing, center), Trade Minister Patolichev (left) and Foreign Minister Gromyko with Brezhnev in 1976

They fear they will be blamed for missing something.

Indeed it is. The KGB center, as its command complex of buildings is called, is located only a few blocks from the Kremlin—at 2 Dzerzhinsky Square. The dour, ocher-colored buildings look down on the Bolshoi Theater and the entrance to Red Square. The agency has a huge network of informers within the U.S.S.R., and it can often veto applications for new jobs, visas and university admissions. It operates prison camps and mental hospitals and directs the Soviet campaign against dissidents. Lubyanka Prison, where victims of Stalin's purges, such as Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, were executed, is part of the 2 Dzerzhinsky Square complex of buildings.

The KGB (the Russian abbreviation for Committee for State Security) is a descendant of secret police agencies maintained over the centuries by anxious Russian czars; after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the Communists called their secret police, successively, the CHEKA, GPU, OGPU, GUCB/NKVD and MGB, the KGB's forerunner. Today the agency has a force of 300,000 men under arms to guard Soviet borders, as well as a corps of customs agents. Intourist too works closely with the KGB; tourist guides can steer chosen visitors to restaurants that have hidden microphones.

The KGB's boss, Yuri Andropov, took command in 1967, and in 1973 became the first KGB head since Stalin's dreaded Lavrenti Beria to join the ruling Politburo. Andropov, 63, is said to admire modern art and to be a witty conversationalist who speaks fluent English—a portrait that contrasts with his harsh actions as Moscow's Ambassador to Hungary during the 1956 uprising. Under Andropov, says one Western analyst, "the thugs are being weeded out of the KGB."

The KGB recruits from the elite of the Soviet Union's managerial class by means of an Old Boychik network. Picked for loyalty, intelligence, presence and family connections to the party and the agency, KGB recruits are often sent to Moscow's prestigious Institute for International Studies for intensive courses in foreign cultures and languages. KGB agents are given preference for scarce apartments in Moscow and buy such rare foreign goods as stereos and Scotch at giveaway prices. They socialize with each other and often intermarry.

"The really boring Russian diplomats are not KGB," says one Western intelligence agent. The KGB man often wears Western suits (veterans of U.S. service favor Brooks Brothers). He—or she—entertains freely, and spends more money than non-KGB apparatchiks.

Abroad, the most sociable KGB agents pose not only as diplomats but also as trade representatives and journalists. Their mission: gathering scientific and technical as well as military and political information. It is pursued directly by inviting employees, journalists and politicians to lunch or parties, and also by covert means.

In the field, KGB agents prepare annual plans that project, among other

continued

things, the number of collaborators they will recruit in the coming year; their performance is judged against the plan. Blackmail is a favorite recruitment tactic, with sex and drugs the standard come-ons, but sometimes other pressure is applied as well. Last month Iranian Major General Ahmed Mogharebi confessed that he had spied for the KGB after Soviet agents threatened to reveal his past membership in Iran's outlawed Communist Party, Tudeh. The leader of the Iranian spy ring, a government official named Ali-Naghi Rabbani, had sophisticated radio equipment for receiving Soviet satellite transmissions in his home. Rabbani's clandestine contact was the Soviet consul in Tehran, Boris Kabanov, who was expelled from the country. Both Mogharebi and Rabbani were sentenced to death; late last month Mogharebi was executed by a firing squad.



Colonel Rudolf Abel

In the Soviet Union, the KGB attempts on occasion to entrap foreign diplomats and journalists, especially ones it wishes to expel. When he was working for U.P.I., Christopher Ogden, now a TIME correspondent, was invited to a mysterious street-corner meeting in Moscow in 1973. He was offered the "secret plans" for a Soviet troop crossing into China. He declined them.

Kim Philby

Because most of the KGB's effort is aimed at free and open Western societies, KGB tacticians stress the use of agents on the ground, instead of electronic intelligence gathering, at which the U.S. is stronger. The KGB excels at recruiting new agents: with only some exaggeration, a West German intelligence expert says, "There is not one place in the world where the KGB does not have its man." Indeed, Superspy Colonel Rudolf Abel, apprehended in New York in 1957, was found to command a vast network of agents that ranged over the entire North American continent. Today the KGB cooperates closely with the East German Ministry for Security, which in 1972 successfully planted an agent, Günter Guillaume, as a close aide to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Guillaume spirited NATO defense and other secrets out of West Germany until his arrest in 1974. Last year French counterintelligence (the DST) broke up a spy ring that gave the Soviets information about the advanced Mirage-2000 fighter plane and NATO defenses. Israeli officials were shocked in 1972 when they deciphered the code used for radio transmissions between Cyprus, the KGB's Middle East headquarters, and Moscow, and discovered the Soviets had obtained full details of a planned Israeli retaliation raid against Syria. Damascus had the plan four hours before the scheduled Israeli raid.

General Jean-Louis Jeanmaire

Of course the Soviets have had their share of intelligence failures. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the KGB failed to detect Israeli preparations for crossing the Suez Canal, and underestimated the maneuver's importance once it was under way. In New Delhi, the resident KGB team concluded that Indira Gandhi would easily win re-election in 1977. More embarrassing was the gambit of Vladimir Rybachenko, who served in Paris as a UNESCO official. Shortly before Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev arrived in Paris on a good-will visit in 1976, Rybachenko was caught receiving secret documents that described a French Defense Ministry computer system. Rybachenko was expelled. Then there was the gift by Colonel Vassili Denisenko, the Soviet military attaché in Switzerland, to an undercover KGB spy of 13 years. Denisenko gave a pair of golden cuff links bearing the hammer-and-sickle crest to Swiss Brigadier General Jean-Louis Jeanmaire. When Jeanmaire wore them, Swiss security agents had their first clue to his treachery; he was sentenced to an 18-year prison term.

Western analysts believe the KGB has several flaws that result from its enormous size and the Soviets' authoritarian mentality. KGB agents overcollect, flooding the district and home offices with so much data that the agency does not or cannot efficiently separate the significant from the trivial. This may explain why, according to a defector, KGB field men in the Middle East reported on Israel's plan to strike Egypt in 1967, but the word never got to Egypt. The society that creates KGB inefficiencies is also an enormous advantage to the agency, permitting it great latitude without measurable objection from its populace. After all, the agency is charged with silencing domestic critics, including any who would make so bold as to criticize the KGB. ■

Spy Guide

When students of the gray world gather, the conversation—whispered, of course—often turns to the quality of intelligence services. The CIA and KGB rank, on a scale of 1 to 4, at the top. Here, with help from intelligence operatives in the U.S. and abroad, TIME *rates the other services:*

Israel. Mossad, its intelligence service, is very well organized, ruthless, dedicated, all but impossible to infiltrate. Excels at information gathering and counterintelligence, is weaker on political analysis. Major target: Arab countries, naturally.

Britain. Its Secret Intelligence Service is tops at analytical work and political judgments. Good on the Middle East, less impressive on Africa. Master Spy Kim Philby's exposure as a KGB agent in 1963 was a blow, but SIS has overcome that.

Czechoslovakia and Poland. Their services are best in the East, after the KGB. The Czechs' main target: Britain, where it has 50 spies in London embassy. Poles tend to move and mix better internationally.

West Germany. Bonn's Bundesnachrichtendienst is superb on East Germany and on analyzing other Warsaw Pact countries. Reputation tarnished by penetration of Soviet and East German spies into government ministries.

France. The SDECE has some bright leaders and operates well in certain areas, notably former French West Africa. Suffers from internal squabbling and is thought to be penetrated by Communist agents.

Japan. Tokyo's Cabinet Research Office aims to gather information about foreign countries' economic-policy intentions and industrial secrets. Political analysis is weak.

China. The General Administration of Intelligence operates mostly in Asia, Africa and in centers of Overseas Chinese. Technologically weak, but sound on analysis. Especially concerned with Soviet industrial development in Siberia.

Norway and Sweden. Both sound on Soviet Union, but Norway has edge, with access to NATO intelligence.

Canada and Australia. Minor league worldwide, stronger regionally.

Newsweek

February 6, 1978 / $1.00



The CIA: How Badly Hurt?

Stansfield Turner

Wally McNamee—Newsweek



The CIA: How

The spy named Hook slumped into an overstuffed chair in the old Mamounia Hotel in Marrakech to wait for his contact—and think things through. His best Arab sources seemed to be ducking him these days. Even the British weren't talking to him more than they had to—not that the bloody Brits had much to say anyway. Back home, the President and Congress were watching the CIA more closely than ever before. Young guys were getting out of The Company and heading for fat advances from publishers in New York. Old guys, his friends, were getting pink slips right and left. And they said the new director seemed to trust electronic gadgets in the sky more than men who knew how to keep an ear to the ground. "How the hell are we gonna stay ahead of the KGB?" Hook thought. He waited, but his man didn't show up. Strike three. Finally he got up, walked slowly back to the station, filed yet another no-news-is-good-news report to Langley—and started thinking about his wretched pension.

Turner meets with top aides at Langley: T

Hook is a fiction, but his problems are very real facts of life around The Company these days. "For the first time in my experience the CIA is demoralized," says former Deputy Director E. Henry Knoche, a career man who resigned last summer. Some normally tight-lipped spies now charge angrily that the CIA's director, Adm. Stansfield Turner, is an abrasive martinet who doesn't understand the first thing about spycraft. Others around the agency's Langley, Va., headquarters maintain that squeaky-clean new rules set by Carter and Congress to control the old and often dirty business of espionage are seriously hobbling the CIA's covert operatives, weakening its network of foreign spies and straining its relations with friendly intelligence services. Said one worried spook: "It's a total disaster."

That damage assessment was probably exaggerated, but the deeper issues it raised troubled Carter, Turner and their critics alike. How much harm has three years of unrelenting public exposure of CIA misdeeds and mistakes done to the agency? Has the intelligence community got its sensitive machines and sophisticated staff pulling together or against one another? What can be done to cut deadwood from the CIA? And, most important, how should Carter—or any President—square legitimate needs for espionage and covert capabilities with the country's fundamental democratic values and processes? "We want an accountable structure," Vice President Walter F. Mondale promised recently. And Turner told NEWSWEEK that tighter controls and more coordination around the CIA—and the rest of the nation's supersecret intelligence community—were making things better, not worse. "This place is *producing*," he said (page 29).

Outwardly, at least, there seemed to be ample evidence of that. As usual last week, sophisticated U.S. spy satellites scanned the remote corners of the earth, giant electronic "ears" drew signals and secrets out of the airwaves, computers at CIA headquarters purred and the agency's daily intelligence briefing landed on Jimmy Carter's desk each morning around 8 o'clock—right on time. To give the President a cloak-and-dagger capability, NEWSWEEK learned, the CIA keeps in reserve a skeleton crew of 30 covert operatives and 50 paramilitary experts. And there were signs that the agency may be working to build a new,

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

Stanley Tretick—Sygma

Bill Ray

Outsider at the helm: Turner with national security adviser Brzezinski (left) and in his office, CIA equipment analyzing Soviet radar signals

Badly Hurt?

Bill Ray

Question was whether the agency needed a clean sweep with a stiff broom

even more secret service despite—indeed, because of—all the recent scrutiny and criticism. "We are dealing with our cover impediments by creating a truly clandestine corps of operations officers," notes one section of an ambitious five-year plan drafted at Langley last year. "[This will be] an extremely delicate undertaking with many complex operations and support ramifications that will require adroit handling by our most experienced people."

Both Congress and Carter are casting about for adroit ways of their own to exert more quality control over the CIA's "product"—a blend of military, economic, political and scientific intelligence that aims to be this nation's best window on the world. "Their intelligence is lousy," says New York Rep. Otis Pike, a critic who believes it costs more than it's worth. And a top White House strategist concedes that CIA reports are often too tame. "Technologically, we're awfully good," says another Presidential confidant. "But when it comes to foreign policy—what other governments think of you, what they think of themselves, what their strategy is and what they think your strategy is—our intelligence is not very good."

SUPERSPOOK

In the hopes of improving things, the CIA is importing Ambassador to Portugal Frank Carlucci, 47, a tough-minded administrator who ran the Office of Economic Opportunity for Richard Nixon, as Turner's top deputy who will take charge of day-to-day operations. And last week, the President signed an Executive order giving CIA boss Turner broader responsibility for the U.S. intelligence "community"—including the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office and the electronic wizards of the National Security Agency—a development that may ultimately make Turner the most powerful and controversial superspook since Allen Dulles in the Eisenhower era of cold-war brinkmanship.

Turner steamed into Langley last March under full power and a somewhat vague mission from Carter to take bold action. His credentials looked impressive to liberals and conservatives: Annapolis and Oxford, chief of the Naval War College and a combat command on a frigate off Vietnam. The CIA itself welcomed the admiral, if only as a contrast to Theodore Sorensen, Carter's first choice for the top intelligence job. The liberal Sorensen dropped out after it developed that he had exploited classified documents in writing his memoirs of the Kennedy years. "When Sorensen lost, everybody was so relieved that they never asked, 'Who's Turner?' " said one former agency man—a bit ruefully.

It turned out that the admiral was a salty outsider who made no effort to adapt to the traditional pinstripes and gelignite image of directors like Dulles, Richard Helms and William Colby. Nor did he follow the pattern set by onetime

Continued

Republican Party chairman George Bush—another outsider who came to Langley with a mandate to shake things up but managed to replace much of the CIA's top management in 1976 without drawing too much blood or ink in the process. "My attitude was I'm going to hunker down," Bush said last week. "This idea of openness—I just don't buy that." Turner seemed more suspicious. "I said to myself: 'I've read about the accusations against the clandestine service'," he recalled. "I don't believe them all—but I don't know which are fact and which are fiction."

He decided to find out. "The paramount question in his mind—and quite rightly—was 'How do I control the place?' " said former deputy director Knoche. "The trouble was, he allowed this question to exist in his mind for too long." To get the clandestine Directorate of Operations (DDO) in hand, Turner hired Robert D. (Rusty) Williams from Stanford Research Institute to be his freelance investigator. Williams rattled a few skeletons and set quite a few teeth on edge around Langley. To some, he seemed more concerned about investigating booze and sex play than foul play during a tour of CIA stations in Asia. Old hands at headquarters and in the field disliked Williams's aloof moralizing and resented his prying questions. "Having endured the process of external criticism and suspicions since 1975," Knoche said last week, "the CIA and particularly the Deputy Director for Operations found itself going through it all again—from their own leader. The place buckled."



Bad press: A critical report, Allende's fall, Vietnam's collapse

PINK-SLIP MUTINY

The most crippling blow to the morale of Turner's 15,000 employees has been his method of cutting back the clandestine staff. The operations division had already been whittled down to 4,730 employees from a peak of 8,000 during the Vietnam war, and Turner inherited from the Ford Administration a recommendation to slice another 1,200 to 1,400 officers, virtually all of them at headquarters. He chose to cut only 820, but speeded up the original, six-year timetable. That made it impossible to achieve all the reduction by attrition—and a flurry of pink slips was inevitable.

The firings and the ensuing uproar were the first, outward signs that something was amiss in the CIA. "It was the CIA's first mutiny," recalled one ex-officer last month. Many victims of the firings broke the agency's tradition of silence and went out talking. One fired agent told NEWSWEEK: "To receive the grateful thanks of a grateful government for services rendered—sometimes overseas at great hazard—in the form of a two sentence message, without any recognition of past performance, was insulting and humiliating." Turner argued that he was only being cost-conscious and efficient; he also hoped to spare victims the suspense of wondering whether the ax was going to fall. But when he told NEWSWEEK later: "You really heard them crying, haven't you?" he appeared to some rather like Gen. George Patton slapping combat-fatigued GI's—and apologized in writing to the entire agency.

Even so, the unhappy mess gave the impression that Turner had a short fuse and a hard heart. In a gesture of lese majesty that would have been unthinkable under Dulles or Helms, one mutinous wag posted an "H.M.S. Pinafore" parody called "A Simple Tar's Story" on the CIA's staff bulletin board. Lampooning Turner, it read: "Of intelligence I had so little grip/ that they offered me the Directorship/ with my brass bound head of oak so stout/ I don't have to know what it's all about./ I may run the ship aground if I keep on so/ but I don't care a fig: I'll be the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations]."

When pressed, most intelligence experts conceded that the cuts were needed and that the agency could absorb them. But one unsettling fact remained: Turner had chosen to cut *only* the clandestine services, leaving the rest of the agency untouched. Some agents wondered whether Turner was something of a stubborn naïf who failed to realize how tough the game against the Russians really was.

THE CLASSIC JOB

To make matters worse, Turner left the impression with many people that he thought he was simply phasing out anachronisms of the sophisticated new technology of intelligence. "There's no technology invented yet that can read minds," snorted one first-rate fieldman in Western Europe last week; he explained that the classic job of the clandestine operative remains indispensable: to cultivate sources and collect "human" intelligence (HUMINT in spookspeak) so political leaders can answer questions like "Who is going to push the button—and when?"

"Intelligence used to be poker—what did the other guys have," reflected one top agency man in Washington. "Now

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it's chess: we know his pieces and where they are located—we need to know his intentions." Finding them out takes a peculiar breed of person. "They won't say: 'Aye, aye, sir,' and salute Turner," said one retired agent. Even Campbell James, a Company legend in his time, failed to pass muster in Turner's no-nonsense shop. A distant relative of Teddy Roosevelt, James is American but speaks with a British accent. He wears a chain across his vest with a caviar spoon fixed to one end, a large watch on the other and a tiger tooth dangling in between. "When we got into Laos, he would go right up to a tribal chieftain sitting in a tree hut eating betel nuts and present his card," recalled one old mission mate last week. "When we went into Laos in 1960, he was the only guy Souvanna Phouma would talk to."

By most rules of thumb, HUMINT accounts for only about 10 per cent of the U.S. intelligence product. And with the Directorate of Operations also being the source of many escapades embarrassing to the Company in recent years, it was understandable that Turner looked to the operations division as a safe place for cuts. But he has had to assume the risk that real, if unusual, assets might be lost, too. One of the last men at the agency who spoke Albanian reportedly fell to a pink slip not long ago—and even Jimmy Carter knows the difficulty in finding good interpreters these days. In one East European country, in fact, there are reports that an intriguing number of dissident Communists would like to talk with CIA officers but can't because all the station's linguists have been recently fired.

HUMINT experts have scored a share of victories over their counterparts in signal information (SIGINT) and communications (COMINT). A HUMINT man fed the CIA its first solid report that China was about to set off an atom bomb, thereby scooping the spy satellites and U-2 reconnaissance planes that had been overflying China's nuclear-testing range at Lop Nor for years. The HUMINT man got the story from the foreign minister of a small African nation, who got it from the Russians during a trip to Moscow. "When the information got back to headquarters," one analyst laughed last week, "everyone said, 'What the hell does *that* guy know about an A-bomb?' But it got to Dean Rusk who used it in a speech—just before the bomb blew."

COVERT ILLUSIONS

In addition to gathering information clandestinely, the CIA's Directorate of Operations has traditionally been responsible for covert operations, the sometimes dirty tricks used to shape events in foreign countries. But the agency's covert-action team was reduced to a bare minimum even before Turner arrived, and there is no indication now that it will be significantly expanded. That may be just as well. While the CIA did score covert victories in Guatemala and Iran in the 1950s, it is better known for its covert failures in Cuba, Chile and elsewhere. In Africa, for example, eager operatives subtly prompted the government of Burundi to send home a bumbling Russian ambassador. To the CIA's dismay, however, the Russians then posted a crack diplomat, and relations between the Burundis and the Soviets grew more cordial than ever. "I am forever overwhelmed by the number of very fine people who have been deluded into wasting their lives in this business," said one very candid covert-action man in Washington.

Even so, neither Turner nor the President intends to give up covert action



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Mind bending: Can the government—or the public—overlook past mistakes?

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

Bookmanship: Former Company men Agee (left), Snepp and Marchetti with their controversial critiques

Jan Cayaux, AP, Jill Krementz

entirely. "It's got to remain an arrow in our quiver," Turner said last week. The CIA's small crew of paramilitary experts can be used against terrorists, for example. Any such action, Carter maintains, is now subject to Presidential approval and Congressional scrutiny. His goal is to do away with the CIA's old doctrine of "plausible deniability," a euphemism for the cover stories that hide links between the President and illegal operations.

The new policy has astonished a few old-timers. One West European intelligence chief who met Turner recently said in surprise: "He told me that the only difference now is that all covert operations henceforth will be conducted legally. He doesn't seem to realize that the whole point of covert operations is to be able to do things that *aren't* legal."

MATTER OF TRUST

The warning was cynical but well meant. Openness, legalities and moral imperatives tend to put off intelligence professionals whose ruling passions, of necessity, run to guile, deception and secrecy. Sources in Europe told NEWSWEEK's Arnaud de Borchgrave that friendly intelligence agencies such as Egypt's well-wired Mukhabarat now worry about their best secrets falling into the wrong hands around Washington. South Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS), the best intelligence outfit in Africa, has reportedly become standoffish—in part, no doubt, because of mounting political differences with the U.S. Iran's SAVAK is irked by the CIA's refusal to turn over tips on Iranian dissidents in the U.S.; the Iranians charge that similar details about anti-Castro terrorists have been supplied to Cuba. And the French complain that their reports on Cubans in Africa have been ignored. "The Dutch, the Italians, the Greeks—even the British don't trust us any more," said one American operative in Washington.

Trust has also become a pressing question around Langley. Defectors to the publishing world like Philip Agee have called names and named names, arguably jeopardizing plans and even lives. More thoughtful critics like Victor Marchetti (in "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence") have poked fun at the CIA's cult figures—and holes in its mystique. And former officer Frank Snepp's charge (in "Decent Interval") that The Company ran out on thousands of its Vietnamese employees did little to improve the recruitment of local spies elsewhere. With hundreds of defrocked spooks on the beach, some now worry that more books—or even more serious defections—are on the way. "It's a red herring to say someone might go over to the other side," insisted one retired CIA executive. Then he thought a bit and added philosophically, "But with a slap in the face, strange things can happen."

Turner believes firmly that such fears are exaggerated. He may be right. Ousted veterans and their supporters tend to be furious at him, not their country. And few ex-CIA scriveners have taken their true confessions as far as Agee did. "Even Snepp was very circumspect in writing his book, as far as I can see," Turner told NEWSWEEK, a concession that may prove bothersome if the agency ever takes the case to court.

Rattled or not, the CIA seems to be pulling itself together. The Domestic Contact Division is expanding to interview more Americans, particularly scientists, technologists, economists and energy experts, returning from "points of interest" abroad. And the Foreign Resource Division, which recruits foreign sources in the U.S., may grow. The Director of Operations is also redeploying its officers abroad. It may expand operations in Africa to cultivate sources there who travel in and out of China and the Soviet Union, two "hard targets" that American operatives seldom manage to penetrate directly. It is moving, though slowly, to meet the Freedom of Information Act—and to declassify more of its less sensitive secrets.

To head a leaner, meeker Directorate of Operations, Turner picked John McMahon, a veteran of the Science and Technology division. The choice alarmed some critics who fear technological progress will alter the CIA's traditional mission—and replace Nathan Hale with R2D2. Calmer hands pointed out that McMahon was a superb manager who had learned much about clandestine affairs from the years he had spent developing exotic doodads for the CIA operations. "He'll have the Directorate of Operations eating out of his hands in 60 days," predicted one unruffled colleague.

FERRETS, BLEEPS, BIG EARS

Even traditionalists now concede that the main burden of collecting intelligence has fallen to machines. "Ferret" satellites 200 miles up in space record electromagnetic signals from ships, aircraft and ground stations. Fifty miles closer to the earth, photo satellites circle watchfully, dropping film packs and bleeping messages back home. Their photos are so good, Turner has told White House aides, that the CIA can distinguish Guernseys from Herefords on the range and read the markings on a Russian submarine. Even closer in, U-2 and SR-71 photo reconnaissance planes snoop at altitudes of 70,000 to 90,000 feet. And far below, mountaintop radio receivers scan the airwaves while the electronic devices of the National Security Agency, the nation's "Big Ear," pick up everything from chats between foreign leaders to enemy orders of battle.

Without photo evidence of missile sites in Cuba, John F. Kennedy would never have gone to the brink of World War III with the Soviet Union. Lyndon Johnson made a point of giving Third World leaders satellite photos of their capitals—to show he had his eye on things. But technology can also produce intelligence as mindless and worthless as anything ever concocted by human bumblers out in the cold. CIA scientists, not cloak-and-dagger men, took on Op-

(Continued on page 30)

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(Continued from page 24)

eration Midnight Climax, an inquiry into mind-bending drugs in which unsuspecting men were given the drugs in CIA-run brothels and then observed at play. In another effort that didn't pay off, the CIA managed to plant seven bugs in the Chinese Embassy in Burundi in the early 1970s: five failed to function at all, one burnt out in three months because the "off" switch wouldn't work—and the one in the ambassador's office produced nothing new because the ambassador assumed his room was bugged.

BRAINS OVER BOMFOGGERY

The real issue is not whether electronic spies are better than those who wear gumshoes but how to master the glut of data and improve the bomfogging reports that make up the "product" of the U.S. intelligence community. "Rather than finding that increased technical capabilities diminish your human intelligence requirements, it's just the opposite," Turner observes. "The more information you have from technical sources, the more intentions you want to know . . . and you go to the human to find the intentions. You must make them dovetail."

Top priority is still military intelligence. But Carter is also making heavy new demands on the CIA to improve its predictions and its analysis of economic and political developments. "When you finally get to the edge of where the facts are—that's where the stuff gets weak," said one Carter strategist. Turner's efforts to push beyond data grubbing has probably led to the most serious criticism leveled against him: shaping intelligence analysis to please the President. "He orders the intelligence estimates to be jazzed up," said one exasperated CIA analyst last week. "The facts aren't always exciting enough for Stan."

To his defenders, Turner is providing just the kind of excitement the CIA needs. "We are talking about a tired, middle-aged bureaucracy and we should be rubbing their noses in the billions they have spent to make bad calls on major events," says Congressman Pike. And in signing the Executive order that broadened Turner's powers last week, President Carter said evenly: "I want to express my complete appreciation and confidence in Admiral Turner, whose responsibilities ... will be greatly magnified."

At one time Turner had hoped to become an intelligence czar. The reorganization gives him a more modest role: Carter did not grant him Cabinet rank or sole authority to speak publicly on intelligence matters. But he did give Turner an empire: a new National Foreign Assessment Center, to prepare the CIA's most important strategic assessments; a National Intelligence Tasking Center, to distribute missions and cut waste, and a Directorate for Resource Management, to supervise a budget estimated at more than $3.5 billion.

Turner has also assembled his own team of new and old hands to run the new units and the traditional CIA structure. Among the most notable are Robert Bowie, at the NFAC; John Koehler, at the DRM; Lt. Gen. (ret.) Frank Camm at the NITC; Leslie Dirks as the CIA's deputy for Science and Technology and John F. Blake as deputy for Administration. Old pros around Washington last week also predicted that Carlucci, the CIA's new Deputy Director and a man who understands Washington manners, would do much to smooth some of the feathers Turner has ruffled among his own people at Langley.

NEW CHARTERS AND RED TAPE

Turner's new-style intelligence community may run into the same kind of controversy as the old one. To civil libertarians, Carter's new restrictions on various clandestine activities seemed too tame; former intelligence officials, on the other hand, called them crippling. The Senate is considering new charters for the entire intelligence community that would require written opinions from the Attorney General on the legality of every operation, a reform that could tangle the agency in red tape. And Rep. Edward Boland, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, vowed to demand more Congressional access to secret operations. "It all comes down to the fact that since we are going to be in on all the crash landings, we must insist we be in on the take-offs," he said.

Whether such open exposure is really practical remains to be tested. The CIA's plan to open its headquarters to carefully guided tours on weekends died unmourned around Langley when it turned out that almost nothing of interest could be seen without breaching security. Turner himself believes it will take another year to tell whether the reforms are taking hold and the product improving. The best judgment now is that the overall quality of U.S. intelligence has not dropped dramatically and that it may indeed start to go up. "We ought to knock off criticizing the changes at the CIA, let it settle down and do a good job," urged one level-headed former officer last week. In the meantime, Turner has shown at the very least that he can shake some of the dust off a bureaucracy that once considered itself untouchable.

—TOM MATHEWS with DAVID MARTIN, EVERT CLARK, ELAINE SHANNON and JOHN LINDSAY in Washington, ARNAUD de BORCHGRAVE in Geneva and bureau reports.

Terry Arthur

Wally McNamee—Newsweek

Carlucci (above), Koehler: New faces, new game rules

Dirks, Camm, Blake: Shaking some dust off the untouchables

NEWSWEEK
6 February 1978

How Turner Runs His Ships

There seems to be a penchant for equating instant popularity with leadership," muses Vice Adm. Robert Monroe about the CIA uproar over his friend and tennis partner Stansfield Turner. Monroe doesn't think things necessarily work that way. A good leader, he says, "sees what needs to be done when the issues are not all that clear, and has the strength to carry them out whatever obstacles exist."

Though the jury is still out on the clarity of Turner's vision as he turns the CIA inside out, hardly anyone doubts his will to perform. A marked star as long ago as his Naval Academy days in the '40s—"so far ahead of us that we never considered him a competitor or even a peer," according to classmate Jimmy Carter—Turner, now 54, went on to an ever-upward Navy career that earned him four stars at 51. Unlike many hotshots, Turner distinguished himself in a variety of dissimilar jobs—battle command, systems analysis, strategic planning, budget and manpower management, Pentagon infighting, even academic administration.

To his detractors—in the Navy as well as the CIA—this elegant résumé merely cloaks a man fired with ambition, an arrogant egomaniac who takes blustering charge before he knows what he's taking charge of. His admirers see something else working—an abhorrence of conventional wisdom, an overriding passion for fresh thought and new ideas. "His strongest point was his unusual ability to get people to produce new ideas," says a ranking Navy colleague. The traditional ways of doing things can get trampled in the rush, however. During Turner's time as head of the Naval War College, he picked up on a student's idea of holding meetings between Navy brass and newsmen, who had become mutually embittered over the Vietnam war. "There was a lot of blood on the floor and some tempers exploded," recalls a War College associate, "but both sides learned something."

THUCYDIDES FOR STARTERS

With his zeal for stirring the pot, Turner has always had trouble with those who abide by the old ways and the old ideas. At the War College—the Navy experience that most resembles Turner's embattled stand at the CIA—the admiral took over a snoozy, stagnant lecture society that required little reading or writing and no exams. At his first assembly, at 11 a.m. on a warm August day, Turner woke up his students, all middle-rank officers with high career expectations, by ordering them to read Thucydides's history of the Peloponnesian War. "The gripes and grumbling got louder," recalls one who was there, "as they found out that they would have to read about three shelves of books, take examinations and write papers and a thesis."

The admiral hung two signs on his office door—"Call me Stan" and "I need one good idea a day"—and set about fermenting the intellectual juices. "Turner liked the Socratic method," says a former student, "and he would ask 'Why do we need a Navy?'—

'Sturdy Stan': At Amherst (front row) with Webster, as Annapolis guard, with wife, Patricia, leaving NATO

'What made the nuclear deterrent deter?' " As usual, says a civilian professor, "he had a lot of people upset"—but by the time Turner left in 1974, the War College was a country club no longer.

BUDDIES AT THE TOP

A teetotaling Christian Scientist from a well-to-do suburban Chicago family, Turner put in two years at Amherst College in Massachusetts before opting for a naval career in 1943. He is still remembered at Amherst as "Sturdy Stan," a soberly prankish BMOC and, as it happened, a classmate and close friend of William H. Webster, Carter's new choice to head the FBI. Turner believes that the long-standing friendship will facilitate cooperation between the FBI and CIA—a goal not necessarily shared by civil-libertarians.

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"I anticipate I'll have no problem whatever in calling up and saying, 'What the devil are you doing, Bill?'" Turner has said. "And he'll call me and say, 'Why in the world did you do that, Stan?' I'm looking forward to it."

At Annapolis, Turner became brigade commander and graduated 25th in his class of 820. As a Rhodes scholar at



Keystone

Oxford, he studied philosophy, politics and economics. Turner served on a destroyer during the Korean War, then alternated between shore and ship assignments before putting in three years as a systems analyst at the Pentagon. He commanded the missile frigate Horne during the Vietnam war, winning a Bronze Star and an enhanced reputation as an innovator.

Turner won equivalent notices after he took over the wholly different job of aide to Democratic Navy Secretary Paul Ignatius in 1968. "He had to organize the work, advise on budget matters and programs, manpower problems and a host of other tasks," says Ignatius, now president of the Air Transport Association of America. Turner moved on to the War College in 1972, became commander of the Second Fleet two years later, and then commander of NATO forces in southern Europe. That was the job he held when Jimmy Carter, whom he had never known at Annapolis, had his celebrated "wakin'-up thought" one morning last spring about putting the admiral in charge of the nation's intelligence.

When he flew from Rome to Washington, Turner did not know what job the President was going to offer him. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was his fondest dream, but Chief of Naval Operations also seemed likely. He worked out a telephone code with his wife, Patricia. If it was the Joint

Chiefs, he would tell her, "major league." For CNO the code words would be "minor league." In the event, Turner called to say, "It's the bush league," a slightly pejorative pun on the name of his CIA predecessor, George Bush.

In Washington, Turner enjoys an occasional night of opera but he is too busy, even on weekends, to take Patricia on a promised museum-hopping expedition. "I think he's a little overboard myself," says his wife. "He needs to have contact with more people." That's what they say about Jimmy Carter, too, a man with whom Turner shares a certain faith in management systems, a broad-band intellectual interest—and a terrible impatience with those not similarly saturated in the job at hand.

—RICHARD BOETH with DAVID C. MARTIN and LLOYD H. NORMAN in Washington

NEWSWEEK
6 February 1978

'This Place Is Producing'

To get the view from the top at the CIA, Washington bureau chief Mel Elfin and correspondent David Martin talked with director Stansfield Turner. Excerpts:

NEWSWEEK: ***Every single person we have talked to, without exception, says morale has never, ever, been lower than it is right now.***

TURNER: I categorically deny that. There is not a morale problem in the CIA today . . . This place is producing. The President of the United States is pleased with it. And the product is high. People work twelve-, sixteen-hour days out here. I have people, at the drop of a hat, working all day Sunday, coming over to my house Sunday night with the results. They are dedicated, wonderful, inspired people. Now, there are complaints. There's griping. There is in every organization of the government. And when you're in a period of transition to new objectives, new methods, new management systems, new styles of openness, of course there are people who are complaining, because it isn't being done the way it was yesterday.

Q. Your dismissal of 212 persons obviously hurt morale. Would you do it again, and in exactly the same way?

A. What I will do differently the next time is spread the notification out over a longer period of time . . . But I did what I think was the only honest, proper thing to do for the agency and for the country . . . There's just nobody around here that doesn't know that we're in a time when we have to improve, we have to change, we have to adapt.

Q. Do you have confidence in the clandestine service, or are you afraid that there is something else hidden there?

A. I took a skeptical attitude and I hired [Robert D. Williams] to come in, and I gave him a carte blanche [to investigate]. At the end of six months, I said to the clandestine service, "I am well satisfied with the way you are doing things. I have no concern that you are doing things deliberately without orders, or contrary to orders." I also told them there were going to be 820 of them less, you know. The good news and the bad news.

Q. Can the United States still take action covertly in a national emergency?

A. Yes. We're scaling that down in our objectives . . . but I will fight to the last to retain an arrow in my quiver to do political action. But not thousands of people to do paramilitary things like we had in Vietnam—a small paramilitary capability. Modest, tuned, honed and ready to go. It's very important that it be there, particularly to combat terrorism.

Q. Have such things as the Congressional hearings, allegations by former agents who have written books and the fact that many people are leaving the CIA in a disgruntled mood caused any sources to dry up because they are afraid of leaks?

A. Oh, that's just balderdash. I have such confidence in these people who leave. They're patriotic Americans. Now, some of them have shown a very unprofessional stance in running to the press, but, you know, even Frank Snepp was very circumspect in writing his book, as far as I can tell. There is apprehension around the world as to how the Congressional thing will settle out. But we haven't had, to the best of our knowledge, leaks from the Congressional side that can be pinpointed.

Q. A retired CIA official told us recently that if he had been a Russian working in the Soviet Embassy in Washington, he could probably have all the documents and information presently given to the Congress of the United States within a year.

A. I don't believe it. I really don't. The documents we give to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence are held in one series of closely guarded rooms, 24-hour guards on them, alarm systems, locks, the whole works. They're not running around in congressmen's offices.

I went to see a senator the other day, just to pay a courtesy call on him. We got discussing something, and he suddenly told me, "Write it down." He was so security-conscious. His room hadn't been debugged for a while and [when] I slipped into saying something classified, we started exchanging notes, just the two of us sitting in the room there . . . I mean, one of the benefits [in] oversight now is that the Congress is really getting to know what intelligence is about; they are recognizing how much of a responsibility they're shouldering.

Q. Have any of the friendly services around the world shown reluctance to share information with the CIA because of leaks?

A. I have heard that foreign services are questioning how our procedures are working out under these circumstances. I have zero evidence that it has, at this stage, resulted in a degradation in the quality or quantity of information we get from them . . . What's changed in the last decade is [that] technical-intelligence collection has become so sophisticated, so expensive, that in all areas of the world we can do better in many of these technical areas than anybody else.

Q. Is it true the CIA had to contract out to the Rand Corp. for the first draft of this year's National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Union? If so, does this reflect in any way on the most important job you do around here, which is the estimate?

A. We contract in a number of areas. I don't want to discuss that NIE in particular, but I see nothing wrong with getting, in specialized areas, the very best talent the country can bring to bear on a national intelligence estimate . . . This is only one little piece of the Soviet estimate. We went out and hired a fellow who worked for us a few months ago. He was working on this before he left.

We [also] go outside when it is, in our opinion, to the government's best interests . . . to make sure all the divergent views are represented. And if you don't happen to have hawks and doves on some particular situation or you don't have specialists on this and that, you complement your in-house talent.

The White House

Turner with Carter, Brzezinski and Mondale: 'The President is pleased'

Controversy Over "Czar" for Intelligence

A sweeping reorganization of America's crisis-ridden intelligence system gives unprecedented powers to a controversial Navy officer.

Adm. Stansfield Turner, an Annapolis classmate of Jimmy Carter, gets wide authority over all spying activities overseas in the reform plan unveiled by the President on January 24.

As Director of Central Intelligence, he will supervise spending on foreign espionage activities by all Government agencies—the Central Intelligence Agency, which he heads, as well as the Defense Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Treasury.

Also, Turner will co-ordinate the overseas intelligence-gathering operations of these agencies and play a key role in setting priorities—for example, whether American spies and reconnaissance satellites should concentrate on China's economic and political prospects or its military potential.

Turner's new deputy, Frank Carlucci, a career diplomat, disclosed at a January 27 confirmation hearing that he will take over day-to-day running of the CIA.

Ironically, the new reorganization scheme that strengthens Turner's role came amid speculation that the 54-year-old Admiral actually was on the skids as Director of the CIA.

The speculation surfaced the day before Carter announced the new setup. The *Detroit News* published a Washington report to the effect that Turner's ouster was being sought by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Defense Secretary Harold Brown with the tacit co-operation of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance.

Praise from Carter. Denials came from all sides—Turner, Brown, Brzezinski and Vance. And the President himself went out of his way to reaffirm his confidence in the intelligence chief. After signing the order expanding Turner's authority, the President praised the CIA Director for his "superb" performance, adding:

"I want to express my complete appreciation and confidence in Admiral Stan Turner, whose responsibilities under this executive order will be greatly magnified."

Despite the denials, informed Washington observers say there is convincing evidence of a strong effort in the Carter Administration to undercut the CIA Director. The challenge first appeared inside the Central Intelligence Agency after Turner initiated a far-reaching plan to tighten discipline and shift emphasis from covert activities to analytical intelligence. CIA veterans complained that he was aloof and inaccessible and that he was surrounded by a "Navy mafia," a small group of officers appointed to his personal staff.

The grumbling reached a climax at the end of last year when the CIA Director delivered dismissal notices to 820 officials in the Directorate of Operations. This unit handles all clandestine activities—both traditional spying and "dirty tricks" of the kind that led to a protracted scandal and a series of official investigations.

Disgruntled clandestine operatives charged that Turner was relying excessively on technology at the expense of traditional espionage methods. In the interview appearing on these pages, the CIA Director gives his views on the purge and his new role.

The controversy—and the "dump Turner" movement—extends beyond the CIA into the White House and the Defense Department. Key members of Brzezinski's staff have put out hints that Turner was alienating the President by attempting to act as an adviser on policy as well as intelligence.

The strongest but least publicized challenge to the intelligence chief has come from Defense Secretary Brown. For more than six months the Pentagon boss has fought a running battle to limit Turner's control over Defense Department intelligence operations. In private, Brown argued that demands made by the Director of Intelligence would seriously impair his ability to discharge his responsibilities for the nation's defense, especially in a war crisis.

Top Pentagon officials say that the President's executive order gives Turner much but by no means all the authority he sought. Carter himself spelled out this definition of the expanded role of the intelligence boss:

"Admiral Turner will be responsible for tasking or assigning tasks to all those who collect intelligence. He will also have full control of the intelligence budget and will also be responsible for analysis of information that does come in from all sources in the foreign intelligence field."

That seems close to the job description of an intelligence czar. But Pentagon officials say that is not how they interpret the executive order reorganizing the system. They predict a continuing battle if Turner attempts to take over functions that Defense Secretary Brown deems indispensable. □

Carter's man at the CIA is under fire for purging the "dirty-tricks department" and reforming the whole spy system. Here he explains what he is doing—and why.

Q Admiral Turner, how do you answer the charges that you're emasculating intelligence operations overseas by getting rid of 820 officials in the clandestine services?

A We are not cutting the clandestine service overseas. We are not emasculating its capability to collect intelligence for us.

The 820 cut is coming out of the headquarters. Reducing overhead and reducing unnecessary supervision of the people in the field will, in fact, have the reverse impact: It will increase productivity overseas.

Q If you're merely getting rid of superfluous overhead, why have the clandestine services become so bloated?

A Because the mission of intelligence in this country has changed over the last 30 years, we have to adapt to the change.

Thirty years ago, we were interested primarily in collecting intelligence about the Soviet Union, its satellites and the few countries around the world where they were trying to establish a position. Today, we're interested in intelligence in a wide variety of countries.

Also, for most of the past 30 years, the Central Intelligence Agency was called upon by the nation not only to tell what was going on overseas but to help influence events—for example, in Guatemala, Iran, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola.

Today, we don't think that kind of

CIA's Turner Strikes Back

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE CHIEF

Adm. Stansfield Turner, 54, an Annapolis classmate of President Carter, left as commander in chief of NATO forces in Southern Europe to take over the crisis-ridden CIA in February, 1977. A graduate of Amherst College and a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, Turner headed the Naval War College from 1972 to 1974, after commanding a carrier task force.

interference in other people's governments—political action—is as useful a tool for this country. We're not eschewing it completely, but we're downplaying it.

These changes require a shift in the way the operations of the directorate of operations is organized and run. I believe that we needed to reduce the size of that organization—and I find nobody out here who's informed who disputes the fact.

Q Are you "going overboard" in your reliance on technology rather than traditional spying to do the job, as some critics have complained?

A Quite the reverse. Everything I am doing is designed to emphasize improved human intelligence collection.

One of the things that I have done in the past year is to stimulate increased interest and attention on the part of the top policy makers in the Government in what human intelligence collection can do for them. And they're giving us lots of support in that direction, and more guidance as to what they want.

That's what helps to make good clandestine intelligence collection. You want to collect what people need, not what you think is important.

Now, the advent of new technological means of collecting intelligence is one of the factors that is creating change in the process of intelligence in a very substantial way. The trouble is that, in a general sense, technical intelligence tells you what happened yesterday.

Ever since the Battle of Jericho in Biblical times, the human intelligence agent has helped you to find out what's likely to happen tomorrow. I find that the more technical intelligence data I give to the policy makers, the more often they ask me what is going to happen tomorrow—the intentions of the other side. And I must turn to the human intelligence people of the CIA for those answers.

So, contrary to the implication of your question, the advent of better technical collection has led to greater demands for the kind of collection which is done by the human intelligence element.

Q What about the allegations that you are destroying morale in the CIA by getting rid of so many people in such an abrupt manner?

A There have been lots of complaints because nobody likes to be asked to leave.

My measure of basic morale, however, is that I see no drop in the dedication, in the quality of the work of these employes. They're a most dedicated, capable lot of people. I have not seen a drop in the quality of the work. When you make as many changes as I believe are necessary in our over-all intelligence operations today to adapt to the times—to modernize—you're bound to have grumbling.

I am totally convinced that there is wide consensus in the Central Intelligence Agency that these changes are generally needed. I don't say that everybody agrees on the exact form and the exact timing and so on, but the idea that we must move forward into a new concept, a new age of intelligence, is universally accepted.

Q But aren't spies and people operating undercover abroad a special breed who require special handling?

A They certainly do. They're a wonderful group. But we must have a new and modern personnel-management system here—and this reduction is part of a move in that direction. Very frankly, it's long overdue.

We have not in the past planned a career progression to insure that we will have new blood coming in to replace these dedicated, marvelous people who are leaving. We had a wonderful influx in the late '40s and early '50s of most-capable, dedicated people. Two things are different today:

First, these people have gone through the system, and we've not programed their replacements.

Secondly, they came into the Agency in a period of cold war—a period of great dedication after World War II—and they were willing to sacrifice and work. Today I think you have to give better incentives, better rewards to young people in their early 30s to get them to stay in this career. I am trying to remove enough at the top to create more opportunities so that there will be young people coming forward with adequate training and with an added incentive to make this a career.

I would rather have a short-term morale problem among these disaffected people whom we have had to ask to leave. I'd rather have them disgruntled for a very short period of time than I would to have a long-term, gnawing morale problem existing in the bowels of this organization, where the future lies.

Q Are you at all concerned about the possibility of any of these disaffected people compromising the CIA—or even engaging in work with hostile groups?

A I'm not at all concerned about these people who have been dismissed being traitors to their country. They're dedicated, loyal people who have served well for their country. Two thirds of them have served long enough to retire, and will be pensioned immediately upon leaving the Agency. I can't imagine those people being disloyal or subjecting themselves to the danger of conducting treason.

I am most disappointed, however, at the lack of professionalism that some of them have shown by going to the media with their personal complaint against me and against the fact that I have had to bite what is a difficult and unpleasant bullet in carrying through a retrenchment. That is unprofessional, and it reflects the worst fears of the American public about the Central Intelligence Agency—namely, that its operators will not respond to duly constituted authority.

And I am pleased that, if we had people like that in the Agency, they are gone, because I will not tolerate people who will not follow the duly constituted leadership. This organization must be under full control at all times. Before this planned reduction, I fired five people because they were not under control. The minute I found out about it, they went out the door. There's no mincing words on that one with me.

Q As you see it, Admiral Turner, how does the reorganization announced by the White House on January 23 strengthen our intelligence system?

A It's a major step forward for the country. It emphasizes that the policy

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

Admiral Turner listens as President Carter announces an executive order that expands the CIA Director's control over foreign-intelligence operations.

makers must get involved with the intelligence process in terms of setting the priorities for what we should do.

Beyond that, it gives to the Director of Central Intelligence enhanced authorities to insure the adequate co-ordination of the entire intelligence apparatus of the country, because there are a number of agencies and quite a few people involved. Particularly with the changes in the ways we collect intelligence today, there is a great need for better co-operation.

Under this new executive order, I will be permitted to task all the intelligence-collection agencies of the Government that are funded in the national-intelligence budget. This will exclude intelligence activities funded in the defense budget—such as an Army lookout on a hill, or a tactical airplane, or something like that.

Secondly, I am given authority to put together and present to the President the single national-intelligence budget and to make the recommendations to the President on what we should be buying, how many people we should have, how much operating funds that we need for the entire intelligence community.

I think that this new authority will still leave independence where it's needed within the intelligence community, but provide centralized control where it's been lacking.

Q. Under the reorganization, will you, in effect, become the "intelligence czar"?

A. As Director of Central Intelligence, I will have greater authority than that position has had before. At the same time, there are clear limits on that authority—particularly, there are limits over the interpretation of intelligence.

The last thing that any of us want is a single individual who can determine what the interpretation of the intelligence data is to be.

When it comes to interpretation of intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research are quite independent of the Director of Central Intelligence. We meld interpretations together and see where we differ. But I have no authority to tell them how to interpret—how to analyze the information.

Q. What is being done to guard against the kinds of abuses by the intelligence community that have been so widely publicized in the past few years?

A. Well, I think abuses have existed but have been grossly exaggerated.

Over the last several years, we have established in this country some very fine controls. They amount to what I call "surrogate public oversight." The problem is that the public cannot oversee the intelligence agencies as it does the Department of Agriculture or the Department of Commerce or other agencies that work in a more or less unclassified atmosphere.

So, instead, we have oversight in the executive branch by the President and the Vice President and by the National Security Council, which, under the new executive order, has certain oversight responsibilities—for instance, preparing an annual report on how we're doing and what we're doing.

Then there is the Intelligence Oversight Board—three distinguished American citizens—appointed by the President to look into the legality and the propriety of our intelligence activities and to report directly to the President.

Outside the executive branch, we have the oversight of two committees of the Congress dedicated just to intelligence. They're a big help to us. They keep us sort of in tune with the American public. I think that's where the intelligence community has gone astray before: They were a little bit too isolated. Going up and testifying on Capitol Hill regularly keeps you from being isolated.

Q. Can you run an effective intelligence organization when you must tell so much to congressional committees?

A. Yes, I believe we can.

The committees have shown a tremendous sense of responsibility—a tremendous sense of restraint—in not getting into such operational detail that would endanger lives of people or the ways we do things, but still getting into adequate detail to conduct the kind of oversight that they need.

The next year or so will be very important as we and the Congress work out the next step in this process after the executive order—that is, legislative charters establishing statutory controls over our activities. The degree of detail in those charters will be very important to our future.

I anticipate a spirited but friendly and co-operative debate with the Congress over the next few months in just how those charters are drafted.

Q. Admiral Turner, given the enormous amount of money that this country pours into intelligence activities, why did the CIA underestimate the Soviet grain crop by such a wide margin?

A. First of all, we're not perfect, and we're not Avis—we're No. 1, but we're still trying hard.

It is not unusual for the Department of Agriculture to miss the long-range forecasts of the American grain crop by 5 per cent. We missed the Soviet crop by 10 per cent. Because of reasons of classification, I can't tell you all the reasons we missed it by 10 per cent.

But I can assure you that getting detailed information in a country that hides something that is really of global importance and impact—as the Soviet grain crop is—is not easy. It is particularly difficult when, in the last month of the season, they had a very bad weather situation there, which we think is largely what tipped the difference.

Let me say, though, that we did predict that the Soviets were buying grain and would continue to buy grain, and, as a result, the market did not jump markedly or significantly after the announcement was made of what their harvest was going to be. So we think we did serve the American public even though our prediction was wrong.

We'll always miss one here or there. If those are the worst that we missed, I'm reasonably happy. But I don't want to say that I'm happy that we didn't do well on this. We are certainly going to try harder and harder.

NEWSWEEK
21 November 1977

THE CIA:

Out in the Cold

Even granting that there is no humane way to fire somebody from his job, the two-sentence pink slip that went out two weeks ago to some 200 CIA officers was brutal: "This is to inform you of my intent to recommend to the director of personnel your separation in order to achieve the reduction . . . ordered by the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] . . ." The memo was signed by William Wells, head of the CIA's clandestine service, but the brusquely impersonal tone belonged to the DCI himself, Adm. Stansfield M. Turner (NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12). By last week, the rebellious muttering in the corridors had reached the spillover point, and one high-ranking officer threw regulations to the winds and aired his grievances to NEWSWEEK.

Susan T. McElhinney—Newsweek

The CIA's Turner: Showing the door to 820 spies

"To receive the grateful thanks of a grateful government for services rendered—sometimes overseas at great hazard—in the form of a two-sentence message, without any recognition of past performance, was insulting and humiliating," said the defrocked spook, who will be called George Smiley. Spooks are no more frugal than anyone else, and given the esoteric nature of their skills they generally have trouble finding civilian jobs. But even in the case of men who have only two or three years to go until retirement, the agency insists that the first wave leave by March—and it is trying to hustle them out even faster by promising not to make the pink slip part of their personnel file if they resign immediately. "That implies blackmail, doesn't it?" says Smiley. "That's deeply resented."

Hardware: Like almost all his colleagues, Smiley agrees that the CIA has too many people, too much deadwood. But he questions the decision to make all the cuts—a total of 820 in the next two years—in the 4,500-man operations division while leaving the analysis, technological and administration branches untouched. In essence, this means a greater reliance on hardware (satellites and such) and less on spies—a tilt that could turn out badly if the Soviets perfect a killer satellite. And Smiley wonders about the susceptibility of out-of-work spooks to Russian blandishments.

But what really rankles Smiley and his cohorts is the meathook methods of Stan Turner. "He doesn't know what is being eliminated," Smiley says, alluding to a pink-slipped spy who has "better and deeper contacts in the government of Israel today than anybody in the agency. I believe that the admiral is aware only of grades and numbers."

Bloated: "You really heard them crying, haven't you?" Turner retorted when told of Smiley's complaints. " 'Often at personal risk!' I bet you there isn't five of them that had personal risk . . . I told them right to their faces . . . there is going to be a higher percentage of cuts in the senior grades than in the junior. What do you do when you've got a bloated agency on your hands?"

Turner does not dispute that he made no attempt to humanize the pink slips, but he insists that he knew the names and skills of the senior people he fired. Faced with pressure to trim up to 1,200 operatives over six to eight years, he collapsed the timetable to two years, on the ground that "I waste the taxpayers' money by keeping people on the payroll I can't justify." But agency sources question whether the economies will be that great, since some of the fired people will catch on with other CIA branches. Others may sue for settlements. One way or another, the already troubled CIA may be in for a long period of bitterness in the clandestine ranks.

—RICHARD BOETH with DAVID C. MARTIN in Washington

THE WASHINGTON STAR
17 JULY 1977

CIA Chief Gave Carter Pros and Cons

Turner Cautious on Korea Pullout

By William Beecher

President Carter not only overrode the warnings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that fulfilling his campaign promise to pull all U.S. troops from South Korea might increase the risk of war, but also the cautions of his intelligence chief.

Adm. Stansfeld Turner, director of central intelligence, said in an interview: "My position is that we have a balance of deterrence (between North and South Korea) today; when you withdraw forces, that in some measure diminishes it. Whether it diminishes it below the level of stability is another question that's very difficult to answer."

Turner denied that in a private meeting with the President he directly recommended against the withdrawal plan. "I laid out . . . as expressly and as frankly and as objectively as I could — from an intelligence point of view, not a policy point of view — the pros and cons of withdrawal, what I thought the reactions of various involved countries would be. . . . I did not make any recommendation."

IN AN HOUR-LONG conversation in his seventh-floor CIA office, Turner also made the following points:

- It is not assured that if South Korea attempts to develop nuclear weapons that the United States could detect a clandestine effort.
- The Soviet Union appears to be following a different strategic philosophy than the United States, planning extensively not only for what is necessary to deter nuclear war, but how to fight it and recover from its effects.
- He does not share the reported view in a major Carter administration study that the Soviet military threat is "leveling off."
- If the United States cuts formal military and diplomatic ties to Taiwan, China could militarily take over the island fortress only at great cost in lives, and would have to be willing to incur the animosity of a number of trading nations if it decided instead to impose a blockade around Taiwan.

Carter's Korean withdrawal plan came under increasing fire in Congress last week after North Korean gunners shot down a U.S. helicopter that strayed into their territory, and in the face of revaluations that the Joint Chiefs voiced strong doubts about the size of the President's pullout.

BOTH GEN. GEORGE BROWN, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Gen. Bernard Rogers, Army chief of staff, testified that the top brass had recommended that only about one-quarter of the 32,000 American combat troops be withdrawn over five years, lest the risk of hostilities be heightened. Maj. Gen. John Singlaub earlier had been called on the White House carpet and reassigned from Korea after he told a reporter the larger pullout could lead to war.

Turner's interview was the first clear indication that he, too, had concern about Carter's plan, which the President announced at an early White House press conference before a National Security Council study of the proposal could be completed.

But Turner was quick to point out that there are many ways to make the U.S. commitment to help defend South Korea against aggression "pretty persuasive."

He said these include the maintenance of strong American fighter-bomber squadrons there, military aid to build up the South's combat capability, more American military training exercises in Korea and strong statements from the administration of its continuing resolve.

WITHOUT CONCEDING that the United States has about 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Korea and intends to pull them out along with the troops, Turner declared: "When you withdraw any kind of military tool, you've got to weigh how credible was it that it would have been committed by the owner country."

Some critics of the Carter plan have asserted it may induce the Seoul regime to secretly attempt to develop its own nuclear weapons to deter attack. A number of administration planners pooh-pooh that notion on the basis that the United States was bound to discover any such attempt and might cut off vital military and economic cooperation with Korea in that instance.

But Turner, whose CIA operatives would be depended on to discover any such covert effort if it were attempted, was hesistant to predict success in spotting it. Getting weapons-grade uranium from the bulky gaseous diffusion process would be relatively easy to discover, he said, but certain advanced technology, such as the centrifuge process, would be much harder to discern.

RECENT NEWS stories about a major new strategic analysis, called Presidential Review Memorandum No. 10, suggest administration planners feel the Soviet military threat after several years of buildup has leveled off. Asked whether he had seen any leveling, Turner said in the last year or two he had seen "no slackening."

But an impending shortage in oil and an expected falling off in the size of its labor force, he said, raise legitimate questions whether the Soviet Union "will be able and willing to continue to devote (substantial) quantities of resources to the military effort."

Turner said that unlike the United States, which bases its strategic doctrine principally on the ability to deter nuclear war by being able to ride out a surprise attack and retaliate overwhelmingly, the Russians appear to be planning not only to deter war, but to fight it and recover if deterrence fails.

"I don't think that means they intend to start a nuclear war or that they feel it's inevitable that they'll have one. But in a country that has been invaded and decimated and had to recover several times in comparatively recent history, there is more of a tendency . . . to take into account the possibility of conflict on your own territory." He cited a comparatively large-scale civil defense program as an evidence of what he was talking about.

Asked what would happen to Taiwan if the United States cuts its formal military and diplomatic ties, Turner said much would depend on China's words and actions. An invasion could be successful, but at a very high cost in lives, he said, and a naval blockade would risk strained relations with a number of important trading nations.

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 4

NEWSDAY
8 JULY 1977

Turner Hopes To Narrow Gap In Intelligence

By Martin Schram and Jim Klurfeld
Newsday Washington Bureau

This is the second of two articles on the U.S. intelligence community.

Washington—Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner has begun working with top Carter policy-makers to bridge the intelligence gap and solve what he concedes are "very real" problems in the way the system works.

"There has been too much emphasis on what I call intelligence by committee—by consensus," the new CIA director said this month in his most extensive interview since assuming office four months ago. ". . . The system has had too much emphasis on having an agreement, so you can . . . come up with a community solution. . . I think I have to bite more bullets myself."

The trim, gray-haired admiral—he retains his active duty rank—spoke candidly and on the record as he acknowledged criticisms that had been leveled at the intelligence community by a number of current and former top policy-makers.

Those comments of dissatisfaction, outlined in Newsday yesterday, included complaints by policy-makers that they are deluged by raw intelligence that is poorly analyzed—that the espionage experts often do not tell the decision-makers what the information means and how it may affect present and future policies.

Now, for the first time, a president and his top policy-makers will begin telling the intelligence community—on a regular basis—specifically what they expect them to provide in military, political and economic analysis.

"The decision-makers have been too preoccupied to give [the intelligence community] the attention," Turner said. ". . . We are now actively engaged with the President and top people . . . in sorting out the priorities that will be ordered on me to do." He said he had begun setting up a procedure in discussions with President Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Gen. George Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Turner spoke while sitting at the head of a long, dark mahogany conference table in his seventh-floor CIA office that blends blond-wood paneling and an expansive wall of windows overlooking the woodlands of Langley, Va. In the wide-ranging interview, Turner:

- Agreed that the CIA does not provide enough analysis of the mass of hard data that is delivered to policy-makers;
- Volunteered that perhaps the best remedy for this is for the CIA director himself to "bite the bullet" more often and offer his own analysis and prediction of major events and trends;
- Outlined the manner in which the intelligence community is beginning its most important current assessment—the study of Soviet strategic capability and strategy;
- Criticized the controversial "A Team, B Team" approach to assessing Soviet strategic capability and strategy, which was initiated by his predecessor, George Bush, and pitted a team of agency analysts against a team of outside hardline analysts;
- Conceded that many CIA analysts need more training and experience because they are not familiar with the countries they are in charge of assessing.

Intelligence: Analysis Needed

Turner agreed with complaints of top officials such as Brzezinski that the policy-makers are not provided with enough good analysis of the mass of hard information that is fed to them by the intelligence community.

Another problem, he conceded, is that the policy-makers are simply fed too much information from the various sources in the intelligence community.

". . . There is too much information and they can't use it—that is a very real problem," Turner said. ". . . If I had a complete throttle on all of the information going around town from intelligence [agencies] I could prevent some of that. [But] to do so would be dangerous in that I obviously could have my biases and could leave something out. So it is a risk you take in order to have multiplicity of sources. . . ."

He added: "It is unfortunate that one of the games in Washington is 'Who Has the Latest Intelligence?' And that puts too much emphasis on current intelligence. . . . The problem is as soon as something happens, somebody runs in and says, 'Mr. Jones, did you hear what has happened? Hot off the press, raw intelligence has just arrived!' Three days later we find out it was a bad report . . . or put it in context. . . ."

So it is that the director of intelligence has some suggestions of his own for the policy-makers who rely on intelligence: "If the consumers would learn to be a little more patient and let us put it in context for them, I'd be happier."

Still, he concedes, the criticisms of a lack of good intelligence are "valid." Turner offers his explanation:

continued

"There has been too much emphasis on what I call intelligence by committee, by consensus. . . . A group gets together and they can't agree, they try to find a common middle ground—and the middle ground is probably never the ground on which you want to be."

He also offered one solution: "I think I have to bite more bullets myself. When the community can't agree, it is the DCI [director of central intelligence] estimate [that must be made]. I've done it once since I've been here already. I bit the bullet and said, 'I think you have waffled this one'. . . As a result, I deliberately took an external position."

(Turner would not go into detail on just what his position was in the example he cited. But he said the case involved an assessment of the military capabilities of two forces. One was numerically larger than the other, but he said he took the position that the smaller force was of higher quality, and thus should be considered superior.)

A Team vs. B Team

Turner said he is determined to avoid the public controversy that has surrounded the most vital intelligence estimate that the agency makes: the assessment of Soviet strategic strength and intentions.

In 1976, Bush, then the CIA director, took the internal CIA estimate and brought it before a board of experts from outside the government. That was called the A Team, B Team approach.

But Bush purposely loaded the outside team with hardliners, who predictably said the Soviets had a much greater military capability than the CIA estimated and that the Soviets were pursuing superiority in nuclear weapons.

The hardliners leaked their version to the press and started a public controversy as the Carter administration came into office.

Bush defended the A-team, B-team approach, saying: "Yes, if you pick hardline guys, you're going to get a hardline response—so what? This was to have been done in private. . . The question we were posing was if you pick hardliners, would they necessarily come up with analysis that was more hardline?"

Turner said of the A Team-B Team approach: "The concept of having a team with an ideological polarization is one I would use with great caution." He added: ". . . But there could be some cases in which I would want to do it."

Turner says he is using a different procedure. "We are approaching the next estimate with a single team and a single advisory group rather than the A-B team approach," Turner said. ". . . I don't ever want to get into an A-team, B-team [dispute] in public again."

Turner's plan on the new Soviet estimate is to bring in outside experts with a diversity of opinion to work with agency personnel within the analysis team.

He is relying on top assistant Robert Bowie, a Harvard political scientist who served on the State Department's policy planning staff in the Eisenhower administration, to select the consultants. "We are selecting them to complement the background, biases, theologies, and the philosophies of the people we are assigning," Turner said.

Turner also plans to consult with a board composed of all the key members of the intelligence community, asking them if there is "any strain of opinion that ought to be represented."

He said: "I've told the board that I don't want to find out we left something out after it has been published."

Turner said he planned to use basically the same approach in organizing the national intelligence estimates of other nations. He also has created a special board composed of members of the intelligence agencies that will help him determine which countries and subjects should be studied.

Top past and present policy-makers have criticized the CIA analysts for not being sufficiently knowledgeable about the countries they are assessing. Many analysts have not even been to the countries to which they are assigned, the officials charged.

Turner concedes that that is true. "We need some improvements in the training and education and diversity and experience of our analysts," he said. "We need to give our analysts more opportunities—letting some of them go to various courses, posts overseas, and with more interplay with the academic community and think-tanks."

Officials throughout the executive branch and on Capitol Hill currently are debating various proposals to reorganize the intelligence community. Reorganization has become a topic of major dispute, especially between Turner and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.

The subject has become so sensitive that Turner wouldn't discuss it in the interview. But according to other intelligence officials, Turner wants to create a director of national intelligence who would have broad power over the entire intelligence community.

The director would set the budget, make the assignments and, possibly, directly control the analysis of all collected information. He would be an intelligence czar.

Brown is opposed to relinquishing administrative control of the huge National Security Agency, the agency that does most of the electronic collection and currently is run by the military.

Other members of the intelligence community say they fear that the director would be too powerful and that dissenting opinions would not get through to policy-makers.

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Proponents of the reorganization argue that it would make the agencies more accountable, eliminate duplication and inter-agency rivalry and improve the production and quality of intelligence.

Bush, the former CIA director, is against the reorganization. He said: "I oppose the concept of a czar if it means that he would be removed from being the head of the CIA and would not have a CIA base. I don't think the CIA should be just one component in a military dominated intelligence network."

Joseph Biden (D-Del.), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, says he favors the concept of a single director with broad powers.

"There has got to be one person a president can turn to and say, 'Hey, Charley, what's the story?' We need one person—a director of intelligence—over CIA, DIA, NSA and all the rest," Biden said.

The President is expected to make a decision on reorganization before the end of the summer.

Even with all the controversies and problems, high-level officials in the intelligence community hope Turner is the man who can bridge the gap between the needs of the decision-makers and the capabilities of the intelligence community.

"You see, I have an interesting perspective here," Turner said. "Until March 9, I had been nothing but a consumer of intelligence for 30½ years. And I sympathize with the consumers."

NEWSDAY
7 JULY 1977

The U.S. Intelligence Team: How Well Does It Work?

"I told my people that I wanted to know about something before it happened. When I did not it meant we were not doing our job, that it was an intelligence gap."

—William Colby, former director of the CIA

This is the first of two articles on the U.S. intelligence community.

By Martin Schram and Jim Klurfeld
Newsday Washington Bureau

Washington—Top policy officials in the Carter administration say they are dissatisfied with the caliber of information analysis provided by the U.S. intelligence community.

Those officials, including White House National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, believe that the material reaching their desks often is not well analyzed and at times has failed to alert them to major developments in the world. Their concerns were made clear during a series of Newsday interviews with leading policy makers and their assistants, current and former intelligence officials, and intelligence experts on Capitol Hill.

"The United States does seem to have a particular fascination with technology and gadgets," Brzezinski said. "I would say that the American information-gathering techniques are the best in the world—the equipment is absolutely remarkable. But it is the analysis of the information that is so important. And I think there is not enough attention given to the ability to say what all the information that is collected means."

Secretary of State Vance also is known to feel that there is a problem. Vance says there is too much information and there is a need to decide on priorities and then to do a better job on the priority matters.

Officials of the Carter White House say they were not able to obtain timely or adequate intelligence analyses on such matters of international significance as the recent invasion of Zaire, the removal of Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny, and the strength of the conservative Likud Party in the Israeli election campaign, forecasting the possibility of a new hard-line era in Israeli leadership.

And the complaint is not limited to the new administration. Similar concern was expressed by officials of the Ford and Nixon years, especially on intelligence concerning such areas as Angola, China, Cyprus, Portugal, the Mideast and Vietnam. One of the most publicly critical of those former officials was Richard Nixon himself, who said in his nationally televised interviews with David Frost recently that the intelligence agencies at the State and Defense Departments, as well as the CIA, had provided poor information in Indochina and had failed to predict the start of the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Mideast.

"I was not surprised to see our intelligence drop the ball," Nixon said, in talking about the Mideast war. "I thought basically that our intelligence community needed a shaking up."

In a series of interviews with Newsday, the intelligence experts cited several major reasons for the problem:

- There is too much emphasis on gathering information and not enough emphasis on analyzing what it means.
- The fragmented, bureaucratic structure of the intelligence community often prevents vital information from reaching decision-makers in timely and usable form.
- Intelligence agencies do not know what the decision-makers expect of them, in part because the decision-makers do not ask the right questions and make the right requests of the agencies.
- At times decision-makers receive good intelligence but disregard it for their own reasons of policy and/or politics.

Rep. Otis Pike (D-Riverhead), whose House Committee on Intelligence first publicly raised the question of the quality of intelligence, defined the problem this way: "The real question is: Are we getting timely knowledge in the proper fashion? Are the cost and the risk justified by the end product?"

About 80 per cent of the U.S. intelligence budget is spent on military affairs, according to an informed source. But now decision-makers are saying there must be greater emphasis in the intelligence community on political analysis. "They hate like hell to predict the future," one Carter national se-

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curity official said. "They don't want to accept it, but that is their job. That is what we expect of them."

Two of the staunchest defenders of the capabilities of the intelligence community, George Bush and William Colby, both former CIA directors, concede that there are major shortcomings in the system—but add that there are real problems in trying to satisfy the demands of decision-makers.

"There is a desire that we have a crystal ball," Colby, director of the CIA from May, 1973, to January, 1976, said. "The problem is that there are so many variables—if you understand that, okay.

"If the agency does not predict something that happens, that is an intelligence gap. I told my people I wanted to know about something before it happened. When I did not, it meant we were not doing our job."

George Bush, CIA director from January, 1976, to January, 1977, acknowledged one problem: The intelligence information collected is so voluminous that it cannot be properly analyzed and used by policy-makers. "I don't think the highest level policy-makers get swamped," Bush said. "But the middle levels have a helluva lot of information. It's a lot to sort and analyze."

Bush said he thought the CIA does, all in all, an "excellent job of gathering and analyzing." The CIA does have shortcomings and does make mistakes, Bush said, "but it could be that some of the problems are that leaders are not asking the right questions."

Newsday's interviews and congressional studies show a number of examples of major international events in which the intelligence community clearly has not met the needs of the policy-makers. Some examples:

Soviet Union, April, 1977: Administration officials now say they had no warning that the Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny was about to be kicked out of office. "That was no small step, it was a major event," one White House official said. "They didn't give us anything—nothing!"

The Carter Administration was criticizing the human rights situation in the Soviet Union and presenting a new strategic arms proposal without knowledge that there was a major shakeup under way in the Kremlin. While it is quite possible that knowledge of those events would not have changed administration policies, officials say the information would have been helpful.

"If we knew there was an upheaval going on within the party, it might have told us something about the dissident situation," the White House official said. "It is the type of information that would have been useful to have." The White House finally received a CIA briefing on the Podgorny ouster on June 28—weeks after it had occurred.

Zaire, March, 1977: The administration received newspaper reports on March 8 that the copper-rich Shaba province of Zaire [formerly the Belgian Congo] was being invaded by unknown forces. Then, more than 48 hours elapsed before President Carter was given specific information about the invasion.

"We didn't know what was happening," the White House official said. "We had no idea who they were or what they wanted. We didn't know if there were Cubans or Russians involved. . . We needed people on the ground we could phone or radio. There was no network of contacts. And there was no advance warning."

The question of Cuban involvement, of course, was key. At the time, the administration was actively pursuing improved relations with Castro.

China, November, 1976: Bush, the director of the CIA at the time, strongly defends the agency's record, but even he concedes that the rise to power of Hua Kuo-feng in mainland China was an event that the agency should have been able to predict.

"That is one area in which our intelligence has been less than we wanted," Bush said recently. "We couldn't predict the changes with accuracy. Hua was not fingered by our intelligence sources. We knew something about his background, but not all that much. And, most important, he was not cited as the next likely leader of China. . . It is a valid complaint against U.S. intelligence."

Angola, September, 1977: While the U.S. government was making a clandestine effort to affect the outcome of the civil war in Angola, former aides of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger say that they were operating without knowledge of two important events: Cuba was planning a major military involvement and South Africa was planning "a whole organized intervention."

"We picked up the Cuban involvement early, but we way underestimated the numbers," one of the former aides said. "We thought the MPLA [the side supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba] was going down the tubes." With the help of about 15,000 Cuban troops, the MPLA won.

In addition to supporting the losing side, the United States was closely identified with the South African intervention—precisely the identification Kissinger had wanted to avoid. Two former intelligence officials confirmed that while U.S. intelligence was secretly working with the South Africans on Angola, the Americans were caught by surprise by the large-scale South African intervention. "If we had known, we might have gone to South Africa and said, 'What are you doing here? This changes everything,'" one source said. "Our intelligence was really very good during Angola—except for those two problems."

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Cyprus, July, 1974: The U.S. government clearly was caught by surprise by the Greek-led military coup that almost started a war between NATO allies Greece and Turkey. "Intelligence clearly failed to provide warning of the coup," the Pike committee report said. "And it performed indifferently once the crisis had begun."

Although there were many signs that a coup was possible, CIA reports continually downplayed the chances of its happening.

The CIA postmortem of that event, parts of which appeared in the Pike report, concluded: "Many reports were too technical to be understood by lay analysts. . . . As in past crises, most of the customers complained of the volume of . . . reporting as well as its frequent redundancy. Many also complained of too little analysis of the facts, too few assessments of the significance of reported developments."

Portugal, April, 1974: The Pike committee study of the left-wing coup showed that not only did the intelligence community fail to predict the coup, it had failed almost completely even to alert decision-makers that there was a problem. The study said the Defense Intelligence Agency clearly failed to detect the unusual strength of left-wing military leaders though there were public signs of their rise to power and of their split with the right-wing government.

"There were plenty of signs," a former member of the intelligence community said. ". . . An article by a professor really had more information on the situation than we received from our sources . . . One problem was that nobody was paying any attention to Portugal, it was on the back burner. It could have been a disaster."

Mideast, Oct. 3, 1973: In his interview with David Frost, Nixon described how he found out about the outbreak of the war: "I was going to Key Biscayne at the time . . . and I got the intelligence report from the CIA that day. And the intelligence report said that an armed attack is possible, but unlikely. The next morning I got a telephone call from Washington that Egypt had attacked . . ."

Colby, the CIA director at the time, said there is no other way to describe it: "It was a blunder, an intelligence failure. We blew it."

The Pike committee concluded that the entire intelligence system had malfunctioned. "Massive amounts of data had proven indigestible to analysts," the panel said. "Analysts, reluctant to raise false alarm and lulled by anti-Arab biases, ignored clear warnings."

Arab Oil Boycott, October, 1973: The intelligence community failed to warn decision-makers of the boycott, and then after the boycott was imposed, did not accurately forecast its impact, according to officials inside and outside the community. "There was no specific warning that the boycott was about to take place," Herbert Hetu, the CIA's current director of public information, said in response to a question from Newsday. "They did not have that information."

And Sen. Adlai Stevenson III (D-Ill.), whose subcommittee is doing a detailed study of the boycott, said the economic analysis was disappointing. "The intelligence did not deal with the economic consequences," Stevenson said. "There were private sources that were making a much better analysis than the CIA: the oil companies and even the [British] Economist magazine."

Sources familiar with the oil boycott situation, however, have told Newsday that they believe that Kissinger, through his personal shuttle diplomacy, was warned of the possibility of the boycott, but did not act on his information or pass it along to intelligence. The fact that decision-makers were not sharing information with intelligence also was cited as a significant problem by the Pike committee.

There has been one other major problem: interagency rivalry. In some of the examples cited above, the fact that military intelligence could not or would not cooperate with the CIA or the State Department led to fragmented or contradictory reporting. Bush offered one graphic example of the rivalry when he was director.

In the winter of 1975-76, when Kissinger was trying to negotiate a strategic arms treaty with the Soviet Union, the military said the Soviets' new Backfire bomber was a major threat to U.S. security and wanted strict limits placed on it in any nuclear arms control agreement. Kissinger was negotiating only to limit the deployment of the plane.

"The Air Force intelligence leaked a report that the CIA assessments of the Backfire bomber were wrong and weak," Bush said. "The thrust of the report was rather malicious and untrue, as far as I'm concerned. What was untrue was that it said the CIA was instructed by Kissinger to come up with estimates that the Backfire bomber could fly less far than it really could. The analysts were highly competent, professional engineering types. If anyone suggested to them, 'Here's your answer, now come up with it,' they'd blow the whistle on them."

Another case of interagency rivalry occurred last year, after President Ford gave the CIA director budgetary control over the entire intelligence community. A former top CIA official said that fighting over the new budget system became so intense that the agencies were withholding information from each other. The official said that since the new administration took over, that problem has abated.

Ultimately, intelligence gathered by all agencies is for the use of the President. At the White House, senior officials say they much prefer the daily intelligence analysis of the small State Department intelligence unit, the bureau of intelligence and research, to that of the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. "'INR' gives us the best analysis," one White House official said. "It's more insightful. They focus on five or six items of interest . . . what it means, where it's going."

The man who heads that unit, Harold H. Saunders, who was a National Security Council official under Henry Kissinger, said the solution is not any plan for reorganization currently under discussion. Saunders said the intelligence community and the policy makers must communicate better. "The intelligence community does its work in a vacuum, just gathering facts, and not considering what the decision-makers need. And the decision-makers never define what it is they want," Saunders said. "The challenge is to bring the two together. Get the community more conscious of policy and the decision-makers asking the right questions."

NEXT: An Interview With the CIA Director

ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 24
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
16 May 1977

CARTER'S INTELLIGENCE CHIEF SIZES UP WORLD'S TROUBLE SPOTS

Interview With Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director, Central Intelligence Agency

On the eve of President Carter's departure on his first overseas mission—a summit conference with Allied leaders in London—Admiral Turner took the editors of *U.S. News & World Report* on a verbal tour of danger areas around the globe.

Before joining CIA in February, Stansfield Turner, 53, had a long Navy career that included the presidency of the Naval War College and command of Allied forces in Southern Europe. He attended the Naval Academy with President Carter, and later was a Rhodes Scholar.

Q. Admiral Turner, do you agree with the view expressed by some high officials in recent years that the Soviet Union is an ascending power and the U.S. is declining?

A The Soviets have their strengths, and they have their weaknesses. Their weaknesses are in economics and politics. I don't see the Soviet economy climbing to outdistance us. Our lead is so great that they cannot hope to overtake us unless our percentage of growth every year were to be a lot smaller than theirs. And that is not happening. So, in terms of raw economic power, we are not a declining power.

As for ideology, the Russians may think it is a strength for them, but I am sure we would all agree that their ideology is hamstringing them in many ways. After all, what's left of pure Marxism? Where is it practiced or believed in? You have a different brand of Communism in every country in Europe—and a different brand in Yugoslavia, a different brand in China. Even in the Soviet Union, they don't hold to it very carefully. So—no, I don't think the Soviets are on the ascendancy ideologically.

Q. And militarily?

A They have a strong military position. One of the reasons they are putting such emphasis on their military strength is that they are trying to convert military power into political advantage. They have no other strengths that they can exploit in Africa and elsewhere. Military is all that they have.

Q. Is the U.S. falling behind Russia in military power?

A In my view, we still have the edge in the strategic nuclear field as a result of our preponderance of warheads and the accuracy of our missiles. However, the trends are moving in the other direction because of the substantial effort the Soviets are putting into strategic weapons. If that continues, they could close the warhead gap and outdistance us in what is known as throw weight.

The complex equation as to when those trends might give the Soviets a militarily superior position is very difficult to state—given the fact that you're balancing numbers of warheads, accuracies and throw weight in the same mix.

Q. Are the Soviets near the point where they could knock out our land-based missile force with a first-strike attack, as some strategists claim?

A I don't see a first strike as being anything like a rational calculation in the years immediately ahead by either side. What concerns me is the image that is created and the impact this could have on world opinion if there is a perceived imbalance in favor of the Soviets in strategic nuclear power.

So I think that, first, we must understand the nuclear strategic equation as best we can. And, second, the United States must not let it get out of balance in fact or in perception. I don't think that the people of this country are going to let the Soviets outdistance us in a dangerous way. But we've got to be vigilant as to that.

Q. We've heard a great deal lately about Russia's massive civil-defense program. Is there any danger that this will give them a decisive strategic advantage over us?

A Certainly not at the present time. I don't believe that the Soviets are near the point in civil defense where they could think that they could absorb a nuclear blow from us with reasonable loss—that is, a loss they would be willing to accept.

It doesn't seem to me that the damage to the three ingredients that civil defense protects—leadership, population and productive capacity—could be estimated by the Soviets to be small enough to make it an acceptable risk for them to initiate a nuclear war with deliberateness.

Q. What truth is there to the report that the Russians have made a breakthrough in developing a beam that could destroy all of our missiles?

A The question of Soviet development of a charged-particle-beam weapon has been the subject of intensive analysis for a number of years. All the results of these studies have been made available to high-level U.S. Government officials on a continuing basis. The Central Intelligence Agency does not believe the Soviet Union has achieved a breakthrough which could lead to a charged-particle-beam weapon capable of neutralizing ballistic missiles. This question is obviously of concern to the U.S. Government, and is continually under review by all members of the intelligence community.

Q. Aside from the idea of a first strike, are the Soviets thinking and planning in terms of actually fighting a nuclear war rather than just deterring one?

A The difference that I note between them and us is this: The Soviets in their planning start with cold war and think the process through all the way to a strategic nuclear war—and even to postwar recovery. We, on the other hand, tend to think from cold war to deterrence. There's less emphasis in our thinking on what happens after the nuclear weapons start going off, because the idea is so abhorrent.

It's a different psychological attitude. Maybe it comes from the fact that the Russians are from a country that's been attacked and overrun a number of times in their memory. So they have more of an inclination to think through the implications of someone attacking them.

Q. Are they more inclined to contemplate resorting to nuclear war to achieve their political objectives?

Continued

A I think not. I think they have shown a rational, sensible approach to the nuclear-weapons problem—a willingness, for example, to negotiate SALT-type agreements.

Q. In your opinion, where do the Soviets pose the greatest threat to the United States today?

A Well, you have to break that down between where our greatest interest is and where their greatest opportunity is. We have a vital national interest in Western Europe—in maintaining the NATO fabric whole and strong. The Soviet Union is trying hard to build up enough military power in Europe to give the impression that they can dominate that area. With an intimidating force on their side, they want to fracture the NATO Alliance from within by undermining the resolve of the NATO Allies. That is a serious threat—but not the most urgent.

The Soviets are pressing hardest at the moment in Africa. So, in that sense, Africa is the most urgent threat. But clearly Africa is not as vital a national interest to us as is Europe.

Q. What is the Soviet objective in Africa?

A I think that, all over the world, the basically imperialistic thrust of the Soviet Union is one of opportunism. They are very adroit in the sense of pushing their opportunities wherever they develop, but not pushing them to the point where it involves a major commitment of Soviet resources or prestige if they fail.

They've found that NATO has stymied their imperialistic expansionism in Western Europe. And so they're probing each opportunity that comes up anywhere to get a foothold or friendship.

Somalia is an example of how this works. The Soviets start with a fishing fleet calling in at a Somali port. Then they offer aid to the Somali Army. The Army stages a coup, and a general takes over as President of the country. Then the Soviets build the fishing port into a naval base—and on and on in gradual steps.

They look constantly for an opportunity for that first step—a fishing agreement or a trade agreement—and then they just keep pushing, but without committing themselves in a major way.

Q. How successful has the Soviet Union been with this strategy?

A Only moderately successful. They've established three toe holds that seem to be useful to them in Africa. They've had a toe hold in Guinea for six years or so, and seem to be hanging on there. They've had one for a short time in Angola, and they're doing all right there. There's no major Soviet presence, but the Angolans are still co-operating with them. And the Soviets have had a fairly strong position in Somalia for seven or eight years, and it seems to be holding.

They're beginning to explore other opportunities—for example, in Southern and Eastern Africa with the visit of President Podgorny.

On the other hand, the Russians have failed in Egypt. They've lost a major position there. Outside Africa, they failed some years ago in Indonesia. Their relations with Syria are not as warm as they were several years ago. So they are not always adroit enough to do this well. Basically they lack the economic foundation to be an imperialistic power.

Q. What about Ethiopia? Are the Russians establishing another toe hold in Africa at the expense of the United States?

A There is no doubt that Soviet ties with Ethiopia's present leftist regime are close. At the same time, however, the apparent Soviet gains in Ethiopia may lead to a deterioration in its formerly close relations with Somalia.

Q. Are the Russians using Cubans in black Africa as a Soviet tool, or are the Cubans there for their own ends?

A I think it's a fine line. The Cubans are anxious to establish themselves as a leader in the "third world." The 1979 conference of nonaligned nations will be held in Havana. Thus the Cubans are anxious to raise their world image in Africa and elsewhere in the third world. However, I don't think that they could afford economically to indulge in these activities without considerable support from the Soviet Union. The Russians, by operating with a surrogate, get an opportunity to establish an African foothold without necessarily committing themselves too much.

Q. Admiral Turner, why are we so worried about the Indian Ocean, considering the relative weakness of Soviet naval strength there?

A I wouldn't say their naval strength is relatively weak there. At the same time, I wouldn't say that the Soviet naval presence is formidable compared with ours, which is somewhat smaller. The difference is not overwhelming.

The asymmetry that impresses me is that the United States as well as Western Europe and Japan have a vital interest in the Indian Ocean—in the oil route which is vital to our future prosperity and security—while the Soviet Union does not have a vital interest there.

Q. In that case, why do the Russians maintain a naval force there?

A I think their presence in the Indian Ocean is symptomatic of their desire to leapfrog out to gain influence in other areas of the world while they're stalemated in Europe.

Now, you can talk about their continuing naval presence in the Mediterranean as a counter to the U.S. position in the Mediterranean. You can talk about their continuing naval presence in the Norwegian Sea and the Sea of Japan as legitimate defensive concerns close to their homeland. But you can only look at a continuing Soviet presence off West Africa and in the Indian Ocean as gunboat diplomacy. I don't say that this is malicious or bad, but I am saying it's indicative

continued

Global Dangers Facing U.S.—Admiral Turner's Assessment

Soviets in Africa: This is the "most urgent threat" posed by Russia, but the Soviets have been "only moderately successful" there.

Western Europe: Russia is "stalemated in Europe" and therefore is trying "to leapfrog out to gain influence in other areas of the world."

Post-Tito Yugoslavia: "The most fragile point in the European scene today," where Soviets will "look for an opportunity and probe without getting themselves overcommitted."

Revolt in Eastern Europe: Even though there is a "stirring of thought behind the Iron Curtain ... I don't see a real possibility of a major fracturing of the Soviet bloc."

Indian Ocean: Russia has no vital interest there. The only purpose of her naval presence there is "gunboat diplomacy."

U.S.-Soviet balance: Russians emphasize military power because "they have no other strengths that they can exploit." The Soviets lag in economic power and ideological appeal.

First-strike threat: Neither superpower can rationally contemplate first-strike nuclear attack "in the years immediately ahead."

of a change in strategy, dictated by the fact that they are blocked on land.

Q. Do you see any danger that the Russians will be able to break the stalemate in Europe to their advantage?

A No, at this point I don't, although I recognize that some of our allies are facing difficult political and economic problems today.

"INTERNAL PROBLEMS FOR SOVIETS"—

Q. What about the situation in Eastern Europe? How dangerous is it for the Soviets?

A It varies from country to country. Since Helsinki, there has been a stirring of thought behind the Iron Curtain. Yet, basically, one has the feeling that the dictatorial controls in those countries will be exercised ruthlessly as requirements dictate. There could be internal problems for the Soviets—as there have been in Hungary and Poland and Czechoslovakia. But I don't see a real possibility of a major fracturing of the Soviet bloc.

Q. Do you expect the Soviets to make a grab for Yugoslavia after Tito's death?

A I think that Yugoslavia is the most fragile point in the European scene today. I would think that the Soviets would look for an opportunity and probe without getting themselves overcommitted.

Q. Do you anticipate a Russian military move to force Yugoslavia back into the Soviet bloc?

A That would be a very definite commitment by the Soviets, and it would be taken only as a last resort. They would try a lot of other things first before they contemplated that.

Q. Turning to Russia's other flank—in the Far East: Are the Soviets and Chinese likely to patch up their quarrel in the near future?

A That is always a possibility when you are dealing with countries that operate on such an expedient basis as the Soviets did in their relations with Nazi Germany before World War II. But I don't see it on the immediate horizon. Even if it happened, I doubt if it would be anything more than an expedient. The fissure between these two countries is quite deep.

Q. President Carter proposes to withdraw U.S. ground forces from South Korea. Will that affect China's relations with Russia or its attitude toward this country?

A Of course, it would have an effect on Chinese attitudes if that decision were made and executed. How important it would be will be largely dependent on how and when a withdrawal takes place—if it does—and what changes occur on the world scene in the interim. It's pretty difficult to speculate in the abstract until some policy decision is made here as to how and when it's going to take place—if it does.

Q. Will such a withdrawal be seen as an American retreat from Asia by Japan and other U.S. allies?

A Again, it depends on how it's done and whether the preparatory steps can persuade those countries that it's not a retreat from Asia. Those who are looking to us for a security function out there would be bound to think of it as something of a retreat. But the *status quo* is not always the right answer. Any time you change something, it's going to be approved by some and disapproved by others.

Q. One further point about the Soviet Union: What is your reading of Brezhnev's health? Is he about finished, as recent reports suggest?

A. My reading of Brezhnev's health is that it's a sine curve that goes up and down. Sometimes he wears himself out a bit or he has a particular problem, but I don't see this as a curve that's constantly declining and has a terminal date that can be anticipated. It's not such that we have to sit here and plan, "Well, in 12 months or 24 months we're bound to have somebody new."

Q. Are there any signs of a power struggle for the succession in the Kremlin?

A No, I don't read the signs that way at this point.

Q. Would a leadership change have any significant effect on Soviet-American relations?

A Yes, it's bound to. With a new Administration here in Washington beginning to establish an understanding with the Brezhnev Administration in Moscow, we would have to start over and feel out a new Administration over there. There would bound to be some slowdown in the development of enough understanding to proceed with things like SALT.

Q. Turning to your own situation at the CIA, Admiral, are you handicapped in countering Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa by restrictions on covert operations?

A No, I've not found them a handicap at this point. There are no new limitations on our covert operations other than specific prohibitions on assassinations. I would not permit that kind of activity anyway. The point now is that there must be presidential approval before any covert action is undertaken, and Congress must be informed in a timely manner.

"WE CAN'T ABANDON COVERT ACTION"—

Q. Are covert operations—dirty tricks of that sort—really necessary?

A We can't abandon covert action. However, in today's atmosphere, there is less likelihood that we would want to use this capability for covert action. But I can envisage circumstances in which the country might demand some covert action.

Q. What circumstances?

A For instance, let's say a terrorist group appears with a nuclear weapon and threatens one of our cities and says, "If you don't give us some money or release some prisoners or do something, we will blow up Washington, D.C."

I think the country would be incensed if we did not have a covert-action capability to try to counter that—to go in and get the weapon or defuse it.

So, although we don't exercise it today, I think we must retain some capability for covert actions that range from small paramilitary operations to other actions that will influence events.

Q. There have been recent allegations that you have declassified reports on energy to support the President's policy decisions. Does this represent a new CIA policy of using intelligence to support White House programs?

A That is definitely not the case. This study was started over a year ago—before even the election. The President did not know of it until a few days before he mentioned it in a press conference.

Let me say, though, that I believe that the intelligence community should make more information available to the public on an unclassified basis. The public is paying for our work and deserves to benefit from it within the necessary limits of secrecy. Moreover, a well-informed public is the greatest strength of our nation.

I also believe that declassifying as much information as possible is a good way to provide better protection for those secrets we must hold. Excessive classification simply breeds disrespect for and abuse of all classified data. I intend to continue to declassify and publish information of value and interest to our people.