

**RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.**

41 EAST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017, 697-5100

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CONFERENCE CALL

STATION WABC

DATE JANUARY 15, 1978

11:30 P.M. CITY

NEW YORK

*FRANK Snepp, William Hood*  
FULL TEXT on Intelligence

LARRY BEAR: Hello. I'm Larry Bear, and this is "Conference Call" on WABC Radio. Tonight on "Conference Call" we're going to talk about a subject that has occasioned a steady national debate for several years now, and the subject is intelligence-- not the kind that we associate with IQ, but rather, the kind we associate with agents, with national security, with crime, with espionage, spies, counter-espionage, and covert action, with code name operations, both real and fictional, Operation H T Lingual(?), Health Alteration Committee, the Executive Action Squad, and those familiar initials CIA, FBI, NSA, Consect(?). In other places, for example, KGB, and GRU.

We're going to take a good, hard look tonight at two United States agencies, the CIA and the FBI, and at what I believe to be the key issue for a free and democratic society--how, and I guess this is the question, how, in a world looked at realistically as a network of nations essentially in competition, we, the United States of America, can maintain national, and international intelligence, and criminal justice services that will be competent and effective, and also controlled, responsible, and accountable. What, if any, are the limits we should set for secret intelligence operations and activities? And what should be the limits, do you think on the freedom of the press, public agencies, and the Congress to hold such activities up to public scrutiny?

In Russia, for example, there are no moral issues posed(?) to the KGB, and that includes kidnapping and assassination activity. Nor does the Russian GRU, the Soviet Armed Forces Intelligence Spy Service, have to concern itself with internal or external niceties involving human rights and freedom.

Stalin was deified by tens of millions of people all over the world. He was engaging with the help of the Soviet Secret Services in mass murder, so extensive, brutal and inhuman as to stagger and sicken the imagination even in the twentieth century, where we witnessed so much death and destruction.

Now in the United States we come to grips with moral issues light years away from that kind of horror. Because we are an open society.

However, there are serious issues we do have to face. For example, one, domestic spying by the CIA. Have there been illegal spy activities in violation of the rights of United States citizens? Has the FBI infringed on the personal liberties of U.S. citizens?

The allegations have included, in reports, for example, from the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Senate Intelligence Committee, as well as from public groups, such as the Committee for Public Justice.

Allegations concerning the opening of citizens' mail, or(?) planting of tapes and bugs, the commission of burglaries, testing of dangerous drugs on unsuspecting subjects, and accumulating, and I quote, "regrettable mountains of dossiers on US citizens."

Secondly, there has been some criticism that there is a lack of accountability by United States intelligence services to the Congress, to the people, and even apparently to the White House.

And there may be other serious issues involving illegality and competence, intelligence community manipulation of United States Presidents, and intelligence community manipulation by United States Presidents.

But to me at least one thing is clear. If there is an important issue to be resolved relating to the interplay between intelligence community activities and the civil and human rights of US citizens, and indeed of the citizens of other nations of the world, and I believe there is, there is also a powerful, even overwhelming case to be made for the absolute necessity of national intelligence services, engaged in the protection and furtherance of the growth of the Republic.

Effectiveness and competence may necessitate secrecy, while Democratic process demands control, responsibility and accountability.

And so we're talking, are we not, of a very delicate balance.

The subject, then, is intelligence. Secret operations in an open society. My guests on Conference Call tonight

are uniquely fit to discuss the subject with us. And we'll take your telephone calls, all of us, and your questions and concerns and issues.

Later on this evening when I announce the Conference Call telephone number.

But for now, let me introduce my guests to you. My first guest is Frank Snepp. He was recruited into the Central Intelligence Agency in 1968, and he served over a period of eight years as both an intelligence analyst, and an intelligence operative, which in itself is unusual.

He worked on European security matters, and then did two tours of duty in Saigon, Vietnam. From 1969 to 1971, and from 1972 to 1975, where(?) he was responsible for strategic estimates and briefings, and handling interrogations and(?) informant network.

He resigned from the CIA one year, after Saigon fell. His new book, entitled Decent Interval, published by Random House, was written in total secrecy and published without advance announcement by Random House, without having been submitted to the CIA for review. The CIA has charged that publication of the book, Decent Interview, Decent Interval, was a violation of the CIA secrecy oath, and Frank I'm sure will comment on that.

My second guest is William Hood. And he began his career in intelligence operations (UNCLEAR) of America's modern intelligence service. He was with the OSS, the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. And then with the Central Intelligence Agency of course, at its official formation in 1947.

Bill Hood has been a specialist on England, France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland. He has been on the Latin America desk, and has held positions in the CIA as Chief of Operations in Eastern Europe, and as Executive Officer for Counterintelligence.

My third guest is Dorothy Samuels, and she is Executive Director of the Committee for Public Justice, which monitors -- monitors the progress of intelligence reform, and is dedicated to the protection of individual civil rights.

Its historic 1971 Conference on the FBI was the first investigation of the FBI ever undertaken by either a public or a private organization.

I welcome you to Conference Call, and am glad to have

you with me tonight. The three of you. And I'm grateful that you came. I don't know whether we'll solve anything, but I think we can at least (GARBLED) issues of some importance.

I wonder, though, if I might, Bill, begin with you. While I don't want a history lesson, I'd like to go back a little back. In terms of the formation of -- of our intelligence services in this country. I realize, of course, that we've had intelligence services for many years. But I like to think of the modern intelligence service as beginning --beginning around the time of the Second World War. With the Office of Strategic Services. Maybe you can tell us something about how that --how that began.

My impression was that Bill Donovan, who was I guess the, what did they call him, the Father of the OSS, worked with Winnie Stevenson, Winnie Stevenson of the British Security Coordination, and then the OSS developed. But I'd like some background from you.

WILLIAM HOOD: That's correct. Donovan was sent on a couple of exploratory missions, tours really, to Europe by President Roosevelt. And was clearly Roosevelt's candidate to establish a, what would be in effect our first peacetime national intelligence service. This was --was formed just before we entered World War II.

I think actually American intelligence is now, seems to be common coin, really started with our first great intelligence officer, George Washington. And the difference in his operations and the operations that have been conducted since his time is not very great.

I think he engaged in covert action, counterespionage, and state espionage. And did so very brilliantly. I think I would call him a better intelligence officer, perhaps, than a general.

BEAR: Really.

HOOD: And he also had a -- a notion for secrecy. It's -- it's as you probably know it's only within the last fifteen or twenty years that some of his agents have been identified. And there're still two or three that -- to be identified.

BEAR: And is -- is there some, there was a book. I think it was called The Man Called Intrepid, or A Man Called Intrepid, or something. Which began at least to -- to give the story

of -- of Dewin(?) Stevenson and the British Security Coordination that -- that operated as I understand it throughout the war right here in New York City. In Rockefeller Center.

HOOD: Uh,huh.

BEAR: In complete secrecy, even though they had a couple of thousand employees.

HOOD: Well, Stevenson I don't think was in complete secrecy.

BEAR: Uh,huh.

HOOD: But he was in formal liaison with the FBI at the time. And of course, with Donovan, once Donovan was named by President Roosevelt.

BEAR: Uh,huh.

And when was the -- did the CIA as such come into being, though?

HOOD: It was established by the National Security Act of 1947, At the same time the National Security Council was formed. And the services were unified. The military services.

BEAR: Uh,huh. And the CIA itself, then became in 1947 the United States intelligence arm. But were there not, are there still not, other intelligence agencies operating in the United States? Governmental agencies?

HOOD: Well, of course. The -- there is the Department of Defense Intelligence Agency. The National Security Agency. And the FBI, although I don't know whether you'd call that an intelligence agency. It certainly has a counterintelligence responsibility. Those are the only ones that leap right to my mind.

BEAR: Uh,huh. And some of them have a lot. I don't want you to feel left out of this. I -- I just began with Bill because he began with -- with the modern intelligence.

FRANK SNEPP: Well, can we bring up a point.

BEAR: Sure.

SNEPP: Going back to 1947.

BEAR: Of course.

SNEPP: The National Security Act. Actually, the CIA was formed as an intelligence gathering organization in 1947. And as I understand it, although my knowledge is obviously coming from reading, now. Because I was not in the agency at its inception. As you were, Bill.

But it was not involved initially under the 1947 National Security Act in covert activities. That was part of the OPC, was that the --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Accurate name for it. That was operated quite separately, by Wisner, and several others. And only in 1947, I -- I thought, 1949 was the Act amended to make the agency responsible for covert actions as well as intelligence gathering.

HOOD: That's -- that's correct indeed. The agency was established in '47.

SNEPP: In '47. But it didn't have covert action --

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: That was added, I think it was --

SNEPP: Which is part of one of the -- the great debates. Whether or not the agency should be in fact returned to its original role and form, which is to collect intelligence, without that covert action capacity.

BEAR: Well, that's an excellent point. And it seems to me that in the recent (GARBLED) debate about the role of intelligence, and whether the CIA and the FBI have overstepped their bounds, and so forth.

A lot of material comes out that I think falls on unsophisticated ears.

SNEPP: Ummm.

BEAR: Let me put it that way. You mentioned, for example, covert action. I would think that a good many people, like myself who are lay people, tend to think that's all that the CIA's involved in.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: And probably the FBI too. Covert action. Covert actions means --

SNEPP: That's the dirty tricks.

BEAR: Yeah, people are out there doing tricks --

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: Against foreign leaders and so forth and so on. And as a matter of fact, and we can discuss whether that's real anyway. But -- but you mentioned espionage, and you mentioned counterespionage.

And I really would like to take a few minutes to talk about what the CIA in fact does. And what espionage means. And what counterespionage means. And what covert action means.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: I think most people don't really understand that.

SNEPP: Well, Bill is the expert, I think, on terminology. But it would be useful to start out by saying that William Colby mentioned recently. I think in testimony before one of the House Committees. That initially covert action, meaning dirty tricks, accounted for something like 50 per cent of the CIA's budget. And now accounts for only 2 per cent. Which it seems to me extraordinarily small.

But this is what the former Director said. So that's a starting point. We're seeing that particular activity -- kind of activity shrink. Covert action --

DOROTHY SAMUELS: (UNCLEAR) I, just about a point, what is this you say, that this is the Director saying that 50 per cent of the CIA budget --

SNEPP: Initially. Initially.

SAMUELS: Would you say, not only that an enormous part of the budget, obviously. But would you say something about --

SNEPP: Well, I think the budget is \$700 million. Something like that.

SAMUELS: Just a note on who gets to look at the budget. And --and --

SNEPP: Oh my heavens. We're jumping from subject to subject. First of all, I think maybe we should --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Sort out the terminology.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Then we can talk about who (GARBLED) the budget.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: I just want to point out that the budget itself is a covert activity.

SNEPP: Well, not any more.

SAMUELS: Well, less and less.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: And -- and you know also point out the National Security Agency has a bigger budget. And --

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: And we can -- we can relate to that budget because I think it's important. And where the FBI spends its money too. But I -- I don't want to miss the central issue --

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: So what are we talking about in terms of activity?

SNEFF: Well, I was an analyst, and unlike the KGB and the Chinese Secret Service, the CIA has a huge part of its facilities devoted to analysis. Of overt(?) source material. Of agent source material. Of all data.

Then there is the other side of the house, which Bill worked in. I take it, for most of your career.

HOOD: Uh, huh.

SNEFF: Which is the -- the clandestine service. Now



I, because of my Vietnam service, slipped back and forth. But on the other side, you have covert action, that is to say dirty tricks people, if you will. You also have people who are engaged in counterintelligence, as Bill was. And you also have people who are engaged in simple intelligence gathering. So those are sort of broad categories, I think, under the aegis of the clandestine service.

Okay Bill. It's your turn.

BEAR: I wonder (GARBLED) if -- if I can ask you specifically. The word espionage, which you mentioned Frank.

SNEPP: Yes.

BEAR: Even of itself. I think most people find hard to differentiate from -- from covert action. Because espionage has that meaning. It means that somehow you're sneaking around in back alleys. I don't necessarily mean(?) it's a bad, you know, that's a bad thing. But it's a way of being.

Espionage is not covert action. Is it Bill?

HOOD: No. There are three intelligence disciplines: espionage, counterespionage, or counterintelligence. They're used synonymously now. And covert action.

Espionage is quite simply stealing the plans. That's all it is.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: You're trying to find out what the other fellow doesn't want you to, has classified, and wants to keep away from you.

BEAR: Uh, huh.

HOOD: Counterespionage is keeping him from finding out your secrets. It gets into much more elaborate things than that. It means penetrating his intelligence services, deceiving him, when this is possible.

But basically it's a defensive activity.

Covert action is a very broad term, and it -- it ranges from clandestine attempts to influence foreign opinion or action --

BEAR: Propaganda, in other words. Right?

SNEPP: Right.

HOOD: And black(?) propaganda, that is, propaganda that can't be attributed. And goes from that to support of irregular warfare. Resistance or guerilla groups, underwriting certain foreign activities, as we did in Laos. Arming and supporting paramilitary forces.

BEAR: So what you're saying then is that in -- in espionage and as you got on, Frank, it could be something as unglamorous as reading thousands of newspapers --

SNEPP: That's right. That's right.

BEAR: All over the world. Thousands of magazines. And you know (GARBLED).

SNEPP: And listening to -- to foreign broadcasts, and trying to figure out what somebody actually means.

HOOD: It's important to realize how -- how much more comes from these -- these activities which are -- are honest and completely aboveboard.

SNEPP: Reading.

HOOD: Reading newspapers--

SNEPP: That's right.

HOOD: And listening to the other fellow's radio broadcast. And I would say you would get any variety of estimates on it, but certainly 80 to 90 per cent of the data collected by the agency is from overt sources.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Though as one said, it is the -- the agent, the (GARBLED), the John McCone(?) types --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Who are deep inside the opposition that provides the goad(?) or the corroborating information.

HOOD: Permits you to -- really to evaluate --

SNEPP: That's right.

HOOD: And point out the importance of the mound of data that you've got --

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: From overt sources.

SNEPP: Absolutely.

BEAR: And -- and when we pass from espionage into counterespionage or counterintelligence, I guess that's where you have the coin (?). You've got to understand that -- that foreign governments, they may be Russian or otherwise, are in -- are hopefully from their point of view engaged in the same kind of operations.

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR: And they're trying to recruit Americans, wherever they may be, in the hope that they'll provide for them the kind of information we're looking for our agents to provide.

SNEPP. Uh, huh.

BEAR: So dealing with -- with that kind of threat is -- is the counterintelligence operation that I take it you were involved with,

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: From time to time I had to, yes.

SNEPP: And of course as counteragents -- and there's the feel of the intelligence business. Counterespionage. Keeping your opposition from determining how you're operating.

And it's so important. Without that, then you're vulnerable.

HOOD(?): A good counterespionage service is at the heart of any intelligence activity. No matter how good your positive intelligence, your intelligence collection is, you can be tricked if -- if you do not -- if you're not supported by a very strong counterespionage service.

BEAR: Well, in -- in what sense, when you say you can be tricked.

HOOD: You can be deceived. Your agents can be doubled,

and run against you. Unless you have an inside view of the opposition you, to a degree, are at their mercy.

BEAR: When you talk about an agent being doubled, what does that mean.

HOOD: That means an agent of one side who is, comes under the control, of the opposition or enemies, as the case may be.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: Is a double agent.

BEAR: It's an interesting book.

SNEPP: Are you going to mention Masterman's book.

No doubletalk systems.

BEAR: Well, -- I was thinking of something a little simpler, and that's a book, the Harry Rozitky that I was just mentioning about the CIA's secret operations.

And it's interesting he mentions at one point, I think it's in the late sixties, am I correct, that there were 300, or 600, Russian agents in New York City alone.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: At that time. Is that -- am I correct?

HOOD: I'm not sure that that was his figure but we have to distinguish between agent --

BEAR: Uh, huh.

HOOD: And intelligence officer. An agent is somebody who has no ostensible connection with the intelligence services employing him.

Frank and I were intelligence officers --

BEAR: Uh, huh.

HOOD: And we're sometimes referred to in the press as agents.

SNEPP: As agents, correct.

HOOD: And that is like covert action getting involved with covert activities --

BEAR: Uh,huh.

HOOD: And secret intelligence. These are quite separate words which the press as yet hasn't thought out.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: Well, I'm glad we've got you then. Does that mean Bill as a matter of fact that -- that when you were in Europe, for example, that your identity was known? Because you were an officer, as opposed to being an agent?

HOOD: Well it wasn't theoretically, it wasn't known. But when you've been around 25 years, it's already known(?).

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: People, there were people (UNCLEAR) my authority as a member of the CIA.

BEAR: Well that's an interesting fact. What you're saying is there're people who are not to be identified, hopefully. Is that right?

HOOD: They're not career employees. They're hired to -- for a certain job, and released when their job is over.

SNEPP: And there's also another category of let's say operative. And that your asset. An asset may be someone you don't hire, whom you're able to manipulate through various and sundry techniques.

Now sometimes that term is misused, and maybe I'm misusing it right now.

But in Vietnam, we always referred to an asset, as, say, a journalist, who we might talk to regularly. Who -- who we're trying to cultivate, and draw into our confidence, so that we could direct him in the right direction. The way that would be useful to American policy. Or to our interests, or what have you.

That's an asset. Not paid. (GARBLED) most of the time. Not realizing that we're doing this.

BEAR: Uh,huh.

SNEPP: And then you have the agent who is willing(?). He perhaps may not be willing. But in any event, he was hired, or there is some handle on him.

SAMUELS: In the development of what you call (UNCLEAR), which is really an espionage function, you in fact can get involved, and how does that become covert action, or does it?

( OVERTALK)

BEAR: That's not necessarily a function, is it?

SAMUELS: Well it's --

SNEPP: It would be.

SAMUELS: A hindrance.

HOOD: There's another -- another term that's used perhaps more in Europe than in Southeast Asia. Asset, as it's used, as I understand it, applies to, was applied to an agent. It's not really a category.

But you put something down as a contact. You've added someone who's not employed. But someone --

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: Information, or for advice. Or to -- to do you a turn.

SNEPP: That's right.

HOOD: Who would faint dead away --

SNEPP: Well, I noticed --

HOOD: At the thought of being called an agent.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Or being called an asset. But, we thought in Vietnam we had a couple of assets that we could --

BEAR: Well I --

SNEPP: Utilize from time to time.

BEAR: To pursue something that Dorothy I think was getting at, Frank, I note, you did mention in the book, in your book --

SNEPP: Uh, huh.

BEAR: (GARBLED) book. The Bureau Chief of the New York Times --

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR: Giving(?) a general (UNCLEAR) with a television interviewer in 1969.

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR: He said that in reference to journalists --

SNEPP: Hmm.

BEAR: American journalists in Vietnam. And I quote. "We would leak to them on a selective basis, draw them into our confidence, and then we could shape their reporting (GARBLED), because they trusted us.

SNEPP: That's right.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: A rather convoluted way of saying something. To somebody.

What it means simply, that we would indeed pass around information from time to time, most of it was checkable. And the journalists would come back to us with further information. And then we would feed data which wasn't checkable.

Let me give you an example. So that there's no misunderstanding. If we wanted to paint the North Vietnamese at a particular time as particularly perfidious, we would emphasize in our leaks to the press the fact that they were, oh, running a lot of men down the (GARBLED) system to South Vietnam.

We would neglect to mention that they might be running a lot of people back up the trail system to North Vietnam. So it appeared that in fact the North Vietnamese presence(?) was expanding, expanding.

And this would put a particular burnish on the story we were putting forth, the kind of story we were trying to put across to Congress or whathaveyou.

That's what I mean by manipulations. And manipulations, are -- is really a loaded term. Now the journalist, because the information is so technical, could never check it. He would never be able to determine whether or not that certain number of troops had come down the trail system. And he couldn't know that we were withholding information that might relate to the -- the exfiltration of those troops. So that's the business of manipulation.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Finding ourselves sufficiently(?) obscure.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: I'm going -- I'm going to have -- I'm going to have to manipulate (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE).

We're talking on Conference Call about the intelligence issues. Secret agency operations in an open society. With Frank Snepp. William Hood. And Dorothy Samuels. Now you stay with us. Because we'll be back to talk with you some more after five minutes of the latest news on WABC, New York.

\*\*\*

BEAR: Larry Bear back again. Your listening to Conference Call on WABC Radio. And tonight we're talking about the intelligence issue. Secret agency operations in an open society.

My guests, Dorothy Samuels, the Executive Director of the Committee for Public Justice. William Hood, who began his career in intelligence operations with the Office of Strategic Services, the OSS, which was formulated of course at about the time of World War II, and then became in effect the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. Bill Hood has been a specialist about England and France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland. That is, in Europe.

He's been on the Latin American desk for the CIA. Has held positions as Chief of Operations in Eastern Europe. And as Executive Officer for Counterintelligence.

My third guest is Frank Snepp, who was -- began his career in the CIA in 1968. Served over a period of eight years. As both an intelligence analyst, and intelligence operative.

He did some work in European security matters, but did two tours of duty in Saigon, Vietnam, which resulted, one of the results at least, was his new book. Called Decent



interval. Which you may well have heard about. If you haven't you certainly will. And it's published by Random House.

Frank did two tours of duty there, in 1969 and 1971 in Vietnam. And from 1972 to 1975, when he was responsible for strategic estimates and briefings, handling interrogations and informant networks as well.

And we have begun here on Conference Call to try and make some sense out of some of the terms that (UNCLEAR) on our -- in the media, and the press, television and radio. With regard to intelligence. Espionage. Counterespionage. Covert action. And so forth.

And it seems to me that it's quite important that we do talk about those terms, because all of us as citizens have been and will continue to be called upon to play some role hopefully in the ultimate decision making process here in the United States about intelligence operations.

What kind of legislation we should seek, what kind of intelligence gathering our agencies should or should not be involved in. And it's impossible to contribute anything, to your Congressman, to your Senator, to the general discussion in any way if you don't understand in fact what we're talking about.

We relate it seems to me, and we have been relating to a lot of so called covert activities that have to do with the CIA, I think more than the FBI. And one tends to think, I guess, that "dirty tricks" is the real business of intelligence. And what's been said here tonight, and I think that certainly what's true is that the Central Intelligence Agency does not spend a great deal of its time involved in covert activities or dirty tricks, in fact, as we tend to think of them.

But in intelligence gathering activities. And we have talked some about that. And I think that maybe we ought to talk a little more about it as we were doing during the course of the news break.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: I'd like to ask again if I could with regard to the activities of the CIA, if you like -- just make, perhaps

you might do this, Bill, some general estimate of the involvement of the CIA in intelligence gathering. That is to say, espionage and counterespionage and covert activity. How does it -- just in very general terms -- break down? Is it half and half. Or is the majority of the work of the agency outside the covert activity area?

HOOD: I think it's changed, obviously. Historically that -- that it must be at a very low level now. I'm not sure what the figures are. But if Director Colby said 2 per cent, I wouldn't certainly argue with that.

The time was that the, probably at the height of the Cold War, 51, 52, when we were first engaged in that heavily, the percentage was much -- was much larger. And it varies from country to country.

I think that rather obviously today in a great many areas there is no covert action whatsoever. Going on. And I'd say very little in any area. But it -- it is, there was a lot of it done in -- in Latin America during the -- during the Kennedy time. And I'm sure that's dropped to nothing now.

SNEPP: Talk about figures again. Because having been an analyst, I've become fixed on figures. For better or worse. I'm sure for worse. But in any event, it's in the public domain now. That about the -- the roster of the CIA is about 15,000 people, which is you know rather small considering that the agency is accused of all these great sins.

Only about 8,000 people in the agency are engaged in clandestine services. It may vary back and forth from 5 to 8,000.

HOOD: I would say that's on the low side.

SNEPP: Right.

HOOD: You know, (GARBLED) to do it.

SNEPP: And half of those are in a sort of support role. Which means supporting -- reporting from the POE, writing reports in(?) an editorial capacity, to put it in simple form. Technical services. And what have you.

And so a very small number of people actually out there

in the field doing dirty tricks, if you will. Or gathering intelligence, if you will.

So again, we're -- we're not confronted by this -- this monster in -- at least in terms of numbers.

HOOD: Uh, huh. You had to compare it too. I think that if you take just that 5,000 figure, which I think is quite high today. If you take -- if you subtract from that just the secretaries, you come down -- and the clerks --

SNEPP: That's right.

HOOD: You come down to -- (OVERTALK)

HOOD: Well, that's where we -- well, you have to compare that with the -- with the threat. Now what's the KGB up to? Everyone will agree that there's a 90,000 figure for the --

SNEPP: Hmm.

HOOD: For the KGB. But even in that, when you cut out the people who are engaged exclusively in the Soviet Union, and guarding the borders, that's one of their other jobs, you come down to probably 20,000 people in the espionage --

SNEPP: Hmm.

HOOD: And counterespionage, and covert action. Which is -- is quite different from the CIA figure. And then you have to throw in of course all the East European Communist countries --

SNEPP: Uh, huh.

HOOD: The intelligence services of which are completely at the beck and call of the KGB. Or GRU.

SNEPP: So there's quite -- quite a substantial threat.

BEAR: Uh, huh. Clearly so.

Okay, I wanted to at least get that out on the table somewhat, and we may get some more questions about it from some of the callers.

And get back to what we were talking about at the news break, Frank. In terms of -- of loose ends.

SNEPP: Hmm.

BEAR: And you take another step. You had said that there were leaks on a selective basis.

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR; And in a sense --

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR: We were certainly talking about manipulation of the press.

SNEPP: Uh,huh.

BEAR: What's -- what's your feeling about that? Do you -- I think, if I read your book correctly, would not think so highly of that(?).

SNEPP: No. As a matter of fact --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: That's the one axe I have to grind. I think the CIA should get out of the press business entirely.

The latest CIA guidelines recently issued by Admiral Turner permit the CIA to continue to deal with foreign journalists who work for foreign intelligence organizations -- I beg your pardon, foreign news organizations.

In other words, we could hire somebody who works for The Economist, or for lawyers, technically. Just to give you an example. I'm not suggesting that's happening.

BEAR: Uh,huh.

SNEPP: But we can no longer under the new guidelines hire American journalists who work for CBS, or foreign journalists who might work for CBS, Time Magazine, and so forth. (GARBLED)

I think, however, we should get out of all news gathering activities, or we should get away from trying to hire any journalist. Because the problem is there is blowback, to use a terrible term.

When a journalist begins working for you, I don't care how objective he may try to be, he at some point I think -- at least this is true of the journalists I've known, foreign journalists overseas. They will begin to skew their vision in your direction. Even if they don't want to.

They may be doing something for you in the intelligence field. They may be out there gathering intelligence. They may be reporting to their editors, quite objectively, the situation. But the two are beginning to merge.

And it's very possible, even if the journalist writes for a foreign newspaper, that his material would be picked up by, say, The New York Times, The Washington Post. That's blowback.

And because of that -- that threat, I think we should again back off from all journalists.

HOOD: But what -- what would happen if the journalist works for Tass, or Izvestia?

SNEPP: I know, this is the counterintelligence man speaking.

HOOD: Well, I say -- I say, if we're recruiting somebody. If we had a chance to recruit somebody from Tass --

SNEPP: Hmmm.

HOOD: Would we be forbidden to do that because what he reports would be -- could be manipulated, and blowback on the United States? I'm sure you wouldn't go that far?

SNEPP: Well, I think if we're targeting, say, the -- the Soviet news services, we're talking about in fact targeting the Soviet intelligence service, for many Tass men are operating part time or full time for KGB.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: But it's -- that's (GARBLED).

HOOD: You consider them fair game. Although, if we influence their product, what -- what is printed --

SNEPP: Well, can you give me an example of a Tass man's reports and dispatches being picked up by The New York

Times. Or The Washington Post. I think -- in other words I think you're posing a case where in fact there is not really a problem. I would go after Tass.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: I would go after Tass.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: But if we begin talking about hiring, say, a French journalist. Or a Chinese journalist operating out of Taiwan. Then I think we're getting into a very gray area. And I think that's what we should stay away from.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: I think it's very easy to blow that into a bigger problem than that is because I don't think there are -- ever have been that many foreign journalists as -- as agents or sources or contacts.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: I think it is a big problem. And I -- this is a, I think it's an important point to make.

Colby said the other day at(?) the House Committee on Intelligence, in these hearings dealing with the press -- it doesn't really matter, he said, if there's blowback. Spillover into the American press. Because oftentimes, the stories that blow back appear at the bottom of page 4, in the newspaper. Therefore it's unimportant.

Well, the point is that that story that appears on the bottom of page 4, which may seem in the overall context of the news to be unimportant. Could deal with atrocities in Cambodia. They can deal with many things that could finally figure in American policy down the road a piece. And at the moment makes them very unimportant.

That's why, again, I think that there is a danger. And I think any spillover, however small it may be, (GARBLED) the advantage you might gain by hiring a journalist to do your bidding overseas. Leaving aside Tass. I -- I grant that's an exception.

HOOD: But would you -- would you stop diplomats from dealing with journalists?

SNEPP: Certainly not. But the CIA should not be in the business --

HOOD: Well --

SNEPP: Of propogandizing, even indirectly, the --

HOOD: That's not what I --

SNEPP: The American people.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: Frank, I -- I think there's a distinction that needs to be made.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: Because -- Frank, I -- I think there's a distinction that needs to be made.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: Not one where you'd have to accept the morality of it, but at least a distinction. Between in -- in essence having a newsman in a sense on your side, because he's --

SNEPP: Un,huh.

BEAR: Doing work for you. And you've made I think, you know, a reasonable case for that.

How about the press guy who wouldn't dream of -- of being a go between for the -- for the CIA --

SNEPP: Uh,huh.

BEAR: Wouldn't dream of -- of gathering information for them. He's nevertheless in a position to be manipulated --

SNEPP: Uh,huh.

BEAR: By the CIA. In terms of the stories he writes. It can be like the gentleman from The New York Times you mentioned. As I recall, in your book you said, you know, to all intents and purposes, was being as objective as he could.

SNEPP: That's right. That's right.

BEAR: But he was getting data he couldn't check terribly well.

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR: Now, that's a different thing, isn't it --

SNEPP: That is. That's a different thing.

BEAR: Well, then let's relate to that because in a way that's (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE).

SNEPP: Absolutely. Because there can be blowback there. In other words, we can have a foreign journalist, whom we're using as an agent. He may write stories that blowback into the American press. That's propagandizing the American people. Any way you cut it.

We may be briefing an American journalist, who is in no way, shape or form working for the CIA. And we may brief him on a particular subject. And we may skew the briefing to get across a particular point of view. He'll write the story. We're propagandizing the American people.

The National Security Act of 1947 unfortunately is not as clear on this point as it should be. But it says that the CIA shouldn't have domestic police functions in the United States.

And as I understand it, this has been interpreted as barring the propagandizing of the population in the United States. And I think it's a very fair -- fair rule. And so we're talking about a point of legality, granted ambiguous legality, but a point of legality. And that's why I say the CIA should back off from journalists. Because it seems to be illegal.

BEAR: Well but -- but just take a look -- sure, take a look at that.

If I'm a journalist for ABC and I -- and I want some information. And the story that I'm writing it seems to me does relate in part --

SNEPP: Hmm.



BEAR: To some activities I at least have a suspicion that you're engaged in at the CIA. It could be the FBI or whatever. And I want to go there, and I want to try and dig out a story. And what can I do other than talk to the (UNCLEAR).

SNEPP: You should go to the political officer in the Embassy, who hopefully isn't a CIA man and under cover.

BEAR: Wouldn't be. It's not his cover.

SNEPP: Right.

And get your information from him. I don't --

BEAR: Ever talked to CIA people?

SNEPP: Think the CIA should be in the business of handing out news. It's an intelligence gathering organization.

BEAR: But you know what I see there? I see -- I see ABC, or CBS, or Time or someone going back to the editor and saying, you know something, those guys won't not say anything about anything. And I don't like it. And I'm going to write a story.

SNEPP: Uh, huh.

BEAR: And say, these guys won't talk or give any information to the free press. What do you do with that?

SNEPP: Well, here we have a problem. Because obviously the press has a stake in not pursuing this issue of the CIA's relationship with the press too far, because it's going to lose its terrific sources.

And there is a bit of hypocrisy here. The press stays rather quiet when this issue is raised because it would mean again the access in the Embassy would be more limited. And sources would begin to dry up.

BEAR: So that's a problem. I take it, Bill, that you have a -- a --

SNEPP: He's looking pained over there.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: No, I was thinking. From the point of view of

the journalist. There's an immense amount of data which can be made available that --that only -- only exists in the CIA. Perfectly open -- openly arrived at. Press analysis. All of this data that's put out by OCI. A great deal of it could be released to the press.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: And as far as I know is. I'm not sure --

SNEPP: That's right.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: It seems to me silly to withdraw from that.

SNEPP: You brought up a very interesting point. I appeared recently before the Senate (GARBLED) Committee, and one of the things that I told them from my modest perspective was that if you're going to deal with the press, if that -- if we can't get rid of that problem. And the CIA must continue to deal with the press, brief the press, and what have you.

Then we should establish a rule. Anytime the press gets a briefing from a CIA officer, it ought to be on the record. So the -- the reporter can say, according to the CIA, the Soviet balance of forces is so(?) --until the Soviet strategic forces (UNCLEAR).

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: So that the reading public will know where his information is coming from. I think this would discourage the agency from handing out this information, knowing it could always be called on it. And this seems to me a very sensible rule. If we're going to continue to deal with the press.

I mean, I'm defeating my own purpose by suggesting a solution. But there we are.

BEAR: Well, okay. Because it just seemed to me that that, you know, was worth bringing up.

SNEPP: Yeah.

BEAR: Let's -- let's for the moment talk about the book, Decent Interval. It seems to me just from what we've said thus far that while you could certainly be -- be referred to as a responsible critic (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE).

SNEPP: Well I -- I think there're probably some fairly responsible people who would say that's not true.

BEAR: Well, it seems to me that you could be called that. And yet the book has caused an enormous amount of controversy. People saying, for example, that Decent Interval is an indecent book, because it takes the CIA to task, and -- and the Federal Government. And -- and --

SNEPP: Hmm.

BEAR: And Ambassador Martin, and a whole lot of things. Just what if -- if -- and I hate to put such a blunt(?) question to you. But what was your great concern, that caused you to write a book of so many pages, and obviously such a great link(?).

What was the -- the heart of your concern (UNCLEAR PHRASE) It appears to me it obviously was not that the United States of America was making a mistake in having a Central Intelligence Agency and an intelligence function.

SNEPP: (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) Because I believe that there cannot be a double standard in matters of secrecy.

Look, Director Colby was handing out his account of the evacuation, right after the collapse of Vietnam, to journalists of his choice.

He expected the rest of us in the agency who had been there to keep quiet. In deference to the secrecy agreement we all signed. I think what he was doing was an abuse of the secrecy system. Secrecy is not divisible. It applies to Director Colby, and to Director Turner, to Frank Snepp, or it applies to nobody.

I mean, after all, Director Colby, when he was Director, signed the secrecy agreement, was under pain of the secrecy agreement. And he should have abided by it. And yet he didn't.

So I figured the bets were -- were off at that point. I wanted to demonstrate by example that again secrecy is not divisible. The secrecy strictures cannot be selectively applied. So I wrote the book.

Now, in the book, I hasten to add, I did not expose

any sources and methods, at least not to my knowledge. And I think the CIA is still combing the book, trying to find a source or a method which would justify legal action, but so far I don't think they have. And that was one of the reasons I wrote the book.

Secondly I wanted to force the CIA to learn from some of the mistakes it made in Vietnam. I offered to do an after action report when I came back. I wanted to help focus attention on what we'd done wrong with the evacuation.

We had left a lot of material behind. We left agents and collaborators. And it seemed to make sense to sit back and determine what this meant in terms of our future operations in Southeast Asia.

BEAR: Uh, huh.

SNEPP: But the agency didn't want to do this. It wanted simply to forget about what had happened. When I discovered this was the attitude of the agency, I said okay. Then I'm going to write an after action report of my own. And that was the book. The second reason.

BEAR: Okay. Let's -- let's then take a look at the substance of the book. What (UNCLEAR) -- again, we can take so many pages and such obviously an enormous effort on your part. And -- and condensing it is hardly fair.

And I think the listeners would know that the only way to get a complete picture is to read the book, Decent Interval.

But what is your -- were your substantive specific concerns that you laid(?) out there? I mean, what happened that -- that enraged you?

SNEPP: Well first of all, the book, I think, is a pro agency book.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Because it demonstrates that the CIA was (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) job throughout the last years of the war. It was generating very good intelligence on Communist intentions.

We knew what was going to happen. We knew the Communists were going to move on Saigon toward the end of April, 1975. We knew it in time to begin planning rationally for an evacuation.

We didn't. And I wanted to answer the question, why didn't we.

And what I discovered was myopia at the top. The -- the intelligence was flowing back to Washington, in most cases. But Dr. Kissinger, for his own reasons, Ambassador Martin, for his reasons, and finally my own boss Tom Polgar(?), the CIA Station Chief in Saigon, for his reasons, chose not to go with the intelligence. Not to begin planning again in any vigorous way for evacuation.

And I focused -- the most important part of the book, from my standpoint, deals with the question of why they -- why they didn't.

And why didn't they? All right. I'll answer that question very quickly. Henry Kissinger, you'll recall, by late March 1975 had just come off of a Middle East shuttle. He'd been unsuccessful in arranging a disengagement of Egyptian and Syrian forces in the Sinai Desert. Precisely because both sides were unsure of how far to trust American policy.

Because of this, the last thing Kissinger wanted to do was to give the impression that we were prepared to abandon an ally in Southeast Asia. This would have further complicated his Mideast peace gambit. So he was not in favor of (GARBLED).

Then you had Ambassador Martin. Ambassador Martin an old cold warrior(?). He had lost a son, an adopted son, in Vietnam. And this of course strengthened his determination to stand fast.

I think Tom Polgar could also be spoken of as a cold warrior in a certain classic sense. Not quite able to distinguish between the devil and Communism. I think that's a line I use in the book. And I hope that's not too offensive. And I think it probably is -- is accurate. It speaks to the man himself.

The -- these are the personal factors. That vitiated(?) against the planning for an evacuation. Pulling the plug.

Then, on top of all of that, we had the false peace signals. During the final month of the war, the French, and then the members of the Hungarian truce team in Saigon, put out the word that there was a chance for a negotiated settlement. And the Soviets in private communications with Kissinger conveyed the same impression.

And all of this tended to divert, I think, the principals from what the intelligence was saying. Which was, there was no chance for a negotiated settlement. Ergo, we should begin planning for that evacuation. Very complicated tale, indeed.

BEAR: Hmm.

SNEPP: But that's the sum total of it.

HOOD: Wasn't one of the major considerations the fact that a detailed evacuation plan, if it leaked, wouldn't it cause a run on the bank. Wouldn't it threaten the -- our policy there? If -- if --

SNEPP: I think that was a neat rationalization. First of all, in very early April, a highranking CIA man, who visited in Saigon, Ted Schakley, in fact, had seen to it the city of Saigon was cordoned off against refugees in the countryside. Against stragglers from the South Vietnamese army.

And therefore the city was in a way in a vacuum as the crisis developed. So there was less of a danger of panic.

Secondly although there was a danger of panic possible, a potential for it, I think we could very early on have begun quietly putting together the lists of the Vietnamese we would have helped when the crisis finally reached a head.

We didn't do that. On the last day of the war, the day of the evacuation, we didn't have any master list identifying collaborators, or identifying the -- the Vietnamese who had worked for the Embassy we might help. And that was the failure. A very, very basic failure. A failure of organization, if you will. That could again been done I think without precipitating the collapse of morale within the city.

HOOD: But don't you get into -- into a -- a argument on just that point.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: With people like the Chief of Station or the Division Chief in Washington? I don't think they'd agree with you on that.

SNEPP: They may not. But there we are.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: The point is, we didn't get out the people we should have gotten out. And --

HOOD: How many people were gotten out? How many people did we evacuate?

SNEPP: All right. 140,000 Vietnamese refugees, now live in the United States. Half of those, or well over half of those, escaped on their own. That is, by jumping into fishing boats at the last moment, and paddling out to the American evacuation fleet offshore.

The other roughly 60,000, 51,000 in fact, were evacuated by the American airlift out of Saigon, which was organized by the American military.

The agency got out about, oh, I think, 2,000 or 3,000 people.

HOOD: And how many would you have recommended we get out?

SNEPP: I would have -- I would have at least have gotten out all of our Vietnamese employees. And our Vietnamese employees numbered 1,900. Only 537 of those got out. The 2,000 or 3,000 I'm talking about are -- are collaborators like Tu and Quong, and what have you. The others who worked inside the government.

And as a matter of fact, the majority of those got because people like your friend and mine, Bill Johnson, defied the orders of the Ambassador and the wishes of the Station Chief, and moved on his own. Put people on aircraft without permission.

HOOD: That was in -- in a degree in -- in defiance of -- of Embassy --

SNEPP: That was not in a degree. That was --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: (UNCLEAR) of Ambassador Martin's wishes and directives.

BEAR: One of the things that -- that really strikes home to me about the book is -- is that I would certainly agree with you as I read it, it seemed to me not at all an overall condemnation of the CIA.

On the contrary, it seemed to me that what you were saying,

I think almost pleading was the thought I got, was gee, it means so much to me. I wish you guys would, I mean, pay attention --

SNEPP: Uh,huh.

BEAR: To the problems. And -- and it strikes me that some of the -- of your insights into the Ambassador, into the Station Chief for example, into what you call it, the Cold War mentality. The -- was echoed in Harry Rozitsky's book and that was done with the complete approval of the CIA.

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR: (GARBLED) completely. In terms of --

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR: His own, you know, judgments about the mistakes that have been made.

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR: In terms of -- of this -- of this Cold War mentality, and this -- this -- this kind of violent military anti-Communist stance that we take.

SNEPP: Uh,huh.

BEAR: As opposed to some of the stances we could take. But --but it still leaves me with one question (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) germane, about the whole discussion tonight.

That is, in terms of trusting American policy.

SNEPP: Hmm.

BEAR: How do you begin to make those judgments that we should hold up to public display the mistakes, misjudgments, if indeed they are, and I'm sure Bill Hood, you know, as he was saying would not (GARBLED) --

SNEPP: Hmm.

BEAR: But assuming that they were, hold up to public scrutiny these kinds of mistakes. And then find a delicate balance where we're really saying, hey, let's make things better. And at the same time, what really happens when people read these things and see these things. And lose faith.

SNEPP; Well, I think it's wrong to debate all of this



in public, as a matter of fact. I don't think people should a book like -- books like mine.

I think the agency should do internal after action reports, and that's what I was pushing for. And only because they didn't do it did I go the way I did. In fact, I'd love to be in the agency right now. I'm sorry I had to leave it.

But I figured I had to take a stand on this issue. Because too many of my Vietnamese friends had been left. And the agency didn't want to acknowledge again that this is what --

HOOD: I find it remarkable that there was no after action report written. Because on almost every failed activity, it seems to me it's more -- it's analyzed more thoroughly.

SNEPP: Hmmm.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: (GARBLED) interrupt you, only because we've got to pause for some public service announcements. But then we will be right back on WABC, New York.

\*\*\*

BEAR: Larry Bear back again. This is Conference Call. And for those of you who have been listening to this first hour, to our discussion of the intelligence issue, secret agency operations in an open society, here's your chance to ask some questions of my guests Frank Snapp, William Hood, and Dorothy Samuels. And I'll reintroduce them more fully in just a moment.

If you've got a pencil and paper, and a mind that talks, now's the time. 212 is the area code. Because we are here in the city of New York. The telephone number is 541-8520. That's 541-8520. And the area code is 212. And the issue is intelligence operations.

If you've got questions or concerns, (UNCLEAR), let's make them now. 212 is the area code. 541-8520.

Frank Snapp is one of my guests. He was with the Central Intelligence Agency over a period of eight years. As an intelligence analyst, and operative. He did two tours of duty in Vietnam. And his book, Decent Interval, has to do with the last days of that war. And particularly the evacuation. And his particular

criticisms and concerns about the Central Intelligence Agency. And the United States Ambassador. And some of the people back home in connection with that.

William Hood is with us. He has been with American intelligence, now retired, but with American intelligence back in what we might call, I suppose, the beginning of modern American intelligence, the oss, the Office of Strategic Services, which came to public attention of course in World War II.

And then he went directly with the Central Intelligence Agency. Which was formed in 1947. He was a specialist, a European specialist. Was the Chief of Operations in Eastern Europe, and Executive Officer for Counterintelligence.

And my third guest is Dorothy Samuels. She is Executive Director of the Committee for Public Justice, which monitors the progress of intelligence reforms.

We're going to talk about that Committee, and particularly its relationship to the affairs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Okay. We'll take your calls. Again the telephone number is 541-8520. That's 541-8520. And I want to talk as a matter of fact too with -- on the issue of these intelligence reports that you brought up, Dorothy. How they're used. And who makes policy decisions on (UNCLEAR)

And then you've got -- glad(?) to take your call. Hello.

VOICE: Yes.

BEAR: Yes, go ahead.

(INTERRUPTION IN TAPE)

BEAR: Hello. Are we having any trouble with -- with the lines. Will you pick them up and see. We seem to be having a little difficulty. Because I see the lines are lighting up in different parts. But if you -- you'll stay with us, I'm sure it'll be all right.

212 is the area code. 541-8520. Why don't you ask your question Dorothy. The one that we were talking about as we went to the --

SAMUELS: Yes. Well, my question, and I -- I think this is something Frank explains. All this intelligence that's gathered by the -- by the CIA. How is that used, to make policy. Who does it go to, to make policy decisions about --

SNEPP: Well, the routing slip is probably one of the most powerful weapons of any bureaucrat in the CIA. It can determine where a report is directed. It can determine where a report is directed. A CIA Station Chief for instance in the field might want to get a particular report to the White House. He so designates it, and that report will go directly to the White House. As opposed to (GARBLED) consumers at the CIA headquarters in Washington, in Langley.

And if it goes to the White House, obviously it carries greater weight. So the Station Chief in the field is in the position to put a particular slant if you will on a particular event, or crisis. Simply by directing the intelligence to -- to a particular consumer.

And an Ambassador can do that as well. It is part of the standard operating procedure for a Station Chief in the field to issue his own analyses of a situation. We call them field appraisals in the business. And again he is in a position in these field appraisals to put a particular slant on the situation. And it's also standard operating procedure to clear these field appraisals with an Ambassador. So the Ambassador can impose his view on your intelligence. On your final analysis.

And analysis is very important. Because obviously the policy maker in Washington, top men, don't have time to look through all the raw intelligence. So what he gets, in finished analytical form, may influence his decisions.

This was one of the problems in Vietnam as a matter of fact. Kissinger was seeing a great deal of analysis, but oftentimes very little of the raw intelligence which carried the real truth, without any kind of bias whatsoever.

HOOD: But Frank, you agree that the amount of analysis done in the field --

SNEPP: It varies.

HOOD: Is very, very slight.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: As a rule, the reports are passed without analysis.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: Analysis is provided at headquarters.

SNEPP: Well, is that really true, Bill? Don't you agree that there is a mechanism, I'm not sure if it's classified, so I won't mention (GARBLED).

But it is possible for reports officers, the editorial writers, in other words, the editorialists who finally process the intelligence reports. They can add something -- a comment of their own on. And they can say this particular source is to be believed. His track record is terrific.

And in that way (UNCLEAR) can be imparted to an intelligence report --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Even a raw intelligence report. And that'll appear in(?) parenthetical form, or what have you. On the report.

And the consumer will see it and say, oh well, we won't trust this one. We'll (GARBLED) trust it a great deal.

HOOD: The -- the source evaluation is done at headquarters. It's not done in the field.

SNEPP: Well, it was done in --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: They were done in the field.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: In both places.

HOOD: The -- the evaluations are done in -- basic source evaluations -- done in Washington. It's the only place where the policy reporting --

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: Can be compared against --

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: ...And other data...

SNEPP: Uh, huh.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: Well, what about...

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: No, not in the CIA. Which is a very interesting thing. I think, again, one of my little hobby horses. I think the CIA should establish a dissent channel such as exists in the State Department, so that an officer in the field if he sees a piece of intelligence being sidetracked or ignored.

He can go in at risk of losing his next promotion, and send the cable back and say, Mr. Director, I think that this -- this piece of intelligence ought to be looked at. It would be done all in classified channels, so there would be no -- it wouldn't be a matter of leaking this to the press or anything else. Our sources or any methods would be protected.

But this is what the State Department allows now. A dissent(?) channel. And I think the agency could profit by one.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: I think it probably would give heartburn to some of the old officers like Bill. But in any event (UNCLEAR) it's a feasible way of handling it.

HOOD: Is that a dissent from policy, or from the report?

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: It would be -- it could be used in any way.

HOOD: As I understood it, it's -- it's you know for policy -- policy questions.

SNEPP: But I think in the agency, one might be able to apply it more broadly.

So that if you felt a particular, not every -- not every report you're dissenting to, but if you see a series of reports being overlooked or sidetracked, then you send them back through a dissent channel.

In Vietnam we (GARBLED) a dissent channel on the matter of corruption. And I always felt that we were not reporting adequately on that subject. And if I could have gone and said hey look, I'm sending back this cable, it might have done(?) probably no good, but in any event it would have done some good for me. I would have laid off the martinis.

BEAR: Okay. Let's see if the phone is working now. Hello. Are you there?

WOMAN: Yes.

BEAR: What's on your mind? Go ahead.

WOMAN: Uh.

(INTERRUPTION IN TAPE)

BEAR: Hello. You know -- you know what you're doing. You're keeping -- you're keeping your radio on (UNCLEAR). Stop for a moment.

WOMAN: Uh, huh.

BEAR: And those of you who want to call us, the number is 541-8520. And you must remember that when you do get on the phone, you have to keep your radio off. Because there simply isn't any way that we can talk to you and get the radio feedback too.

Go ahead.

WOMAN: Okay. I just wanted to say (GARBLED)

BEAR: I beg your pardon?

Joe, would you do me a favor? You know, the calls are not coming in very well, but when they do come in, seems like the CIA --

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: For those of you, I'm sorry -- they -- I don't know why the phones don't seem to be operating well, but I would appreciate it if you'd --keep trying.

It's happened in the past, and we'll check with the phone company and see what's going on. But just try to dial. It's 541-8520.

And if enough of you call in, maybe you'll finally get through. I'm really sorry about that. Okay.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: (GARBLED) We were talking about how to get dissenting views back to Washington. Or at least a multiplicity of views on pieces of intelligence.

And I think something else you could do(?) in the agency aside from establishing, say, a dissent channel would be in the major embassies to establish an analytical shop. This isn't done normally. Quite apart from the CIA station. An analytical shop, made up of one or two CIA analysts.

And you might do this in Rome, Tokyo, what have you. So that they could -- they would have the opportunity to do analyses, independent of the Ambassador, without having to clear them with the Ambassador, or the CIA station chief.

The Ambassador and the station chief would send back their own views. But you would have this independent voice. And I think this would serve to insure that all the intelligence did get back to the policy makers. Maybe I'm naive and idealistic or both, or what have you, but I -- it's not -- it doesn't seem to me so far fetched.

HOOD: Well, it -- it requires quite a bit of logistical (UNCLEAR) to establish a couple of analysts in every --

SNEPP: Not in every embassy. Just the major ones(?), like Singapore, say, Tokyo, Rome, maybe Paris. That sort of thing.

HOOD: Do -- do you have the feeling that there's that much dissent about reporting in -- in these major embassies? I understand in Vietnam it's entirely different matter.

I have never encountered a situation where a reports officer and Chief of Station are at loggerheads over a piece of intelligence. Some -- a station chief may think that a case officer's individual report is less valuable than the case officer thinks it is.

SNEPP: Hmm. Hmm.

HOOD: That(?) comes up all too frequently. But it's rarely dissent as to whether -- whether -- whether the thing should be sent forward or not.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Well, have you ever encountered a situation where certain kinds of information are not getting back to Washington. Because the station chief objects to the thrust of the information.

HOOD: I personally never have. And I don't think it probably has happened in -- in Western Europe.

SNEPP: Hmm.

HOOD: Or let alone in Eastern Europe.

SNEPP: You mean we have -- we have had very successful intelligence operations all the way down -- down the line.

HOOD: Well, that's something different. Whether you have a -- a disagreement.

SNEPP: All the news is gotten back.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: Oh, (UNCLEAR) -- why not. Because the more you -- you send back, the -- the better the station looks.

SNEPP: Yeah. Yeah.

HOOD: And I don't think you have to toe to a -- to a policy line.

SNEPP: Yeah.

BEAR: Let me -- let me interrupt you to ask a specific question. We seem to have a couple of calls on the line. But I want to be sure that're cleared, because it means having to end up getting in a bit -- a bit weird(?). So let's hold off for a while.



Let me ask you a question now about the CIA and the FBI.

I think that -- because I want to get into the FBI also -- what is the relationship between these two agencies? Because we saw in Watergate certainly (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) but -- but a very difficult and -- and almost desperate(?) division. Of the CIA and the FBI.

What is their relationship, in terms of intelligence activities in the United States?

(COMMENTS OFF MIKE)

HOOD: It's -- in intelligence activities in the United States, the FBI clearly is responsible for all kind of intelligence activity in the United States. And the CIA basically does not operate in the United States. In close liaison.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: But -- but what happens, for example, if -- if somebody that you've been following in, let's say, Eastern Europe, decides to pay a visit to the United States. And someone about whom -- with whom the CIA has(?) some great concern.

HOOD: That's right.

BEAR: Gets into the country. And is making contacts with people. Whose job is it to follow him up? The FBI or the CIA?

HOOD: If -- if this person is a -- a, presume he's a KGB officer or an agent.

BEAR: Let's -- let's assume that's at least a question.

HOOD: That would be the FBI's job.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: It would, Bill.

HOOD: Absolutely.

SNEPP: Let me ask you a question, Bill. You were in counter intelligence. You (UNCLEAR) John McCone. What business was it of the CIA to open 13,000(?) letters that apparently were opened from 1952 I think until the present. Logically,

that should have been done by the FBI. But it wasn't. It was done by people in the agency, and most particularly in the counterintelligence section. Why was it done? I mean, why did you preempt the FBI in this -- this area?

HOOD: I don't know that it was preempting the FBI.

But the reason it was done, the stated reason, is that the Communist intelligence, Eastern European and KGB, were using open mails to contact --

SNEPP: Hmm.

HOOD: Various people.

SNEPP: Why didn't you let the FBI do this?

HOOD: I -- I cannot answer that.

SNEPP: You mean, that's classified, or you can't answer it?

HOOD: I simply don't know.

SNEPP: Was it because the FBI was considered incompetent by the CIA officials involved?

HOOD: I -- I simply do not know.

SNEPP: That's a rumor I had always heard. The FBI really wasn't considered up to the task. Early on.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: Well, at least they didn't do it. And the CIA did do it.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: The FBI (UNCLEAR) -- as I guess we've found in the last few years. That the FBI seems to have used the whole cloak of national security investigations to go after political dissenters.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: And of course that's been (GARBLED) FBI that the Committee for Public Justice has been very concerned about.

BEAR: I want to get further into that, but I'm told that someone had been on and off so many -- are you there?

MAN: Yes, I am.

BEAR: Okay. Go ahead. I'm sorry we've kept you waiting so long. Go ahead.

MAN: Okay. I would like to know from (TELEPHONE STATIC) relation between the CIA, FBI and the GRC(?).

And excuse me, I was going to ask you another question. What is the opinion of the CIA about the problem of the province of Quebec? (INAUDIBLE DUE TO TELEPHONE STATIC).

BEAR: It cost you a lot of money, I'm well aware you're calling all the way from Canada.

Okay, let's see what we can do. Thank you. Go ahead. Can we -- can we answer that question? We were in the midst of talking about the FBI and the CIA. He probably had his radio on.

(INTERRUPTION IN TAPE)

BEAR: And then if you want to make some comment about the Canadian situation, please do.

HOOD: I think you'd have to ask the CIA to comment on the Canadian situation. I've been out for a year and a half, and I haven't heard anything about it.

The relationship to the FBI is cooperative. The FBI is the domestic, it has among its other police responsibilities domestic counterintelligence responsibilities.

The CIA operates abroad.

SNEPP: But isn't it true though all together, isn't it so, that the FBI has a certain prerogative in various countries in Latin America. That was part of the old -- it was operating there initially during World War II. It had a mandate, did it not? In -- in Latin America?

HOOD: (GARBLED) before.

SNEPP: I see.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: Since World War II.

SNEPP: I see.

HOOD: When it -- under Mr. Hoover it carried on throughout World War II. OSS practically was not operational in Latin America at any time.

SNEPP: Well this could(?) carry over even after.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) the agency till 1947, until the CIA was established.

SNEPP: Do think that has caused problems. In other words, has created tension between the CIA and the FBI?

HOOD: I don't think so. A lot of the FBI men who are involved, who were stationed in Latin America, who were specialists in Latin America, came over to the agency.

So, I -- I don't think that was any part of the friction. I think Mr. Hoover was very miffed at losing any part of his empire, and certainly had throughout his career considered Latin America to be a part of it.

SNEPP: But as of the time you left the agency, you don't think that that was a difficulty. There wasn't tension between the two services. Between the FBI and the CIA.

HOOD: Certainly not over Latin America.

SNEPP: Not over Latin America.

BEAR: Well, if we can't answer the question specifically that was phoned to us, and I can see why -- why we should not. I think (UNCLEAR) there's probably some things that you couldn't say.

But let me relate to the general question. That is the issue of --of separatism in Canada. Is that still(?) business of the CIA or the FBI? I'm just talking generally. I'm not talking about any specific incidents or other -- or whatever.

But how could something that's going on in Canada with relation to an internal problem that the government has there be related to the business of the CIA or the FBI?

HOOD: I would think that would be a straight diplomatic problem. It would be -- it would be under analysis by the embassy. It's nothing to be dealt with through espionage.

We don't operate in -- in Canada. And it is -- I would say it's a diplomatic issue.

BEAR: But let say if the Prime Minister of Canada, and I'm -- I'm just making this up. Okay. I want to make that very clear. The Prime Minister of Canada were to say to the President of the United States during the course of a state visit. And it could be any President. I'm not talking about Mr. Carter, either. You know, we could use some help. Because we've got a very delicate situation. Whether it be Canada, or anywhere else.

And we have great respect for your intelligence activities, and you've got a lot of contacts and so forth. (GARBLED) police. And lots of them(?) are under indictment or whatever is going on there. And what -- what -- an order issues from the President of the United States to provide intelligence. I suppose the CIA or the FBI then provides intelligence. Do they not?

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: That's a pretty hypothetical example.

BEAR: I -- I realize it.

HOOD: If -- if that were to come to pass, and it seems to me highly unlikely, I just --

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: Don't know what -- what the President would do.

BEAR: Well what would the CIA do if the President asked for information?

HOOD: Well, that is so far beyond my experience. The South Vietnamese never posed that kind of question to us though.

BEAR: They didn't? Even with the evacuation(?) orders?

HOOD: No, I don't think so. I would(?) think that if

Canada itself had had an intelligence or counterintelligence problem it would turn to the -- the British --

BEAR: Uh, huh.

HOOD: To help them.

BEAR: Okay. That's about the best we can do.

(GARBLED) You're on the air.

(WOMAN'S VOICE INAUDIBLE ON TAPE)

BEAR: I know. There's been a problem. And I do apologize. And we are checking it out with the engineers there.

WOMAN: (TELEPHONE STATIC)... I haven't been out of the United States but once in my life, and that was just on a night or two.

BEAR: Uh, huh.

WOMAN: But, isn't it true that if you -- if you are supposed to be a rich country, and you mistreat some of your subjects, isn't that easy then for your enemies to come in and take them and use them against you? (TELEPHONE STATIC - VOICE INAUDIBLE).

Just like you have subjects. Your -- your people. But you don't treat all of them nice.

BEAR: I think -- I think I understand your question. I guess what you're saying is that if you have people in the country who are disaffected because of the way they've been treated --

WOMAN: Yes.

BEAR: Don't they make -- don't they make more, easier subjects for -- for a foreign government to recruit. If they're unhappy and dissatisfied with --

WOMAN: Yes.

BEAR: The way they've been treated.

WOMAN: That's what I --

(OVERTALK)

WOMAN: It would be much easier to (GARBLED) them, because they say well I'm not getting a bit more.

BEAR: I understand your point. Let's see if we can get some comment. It's -- it's a debatable(?) question. I think that, Bill would comment on it at least from his own experience from the point of view of the Russians.

HOOD: Well I think it's the disaffected Soviet citizens that make the best agent candidates. And that's true of -- of the other Communist countries. The more the people are pushed around, the more they're likely to resist.

BEAR: Uh,huh. And this is true, I think this is the issue that the Soviet agent would -- would, in your experience, Bill. And I don't mean to shut you out, Frank. But -- but would you make the assumption --

HOOD: Well.

BEAR: (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) for a minute. That the KGB would be more likely to go to -- to minorities in this country?

WOMAN: That's right. That's right.

BEAR: I get your question.

HOOD: It's very clearly established. One of the -- the documents we took from the KGB listed some of their criteria for recruitment operations against the United States.

And membership in a minority certainly is -- is one of the -- the first categories they address themselves to.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: That's a very dangerous notion, actually. If you begin by thinking that one of the real strengths of the country, of a democracy, is the ability of the citizens to dissent. And to publicly --

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: Just, let her -- let her finish (GARBLED).

SAMUELS: Then you know it's one of these, the notion that groups that might be dissenting from established policy are (UNCLEAR) subversive.

BEAR: Uh,huh.

SAMUELS: Just by the very fact that they're dissenting. Is a notion that Hoover used --

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: To justify surveillance and subversion of these groups. Where there was no notion -- there was no evidence at all that any kind of criminal activity was taking place by these groups.

HOOD: We know that. But the Russians look at it through their own eyes. And to dissent in the Soviet Union is -- is

SAMUELS: Uh, huh.

HOOD: Practically a capital crime.

SAMUELS: Yes. But -- but what I was going to say was that in the United States that's a notion.

BEAR: Yeah. And I want to thank --

SAMUELS: Of some -- subversion is a dangerous --

BEAR: And I want to thank the caller.

SAMUELS: Notion.

BEAR: We will have to cut(?) for some news.

The phone calls are getting through. Those of you who are on, please do hold on. We'll get back to you. But I think that that -- that call seems to me an important issue.

On the one side, there is apparently the validity of (GARBLED) on the Soviets that you're going to disaffect. But it raises some tremendous problems internally. If the FBI can make the assumption that if you belong to minority groups or dissenting groups, that you've got to watch them and be careful because they're going to be had.

Okay, we're going to pause for about five minutes of the latest news, and then we'll be back to talk with you on WABC, New York.

\*\*\*

BEAR: This is Larry Bear, back again. This is Conference Call. The issue is intelligence, secret agency operations in an open society. We're at 212, 541-8520.



Everything seems to be operating well. 541-8520.

My guests are Frank Snepp. His recent book is called Decent Interval. Published by Random House. And it relates to CIA activities and United States activities in Vietnam.

My second guest is William Hood, who has been with the intelligence services up until his retirement. Beginning with the OSS, and the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. And among other things, was chief of operations in Eastern Europe. And Executive Officer for Counterintelligence during his service with the CIA.

Dorothy Samuels is with us. She is the Executive Director of the Committee for Public Justice. We'll be talking about that in just a moment.

We'll take your calls now. 541-8520. Good morning. And thank you for waiting. Hello.

MAN: Yes. I have a question (TELEPHONE STATIC - VOICE INAUDIBLE) monitor the activities of terrorist groups. And also, if they do, how would they go about infiltrating them?

BEAR: Does the CIA in fact deal with and monitor the activities of terrorist groups.

HOOD: It surely tries to deal with and monitor the activities of foreign terrorist groups. Because(?) we do that by penetration, by recruiting a member.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: That's certainly the best way.

MAN: (TELEPHONE STATIC) looking for defectors from the(?) group.

HOOD: I beg your pardon?

MAN: In other words, to look for a defector from that group?

HOOD: Well, they might try to infiltrate the group with a -- a agent who's been selected. And then work into it one way or another.

MAN: I see.

BEAR: Could I -- if you (GARBLED). Does -- does the CIA, or would they in a case like that, relate to the intelligence networks of other nations with similar concerns(?). I think of West Germany.

HOOD: Well, there's considerable liaison on -- with all the -- the NATO countries that we're in, and all of our intelligence liaison usually follows diplomatic liaison.

If we're close diplomatically with a country, the intelligence follows along.

BEAR: Okay. Thank you for the question. 541-8520. You're on the air.

WOMAN: Hi.

BEAR: Hello there.

WOMAN: Okay. I was encouraged by a book that is written by Donald Benyon. And it's called, The Control of Candy Jones.

BEAR: Uh, huh.

WOMAN: This will be made into a movie. Mr. Bear, I'd like to know from your guests -- of course the CIA was the villain. I'd like to know from your guests would this type of dirty tricks be carried on.

Now may I hang up and listen to what you have to say?

BEAR: Don't hang up yet, because I'm not sure anybody else has read that book. What did you say it was?

WOMAN: The Control of Candy Jones.

BEAR: And -- and it had to do with what. With mind manipulation? You mean, they manipulated this lady's mind, is that it?

WOMAN: I'm -- I'm not hearing you too well.

BEAR: Yeah. We do have a problem with the phones. And I'm terribly sorry about that. I -- I, what I'm asking you is, since we didn't read it, we can't answer the question unless we know something. Did the -- did the Central Intelligence --

WOMAN: It was -- the book contained how Candy Jones who was a -- a model, one of America's -- America's foremost models --

(OVERTALK)

WOMAN: Was controlled by the CIA.

BEAR: Okay.

WOMAN: And it's going to be made into a movie.

BEAR: Well, Candy Jones is relating to the real person.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: You're relating to the real person. The model.

WOMAN: That's right. The real person. Who is Candy Jones.

BEAR: Okay.

WOMAN: She's on WMCA. I'd like to know if the dirty tricks that were used on her will continue in the CIA. Now may I hang up and listen to what you have to say?

BEAR: Okay. Go ahead. (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) There is a book called The Control of Candy Jones by Donald Baynes. And what it has to do with is mind control, brainwashing and so forth. Hypnosis. And --

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: And so I guess the question really is since we can't relate to Candy Jones, and no one's read the book. And I guess the real question is does the intelligence services really deal at all with mind control experiments, mind control, brainwashing and so forth?

SNEPP: Well, we know a little about that, don't we? That has just come to light. The (UNCLEAR) program, which traces back to 1953. Involved I think \$25 million, and countless subjects. Well, that was -- that was focused on mind control.

And the agency did apparently use drugs to -- without the knowledge of various subjects -- to try to gain some -- some handle on the subjects.

And one particular subject I recall after being fed LSD or something jumped out of a window. Back in 1954. So the agency was into that a little bit.

But as I had been told, I was -- when I went out to

Vietnam, I discussed the possibility of using drugs in an interrogation of a particular subject, and I was told by a colleague who was in the counterintelligence section that it just doesn't work. That drugs never have been very successful in controlling an interrogation.

Now you may have -- you may dissent from that, Bill. But in any event, I was told when you have a subject in solitary confinement, for instance, really drugs are not going to help you out. You've got to establish a rapport to get strategic intelligence from a man.

HOOD: (UNCLEAR) -- two or three separate aspects to that. If you're going after one piece of information -- if -- if someone does or does not speak Russian. So he belts down half a bottle of Vodka, which is probably as good a mind control drug as anything that anyone else has come up with.

The chances are he might be controlled into saying a word or two in Russian. But if you were to ask that man the -- how many carburetors are being made in a factory in -- in (GARBLED) somewhere, he's not likely to be quite so responsive.

My basic impression is interrogation drugs simply do not work.

BEAR: Larry Bear here. Go ahead.

MAN: Hi. How are you?

BEAR: Fine.

MAN: Not specifically related to the CIA and the FBI but, during the Vietnamese War, when McNamara was Secretary of Defense, he would say that he -- he thought we were winning the war. And that oh(?) in six months or eight months (TELEPHONE STATIC) and so forth, and I used to say to myself, now, hell, how does he know that. (GARBLED) the Vietnamese?

No. Cause our boys weren't doing that well. What -- was he a victim of bad intelligence? Supposedly a brilliant man. Should have known what was going on. And obviously we weren't winning anything.

What happened there? With McNamara, you know. What happened there?

BEAR: Frank. Would you like to --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: (GARBLED) a counterintelligence question, doesn't it? I think the man was suffering from what many of us suffered from in Vietnam, and that was a good case of wishful thinking.

And he seemed to along quite far away with his wishful thinking. So did many officials, including, I think, President Johnson. And I think that answers the question. I don't think we can really put words into McNamara's head. And an intelligence officer shouldn't. After all, McNamara was an American official. And the CIA is not involved in -- in trying to interpret the thoughts (UNCLEAR)

BEAR: Well, one of the things I think you could say -- can say, Frank, it's in the(?) book as a matter of fact. That the real, if I didn't misread it, the real problem in terms of Vietnam at least in the time you were there, was not that there wasn't sufficient intelligence --

SNEPP: Uh, huh.

BEAR: But -- because there seemed to be. But what happened to that intelligence?

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: Between the time that it comes in, and the time that somebody makes a decision in Washington that we're winning, we're losing. We put up another \$100 million, or whatever. Or we don't.

So I would say at least from the book that the problem is not with the intelligence, that is data coming in and being gathered well.

SNEPP: Hmm.

BEAR: But what happens to it.

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR: And -- and I don't know whether it was Bill who made the comment or whether it was one of the books that I read.

But that there comes a point along the line where the CIA I think doesn't make maybe that final policy decision. There're a whole lot of other things involved. With intelligence. Including political --

SNEPP: Uh, huh.

BEAR: Policy decisions that get made at the top. Including, I suppose, a decision of, to hell with that data. This is what we have to do politically, and we're going to do it anyway, and whatever.

I don't know if you want to comment on that, Bill.

HOOD: The CIA doesn't make any policy decisions except about CIA activities.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: It's not the CIA that determines that another 15,000 men should or shouldn't go into Vietnam. Is that right?

HOOD: That's right.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: But you may be asked to comment on whether or not the 15 or 20,000 men might have changed their ultimate victory.

HOOD: Right.

SNEPP: Whether or not that will be effective in its objective. And the agency did comment on that. And for the most part said, no, it wouldn't work. So there you are.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: Thanks for the call. We're a 212 area code. 541-8520.

The subject is intelligence. Secret agency operations in an open society. You're on the air.

MAN: Yes.

BEAR: Come in.

MAN: It concerns two things. First off, the missing in Asia. What is the latest opinions of the agency just prior to the total withdrawal. As to the possibility of -- of American survivors, you know.

BEAR: Uh, huh.

MAN: POWs in particular.

BEAR: You write about that in the book.

SNEPP: Right. We -- as a matter of fact, we -- we concluded that -- that the missing in action had to all intents and purposes been accounted for.

That there were no Americans alive in Communist hands. And that was based on our sources. And there may have been some American defectors, or fellows who decided to stay in the jungles with a particular unit, might have been captive at one time. But there was no good intelligence on that.

BEAR: No, you're saying there was no good intelligence.

SNEPP: There was no good intelligence indicating that there were Americans living with the Communists.

BEAR: Uh,huh.

SNEPP: Only rumors here and there. So I think that issue really has been dispensed with. At least as far as the intelligence community-community was concerned.

BEAR: Uh,huh. Thank you for the call.

You're on the air.

WOMAN: Hello, Mr. Snapp. Hello.

SNEPP: Yes.

WOMAN: Mr. Snapp?

SNEPP: Yes.

WOMAN: When you were writing this book, the CIA was aware of it. And you had agreed to let it review the book before publication. You then changed your mind, and you gave I think as your reason that the agency tried to whitewash its role --

SNEPP: Uh,huh.

WOMAN: In the withdrawal. Now, listening to you, it seems to me it just doesn't seem like a logical reason, because you felt that way before you started writing this book.

Why didn't you keep your agreement, and submit the book for them to look at to approve?

SNEPP: That's an excellent question. And we were discussing a little while ago. First of all, when every -- when any American joins the CIA he signs a secrecy agreement. The secrecy agreement obligates the officer not to say or write anything about the agency without clearing it with the agency beforehand.

And secondly it provides for certain redress of grievances through the Inspector General's office in the CIA.

Well, after the collapse of Saigon, I went to the Inspector General, and I offered to provide information on the evacuation, and how it had been mishandled. And the Inspector General in the CIA said he really wasn't very interested. So I thought I met that obligation.

I did not submit the book for review because as I was saying before I felt that the agency had forfeited the right to apply secrecy strictures to me. When high ranking CIA officials like Colby were leaking their own version of what had taken place in Vietnam. In the final days. And they were in fact leaking classified information, to support their version.

So, I figured that this again was (GARBLED) of the secrecy system. And the bets were off.

WOMAN: May I ask one other question?

SNEPP: Yes ma'am.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR(?): Yes, sure.

WOMAN: This -- I'd like to ask his opinion. Is there a likelihood that the -- the unexpected decision there of our government not to furnish any more money then(?) to prosecute this war against the Communists.

That the military there in -- in Vietnam, (TELEPHONE STATIC) the morale of the military and the sudden and unexpected withdrawal. Couldn't that have been one reason, you know -- as you recall people from Congress went there too.

SNEPP: Hmmm.

WOMAN: And I recall reading that they told the military they should not expect any more help from the U.S.



So in view of that, wasn't this totally unexpected. And how could you say the CIA was the one to sort of put the finger on. Wasn't this an unusual situation what(?) our Congress did?

SNEPP: Uh, as a matter of fact I -- you have several questions there. I do not hold a view that Congress was responsible for the collapse of Vietnam. And that was a view promulgated by the Administration right after Saigon's -- Saigon's fall. And the view was that if aid had been provided to the South Vietnamese in large quantities, we might have averted the worst.

I don't believe that. I think that it might have been very useful to give a little aid to the South Vietnamese, simply as a morale booster. But large amounts of aid were immaterial.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: The South Vietnamese had a great deal of material at their disposal. The problem was corruption. And the material was not reaching the guys on the ground. The -- the fellows who needed to use it.

BEAR: As a matter of fact, Frank, in your book you give some figures for the amount of material that was left behind. In the --

SNEPP: That's right. That was the two million -- the two billion dollars.

BEAR: Oh, the two billion dollars.

(OVERTALK)

WOMAN: Yes, well that was all part of the payoff that resulted --

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR: Yeah, but the point was that they had two billion --

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: Dollars worth of equipment. That's a lot of equipment.

WOMAN: Well, do you think the fact that our government (TELEPHONE STATIC - VOICE INAUDIBLE) completely 100 per cent. At that time they said nothing would go forward further. Didn't

that have something to do with the way the military felt, and the way they pulled back, and just surrendered? You don't feel that had anything to do with it?

SNEPP: Well, of course it had something to do with it. And as I write in the book, I think Henry Kissinger's policy, and this is going beyond an intelligence judgment in any case. Henry Kissinger's policy should have been to seek a very small amount of aid for the South Vietnamese for morale building purposes.

Instead, for reasons of his own, he went the other way. He sought a very large amount of aid, which Congress would never legislate.

WOMAN: Well, didn't --

SNEPP: Consequently we were unable to restore the South Vietnamese morale(?).

SAMUELS: (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) pass the buck on the -- on the responsibility for the fall of Vietnam.

(OVERTALK)

WOMAN: And may I say this. Didn't Mr. Kissinger and President Ford, weren't they very anxious for that little bit of aid, and the Congress just -- just gave a flat no.

SNEPP: No, ma'am. They -- they refused to go after a small amount of aid, and shot for \$700 million as a final (UNCLEAR). And Congress just wouldn't buy that.

Because the aid wasn't needed for logistical reasons. It was needed for morale building reasons. And you could have bought morale for the South Vietnamese for about \$300 million. And nobody in Washington seemed to realize that. They were shooting for the larger amount.

BEAR: Thank you for the call. This is Conference Call. You're on the air. Hello.

MAN: Yeah, I'm holding.

BEAR: No, you're on.

MAN: Oh. Okay.

BEAR: Go ahead.

MAN: I've got a question concerning a -- the evacuation.

Because it was -- there was no prior planning on the part of anybody over there, what in your estimation is the number of agents that eventually made it to our shores?

SNEPP: The number of agents who made it to our shores?

MAN: Right.

SNEPP: Well, what we -- we talked about that a little while ago. There were 1900 Vietnamese on the CIA's payroll. Only about 537 finally got to the United States.

There were 2,000 to 3,000 more Vietnamese who were evacuated as a result of some CIA effort. There were some agents among those.

MAN: Right. I'm -- I'm not speaking of (TELEPHONE STATIC) agents.

SNEPP: Oh, you mean, I see.

MAN: Right.

SNEPP: I see.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: That's a question which probably we're still tryin to sort out. Or the agency's still trying to sort out.

I don't think the Communists in fact had infiltrated the evacuee ranks at -- at the time of Saigon's collapse.

(OVERTALK)

MAN: (TELEPHONE STATIC) -- if they didn't, they missed a very good opportunity.

SNEPP: Well, I think they suffered from the chaos too. They didn't expect to win so quickly, and weren't prepared for it.

BEAR: Okay, thank you for the call.

Let me -- we'll take some more calls a little later on. But one of the things we haven't (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE).

Do you want to make a comment, Bill? Please do.

HOOD: One thing about evacuating agents. I -- it's one thing to take them out, but an agent on our side of the lines is not really much good. The (GARBLED) would be to leave your agents behind where they'll still be able to work.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: Some of the people I'd like to think are -- are still in business.

SNEPP: Well that was one of the saddest parts, I thought, of the CIA's planning, and yet a lack of planning. You see, a decision was made very close to the final days of the war not to establish a stay behind spy network in Vietnam. Because it was felt that Congress would never support the funding for such an operation. So it wasn't done.

In Eastern Europe, of course, there was such stay behind operation. Spies were -- were put into the woodwork as it were so they could report on the new Communist governments. That was not the case in Vietnam.

HOOD: I have to say in my experience it must be the only time that that's not been done.

SNEPP: Well, a very explicit decision was made.

HOOD: On the grounds that Congress wouldn't fund it, and it would be a nickel and dime operation.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: It wouldn't cost very much.

SNEPP: But it would have involved setting up expatriate operations on, say, Thailand. And because of the political sensitivities in Thailand, that was determined to be really beyond the pale.

And there was all sorts of technical problems. But the primary problem, the problem given -- or I should say, the primary reason this wasn't done was that it was felt again Congress wouldn't get behind it.

BEAR: Dorothy, I'd like to get into an issue that I think is perhaps more germane to the Committee for Public Justice.

SAMUELS: Hmm.

BEAR: Which -- which you direct. As Executive Director. And it has to do with the FBI. We've been talking about foreign espionage and sabotage and so forth. And then of course there's the whole question of revolutionary or radical activities on the other hand inside the United States.

And sometimes, it would appear that the FBI doesn't make as -- as the important distinction. And -- and one of the great concerns we've had with the business of civil liberties relates to the operations of the FBI, in this area. And you might, at least, set out(?) the issues for us.

SAMUELS: Yes. Well I -- I think the issues here, I think, are pretty clear. (UNCLEAR) Whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation is going to be a Federal Bureau of criminal investigation. That is, to -- to investigate and detect crime.

Or whether it's going to be criminal and political activity that it's going to investigate. And (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) is that the FBI had a counterintelligence program. We talked here tonight about when for instance a foreign agent comes to the United States, the FBI is to be informed. And then the investigation of that agent. And any crimes that that agent might be committing in the United States. Comes -- comes under the aegis of the FBI.

What we learned was that the FBI had a counterintelligence program, CONTELPRO, which went after United States citizens exercising First Amendment rights. And because we have this sensitive title of national security investigation of subversive acts, there was always a -- a cloud of secrecy that we(?) could always say, we cannot tell you the details of what we are doing. Hoover would say. Because to do so would violate national security.

And this national security catchall had allowed the Bureau to go on. And probably if it weren't for what -- what happened in Watergate, with a lot of things sort of coming out in the wash, we wouldn't have really probably (UNCLEAR)

Subversive groups. For example, The League of Women Voters. Certain Democratic (GARBLED), Democratic Party politicians. People who were -- I, one of the jokes my friends always used to have when we would go to Vietnam protests, which were nothing more than sort of (VOICE GARBLED) with a purpose.

I remember looking up at the big moratorium demonstration in Washington, I think it was in 1970, I think, or maybe it was in 69. And we looked up on the buildings. And there were all sorts of photographers. And my friend say, well, can you imagine J. Edgar Hoover at a party?

You know, some people take our pictures in the day. He would --he would take our pictures (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE -- VOICE GARBLED).

And we used to talk about it. And then of course you find out that it's true. It's disturbing. And you find out that the FBI is paying people to infiltrate the supposedly subversive groups.

And -- and some of it is really quite comic(?) to us now about activities (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE -- VOICE GARBLED) participating in a meeting and then writing up reports.

The League of Women Voters met today. They voted today that they would hold a meeting of candidates. Some of these candidates are XYZ who had been pinpointed by the FBI as being against the war. Being against the Vietnam War was thought to be a very subversive idea.

Once you determine that exercising First Amendment rights is -- is somewhat of a subversive notion as Hoover did, at least on -- on the Left, what he did was -- was never subversive.

(INTERFERENCE ON TAPE -- VOICE GARBLED) with his kind of propoganda, was -- was never (UNCLEAR) of investigation.

Once you decide that, then you justify -- you can decide to justify the First Amendment rights as subversive.

Now there's that, well that sometime in the future if this organization dissents from war policy, then some time in the future you might become violent. And so --

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: That was, even though there's no evidence that -- that these people were going to be conducting, in many cases. Now, there're also some instances where because Hoover himself didn't(?) know that certain groups were in fact exercising their right perfect -- in a perfectly peaceful manner.

But he was opposed to the political -- political point of view that they were expressing. There're some instances where we find that Hoover's agents were in fact provoking --

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: Certain kinds of activity.

And that they would be, say, the people on the campus. The campus informers and provocateurs, who would be (GARBLED) to say, let's take over the building.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: Now granted, a lot of other people said those kind of things back in that period. But (UNCLEAR) used to find out that some of those people were agents of the FBI.

There were programs to try and discredit people who were writing articles, major columnists writing in national magazines. Newspapers, and people who are syndicated across the country. To try and spy on them, gain evidence about their private lives, and then disseminate that kind of information.

So anyway, this is all by way of background. I think in a lot of ways this is strange(?) for you, and I guess a lot of people, for a lot of people listening tonight.

And with Hoover, I think, one of the things that happened is that this became paramount with his mores and I think in the process a lot of legitimate law enforcement activities went by the wayside.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: During this period of time. And now the question is, what do we do to bring this under control. Sure, Hoover's gone. But supposedly all governments are laws and not men. Right now, there is no comprehensive statute that governs what the FBI can and cannot do. A comprehensive law to control the activities of the FBI. To define -- to just define(?) what its legitimate purposes should be.

The current question, I think, that's now before us and -- and that my organization (GARBLED). What we want to do is to put an end to what we call the -- the national security loophole, domestic security loophole. That is to say,

that there (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) laws in the United States. Espionage laws, laws against certain kinds of violent activity. That should be able to cover the kind of things that the FBI should be looking into. Investigating.

The kinds of things that might use -- use a court order. Legitimatize for instance a -- a tap. If you believe, and I don't, that -- that wiretaps are a particularly useful tool for gathering information about criminal activity.

Unfortunately what -- what the situation we have is that a lot of people who (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE -- VOICE GARBLED) in getting it under -- back under -- back under -- under the rule of law. And -- and you are effectively performing a legitimate law enforcement function. You see the language of reform and yet because domestic security, national security, really has become sort of such a magic term, (UNCLEAR) -- President Ford's bill, on wiretaps. That he submitted before he left office. And he submitted it with the rhetoric of -- we have to find a way in our society that we could both investigate very serious matters that should be investigated. And that are also, would gibe with our notions of civil liberties.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: And Watergate should never happen again. On the other hand, right now we have a situation at least (GARBLED). There are gray areas. We can at least say there are certain (UNCLEAR) when the FBI goes out. And spies on legitimate organizations. Exercising First Amendment rights.

What we would want to do is keep a -- this national security loophole, and put it in the law. And, unfortunately, President Carter has introduced wiretap legislation that -- that would do the same thing, that is, put it right into the legislation, the possibility for the abuse again, with the broad catchall. Whereas in our view all legitimate kinds of law enforcement activities could take place under some sort of criminal standard, whether in wiretapping, or it could(?), again, if you agree that wiretaps should be permitted.

Or in the charter that Bell and Carter will be submitting to Congress shortly. We think that there's a good chance of -- of that. And again, (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) where Carter will announce that when we see that a Watergate can't happen again, we're going to see that the government can no -- can -- can no longer illegitimately spy on its own people for their political beliefs.



(GARBLED) we will see, you know, in writing a charter which will allow the FBI to investigate a national security matter.

BEAR: Speaking in a general way.

SAMUELS: In a general way.

BEAR: Let me -- let me just talk for a moment so I can give station identification. This is WABC New York.

I would ask you this question. Whether you feel that there is in fact a legitimate way and a way that, and I'm not going to ask you to spell out a statute, but a legitimate way for the FBI to pursue its activities, or to pursue essential activities like being sure, as a matter of fact, that you know we don't have KGB agents running around loose. You know.

And at the same time, in fact protect dissidents who are not KGB agents or anything else. From the wiretapping and(?) mail opening and all of them, the whole horror list that's, you know. The bank(?) jobs we've been reading about, and for which Kenny's(?) under indictment already. That kind of thing.

Is that possible, or are you really saying that the statute or the charter would have to be so restricted in order to protect civil rights and in fact maybe the FBI or any domestic agency would have -- they would all have to be out of the business of -- of espionage, and counterintelligence.

SAMUELS: Yes, well, first I would take it out of the FBI. To begin with. You know, I don't --

BEAR: Would you have the CIA acting too?

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: No. No. I don't think that would be (GARBLED) a problem.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: Absolutely nobody in the agency.

SAMUELS: No. And I think for you know protection of rights I wouldn't particularly want that. But right now, just the way the agency is structured, the personnel, the history, you know, this--

HOOD: Which agency?

SAMUELS: The FBI, you know. It's -- it's proof it's never had, I think the (GARBLED) always had a sort of a reputation, whatever, for recruiting very high level kinds of personnel. And, the FBI never, you know, you might say it's been sort of a (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) -- very little ability, either at law enforcement or at, well it's been very, very inept, you know.

And as far as I -- I think there is a danger just with their mentality. Keeping every time they just, you know, just with their mentality -- (OVERTALK)

HOOD: --what you think of the FBI. I think many people agree with you. But --

BEAR: Well, that's an issue. I think some may or may not. But what is not an issue, I assume, is that we somehow have to deal internally within the borders of the United States -- we somehow have to deal internally with -- with the real threats.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: And also we have to, I don't want to sound (UNCLEAR) but, you know, we also have to deal with the fact that civil liberties have been infringed with impunity. Very often.

SAMUELS: Hmm. And what does that mean?

BEAR: And -- and what do you do?

SAMUELS: Well, that's -- that's tough, but I don't think it means that we spy on every (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE).

BEAR: No, neither do I. Neither do I.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: We do have to practice counterespionage. If you take a -- a rule of thumb.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: Rule of -- rule of thumb.

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: Thirty per cent of the staff of any Soviet installation abroad is involved in intelligence work. Secret intelligence.

SAMUELS: Uh, huh.

HOOD: If there're 100 people in the Embassy in -- in Washington, and it's larger than that, 30 of them are KGB and the GRU personnel. Now who deals with their activities -- their illegal activities. In this country.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Set up a domestic counterespionage organization?

BEAR: We need the FBI to do criminal investigation of the FBI.

SAMUELS: (UNCLEAR) the FBI someplace else. I think what you have to do is really determine what are the FBI -- you know, what is it to endorse espionage war?

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: And whether, you know, that there is a difference between what sort of, the notion of subversion. Subversion's a very bad word. There're no laws against subversion. There are laws against espionage. And there are laws against violence. And there are --

Subversion is anything that would seem to be contrary --

SNEPP: Aren't we really talking about simply imposing better control.

SAMUELS: Yes.

SNEPP: In counterespionage.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: And counterintelligence activities. And I think, I'm optimistic. I think the legislative charters that are under debate in the Congressional committees may be heading in the right direction.

And when they're finally passed, we're going to see

a situation where for one thing no intelligence or counterintelligence activity can be undertaken by the CIA or the FBI without strict guidelines from the White House, and the interagency committees who've been set up by -- was going to be set up under (GARBLED) Turner's direction.

And secondly if someone in the FBI or CIA undertakes an activity that exceeds these guidelines, that person will immediately be liable for criminal prosecution. I think that will be a deterrent --

SAMUELS: Uh, huh.

SNEPP: Against the -- the would be Hoovers, the people who go much too far.

SAMUELS: There's one problem with that, though There're actually several problems. But one major one is that Bell, the Attorney General Bell, supports legislation that would on the one hand -- that would immunize how the government -- it -- it will indemnify government employees from lawsuits and so forth.

SNEPP: Well he's also discussing though a provision which would involve setting up anytime you determine whether an American official, or counterintelligence official, or CIA official, got into an illegal activity, you would immediately set up a special prosecutor who would look into the case.

And there would be an automatic mechanism for this sort of thing. (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE) I think that kind of threat, that danger, the danger that the mechanism might be brought into play, would serve as a very big deterrent against again the would be Hoover.

SAMUELS: Uh, huh. But I'd still do worry(?) -- do you, about what you call the national security loophole.

SNEPP: Hmm.

SAMUELS: Rather than just a criminal standards investigation. That the FBI should investigate criminal activities. And I'd, you know, I'd like to know what you think about that. Whether the FBI's mandate should be a broader mandate, and it should have --

SNEPP: (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE) I would hate to see something -- a special mechanism set up to carry out counterintelligence functions in the United States..

BEAR: Like domestic counterintelligence --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Exactly.

HOOD: I don't see how you could do it.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: I -- I wasn't meaning to propose that. What I would say -- would say, as long as we have sort of the same personnel --

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: At the FBI. I think to a large degree I have questions about whether the mentality --

SNEPP: But don't you think --

SAMUELS: The things that(?) get looked at --

SNEPP: Right.

SAMUELS: Counterintelligence in this country is going after --

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: Are reasonable.

SNEPP: Well don't you think the controls are -- are being better established, that is to say, under the new legislative charter. There will be better control.

BEAR: I -- I don't really know what legislative charters you're actually talking about, Frank.

SNEPP: Well, the House and the Senate Committees on Intelligence have been working for the past year on new charters for the FBI, the CIA. And they're going to be under very heavy debate as of the 19th of January, when Congress finally gets down to business again.

And one of the provisions in these new charters is that again anyone who exceeds guidelines from the top will

be liable to criminal prosecution. This is one of the issues under debate. And the provisions under debate.

And it would be very nice if the American public would get behind that provision, so that it's passed. That it's included in the charter.

BEAR: Well, I -- excuse me. Do you want to make a comment, Bill?

HOOD: (GARBLED) It seems to me at the ground level, one regulation, one concept, is that no government agency is authorized to break the law of the United States.

SNEPP: Yeah. Well, that's always so.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: It's sort of a foregone conclusion.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: So you've got -- you've now got --

(INTERRUPTION IN TAPE)

SAMUELS: (GARBLED) everything is classified --

HOOD: Right.

SAMUELS: And we(?) have access to these things.

BEAR: And the classification can still be used. I mean the whole -- I don't know how many people are familiar with the fact that there is a -- a former CIA agent under indictment now.

SAMUELS: John Kerns(?).

BEAR: Yeah. John -- for things that took place -- events that took place here in New York. Going after, I guess, activists, anti-war activist people.

SAMUELS: Uh, huh.

BEAR: And (GARBLED) jobs, you know. Breaking into houses and so forth and so on. But there's a concern there that maybe

they won't be able to really prosecute him in a full trial because he'll say that I could bring out all the evidence if necessary that involves the national security. And therefore you can't deal with national security openly (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE\_. All that kind of business.

And it seems to me that if we can back up a little, there are really two -- there are two central issues. That I don't think that we're -- that we're really facing through(?) now. I mean, we should solve what we are facing.

One is I think (UNCLEAR) kind of a -- a cultural issue. Social issue. And the other one is legal.

The social issue is this. It seems to me as a result of what's been happening since 1933, 32, 33, 34, there are a lot of people in this country who -- who are looking at the CIA and the FBI now. A lot of people.

SAMUELS: Uh, huh.

BEAR: As really the villains in our democracy. You know. Responsible for everything. Wherever you look. Whether it's somebody who died overseas in the country, or a labor leader, or a political leader--

Whether (STATIC) there's really a conspiracy here. It's a -- it's a CIA conspiracy. Or an FBI conspiracy. Everything, in terms of people's sets of values. Lots of people think(?) there's a conspiracy.

And it's staggering to me. And if you take lawyers, and everybody -- nobody wants to. But if you take lawyers, no matter how critical they are of the system, it is really hard to find a lawyer who looks at the American system of justice as a vast conspiracy to overpower groups in the country.

You know, I mean, that's - lawyers will say well, I don't like this and this. But even, you know, Kuntsler wouldn't go that far.

If you take a look at economists, and you say I want to talk to you about this enormous power that's being amassed by the banks. And enormous sums of money that banks have in investments, and they control the oil companies. And is it(?) a conspiracy, they would say no. I mean, that's not a conspiracy. You may have to watch the abuses of power and so forth. But that's absurd, to say that banks are engaged in a conspiracy.

But it's clear that the CIA is engaged in a national conspiracy, an international conspiracy against everybody.

Look, I'm bringing it out, only to indicate that before you get any legislation, you know, one would hope on the part of the people who -- who are responsible for passing it, and(?) for the people responsible for electing them, that we take a look at this whole issue of intelligence, the CIA and FBI. In a way that's related to some kind of reality.

I think there're a lot of blots on the CIA banner.

I think this drug testing was frightful. It's clearly illegal. And the opening of the mail is clearly illegal.

Some of the lunacy that was involved in covert operations. I mean, what was it, putting a -- a explosive cigar in -- in (GARBLED).

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Well. (UNCLEAR) -- that was not illegal.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: It was a ridiculous operation, but that wasn't particularly illegal.

BEAR: Well, let's put it this way. I think, and Roditzky(?) in his book, and he's certainly (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE). And you(?) say that probably the most immoral act that any nation can engage is the -- the assassination of -- of a political leader of another nation.

And I don't think that, you can argue with me, Bill, if you want to -- but I don't think --

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: I certainly won't. I certainly won't. I agree entirely.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: It's the most immoral kind of act. So that, illegal or not. And -- and (UNCLEAR) say that certainly there have been excesses. I think there's no question about it.



What doesn't get talked about, however, is, you know, the day to day work that thousands and thousands of people do all the time that are absolutely crucial you know to -- to our existence as a nation, it seems to me.

And -- and I think the first thing we have to do is to -- is to overcome an imbalance in the public thought that somehow what we're really dealing with is a wild beast.

And therefore all the legislation proceeds from the basis that we are wild beasts here.

SNEPP: Well, that was Churchill's --

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: (GARBLED) monstrous, okay -- even in terms of the FBI, and Lord knows I -- I --

(INTERRUPTION IN TAPE)

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: The CIA folks may figure (UNCLEAR) that way.

The second issue --

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: The second issue --

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: The second issue which seems to be important too is, it isn't just the CIA and the FBI. You're talking about a proliferation, for example, of agencies. Hell, the National Security Agency has a budget in excess of a billion dollars. And the CIA, say, \$700 million. And the National Security Agency is \$1.2 billion, or \$3 billion. The last figures I saw were '76. And I think that's the Department of Defense intelligence operation. I mean, let's assume they're all beautiful. They aren't. Even if they were. How do you deal with the fact that there's a proliferation of intelligence agencies with an enormous amount of money, and while accountability is crucial, I mean, I would like some accountability for my bread. I mean, why do --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: And you're going to get it.

BEAR: How?

SNEPP: Because under the new legislative charters --

BEAR: How?

SNEPP: The budgets are going to be made public. For the first time.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: (GARBLED) about -- about how the CIA budget is -- is, up until now has worked, and what --

BEAR: And the FBI's budget --

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: And what the Congress and Senate have known about the CIA activities that they're appropriating money for. What they have, and haven't, known.

SNEPP: Well, after all, the oversight committees are only a very recent beast(?). They trace back to the Rockefeller Commission, and then the Church Committee.

Now we've got a Senate oversight committee and a House oversight committee. So they're just getting into business.

And one of their problems is that they are at the mercy of the intelligence organizations in this sense. They can't make any judgments on the organizations, be it budgetary or whathaveyou. Unless the organizations in a way volunteer information to them. So they -- they're in trouble that way.

BEAR: But don't you agree --

SNEPP: Secondly, they can only make recommendations as to the way the agencies ought to go. They don't have any dictatorial powers over the CIA or the FBI, or anything else.

SAMUELS: Hmm.

SNEPP: And that's just as a sort of broad background. Where they stand.

SAMUELS: What -- what I was really referring to is what part of the budget (UNCLEAR).

SNEPP: Now -- they now have absolute budgetary review, and in the future, the budgets will be made -- I don't know whether it would be broken down, but the overall budget will be made -- made public.

SAMUELS: Yes. But that really was an extraordinary thing(?). It was--

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: I thought one of the --

SNEPP: There was terrific debate over that, by the way.

SAMUELS: Uh,huh.

SNEPP: But I think it's finally --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Been resolved in favor of making the budget public(?)

SAMUELS: The great feeling that it was a national security secret --

SNEPP: That's right.

SAMUELS: What the United States was spending on --

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR: And how.

SNEPP: That's right.

SAMUELS: And how.

BEAR: Well, over the badly kept national security, by the way.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: So one issue, the issue of money, of course, is -- is paramount. But -- but do you all agree that the issue is also one, I'm not making a -- a normative judgment, i.e., the CIA is rotten or marvelous on the national security, but that in fact regardless of how they're being operated, there's overlap of personnel --

SAMUELS: This is a reorganization problem (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE --VOICE GARBLED).

BEAR: But can you do anything without a real reorganization. And I don't mean putting in -- you know, what you do when you reorganize, you see, is to -- is to shift personnel. So this guy becomes --

(OVERTALK)

(INTERRUPTION IN TAPE)

SNEPP: There is an overlap problem though. Under the most recent Executive Order, Turner was given authority to determine the budget for the first time. Turner as -- in his capacity as head of Central Intelligence. The budgets of the Pentagon agencies, which are the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, and the BIA(?). Which together eat up about 80 per cent of the intelligence budget of the United States.

Previously he only had budgetary review for the CIA itself. Now everybody gets reviewed by Turner. But he did not get the power to hire and fire people in the Pentagon agencies.

So in a way the budgetary review authority he's gained doesn't amount to very much.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Because (GARBLED) can continue to keep on board in his agencies anybody he wants to.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: So you're going to have continuing overlap.

HOOD: But I think you -- you, the DCI --

SNEPP: That's Differential Central Intelligence --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: For those of you out there who may not know.

HOOD: Finds the Pentagon is spending much too much money

in DIA, it would report that to the Secretary of Defense, and presumably to the President.

Now the Secretary of Defense can say (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE), I'm not going to change.

SNEPP: No -- no -- no. As a matter of fact Turner now, based under the Executive Order, can say this is what you must spend, and what you cannot spend. He has veto power over the budget for the Pentagon agencies.

Now Brown can appeal to the interagency committee -- this is all new structure -- the interagency committee that has been set up with Turner at its head. He can appeal Turner's decisions. So the veto is not absolute.

But the important thing again, getting away from all these technicalities, is that Turner really doesn't have a handle on the Pentagon agencies. And all of what's taken place, all the reforms we've seen in the past summer, in a way, is window dressing.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Because the real -- the real (GARBLED) of the NRO and the NBRA and the --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: No. It would presume (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE -- VOICE GARBLED)

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: But the President can enforce it if he wants to.

SNEPP: Enforce --

HOOD: Enforce the -- the director(?) of central intelligence.

SNEPP: Of course. Of course. Of course.

BEAR: But this is (UNCLEAR) of the organization in a sense. I mean, isn't it(?) better for Congress to say we don't give a damn in fact, you know, if the President says this shouldn't be enforced. Or should. We say that we ought to be (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) with substantive issues.

Like for example the Harry Roditsky book. Certainly his book, certainly is not an anti CIA book in any way. I think he's justly critical, and so forth.

You know, the CIA, in his opinion, might be a lot better off, and so would the country if it were reduced about fifty to sixty per cent. And it would really be, you know, a much smaller, more cohesive unit, with a lot less responsibility.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: I don't think he said fifty or sixty per cent.

BEAR: Well, whatever. But I'm not even saying it's right. I'm saying that is to me a legitimate issue to be debated when one says --

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: When one says let's really -- really look at this whole intelligence apparatus.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: What functions are and should be legitimately performed? It's really the -- the basic issue.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: And how these are performed --

(OVERTALK)

(INTERRUPTION IN TAPE)

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR: Yeah. That's not going to happen just by making (GARBLED).

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: No, of course not.

SAMUELS: And I thought that those were the questions that Carter (UNCLEAR).

SNEPP: He is addressing them. As a matter of fact --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: The great debate in the White House now is with priorities in the intelligence field.

BEAR: Uh, huh.

SNEPP: What do you -- where do you target your assets? And that question is again still being debated. And until it's resolved, until we determine whether or not we should focus all of our intelligence assets on Soviet military capabilities. Or whether or not we should divide them up a little bit. Focus some of them on military capabilities. But also on the Soviet (UNCLEAR). And also terrorist operations around the world.

And until that question's resolved, then we're still going to be sort of treading water.

SAMUELS: What about --

SNEPP: In terms of discussing where --

SAMUELS: What about --

SNEPP: The intelligence, you know, the apparatus and the community is going.

SAMUELS: What about from the point of view of someone on say one of the Congressional oversight committees.

Say the CIA wants to perform a certain kind of operations. And they propose the operation and the budget to -- to the committee.

SNEPP: Hmm.

SAMUELS: They outline it. Will the budget that's submitted to Congress accurately reflect the real cost of that operation. In other words, the CIA --

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: Works with all these other agencies. And so you budget \$20,000 of CIA personnel and resources. That sounds very reasonable. You're maybe, the information that we're going to get out of this operation maybe it's not --

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: Of national importance.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: But \$20,000 is a small investment. But then, when you factor out the real costs and other --

SNEPP: Well, intelligence is not a cost effective business(?) by the way. I mean, you can have (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE), and then you can have a defector who comes in and brings you the (GARBLED), and you're home free.

But the point is, going back to what I said earlier, these committees in -- in many ways are captive of the agencies they're supposed to be overseeing. Because they can only make decisions on budgets and other questions. On the basis of information given to them by these agencies. If the agencies don't give all the information to the committees (UNCLEAR).

HOOD: The Committees -- the Committees must work on a program basis. That you don't --

(INTERRUPTION IN TAPE -- VOICES GARBLED)

SAMUELS: What I'm saying is that in setting priorities for the oversight committee given the present way I understand the costs are factored (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE) because they don't have the real costs.

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: Looking at a total budget, they can't (GARBLED)

HOOD: They come pretty close to it I think. The Bureau of the Budget certainly can.

BEAR: You -- you can't -- you can't expect to make a listing of foreign(?) double agents --

HOOD: Right.

And give them so much a year. I mean, there's just no way to do that. And it's a problem that you don't have in the Department of Agriculture. Or you shouldn't. For example.

How do you deal with the -- with the public perception problem. Seriously. You know, the public perception of -- of the CIA (GARBLED).

SNEPP: You don't open up Langley headquarters to tourists.

(OVERTALK)



SNEPP: I mean, let's face it, that's pretty ridiculous.

BEAR: All right. I'm -- I'm -- right. Fair enough. I'm just thinking of -- of the fact that -- that you get divided up. Like on the Panama Canal Treaty issue, you know. On the one side are the people who say that the CIA, well, the CIA's sacrosanct. And if they say they need \$475 million then give it to them.

Like the Defense Department. If they need \$172 billion, our defense is worth anything.

And on the other side of the (UNCLEAR), you know, you can't give the world's most horrible conspirators anything. So that somewhere, you know, between those two.

HOOD: You -- you keep bringing up such negative terms.

BEAR: That's so. But anyhow, but you know in the middle of that somewhere, people have to begin to understand the good and the bad.

Now I, as I understand what you're saying, Dorothy. I don't want to, you know, misstate you, or misspeak you, as they(?) used to say --

SAMUELS: Uh, huh.

BEAR: But what you're saying is that (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE) of perception of the FBI, as you seem to understand it, there isn't much anybody can do. That that agency goes to the quit(?), or the quick.

SAMUELS: Well I -- I just have some questions given its past history whether it's the agency best equipped at this point to be the Federal -- THE Federal law enforcement agency.

You know, I do have some questions whether we (UNCLEAR).

SNEPP: Don't you think -- don't you think its image is changing with the passage of Hoover?

We're in a new era. A new era with the CIA. I think we owe both of these agencies a little time. And let's cool down this thing just a bit. Let's see what --

SAMUELS: Well --

SNEPP: The legislative charters say.

SAMUELS: One of the problems is -- is that I think at least in -- in regard to the FBI, is that --

SNEPP: They take advantage of you (GARBLED).

SAMUELS: Well, we've had problems. We've had -- recently one of the offices, the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility, which incidentally does not have (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE -- VOICE GARBLED), nor be independent.

They formed a task force which reported out findings about certain kinds of favors being performed by contractors on Hoovers's house, etc. etc.

There were similar findings in the case of the present Director, Clarence Kelley.

HOOD: Did they say what it was?

SAMUELS: Well, whatever it was --

HOOD: It was improper.

SAMUELS: It was improper. And I think the appearance of propriety is very, very important. If you want to --

BEAR: It is -- it is to me.

And we're going to have to pause for some public service announcements, and news. So stay with us. We'll be back on WABC --

(OVERTALK)

\*\*\*

BEAR: Larry Bear back again. This is Conference Call on WABC. And we are discussing the intelligence issue. Secret agency operations in an open society.

With Frank Snepp, who was with the CIA for some eight years, particularly in Saigon in Vietnam. From 69 to 71 and 1972 to 75. His book, Decent Interval, published by Random House, has caused a great deal of controversy because it's

highly critical of some of the CIA operations -- the Embassy operations -- and other operations in Vietnam, particularly with regard to the -- to the final days of the evacuation of Saigon.

William Hood is with us. He was with the OSS during World War II, and then immediately with the CIA (UNCLEAR) in 1947. He's been a specialist in Europe. Was in fact the Chief of Operations in Eastern Europe. And also held the position in the CIA as Executive Officer for Counterintelligence.

And my third guest is Dorothy Samuels, Executive Director of the Committee for Public Justice.

And I notice that the phone has been lighting up. And we'll take a couple of calls if you want to call in now. It's 541-8520. And the area code is 212. 541-8520.

And we were talking -- to clear the calls coming in -- we were talking about some of these operations giving rise to a certain picture of the intelligence agencies.

One of the things that -- that struck me, and I don't think we went into it to the extent that we should have. In -- in presenting the image of the agencies, of course, and maybe you can relate to this, Bill, has to with mail intercepts.

From 1952 to 73, it appears to me at least, and that(?) is to many others, that the mail intercept operation of the CIA was illegal. And you may want to comment on -- on that particular issue. And -- and what it has done inside(?) the agency.

HOOD: Well, it's certainly been very harmful to the -- to the image and way out of proportion to I think any value that -- that could conceivably have come from it.

I think the -- the activity was cleared, with various Attorney Generals, and I believe with at least one Postmaster General. That does not make it legal.

From my point of view, no government agency should be authorized to break the laws of the United States. And when they do, they're clearly in error, and should be brought firmly to task.

BEAR: Of course, the mail intercept from 52 to 73, there's really no excuse for it. Any more than there's any excuse for the -- for the abuse of civil rights that took place

in terms of testing new drugs on human organisms. But you know when you talk about it, you going to --

SNEPP: Wait a minute. You said no excuse for it. Now I want to comment too. I want to (UNCLEAR) to that one.

BEAR: All right.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: The men who launched the mail intercept program were not sinister men. They were patriots in their own way. And we're talking now of people like, well who were in the counterintelligence field, like (GARBLED) and whathave you.

These -- these are very dedicated, hard working people. And I just wanted to bring that forth, because what -- what you're suggesting is that they -- they had some dark motives in mind.

Now they were out to protect the United States in the way they thought was right.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: It raises -- it raises, perhaps (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE).

SNEPP: They tended -- they tended to exceed(?), go beyond the law, yes.

BEAR: Yes, they certainly did. But it does raise another issue, doesn't it. That some of the problems that we have to contend with. And (GARBLED) the problems that get presented by innocent(?) people. This is in a sense terribly difficult to deal with.

Really. You know, you get a -- you get a crook, or a known crook, or whatever, and -- and I don't mean to suggest that. But -- but -- but because they were not, but undoubtedly would do, as you said --

SNEPP: What they thought was right. That's right.

BEAR: Argues even more for --

SNEPP: Hmm.

BEAR: For some kind --

(INTERFERENCE ON TAPE -- VOICES GARBLED)

BEAR: That would on the one hand protect American citizens from that kind of activity which in the end does infringe on their civil rights, and at the same time allow people who are dedicated (UNCLEAR) in an area where we need the best people --

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: To do their job.

SAMUELS: Tell me if I'm wrong, but to do their job, most(?) good people at the agencies would prefer to have a pretty clear idea at this point of what we think and what we're really doing. And what their responsibilities -- to have it laid out for them.

HOOD: I think there's -- that's a very important point. Because if -- if the guidelines are fuzzy, then they're very prickly.

If everyone is working (GARBLED) while wearing boxing gloves, that's not going to work.

They'd have to know precisely what the guidelines are. And (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE) I don't think would be any -- any violations. Certainly in -- in domestic activities.

BEAR: Well, a lot of people who want to ask questions. (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE), we'll take them. The area code is 212, and the number is 541-8520.

Good morning.

WOMAN: Hello. (VOICE DROWNED OUT BY TELEPHONE STATIC)

BEAR: Good morning.

MAN: Good morning. I would like to bring up an important aspect (TELEPHONE STATIC) the countries involved. In my opinion, a war brings out the best qualities in a country, and the worst. And I feel that if you look at the questions on either side, disregarding the other side, either from the positive, disregarding the negative -- or the negative, disregarding the positive. You're highly myopic in your view.

Now, the war in Vietnam brought out the United States' greatest strengths in the fact that we could support a war for so many years. Because we supported the French

involvement in the war, I believe the latest figures were 80 per cent.

BEAR: I don't understand -- I don't understand where that -- where that shows our strength.

MAN: Well, it shows our strength in the fact that we could actually support a war --

BEAR: The fact is we couldn't, and we're still paying for it. I'm just talking about fiscally. I'm not talking about morals.

MAN: Fiscally too. We flushed away \$150 billion.

BEAR: But we could not afford it.

MAN: But we still had people riding around in new Cadillacs. We did in a sense have guns and butter. And then in another sense we had guns but no butter.

I'm saying, it affected us in both ways. It brought out our greatest organizational feats. And then again it brought out their corruption. (TELEPHONE STATIC -- VOICE GARBLED)

BEAR: What's -- what's the point that you want to make, or the question you want to ask?

MAN: Well, the point I want to make is that it brought out our intelligence community's greatest feats of collecting data. But it also brought about their poorest feats, (TELEPHONE STATIC) liabilities.

And that once they had that information, (GARBLED) difficulties in deciphering it and organizing it and utilizing it to its fullest abilities.

SNEPP: Uh.huh. That's exactly right. I agree with you, sir. And as a matter of fact, that's one of the reasons I wrote my book. I wanted the -- the agency to hold that mirror up to itself and realize there was much to be learned from the Vietnam experience.

They didn't seem to want to learn anything from it when I --

MAN: Yes.

SNEPP: I returned from Saigon.

(OVERTALK)

MAN: This is Mr. Snepp, right?

SNEPP: That's right.

MAN: I -- I've listened to you at great extent on talk shows, and all that.

SNEPP: Probably too much.

(OVERTALK)

MAN: No, I don't believe so. Because you were making a valid point. There's a lesson to be learned. And whether we want to accept that fact or not, okay, the question is still there.

If we ignore it --

SNEPP: Hmm.

MAN: We're condemning ourselves to a repetition of the war in Vietnam.

SNEPP: That's exactly right.

MAN: We're in an economic Vietnam right now. Let's face it.

SAMUELS: I hope domestically that that will be learned also. When we see how the FBI behaved during that time.

BEAR: I would hope so too. Thank you for the call. This is Conference Call. And thank you for waiting. Go ahead.

MAN: Mr. Bear?

BEAR: Yes, sir.

MAN: I'd like to know about the John F. Kennedy assassination. Many people say that the CIA and other intelligence agencies were responsible for his assassination.

I don't think this is right (TELEPHONE STATIC -- VOICE GARBLED). Why would our intelligence want to kill him? And I'd like to know what your guests' opinions on this would be.

BEAR: I was waiting for the call. Someone was bound to make it. And you're certainly entitled to do so. And let's see what comment we can get.

HOOD: Well, I agree with you, sir. The motivation for any American intelligence agency killing the President quite escapes me. It's -- it's just not in the -- in the books.

(TELEPHONE COMMENTS INAUDIBLE)

HOOD: There has not been in my view a scrap of evidence produced on any side to bear out that proposition.

BEAR: Okay. Thank you for the call.

(TELEPHONE COMMENTS INAUDIBLE)

BEAR: This is Conference Call. You're on the air.

WOMAN: Mr. Bear. Thank you.

BEAR: Go ahead.

WOMAN: Miss Samuels, and gentlemen.

BEAR: Uh, huh.

WOMAN: I would like to ask (TELEPHONE STATIC -- VOICE GARBLED) Vietnam War. Wasn't -- wasn't that unconstitutional, gentlemen?

BEAR: You mean the war?

WOMAN: I mean (UNCLEAR) Vietnam War. Congress did not declare war, did they?

SNEPP: Well as a matter of fact Congress gave the President sort of a carte blanche with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. And the President tended to go pretty far with that.

(TELEPHONE COMMENTS INAUDIBLE)

SNEPP: So the war was not technically -- technically it was not unconstitutional. The Tonkin Gulf resolution passed in 64 --

WOMAN: Uh, huh.

SNEPP: It said that the President could do certain things. And he gave it the broadest possible interpretation. Several Presidents did. And so we ended up in a very expensive war.

(TELEPHONE COMMENTS INAUDIBLE)



SNEPP: It wasn't unconstitutional.

BEAR: And -- and certainly it shows (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE) intelligence that it was not a war that was brought about by the CIA --

(TELEPHONE COMMENTS INAUDIBLE)

BEAR: Or the FBI.

SNEPP: That's right.

BEAR: Okay. I -- I think that's -- that's at least something (GARBLED) with some degree of -- I don't mean to be -- to be flip, by the way.

SAMUELS: Well what about the Tonkin Gulf, and what information was provided about it.

SNEPP: Well then we get in -- yes, then we get into another question.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Whether or not the whole thing was a set up. And whether or not the spy ships should have been there. But --

(INTERRUPTION IN TAPE)

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Exactly.

HOOD: Whether it was a (UNCLEAR) delay. The way the initial intelligence was handled.

SNEPP: Right.

HOOD: The fault being I gather that the intelligence was going directly into the White House.

SNEPP: That's right.

HOOD: Live. Without any evaluation.

SAMUELS: Hmm. And it --

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: It's my impression -- I think Frank would know --

SNEPP: Uh, huh.

HOOD: That the -- the ships were on direct line to the White House, with the President's intense interest in the war. And the -- it wasn't intelligence. It was news reporting really, that they were under attack. Which seems to be a very debatable question. After the fact.

SAMUELS: Well, that's right. And my understanding is maybe it was not the -- was -- was it the CIA that fed information about that attack (UNCLEAR) to(?) newsmen, to journalists. The layout that appeared in Life Magazine complete with photos. Were they supplied by the Defense Department? Or --

SNEPP: That I don't know.

HOOD: I don't know.

SNEPP: Well, certainly there was an orchestrated effort to put across the Administration's story on account of what had taken place.

BEAR: I'd like Bill to ask you. And you've had a long experience obviously with -- with intelligence. Beginning with the OSS, and then of course with the CIA -- then in different posts. Both in terms of your activities and your location.

Whether you feel that it is in fact valid to take a look now at the organizational structure of intelligence in this country with a view toward some -- some changes and some reforms.

And we're not -- I'm not referring so much now to the -- to the issue whether the CIA is corrupt and all that business. But (UNCLEAR) issue of overlap, of expense, of -- of the ability to handle an enormous amount of detail.

Do you think it's legitimate to look hard at -- at the present structure?

HOOD: Well, of course it's legitimate to look hard at it. And certainly there is and has been overlap and redundancy.

I think that -- that there's a tendency in the press and -- and others to assume that intelligence budgets are really just a matter of breaking open another box of money. Actually they're very tightly controlled. And a real discipline is enforced on -- on redundancy and -- and overlap. Come their budget time. And there just isn't money enough to go around. And I think the new setup will vastly improve that.

It's going to take some doing because basically American government isn't organized so the Director of one agency can tell the Director of another agency what he can spend. I mean that's -- that's -- it tampers with the command function.

But to the degree that can be done, and they're certainly off on the right foot I would say now, it will be an improvement.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Well I would dispute his -- his interpretation of recent history. I think probably that the intelligence budget was not carefully supervised, or overseen by -- by many people. And I think probably the various Senate committees and House committees back when, early sixties, late fifties, sort of gave their nod and said okay, just run with it. We don't want to look at the budget too closely.

And I think the agency, from what I know -- now this is again before my time. (UNCLEAR) I'm only speaking from what I have read and heard. That the agency did have a -- a -- pretty much of a free hand. With money. And the Director did have a contingency fund, which he(?) had used to support operations for which he didn't want to make any accounting.

Is this wrong, or not?

HOOD: Oh, I think so. The contingency fund was only to cover expenses that were not foreseen in the -- in the budget projection.

SNEPP: To say that another way. You could use those funds to support activities which were not reported to Congress in the first place.

HOOD: But were reported on an ongoing basis. There's no money in the agency that I'm aware of that can be used by the agency without reference --

SNEPP: I thought that was the whole purpose of the contingency --

(OVERTALK)

HOOD: That's(?) not my impression.

BEAR: Okay Let's take a look at this, then. Another question. You were involved, Bill, with a lot of counterespionage activities. And some of them were very delicate indeed I'm sure.

Now when you talk about oversight, we're going beyond, well, this is not beyond budget (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE). But we're getting into a report of activities to an oversight committee, or committees.

And one of the things about Congress that worries me all the time, Frank, is that Congressmen, you know, playing with TV cameras, and Congressmen playing with (UNCLEAR).

SNEPP: Uh,huh.

BEAR: Congressmen play all too much. One way or another. And so I'm -- I'm concerned in any event, you know, with the validity of an -- of an oversight committee that's -- that's composed unfortunately at least in part (UNCLEAR) of people who are playing to the gallery. But, that hasn't(?) always led to you know the kind of concerns that you think about (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE).

SAMUELS: Uh,huh.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: But -- but the issue still comes down to how does an oversight committee deal with the kind of activities, legitimate now, I'm not talking about illegitimate. Legitimate activities, that demand secrecy. But how much can you say that helps determine the budget. How much can you say that helps determine questions like should the agency be involved (UNCLEAR) legality --

SNEPP: Hmmm.

BEAR: But should the agency be involved in all these areas at the same time, or should they not. And how --

(OVERTALK)

SAMUELS: And how can they determine -- what -- will they have enough information to determine whether an activity is in fact a legitimate or illegitimate activity.

HOOD: Yes. First thing I think is they get all the

information they ask for. The one exception probably being the identities of specific agents.

I know of no question the agency would not respond to posed by the -- a review committee, oversight committee.

SNEPP: Well I think again we're sort of speaking prematurely because the oversight committees are only beginning to function.

But, look, look at the case of the Church Committee. The Church Committee wanted to look into several test cases, if the agency had done right or wrong overseas. And the agency had offered six test cases. One was Chile. And a deal was made. If they -- the agency gave the committee everything there was on Chile, then the other six test cases wouldn't even be made public. And they weren't. So the agency won a round.

The negotiations were carried on in such a way. The committee carried -- was persuaded to look at the Chilean case, and not at anything else. So the agency won a tactical -- a tactical round.

SAMUELS: (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE) with national security.

SNEPP: Well, there're a lot of -- a lot of problems in it. But in any event, they outmaneuvered -- the agency outmaneuvered the committee, the Church Committee, in -- in its original direction.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Which was to uncover, oh, plots that went way beyond what was necessary, I suppose, you could put it that way.

HOOD: I don't put that down to outmaneuvering them. So far as it's true. I'm -- I'm not -- I'm not aware of that. I -- I testified before the Church Committee, and certainly the form was, answer whatever questions you're asked.

SNEPP: Hmm.

HOOD: Fully and completely.

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: To what extent -- in that -- were the -- were the -- with the simple (UNCLEAR) with the exception of naming names,

you were able to answer all questions with regard to any intricate operations that were being performed, or had been performed, in counterintelligence in Eastern Europe, and so forth.

HOOD: Well I don't think they -- they addressed it on an ad hominum basis. Specific operations. They were looking for -- for real trouble areas.

And you notice that all the scandal and -- that has affected the agency --very little of it has concerned espionage. Or sabotage for that matter. It all comes out in the covert action area. When was the last espionage scandal? When was the last time a spy really hit -- hit the news on the front page.

SNEPP: Well, very recently, as a matter of fact. There's a -- I can't remember the occasion exactly. It was about a fellow who was working for military intelligence recently.

Who had been -- who had blown a particular operation and was allowed to go scott free. It appeared in the papers in the past few days. And I'm sorry I can't remember the details of the case.

HOOD: The guy who blew it was allowed to go scott free?

SNEPP: That's right. For some political(?) reason.

(INTERRUPTION IN TAPE)

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: Well, I think we're quibbling --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: We're quibbling over semantics. I want to go back to this business. Because I think you're dancing around the point here. I don't want to get into a long debate over it.

But, look. The agency has several sets of files on all cases. One is the soft file. And one is the hard file. Now the soft file will contain a lot of data that may not be verifiable. And -- but may carry a case way down the road.

Now when the Senate, or the House, asks for a file from the agency --and if the agency is forthcoming, it will hand over the hard file. But the real nitty gritty, the juicy stuff, is never handed over.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: I know (GARBLED) it's not very -- this is not untrue because I know that I have a soft file and a hard file. So under the Freedom of Information Act I can apply for the hard file, but I'll never get the soft one.

HOOD: I'd say that (UNCLEAR) I wouldn't say that's untrue. I was going to say that I -- my experience of a soft file is a working file.

SNEPP: Yes. I mean we're -- we're speaking euphemistically -- we're speaking euphemistically again.

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: The hard file is the one which in fact has the real operational details in it.

(INTERRUPTION IN TAPE)

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: We do.

HOOD: I think that -- that the -- the agent file is the file. And if somebody's going to leave it on his desk --

SNEPP: You mean to say --

HOOD: He has odds and ends, or pieces, on the desk. But --

SNEPP: You mean to say if you were looking into, say, the agency's involvement in Angola, the hard files would tell us all that Congress needed to know? I'm talking about in a closed session.

HOOD: Well I think (UNCLEAR). It's not one file.

SNEPP: How would you know if you were -- if you were on the committee, how would you know? If you were getting all their files. You wouldn't know. See, that's the problem. You would only know as much as the agency would tell you.

HOOD: If -- if you assume that --

(OVERTALK)

(INTERRUPTION IN TAPE)

BEAR: You know, the issue -- the issue it -- it seems to me is not an issue of good faith or bad faith. Granted, yeah, there may be people in the CIA or the FBI or the Supreme Court, or anyplace, you know, who (GARBLED).

(OVERTALK)

BEAR: Yeah. It's not a question of bad faith at all. It's -- I don't think. I mean -- but -- but it's a question of someone sitting up there and for example and saying, who is part of the establishment, and I don't care if it's the CIA or the Department of Labor. (UNCLEAR) more important I think here. (UNCLEAR) in the best interests of the country, and (INTERFERENCE ON TAPE) decisions about what's in the best interests of the country. And I'm not being sarcastic, either.

But in their (GARBLED), you know, the best interests would dictate a hard file, a soft file, or... (OVERTALK)

BEAR: And that's the way it would go. And there's just no way to get behind it.

SNEPP: There's a marvelous story about Director Colby, who was about to go before one of the committees and testify that the agency was not involved extensively in mail -- the mail opening campaign.

And he was running out to his car, about to jump in the car, and somebody from counterintelligence section came running up and said, sir, we just found this -- this file at the bottom of an old safe somewhere. It indicates we are very extensively involved in --

(OVERTALK)

SNEPP: In this activity. All this by way of suggesting that sometimes even the Director doesn't --

SAMUELS: (INTERRUPTION IN TAPE -- VOICE GARBLED) has not been involved in certain kinds of illegal activities since 1966 --

SNEPP: Yes.

SMAUELS: And formed a very high level task force to check this out with all the Bureaus, and then we find that the activities were going on at least through 73. You know.

(OVERTALK)



BEAR: .. we're going to be here for three hours. But (UNCLEAR) that you can. And try and see for yourself what the problems do seem to be. And try and see what they aren't.

Don't get caught up, you know, any more than you have to in -- in journalistic excesses and communication--excesses. Or even proponents' excesses. Pro CIA. Anti CIA. (UNCLEAR). These are very serious issues. And they do relate to civil liberties. And they do relate to security. In a very real sense.

And -- and, it just seems to me that when the politicians begin to talk, and the journalists begin to get excited, you ought to have some data. That you can think about, and -- and draw some conclusions on. And that, it seems to me is terribly important.

I want to thank my guests who are with me this evening. Frank Snepp and William Hood and Dorothy Samuels. For being here. Discussing the intelligence issue, secret agency operations in an open society.

I have to say of course that the opinions expressed in this show are not necessarily those of WABC Radio or the American Broadcasting Company, Incorporated.

I know that we did have some trouble with the lines tonight. Which I'm sorry. And some of you may still (UNCLEAR) have a line. And I wish we could take more calls. There's just no time for it.

One of the things I'd like to do is -- it doesn't solve the problem, right. Or settle it. But I'd like to read a short quote from Sir William Stevenson, who was in charge of British Security Coordination. It comes from a book entitled A Man Called Intrepid.

And he says, and I quote, "Among the increasingly intricate arsenals across the world, intelligence is an essential weapon, perhaps the most important. But it is, being secret, the most dangerous. Safeguards to protect and prevent its abuse must be devised and revised and rigidly applied. But, as in all enterprise, the character and wisdom of those to whom it is entrusted will be decisive. In the integrity of that guardianship lies the hope of free people to endure and prevail."

I'm Larry Bear. And I thank you for being with us.

Good night.