

Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Director of Central Intelligence  
National Press Club  
Washington, D. C.  
Wednesday, 25 October 1978

PROTECTING SECRETS IN A FREE SOCIETY

In the nineteen months that I have been Director of Central Intelligence, I have come into the habit of screening the press clips first thing every morning. I almost hold my breath until I know if today's disclosures include some of our sensitive sources of intelligence. Sometimes it comes out through a leak, sometimes from the forced testimony of one of our officers in court and sometimes from the subpoena of a document or notes. As a result, I have almost come to think of you in the media and we in intelligence as being adversaries. In recent months, however, I find that we are really in the same plight together. As often as not, the press clips disclose that it is you, the media who are being taken into court and forced to defend the secrecy of your sources or it is you who are receiving the subpoenas. At least if I understand it, the essence of the court cases involving Mr. Farber, the Stanford Daily and others is whether preserving the confidentiality of a newsman's sources is essential to meeting his obligations and to the continued success of your profession.

Let me assure you that if this is anything of a problem to you, the danger of disclosing sources is the number one threat to our American intelligence community today. The focus of the media with respect to intelligence for almost four years now has been on actual and alleged abuses of the past. I sincerely believe the threat to our country of excesses in intelligence operations is far less today than any time in our history. The real danger is that we will be unable to conduct necessary operations because of the risk that they would be disclosed. Let me give you some examples of why I say this.

First, allied intelligence services are losing confidence that we can keep a secret. We suspect that some are holding back information. One recently withdrew a proposal for a joint covert action which would have been beneficial to both nations. It did so when reminded that I must notify eight committees of the Congress of every covert action. They could not imagine that the plan would not leak.

Beyond this, agents overseas who risk their lives to support our country even though they are not even citizens of it ask, "When will my name appear in your press?" This is not a transient problem; it is a trend that could undermine our human intelligence capabilities for a decade or

more. In this kind of a climate there simply may be fewer volunteers to be sources for us in the future.

Finally, with respect to the dangers of a lack of secrecy too many leaks can lead to intelligence by timidity. A timid reporter will never land the big story. A timid intelligence officer will not take the risks which are a part of his work if he must add the high probability that his sources will be exposed in our media. All three of these examples are part of the same fundamental question of question of protection of sources, and are not at all different from the problem which you face.

I do not know what your profession is doing about this problem we have in common. I would like to describe our response thus far. First, we recognize that a lot of the problem is right on our own doorstep. Sometimes it is our own people who provide the leaks. Sometimes it is former employees. Sometimes we are vulnerable to deliberate espionage. Accordingly, we can and are tightening our internal security procedures. You can always tighten up, but it is a matter of compromise between having such tight controls that we cannot do our job with reasonable efficiency and striving so much for efficiency that we do not properly control our secrets. The tables today are perhaps tilted a bit too much in the direction of

efficiency. I am working to turn them back and I hope that will make it more difficult for you to obtain our secrets.

We are also doing things externally. We have a policy of greater openness. My presence here is evidence of my personal commitment to keep the public better informed by being more open about intelligence activities where and when that is possible. How will openness help us preserve secrets? Well, simply by reducing the excessive corpus of secrets that now exists within our government. Today so much information is unnecessarily classified that we have lost respect for the classified label. By making as much as possible available to the public, we reduce the amount that is kept secret. In turn this makes it easier to engender respect for that which remains classified.

It takes more than openness, however, to preserve secrets. Basically there must be some renewed acknowledgment in the media and in the public that secrecy is legitimate. Clearly there is a very fine line which we must tread. Too much secrecy can impede justice or staunch the flow of information within our society. Too little secrecy can give away data that is of vital importance to our nation. It is a delicate balance between a government that serves

its people poorly because it does not keep them informed and one that serves them poorly because it does not maintain necessary secrets. No government, no business, no newspaper, no private individual can conduct his life or business without some element of secrecy. Newsmen feel that the release of their notes even to prosecute a charge of murder would endanger an obligation to individuals who help them and would set a precedent adversely affecting the future of their profession. So, too, do we in the field of intelligence react almost daily. But, there is one difference between our attitudes and obligations. Your case rests upon an interpretation of the Constitution which today is being seriously challenged. My obligation rests upon a law--the National Security Act of 1947 which requires that the Director of Central Intelligence in his person "shall be responsible for protecting our sources and methods of collecting intelligence from unauthorized disclosure." I must comply to the best of my ability and conscience.

Still another difference in your perspective and mine is that protecting sources is only one of my problems of secrecy. It has become very suspect these days to even refer to withholding information in the name of national security. Abuse of this principle

in the past, however, does not make it invalid today. Quite simply, there is information which it is not in the national interest to disclose. We cannot negotiate a SALT treaty if we cannot maintain the privacy of our negotiating position. We cannot afford to develop expensive weapons systems or devices for collecting intelligence and then tell those against whom we might have to employ them what their precise characteristics are.

Because, however, we in the world of intelligence are in the risk-taking business, and because there are dangers to our national fabric from the improper use of the intelligence process, clearly there must be special checks on us. I believe that there are such checks today and that the public can be more confident today than ever before that the abuses of the past will not reoccur. Out of the crucible of the past four years of public criticism, a whole new regimen of controls and checks has been constructed. These begin with the policy of greater openness that I have cited to you.

Beyond this, we have established a thorough system of control mechanisms to govern our day-by-day activities. These start with two basic guidelines which are the framework within which all intelligence professionals now work. The first of these is that espionage must be considered an extraordinary remedy. Clandestine means

of gathering information should never be utilized when the same information might be available openly. The second guideline is that actions which we take in secret must be defensible, in principle, in public. Clearly, we cannot lay out publicly all the details of each instance of espionage which we undertake, but we can in public defend the general classes of actions we utilize.

Beyond these guidelines, we have also established a series of prohibitions. Some activities, such as assassination, are so repugnant to our national standards as to warrant prohibition without exception. In some cases, however, total prohibition is a bit too rigid a position. Instead, we have injunctions which generally prohibit certain activities unless there is a specific authorization for them. This is analogous to law enforcement procedures in common use in our country. We all recognize that there is an injunction against a law enforcement agency invading the privacy of our homes, except with the specific authorization of a search warrant. We too, in intelligence are establishing similar procedures, sometimes with warrants, sometimes with other provisions for approval. The utilization of members of the US media for intelligence purposes is one example. This is proscribed unless I personally make the exception.

The most significant change in American intelligence in recent years, however, and one that is truly revolutionary is the introduction of effective external oversight from both the executive and legislative branches. This oversight is intended to check on how the guidelines, prohibitions and injunctions are being carried out, and to relate the nature of our intelligence activities to the attitudes and mores of the country as a whole.

An Intelligence Oversight Board has been functioning for almost three years. Composed of three members from outside the government, presently former Senator Gore, former Governor Scranton, and Mr. Thomas Farmer, it reviews Intelligence Community activities and serves as a place where anyone can report activities they suspect may be illegal or improper. The Board reports its findings directly to the President.

Oversight committees have been in place in Congress for two years in the case of the Senate, and a little over one year in the House. In both instances the relationship between the Select Committees on Intelligence and the Intelligence Community has been one of cooperation and help, but at the same time definitely one of oversight and supervision. There is no question that we are answerable to these committees.



Many in the Intelligence Community have come to recognize the positive values for us in the oversight process. Ultimate accountability is essential to responsible action. When the stakes are high, when patriotism<sup>is</sup> a driving force and when risks must be taken, it is good to have the element of accountability hanging over us. Oversight is forcing us to be judicious, to think out both the risks and benefits of what we propose to do.

The Congressional Oversight Committees are now in the process of legislating guidelines, prohibitions, and injunctions and further refining the oversight procedures themselves in what will be known as Charters for the Intelligence Community. I strongly support this undertaking. In the first place it will provide the legal foundation for our activities. In the second place, it will provide guidance so that the US intelligence officer on the street in a foreign country and those of us in the headquarters will have a better idea of what is expected, what may not be done and what, if done, must be justified convincingly to our overseers.

On top of all these governmental checks and controls, we also, of course, view you, the media, as another important

oversight mechanism in reassuring the public and in preventing abuse. My plea to you, however, is to recognize the similarity of our plights. We in intelligence are professionals dedicated to secrecy who are constantly having to defend ourselves against being pressed into excessive openness. You are professionals dedicated to openness who are now facing great pressures to dispense with your secrets. I hope that you will recognize that when we balk, for instance, at disclosing all the secrets necessary to prosecute a case in court, we do not do so in an arbitrary manner. We study these cases very carefully. Moreover, we must be prepared to justify our positions not only to the Attorney General but to our oversight committees. Yet, it is right for you to question these judgments, but please bear in mind that your oversight is frequently hampered by only having part of the picture. You are at a severe disadvantage compared with our Intelligence Oversight Board and our Congressional committees since we cannot share our secrets with you. This, indeed, places you in a difficult position. With data that is incomplete, you must be concerned about misleading the public or making disclosures injurious to the national interest. You must constantly balance those dangers with your obligation to keep Americans well informed and to uncover malfeasance in government where it exists.

Another area of delicate responsibility for you is in judging the validity of so-called "whistleblowers" who come to you with tales of impropriety or inefficiency. Many of these appear to have only the most altruistic motives, and probably bring reassurances that what they are disclosing is not justifiably secret. Let me suggest that what is legitimately secret or sensitive is not always obvious on its face, especially to former officials who were third or fourth echelon at best and who were never in a position to assess all of the equities involved. The potential in these situations for abuse of you and your role is immense. What better way to promote a forthcoming book than to titillate the public through encouraging you to issue samples of unauthorized revelations. How many so-called "whistleblowers" go through the oversight mechanisms that I have described where abuses and undue secrecy can be questioned without compromising legitimate secrets? Frankly, I have yet to see a whistleblower use these relief valves fully before going to the court of last resort--you, the public press. I am suspicious as to their motivation and suggest that you might well be also. Further, when every elected or appointed public official is suspect and every

renegade whistleblower is automatically accepted as a hero; when there is greater emphasis on criticizing and tearing down our society than on building it up, I suggest that we are heading for real trouble.

I do not envy you the difficult job of conducting oversight and assessing the validity of your sources without access to all of the information you need; or of making the choices which you face in steering a course between the Syclla of undue emphasis on criticism and the Charybdis of taking too much on face value; or of deciding whether the national interest is better served by printing a secret or by withholding it.

I do not, however, accept the thesis sometimes preferred that your responsibilities leave you no choice but to print whatever you receive; or that the possibility that someone else will print it anyway makes the question moot. Nor do I agree that if you possess some information it can be assumed that the KGB or other foreign intelligence services have it too. But, in the end, those of us in government who are involved in protecting secrets are not the ones to pass judgment on the actual choices you make. It is the public who should and will.

The recent court decisions on Farber and such may indicate that neither the public nor the courts agree with some of the premises under which you have traditionally labored. Your unfettered right to print and disclose is clearly being questioned; just as has our indiscriminate right to classify. Accordingly, we both, it seems to me are in the midst of a reassessment of our roles and the way we carry them out.

The Intelligence Community has been about this task for several years now. I suggest that there is something to be learned from our experience. I would not suggest how you ought to resolve these issues as they affect your ability to play your role. From my point of view, ~~through~~, as this country's chief intelligence officer, what I expect from the nation's media is a greater understanding of the commonality of our problem of protecting sources; less suspicion and reliance on inferences and more quest for facts, especially about alleged improprieties; fewer headlines about intelligence abuses of 25 years ago played as though they were new revelations and more concern for today; and more discretion as to what is relevant to our society's needs and what is pure sensation. Yet I again acknowledge that it is by no means easy for you to strike these balances precisely when you have only partial information. In the final analysis we both serve the same master and will be

14

judged by the same jury--the public of the United States. Within the framework of our uneasy relationship, I believe there is room for mutual respect and for us to work closer together rather than farther apart. A greater degree of communication and perhaps even trust will benefit us both and will permit us jointly to serve that American people more effectively.

- end -

Q47 NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

[Applause]

AUKOFER: Almost makes some of us want to sign up.

[Laughter]

AUKOFER: ...The first questioner alludes to your reference to keeping secrets in court cases, and notes that two federal court cases were stopped yesterday because of secret information, would like to know what the CIA's policy is on criminal trials that involve national security interests when keeping those secrets may mean that people like ITT executives can't be prosecuted.

ADMIRAL TURNER: My policy is that I bear a legal responsibility to advise the Attorney General if the release of documents or testimony necessary for prosecution will in my opinion endanger the national interest. Clearly, this is a subjective judgment in each opinion. And in each case I try to provide my view on how serious the damage would be. I do not claim the privilege of withholding anything from the courts. I claim the privilege only of insuring that those who make the release have had the opportunity to balance the benefits of prosecution with the benefits -- or the detriments, rather, of revelation. And I see nothing different in that than in claiming privilege for Mr. Farber's notes in a case of murder trials.

[Applause]

AUKOFER: This question relates to classification, in that you mentioned overclassification. The questioner would like to know, is it safe for an individual to overclassify rather than to underclassify, sort of to save his own neck? And how important is this problem?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, it's safer to overclassify than underclassify.

To tell you a sea story. A few years ago I had what I thought was a brilliant idea. I forwarded it through channels for how the Navy could do something of great importance. When I looked at it I said, "You know, that really, really isn't classified." So I sent it forward in unclassified channels. A couple of days later, it appeared in the Norfolk newspapers, and the next day the Washington newspapers had 17 congressmen complaining about this horrendous idea, which I believed was great and could have been sold to them if it had come through the proper channels. But because I couldn't hold anybody accountable for this unclassified piece, I got burned by underclassifying.

But it is a serious problem. The new presidential directive on classification puts strictures against over classification. It's something that is endemic, it's something that we have to each work at each day, and it just takes repeated effort and emphasis.

As recently as two hours ago, I wrote a note to one of my subordinates, who had written me and said, "We shouldn't declassify this. There's not enough pressure on us."

I said, "That is not the policy. The question is, is it reasonably declassified without hurting the national interest? If it is, let's go."

AUKOFER: We have several questions about wiretapping. And, somehow, I don't expect much of an answer, but...

[Laughter]

AUKOFER: How many -- there are two: Are you now or have you wiretapped any law firms in this country? And how many taps, if any, does the CIA have in operation in news bureaus, outside and inside this country?

ADMIRAL TURNER: At the risk of destroying my friendship with a friend who destroys me on the tennis courts regularly, I have to say that any wiretaps in this country are out of my province.

[Applause]



ADMIRAL TURNER: And if I knew, I wouldn't tell you the answer to those questions either.

[Laughter]

AUKOFER: That's kind of what I figured.

This questioner asks: Could you please comment on the short-range benefits of the restoration of American bases and communication centers in Turkey?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I'd like to expand on that question, because my last military assignment was commander of the southern flank of NATO, including Turkey; and I think the long-term benefits of this restoration of better relations between our countries is very, very important to us, as well as to Turkey and to NATO. Turkey is that eastern anchor of the NATO alliance, a most stalwart country in defense of freedom and a country in a geographical location of tremendous importance.

In the short term, there is no question that the return to operation of our intelligence-collection bases in Turkey is very valuable to us. In the years that we did not have those facilities, we were able to route around and otherwise get some of the information from other sources. You never can completely replace something as valuable as those Turkish bases, and so we had a very definite net loss. And the routing around is a Peter-and-Paul situation, where, yes, you may pick up something that used to be done in Turkey by some other means, but you probably then lose something else that you were doing; the priorities just have to shift down.

I can't quantify it for you, but I'm very, very happy that this turn of events has taken place.

AUKOFER: We have a number of questions on Nicholas George Shadrin (?), the Soviet defector who disappeared in Vienna while on a CIA mission. One questioner asks: Can you give us any assurance that he is not now in CIA custody? Another questioner would like to know if he is alive and living in Australia.

ADMIRAL TURNER: No, he is not in CIA custody. I do not know if he is alive. I do not know if he is in Australia. I have put a good amount of time onto the Shadrin case in my brief tenure in this job, and I find no evidence of foul play on the part of any American authorities, nor do I have any conclusive evidence or good clues as to just where Shadrin is. I wish I did.

AUKOFER: Now that we've opened the Australia connection, the questioner says: In 1977 the Senate Select Com-

mittee on Intelligence asked the CIA for a report on its activities in Australia. Will this report ever be made public? Can you give us an assurance that the CIA is not involved in activities designed to influence Australian politics and organized labor activities?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I hope the report will not be made public because I think there is classified information in it. It is up to the Congress to decide whether their reports are released.

Yes, I can give total assurance we are not in any way trying to influence internal Australian labor or other activities.

AUKOFER: In that connection, what is the justification, as a general matter, for interference in the internal political affairs in other countries?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, now we are getting into the murky waters of covert political action, as opposed to intelligence. Intelligence is the collecting of information and its evaluation. Covert political action is the effort to influence events in foreign countries without the influencer being known. Political action is not an intelligence activity, but, since 1947, whenever this country has authorized political action, it has been assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency to carry out.

I would say to you that, in my view, there is less need and usefulness for covert political action today than there was at times in the past, at times when it has been very successful on behalf of our country.

There are times, like when you want to frustrate a terrorist group, that it is useful to be able to infiltrate somebody into it and get them to influence the course of events in that group, where if they knew it was the United States doing that, it would be use -- it would be meaningless, it wouldn't be useful at all.

And so let's not kid ourselves. All of our diplomacy, all of our economic power and pressure, all of our military threat is here to influence other countries, to make sure they don't do things inimical to us. Covert political action is another tool in that quiver of arrows.

As I say, it is less useful and applicable today, and particularly, as I mentioned in my prepared remarks, because of the danger of exposure of it. But it is something that I sincerely believe we must retain the full panoply of potential for. One does not know what 1985 or 1990 may bring.

[Applause]

AUKOFER: In that connection, do you anticipate a continuing shift to greater reliance upon electronic intelligence?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes and no. Over the past decade and a half, the capabilities of electronic and photographic reconnaissance techniques have expanded remarkably. This is part of the great strength of our country, in its marvelous technical expertise and its ability to translate that expertise into practical application. So today we are almost surfeited with information derived from what we call these technical intelligence-collection sources, and they become more capable at all times.

But when you look at this situation in its broad aspects, you must appreciate that, as a generalization, what you obtain from a photograph or a signals-intercept generally tells you about something that happened some time in the past. And as soon as I tell this to a policymaker, he looks me in the eye and says, "Stan, why did it happen, and what's going to happen next?" And there is where the human intelligence activity comes in. It is the forte of the spy to divine, to find, to learn what other people's intentions, attitudes, plans, policies are.

And so, my view is, yes, electronic intelligence is increasing, because the technical capabilities are continuing to increase; but, no, it is not relatively more important, because as you gain more technical information, you must have more human information to complement it.

And, therefore, our emphasis is to have a balanced approach in this. And within last year, I have requested and the President has directed the establishment, under Lieutenant General Frank Kamm (?), who was introduced to you here, something called a National Intelligence Tasking Center. And by that I mean tasking technical intelligence, human intelligence, and making it work as a team.

That is what is different today. We have increased emphasis on the importance of bringing together, in teamwork, all of the collection elements, be they technical or human.

AUKOFER: Occasionally we get a question that's based on something I haven't heard about, but that's not important. The questioner would like to know whether there's any truth to the report that Soviet leader Brezhnev died in January and a lookalike is substituting for him.

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: If he has, he's fooled me.

AUKOFER: This questioner would like to know whether the CIA is looking for violations of the arms embargo to South Africa, and, if so, whether it's found any.

ADMIRAL TURNER: Surely it is our responsibility to understand the military posture of countries around the world that are of concern to us, and that would include trying to understand what the South Africans' capability is to obtain and manufacture and handle their weapon systems. But I am not in the business of policing the laws of this country and determining if Firm X or Y is avoiding a legal sanction against sending arms to South Africa. That's over in the law enforcement department.

AUKOFER: This questioner would like to know how the intelligence community will be able to demonstrate to the American public and the Congress that it can reliably verify the provisions of the pending SALT II treaty.

ADMIRAL TURNER: This is one of our great challenges in the months ahead, if a treaty is signed soon. And I'll be frank with you. I doubt that I will be able to make a persuasive explanation of the degree to which we can verify in the public forum, for the reasons we've been discussing so much today. But I am confident that I can give a succinct, clear statement of what those capabilities are and what they are not to the Congress.

And I would also like to give you this assurance: that as the SALT negotiations have proceeded, each term, each proposal made by the Soviets or made by ourselves has come to us in the intelligence community for scrutiny. And for each one, I have gone back and said, "This is the potential for verification that we see, with our intelligence sources. This is how we think that capability may increase or decrease over the years ahead. And therefore, in a sense, this is the risk you are taking if you accept this provision. And here are some suggestions for how you might write that differently that would help us better verify it."

So I can assure you I am convinced that those who make the decisions on what we should offer and what we should accept are well possessed of the information that I have, in its greatest detail, about how well we could verify those provisions.

AUKOFER: An equal opportunity question. The questioner would like to know, are there many female citizens in the United States acting as spies? And would you recommend spying as a good profession for women?

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: Definitely.

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: In fact, I must admit to the ladies that we have been remiss in the Central Intelligence Agency in getting enough women into the clandestine side of our business. And therefore there is greater opportunity for them, proportionally, than for males, because we are anxious to redress that shortcoming.

There are a few instances in which being in the clandestine business as a lady is not satisfactory. There are some countries where you just can't walk out on the street, as a lady, and not be noticed as being unusual, because of their culture and their society.

But there are, in my opinion, as many other instances in which a lady might be even preferable to a man in doing the kind of clandestine work that we have to do.

So the opportunities are there. We are stressing it in our recruiting. We are getting wonderful applicants from young ladies in our country, and we're just anxious for any more. And if whoever wrote the question will send me an address, we'll get you a recruiter out there right away.

[Laughter]

AUKOFER: This questioner refers to President Carter's austerity program, announced yesterday, about reduction of federal employees; wants to know whether this will affect your operating capacity and will we get a subpar intelligence program because of this, and do you propose to request relief from President Carter's edict?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't believe, at this time, it will. But I must confess to you that we have to wait and get the interpretations, the exact rulings from the Office of Management and Budget, in particular, as to how the President's directive is to be carried out. But at this point, in the clandestine service we have just been talking about, we are overstrength to where we expect to be at the end of this fiscal year.

You will recall that, with some controversy, a year ago next week I ordered a 820-position reduction in our clandestine service. We're still in the process of executing that. So we have some slack here. If the employment levels go down, it won't hurt us.

Let me explain to you too, in response to the pre -- in connection with the previous question about balance between elec-

tronic and human intelligence collection, that this 820 reduction was by no means indicated -- or, intended to reflect a change of emphasis. It was simply a recognition of a very long-standing fact: that we were overstaffed; and that, to me, was very inimical to the long-term interests of our country and of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We have outstanding young people who have come in, even during the intensity of criticism of the CIA. And if I am going to challenge them and inspire them to stay in this organization and be the backbone of it in 10, 15, 20 years, we must challenge them today with a full and meaningful job. And if we're overstaffed and they are underutilized and oversupervised, we'll never make it.

AUKOFER: We have several questions on the Freedom of Information Act: How does it affect the operations of the CIA? Do you see any prospect of repealing the Freedom of Information Act, and would you like to?

ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I would not like to. I think the Freedom of Information Act has provided a very valuable service to our country. It consumes, however, over 100 man-years of Central Intelligence employee time, and much, much of that is wasted. We have so few requests that we can fulfill, with respect to the number that come in, because of the classification point of view, that we spin our wheels having to be conscientious and review document after document, and turning them down.

We hope there will be some relief in the Congress from the procedures which are required here.

We have -- Jack Blake, our Assistant -- Deputy Director for Administration is sitting down here.

Jack, how many man-years did we consume with just fulfilling Mr. Agee's requests alone?

JACK BLAKE: About nine man-years so far, sir.

ADMIRAL TURNER: We've consumed nine man-years just responding to one American -- I hate to call him an American -- citizen's request, one person.

And every time we issue anything or we have anything appear in the press, we get requests from certain organizations in this town, one after the other; and we have to go through these in infinite detail.

It just is an unreasonable situation and cost to the taxpayer today. And I think it can be mitigated by some modification. But I think the basic principal of giving the public

access to things that need not be classified is a very good one.

AUKOFER: Admiral Turner, we thank you very much for appearing here today, and we have for your our National Press Club certificate of appreciation and a National Press Club tie.

And I have one final question for you, asked of you in your dual capacity of Director of Central Intelligence and as a former football player for the U.S. Naval Academy. The Washington Redskins won their first game, it was said, because they had a game plan report from the other team. Now that they've lost two in a row, what can the CIA do to help them get game plans in the future?

[Laughter and applause]

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I'd like to help the Redskins in the worst way, but the only thing I can do is to quote my football mentor, the man who meant a great deal to me in my life, who's sitting right in front of me here, E.E. "Rip" Miller of the Naval Academy coaching staff. And I still remember the day when after three tries from our six-inch line Notre Dame failed to cross the goal line, the whistle blew and the game ended. We all went running into the locker room, jumping and shouting. And as we got in there Rip looked at us and said, "Gentlemen, long after those deeds have been forgotten, the score will be remembered. You tied."

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you.

[Applause]